Adams v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al

Filing 227

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 214 MOTION for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required under the PLRA. The undersigned further finds t hat the undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, such that Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The undersigned therefore recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 214) be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 9/14/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION

MICHAEL BRANDON ADAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:15-cv-0115
Judge Campbell / Frensley

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction and Background
This matter is before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Lindamood, Spears, Staggs, Runions, Brewer, Caperton, Stillman, and Woods, the
only remaining Defendants in this action. Docket No. 214. Along with their Motion, Defendants
have contemporaneously filed a supporting Memorandum of Law (Docket No. 215), a Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts (Docket No. 216), and the Declarations of Leigh Staggs (Docket
No. 214-1), Brenda Caperton (Docket No. 214-2), Bruce Woods (Docket No. 214-3), Cherry
Lindamood (Docket No. 214-4), Lee Brewer (Docket No. 214-5), Patrick Stillman (Docket No.
214-6), Randall Runions (Docket No. 214-7), Wanda Spears (Docket No. 214-8), and Crystal
Cummings (Docket No. 214-9).
As grounds for their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has: (1) failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies; (2) failed to establish that any Defendant violated his First Amendment
religious rights; (3) failed to establish denial of equal protection; (4) failed to establish that any

Defendant denied him access to the Courts; (5) failed to establish that any Defendant deprived
him of any constitutional right related to his security classification; and (6) failed to state a
deprivation of property claim, particularly because he has not alleged a causal connection
between Defendant Stillman and his allegedly stolen property and has not alleged that his state
law remedies are inadequate. Docket No. 215. Defendants additionally argue that: (1) Plaintiff
has no constitutional right to access an institutional grievance procedure; (2) Plaintiff is not
entitled to a grievance system that meets his personal standards; and (3) SCCF adheres to
appropriate grievance procedures as set forth by the TDOC, such that any claim Plaintiff asserts
against the SCCF grievance procedure or Defendant Staggs related thereto should be dismissed.
Id.
Defendants further argue that RLUIPA does not permit recovery against them in their
individual capacities, such that those claims must be dismissed. Id. Defendants note that all
official capacity claims have been dismissed except for Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against
Defendant Lindamood as the SCCF Warden, and Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s official
capacity RLUIPA claim against her should be dismissed as a matter of law because “RLUIPA
does not authorize monetary damages as a form of relief against a government or its officials for
violations of its provisions” and Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief have
become moot since he has been transferred to a facility other than SCCF. Id., quoting
Huddleston v. Wilson Cnty. Crim. Justice Complex, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46599 (M.D. Tenn.
April 5, 2016), citing Sossamon v. Texas, 562 U.S. 277, 280 (2011); Haight v. Thompson, 763
F.3d 554, 568-70 (6th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff has not responded to the instant Motion or to Defendants’ Statement of
2

Undisputed Material Facts.
Plaintiff, an inmate within the custody and control of the Tennessee Department of
Correction(“TDOC”) who, from May 2015 to January 2016 was housed at South Central
Correctional Facility (“SCCF”), but who is currently housed at Turney Center Industrial
Complex, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis, action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), alleging that
multiple Defendants from several correctional institutions violated his constitutional rights.
Docket Nos. 1, 1-2.1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff asks this Court to permit him to proceed in
forma pauperis, to appoint him counsel, and to issue several orders. Docket No. 1-2, ¶¶ 214,
216, 222-29. Plaintiff additionally seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,2 as well as costs, fees,
punitive damages in the amount of $2,500.00 from each Defendant, and any further relief the
Court “deems fit and appropriate.” Id., ¶¶ 215, 217-21, 227-28, 230.
Although Plaintiff originally sued seven (7) members of the staff at Riverbend Maxium
Security Institution, four (4) TDOC administrators, and eleven (11) CoreCivic (formerly
“Corrections Corporation of America”) staff members,3 all in their individual and official

1

The Complaint that Plaintiff submitted that is docketed as Docket No. 1 is ten (10)
pages and ends in the middle of a sentence, as quoted above. The same day, Plaintiff submitted
another filing titled as a Complaint that is twenty-seven (27) pages; this submission is docketed
as Docket No. 1-2.
2

The record reflects that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at any of the three (3)
institutions of which he complained. “It is well-established that a ‘prisoner’s request for
injunctive and declaratory relief is moot upon his transfer to a different facility.’” Parks v. Reans,
510 F. App’x 414, 415 (6th Cir. 2013), citing Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996).
3

