Williams v. GM Spring Hill Manufacturing Co. et al
Filing
48
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants motion to dismiss be granted and the complaint against these Defendants dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 8/23/2016. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT COLUMBIA
JACQUELYN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff
v.
GM SPRING HILL MANUFACTURING
CO., et al.,
Defendants
TO:
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No. 1:15-0081
Chief Judge Sharp/Bryant
Jury Demand
THE HONORABLE KEVIN H. SHARP
CHIEF JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendants General Motors LLC (“GM”) (incorrectly named
in the complaint as “GM Spring Hill Manufacturing Co.”, Steve
Hunter, Nancy Gragg (incorrectly named in the complaint as Nancy
“Gregg”), and Ricky Holmes have filed their motion to dismiss
(Docket Entry No. 26) to which Plaintiff Williams has responded in
opposition (Docket Entry No. 28). Defendants have filed a reply
(Docket Entry No. 37) and Plaintiff has filed a “second reply”
(Docket Entry No. 45).
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Jacquelyn Williams, who is proceeding pro se,
has filed her complaint alleging employment discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et
seq. Specifically, Williams alleges that from January through
September 2014, Defendants committed multiple acts of employment
discrimination based upon Plaintiff’s race and color that amounted
to harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation, including
termination
of
her
employment.
Plaintiff’s
employer,
GM,
and
individual Defendants Gragg, Holmes, and Hunter have filed their
motion to dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must
view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). This requirement of
accepting the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations does not
apply to legal conclusions, however, even where such conclusions
are couched as factual allegations. Id.
Civil
Procedure
8(a)(2)
requires
Although Federal Rules of
merely
“a
short
and
plain
statement of the claim,” the plaintiff must allege enough facts to
make the claim plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007). He must plead well enough so that his complaint is
more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Id. at 555. “The factual allegations, assumed to be true,
must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally
cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief.”
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League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523,
527 (6th Cir. 2007).
While a pro se complaint is “to be liberally construed”
and “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), “basic
pleading essentials” still apply. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,
594 (6th Cir. 1990). Moreover, “[d]istrict courts are not required
to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to
construct full blown claims from sentence fragments.
To do so
would ‘require . . . [the courts] to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, . . . [and] would . . .
transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.’” Dixie v. Ohio, 2008
WL 2185487, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2008) (quoting Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
ANALYSIS
Defendants assert that Plaintiff Williams has failed to
file
her
administrative
charge
before
the
Equal
Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and her lawsuit within the time
limits established by law. Specifically, an aggrieved employee in
Tennessee must file a formal charge of discrimination with the EEOC
3
or the Tennessee Human Rights Commission within 300 days of the
allegedly discriminatory action, and must commence a civil action
within 90 days of receipt of the right to sue letter. McNeil v.
City of Memphis, 2007 WL 10849852 at *1 (W.D. Tenn. June 25, 2007).
The starting date for the 300-day limitation period is when the
plaintiff learns of the employment decision itself. Amini v.
Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2001).
In her complaint, Plaintiff Williams alleges that she was
wrongfully discharged from employment on March 6, 2014 (Docket
Entry No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff further alleges in paragraph 6 of her
complaint that she filed charges against the Defendant with the
Tennessee Human Rights Commission or the EEOC on or about January
9, 2015 (Docket Entry No. 1 at 2). She further alleges in paragraph
7 of her complaint that she received a notice of right to sue1 from
the EEOC on or about April 10, 2015 (Id. at 3). Finally, Plaintiff
Williams filed her complaint in this action on September 14, 2015
(Docket Entry No. 1). Thus, from Plaintiff’s pleadings, it appears
that more than 300 days expired between her alleged wrongful
termination on March 6, 2014, and her filing of charges with the
EEOC on January 9, 2015. Similarly, well over 90 days elapsed
1
Plaintiff identifies in her complaint multiple documentary exhibits
and refers to them by exhibit numbers. However, the court record does not
contain these exhibits, suggesting that Plaintiff failed to file them
along with her complaint. Defendants make reference to these exhibits in
their motion papers, further suggesting that Plaintiff included them with
the copies of the complaint served upon Defendants.
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between Plaintiff’s receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue letter on
April 10, 2015, and the filing of her complaint on September 14,
2015.
Plaintiff
Williams
argues
that
the
statutes
of
limitations should not be applied in her case based upon the
authority of Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010).
However, Lewis involved a class action based upon alleged disparate
impact which did not require a showing of discriminatory intent.
The Lewis court explicitly stated that “[f]or disparate-treatment
claims – and others for which discriminatory intent is required –
. . . the plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate discrimination
within the limitations period.” 560 U.S. at 214-215. Plaintiff
Williams asserts a disparate treatment claim, not a disparate
impact case, so the Lewis decision is inapplicable here.
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge
finds
that
Plaintiff
Williams
has
failed
to
file
her
administrative claim with the EEOC within the 300-day limitations
period and has further failed to file her complaint in this Court
within 90 days of receiving the EEOC right-to-sue letter. For these
reasons, the undersigned finds that her claim under Title VII is
time-barred and must be dismissed.
Defendants additionally assert that Title VII does not
create a basis for liability against individual employees or
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supervisors who do not otherwise qualify as an “employer.” Wathen
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997). Therefore,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against the individual
Defendants, Hunter, Gragg and Holmes, must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim.
In her response, Plaintiff Williams cites the decision of
Vance v. Ball State University, 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011) for the
proposition that an employer may be held vicariously liable for
workplace harassment inflicted by a supervisor. While this may be
true, this principle fails to support a claim that individual
supervisors or other co-employees may be held personally liable
under Title VII. The Vance case thus provides no support for
Plaintiff’s claims against Hunter, Gragg or Holmes.
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned finds that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted against the individual Defendants Hunter, Gragg and Holmes.
Finally, these Defendants argue that Plaintiff Williams
has failed to plead a cognizable claim for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges various
actions during the summer of 2014 that she alleges amount to a
breach of contract under Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Agreement between GM and the United Auto Workers (“UAW”).
The latest of these alleged violations apparently occurred on
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October 13, 2014, related to what Plaintiff describes as a “scab
list” for non-dues (Docket Entry No. 1 at 9).
Section 301 actions brought by individual employees are
governed by the six-month statute of limitations borrowed from
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
160(b). Del Costello v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 169 (1963). Moreover, a Section 301 claim accrues “when the
claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should
have
discovered,
the
acts
constituting
the
alleged
violation.” Chrysler Workers Ass’n v. Chrysler Corp., 834 F.2d 573,
581 (6th Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff Williams complains of several
acts the latest of which, by her pleadings, occurred on October 13,
2014. Yet, she failed to file her complaint until September 14,
2015, approximately 11 months later and long after the six-month
limitations period expired.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted and
the complaint against these Defendants dismissed with prejudice.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any
party
has
14
days
from
receipt
of
this
Report
and
Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said
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objections shall have 14 days from receipt of any objections filed
in this Report in which to file any responses to said objections.
Failure to file specific objections within 14 days of receipt of
this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further
appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 106 S.
Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), Reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
ENTER this 23rd day of August, 2016.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge
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