Blanton v. Marshall County Sheriff et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/21/15. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
CARLTON PATRICK BLANTON,
No. 371517,
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Plaintiff,
v.
MARSHALL COUNTY SHERIFF, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 1:15-cv-00096
Chief Judge Sharp
MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, an inmate at the Marshall County Jail in Lewisburg, Tennessee, brings this pro
se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Marshall County Sheriff in his
official capacity and the Marshall County Jail, alleging that the plaintiff did not receive proper care
for his depression and suicidal thoughts while incarcerated. (Docket No. 1). As relief, the plaintiff
seeks compensatory damages for the harm he alleges he suffered. (Id. at p. 6).
The plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I.
PLRA Screening Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and summary
dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. §
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1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require
us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979)
(citation omitted).
II.
Section 1983 Standard
The plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates
a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under § 1983,
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the plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
III.
Alleged Facts
While incarcerated at the Marshall County Jail, the plaintiff was reviewed by crisis center
personnel, who sent him to the county hospital due to his depression and suicidal thoughts. From
there, the plaintiff was transferred to the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Center where he was
diagnosed as bi-polar and prescribed two medications. He returned to the county hospital and
ultimately to the Marshall County Jail. The complaint alleges that, upon returning to the jail, the
plaintiff was denied further mental health treatment and was placed in “isolation/suicide watch” in
a “pledged steril [sic] cell.” While in that cell, the plaintiff located a sharp piece of hard plastic and
attempted to cut his wrist. After being discovered by the correction officers, he was taken to the
nurse. She restrained him to a chair without having provided any care for the wound. The plaintiff
was then placed in solitary confinement for over 45 days, during which time he was not provided
with any medication or mental health treatment. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 5-6).
IV.
Analysis
First, the plaintiff names the Marshall County Sheriff as a defendant to this action in his
official capacity only. (Docket No. 1 at p. 2). However, the plaintiff has not alleged any personal
involvement by the Sheriff. Supervisors cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts or
inactions of employees absent allegations that the supervisor acquiesced, participated or condoned
the employees' wrongful acts. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S. Ct. 445, 70
L.Ed.2d 509 (1981); Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[P]roof of
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personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.”). Other than naming
the Sheriff as a defendant, the plaintiff does not allege any facts that would establish that the Sheriff
was personally involved in, or even aware of, any of the issues about which the plaintiff complains.
Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against the Marshall County Sheriff for which relief
can be granted.
Giving this pro se complaint a liberal construction, the court could construe the plaintiff’s
allegation as an attempt to state a claim against Marshall County. However, while Marshall County
is a suable entity, it is responsible under § 1983 only for its “ own illegal acts. [It is] not vicariously
liable under § 1983 for [its] employees' actions.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S. Ct.
1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A
municipality may be liable under § 1983 “only if the challenged conduct occurs pursuant to a
municipality's ‘official policy,’ such that the municipality's promulgation or adoption of the policy
can be said to have ‘cause[d]’ one of its employees to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.”
D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2014)(quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).
“Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of
its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force
of law.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359. Thus, to state a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must
adequately allege “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an
official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of
inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance [of] or acquiescence
[to] federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013).
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In this case, the complaint does not allege that any of the defendants acted pursuant to a
policy or custom adopted by Marshall County. Neither does the complaint allege the existence of
an official policy relevant to this action. The complaint therefore fails to state a claim against
Marshall County upon which relief can be granted.
The plaintiff names the Marshall County Jail as the only other defendant to this action.
However, a jail or justice center is a building where prisoners are held and therefore is not a
“person” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Fuller v. Cocran, No. 1:05-CV-76, 2005 WL
1802415, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 27, 2005) (dismissing § 1983 claims against the Bradley County
Justice Center on the same basis); Seals v. Grainger County Jail, No. 3:04CV606, 2005 WL
1076326, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005) (“The Grainger County Jail, however, is not a suable
entity within the meaning of § 1983.”). Thus, the complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which
relief can be granted against the Marshall County Jail.
V.
Conclusion
As set forth above, the court finds the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state claims upon which
relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In the absence of an actionable
claim, the court must dismiss the complaint sua sponte. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, the
complaint will be dismissed.
An appropriate order will be entered.
Kevin H. Sharp
Chief United States District Judge
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