Plaintiff also named the TDOC, the Tennessee Parole Board, and CoreCivic as
Defendants in this action, but the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against them. Docket No. 6.
3

capacities, the only remaining Defendants are the instant Defendants and the only remaining
claims involve (1) denial of a diet consistent with Plaintiff’s religious beliefs; (2) denial of access
to the Courts; (3) denial of an appropriate security classification; and (4) the deprivation of
certain items of personal property. See Docket Nos. 1, 1-2, 6, 167, 223, 226.
For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies as required under the PLRA. The undersigned further finds that the
undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
such that Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The undersigned therefore
recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 214) be GRANTED,
and that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
II. Undisputed Facts4
A. Declaration of Leigh Staggs
At all times relevant to the instant action, Defendant Staggs was employed as the
Grievance Chairperson at SCCF. Docket No. 214-1 (“Staggs Dec.”), ¶ 2. As such, Defendant
Staggs is familiar with all applicable TDOC requirements and policies governing an inmate’s use
of the grievance system. Id., ¶ 3.
SCCF follows the TDOC policy that allows inmates to submit a written complaint /
grievance concerning the substance or application of a written or unwritten policy or practice,

Additionally, “K. Rivera” and “f/n/u Bacchus” have not been served; Jason Woodall is deceased;
and the three (3) WCF Defendants (Tammy Ford, “F. Johnson,” and Brandon Leek) have been
dismissed.
4

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are in a form required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56,
and are undisputed.
4

any single behavior or action toward an inmate by staff or other inmates, or any condition or
incident within SCCF, which personally affects the inmates. Id., ¶ 4.
Upon arrival at SCCF, each inmate is given a copy of the “TDOC Inmate Grievance
Procedures” (an inmate grievance handbook) which explains the policies and procedures for
using the grievance process. Id., ¶ 5. Pursuant to TDOC policy and the Inmate Grievance
Handbook, an inmate must submit his grievance within seven (7) calendar days of the occurrence
of the incident about which he is grieving. Id., ¶ 6. Pursuant to TDOC policies and procedures,
and as explained in the Inmate Grievance Handbook and the appropriate grievance notification,
an inmate is also required to provide specific details such as “dates, times, and the names of the
persons involved” in the occurrence giving rise to the grievance. Id., ¶ 7.
Pursuant to the TDOC policies and procedures, an inmate has exhausted his
administrative remedies when the inmate has filed an appropriate and proper grievance and
appealed the response all the way through the TDOC Commissioner’s Office. Id., ¶ 8.
SCCF maintains records of all inmate grievances properly filed and those inmate
grievances are recorded in the Tennessee Offender Management Information System (“TOMIS”),
a computerized database for the TDOC. Id., ¶ 9. When an inmate submits a grievance that is
inappropriate pursuant to TDOC policies and procedures, however, that grievance is returned to
the inmate. Id., ¶ 10. All inappropriate grievances are returned to the inmate with an explanation
as to why the grievance was deficient contained on a separate sheet of paper and/or upon the face
of the grievance itself. Id.
Since Defendant Staggs began her then-current term as a Grievance Chair, a copy of each
returned inmate grievance has been filed and maintained in the grievance office. Id. Defendant
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Staggs has reviewed TOMIS to determine what grievances Plaintiff filed. Id., ¶ 11. Based on
her review of TOMIS, Plaintiff properly filed four (4) grievances while incarcerated at SCCF.
Id. Plaintiff’s first grievance (No. 292349/22708) was received in July 2015 and related to
complaints concerning restrictions on Plaintiff’s visitations with his daughter. Id., ¶ 12.
Plaintiff’s second grievance (No. 23056/295200) was received in October 2015 and related to
Plaintiff’s being placed on pending investigation for his proximity to discovered contraband. Id.,
¶ 13. Plaintiff’s third grievance (No. 23117/295882) was received in November 2015 and related
to Plaintiff’s allegations that he had been yelled at by a case manager while inmates in Plaintiff’s
housing unit were congregating to receive influenza vaccinations. Id., ¶ 14. Plaintiff’s fourth
grievance (No. 297214/23254) was received in December 2015 and related to Plaintiff’s
complaints concerning his facility job duties. Id., ¶ 15.
Defendant Staggs has also reviewed the files maintained in the Grievance Office at SCCF
to determine if Plaintiff submitted any other grievances that were returned to him as
inappropriate. Id., ¶ 16. Based upon Defendant Staggs’ review, Plaintiff submitted three (3)
illegible grievances in June 2015 and one (1) illegible grievance in July 2015. Id., ¶ 16.
Specifically, grievances are submitted on carbon copy paper, consisting of the original and three
(3) copies. Id. Because the aforementioned grievances were not legible on all copies, said
grievances were not processed and were returned to Plaintiff for revision and resubmission if
desired. Id. After receiving the returned, deficient grievances, Plaintiff also had the ability to
appeal the determination that said grievances were not legible on all copies. Id., ¶ 17. Plaintiff
was not deterred from revising and resubmitting said grievances and/or appealing the
determination related to the sufficiency of said grievances in any way. Id., ¶ 18.
6

If Plaintiff would have properly revised and resubmitted said grievances, said grievances
would have been recorded on TOMIS. Id., ¶ 19. If Plaintiff would have appealed the
determination concerning the deficiency of said grievances, his appeal would have been recorded
on TOMIS. Id., ¶ 20. Based on Defendant Stagg’s review of TOMIS, Plaintiff did not revise and
resubmit said grievances, nor did he appeal any determinations related to said grievances. Id., ¶¶
21, 22.
Other than the grievances discussed herein, Plaintiff did not submit any other grievances,
whether appropriate or inappropriate pursuant to TDOC policies and procedures, while
incarcerated at SCCF. Id., ¶ 23.
At all times, Defendant Staggs acted in good faith in enforcing the policies and
procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and further acted in good faith without deliberate indifference
to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 24.
B. Declaration of Brenda Caperton
At all times relevant to the case at bar, Defendant Caperton was employed as a full-time
educator at SCCF’s Annex, where she taught a class of approximately twenty (20) to thirty-five
(35) full-time students. Docket No. 214-2 (“Caperton Dec.”), ¶ 2. SCCF’s Annex is detached
from the main compound. Id., ¶ 3. Said building has a separate library. Id. Inmates housed at
SCCF’s Annex are provided access to said library. Id. Inmates housed at SCCF’s Annex are
allowed to utilize the computer in the Annex’s library. Id. When using the computer, inmates
are allowed to print legal documents from a printer/copier. Id. Inmates are also permitted to
request that their legal documents be copied with the printer/copier. Id.
Inmates are charged for each page that they print and/or copy. Id., ¶ 4. Said charges are
7

deducted from the inmate’s trust fund account. Id. If an inmate’s account balance is zero at the
time that he prints a document and/or requests a document to be copied, he is required to
complete a withdrawal form. Id. After completing said withdrawal form, the inmate is allowed
to print/copy the requested document. Id. Subsequently, when the inmate’s account receives
funds, the balance of his withdrawal form(s) are automatically deducted from his account. Id.
Pursuant to this withdrawal system, therefore, inmates are not denied the ability to print and/or
copy legal documents due to an inability to pay for said printouts/copies. Id. This withdrawal
system was in place at all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Id.
When not teaching in the Annex, Defendant Caperton makes herself available to assist
inmates in retrieving documents printed from said printer and to assist with the requested copies
for inmates. Id., ¶ 5.
When an inmate requests copies from the printer in SCCF’s Annex his requests are noted
in a log book. Id., ¶ 6. Based upon said log book pages, Plaintiff received copies and/or the
services of a notary on the following dates: May 20, 2015; June 29, 2015; July 14, 2015;
September 18, 2015; September 22, 2015; October 9, 2015; October 12, 2015; October 20, 2015;
October 21, 2015; November 3, 2015; November 19, 2015; December 4, 2015; December 9,
2015; December 14, 2015; and January 12, 2016. Id., ¶ 7.
At no time did Defendant Caperton knowingly or intentionally limit Plaintiff’s access to
any Court in any manner whatsoever. Id., ¶ 8. At all times, Defendant Caperton acted in good
faith in enforcing the policies and procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and she further acted in
good faith without deliberate indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id.

8

C. Declaration of Bruce Woods
At all times relevant to the instant action, Defendant Woods has been employed by CCA
as the Principal at SCCF. Docket No. 214-3 (“Woods Dec.”), ¶ 2. As such, Defendant Woods
supervises teachers, library personnel, and work program facilitators, and is familiar with all
applicable TDOC requirements and policies governing an inmate’s incarceration at SCCF. Id.
Also at all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint, indigent inmates at SCCF were offered
indigent kits on a monthly basis. Id., ¶ 3. Said kits included, among other items, envelopes,
paper, and pens. Id.
Inmates housed at SCCF’s Annex are provided access to the Annex’s library. Id., ¶ 4.
Inmates housed at SCCF’s Annex are allowed to utilize the computer in the Annex’s library. Id.
When using the computer, inmates are allowed to print legal documents from a printer/copier.
Id. Inmates are also permitted to request that their legal documents be copied with the
printer/copier. Id.
Inmates are charged for each page that they print and/or copy. Id., ¶ 5. Said charges are
deducted from the inmate’s trust fund account. Id. If an inmate’s account balance is zero at the
time that he prints a document and/or requests a document to be copied, he is required to
complete a withdrawal form. Id. After completing said withdrawal form, the inmate is allowed
to print/copy the requested document. Id. Subsequently, when the inmate’s account receives
funds, the balance of his withdrawal form(s) are automatically deducted from his account. Id.
Pursuant to this withdrawal system, therefore, inmates are not denied the ability to print and/or
copy legal documents due to an inability to pay for said printouts/copies. Id. This withdrawal
system was in place at all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Id.
9

At no time did Defendant Woods knowingly or intentionally limit Plaintiff’s access to
any Court in any manner whatsoever. Id., ¶ 6. At all times, Defendant Woods acted in good
faith in enforcing the policies and procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and he further acted in good
faith without deliberate indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id.
D. Declaration of Cherry Lindamood
At all times relevant to the case at bar, Defendant Lindamood was employed as Warden
of SCCF, which is a correctional facility operated by CCA that houses sentenced prisoners who
are in TDOC custody. Docket No. 214-4 (“Lindamood Dec.”), ¶ 2. As SCCF Warden,
Defendant Lindamood is familiar with all applicable TDOC requirements and policies governing
an inmate’s incarceration at SCCF. Id., ¶ 3.
Plaintiff arrived at SCCF in May 2015 and was transferred from SCCF in January 2016.
Id., ¶ 4.
At all times, Defendant Lindamood acted in good faith in enforcing the policies and
procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and she further acted in good faith without deliberate
indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 5.
E. Declaration of Lee Brewer
At all times relevant to the instant action, Defendant Brewer was employed by CCA
as the Classification Coordinator at SCCF. Docket No. 214-5 (“Brewer Dec.”), ¶ 2. As such,
Defendant Brewer is familiar with all applicable TDOC requirements and policies governing an
inmate’s classification. Id., ¶ 3. SCCF follows said policies and procedures. Id.
As the Classification Coordinator, Defendant Brewer oversees a unit team comprised of
SCCF employees. Id., ¶ 4. Defendant Brewer, along with his unit team, judiciously evaluate
10

each of the inmates housed at SCCF’s Annex in order to determine whether said inmates can be
classified as minimum trustees. Id., ¶ 5. Said evaluations are on an individual basis according to
several factors, including but not limited to, each inmate’s prior and current behavior, as well as
the facility’s unique security concerns. Id. An inmate’s prior classification at a facility other
than SCCF does not automatically qualify him to become a trustee at SCCF’s Annex. Id., ¶ 6.
Minimum trustee status is a highly-regarded privilege that is not awarded to inmates until
Defendant Brewer and his unit team have had an opportunity to evaluate the inmate over an
extensive period of time. Id., ¶ 7. Plaintiff arrived at SCCF in May of 2015 and he was
transferred to TCIX based upon his own request in January of 2016. Id. Defendant Brewer and
his team were not provided sufficient time to evaluate Plaintiff for trustee status during the short
time he was housed at SCCF. Id.
Because classification determinations concerning trustee status are conducted by
Defendant Brewer and his unit team solely for the use of SCCF’s Annex, Defendant Brewer does
not make recommendations for other facilities. Id., ¶ 8. Accordingly, Defendant Brewer did not
make a recommendation for Plaintiff to be classified as a minimum trustee after his transfer to
TCIX. Id.
At all times, Defendant Brewer acted in good faith in enforcing the policies and
procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and he further acted in good faith without deliberate
indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 9.
F. Declaration of Patrick Stillman
At all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant Stillman was employed by CCA
as a Senior Correctional Officer at SCCF. Docket No. 214-6 (“Stillman Dec.”), ¶ 2. In that role,
11

Defendant Stillman was made familiar with all applicable TDOC/CCA/SCCF requirements and
policies governing the inmate property inventory process. Id.
On or about August 9, 2015, Plaintiff’s property was properly inventoried by SCCF staff
while Plaintiff’s property was packed due to his being transferred to another housing location.
Id., ¶ 3.
At no time did Defendant Stillman ever improperly or illegally confiscate or destroy any
permitted items of Plaintiff’s property or belongings. Id., ¶ 4.
At all times, Defendant Stillman acted in good faith in enforcing the policies and
procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and he further acted in good faith without deliberate
indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 5.
G. Declaration of Randall Runions
At all times relevant to the case at bar, Defendant Runions was employed by CCA as
the Chaplain at SCCF. Docket No. 214-7 (“Runions Dec.”), ¶ 2. As such, Defendant Runions is
familiar with all applicable TDOC requirements and policies governing an inmate’s request for
religious diets. Id., ¶ 3.
CCA maintains policies and procedures which establish an inmate’s rights, and one of
these established rights is the right to freedom of religious affiliation and voluntary religious
worship. Id., ¶ 4. SCCF follows said policies and procedures. Id.
TDOC Policy #118.01 provides that inmates may voluntarily participate in religious
activities and that the facility staff will monitor those religious activities. Id., ¶ 5. TDOC Policy
#118.01 further provides, “Inmates may request to participate in the Religious Diet Program per
Policy #116.08 and may contact the Chaplain to complete the Request for Religious Diet
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Program Participation and Agreement, CR-3814.” Id., ¶ 6.
CCA Policy #11-1 provides, “Religious diets shall be provided for inmates/residents
whose religious belief require adherence to religious dietary laws.” Id., ¶ 7. CCA Policy #11-1
further provides, “Religious diets should be kept as simple as possible and should conform as
closely as possible to the food served other inmates/residents.” Id., ¶ 8.
At all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint, SCCF inmates were provided with two (2)
options at each meal, a regular meal and an alternative meal. Id., ¶ 9. Inmates could choose
whether they were provided the regular meal or the alternative meal at each meal time. Id. The
alternative meal complied with the requirements of a Halal diet at all times. Id.
At all times, Defendant Runions acted in good faith in enforcing the policies and
procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and he further acted in good faith without deliberate
indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 10.
H. Declaration of Wanda Spears
Defendant Spears has been employed by CCA as a Librarian at SCCF since March 2014.
Docket No. 214-8 (“Spears Dec.”), ¶ 2. As a Librarian, Defendant Spears is familiar with all
applicable TDOC requirements and policies governing an inmate’s incarceration at SCCF. Id.
At all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint, indigent inmates at SCCF were offered
indigent kits on a monthly basis. Id., ¶ 3. Said indigent kits include, among other items,
envelopes, paper, and pens. Id.
Inmates housed at SCCF’s Annex are provided access to the Annex’s library. Id., ¶ 4.
Inmates housed at SCCF’s Annex are allowed to utilize the computer in the Annex library. Id.
When using the computer, inmates are allowed to print legal documents from a printer/copier.
13

Id. Inmates are also permitted to request that their legal documents be copied with the
printer/copier. Id.
Inmates are charged for each page that they print and/or copy. Id., ¶ 5. Said charges are
deducted from the inmate’s trust fund account. Id. If an inmate’s account balance is zero at the
time that he prints a document and/or requests a document to be copied, he is required to
complete a withdrawal form. Id. After completing said withdrawal form, the inmate is allowed
to print/copy the requested document. Id. Subsequently, when the inmate’s account receives
funds, the balance of his withdrawal form(s) are automatically deducted from his account. Id.
Pursuant to this withdrawal system, therefore, inmates are not denied the ability to print and/or
copy legal documents due to an inability to pay for said printouts/copies. Id. This withdrawal
system was in place at all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Id.
At no time did Defendant Spears knowingly or intentionally limit Plaintiff’s access to any
Court in any manner whatsoever. Id., ¶ 6. At all times, Defendant Spears acted in good faith in
enforcing the policies and procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and she further acted in good faith
without deliberate indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id.
I. Declaration of Crystal Cummings
At all times relevant to the instant action, Defendant Cummings was employed by CCA
as a Business Manager at SCCF. Docket No. 214-9 (“Cummings Dec.”), ¶ 2. In that role,
Defendant Cummings is familiar with all applicable TDOC/CCA/SCCF requirements and
policies governing the access to commissary by inmates. Id. SCCF maintains records of
commissary items purchased by inmates incarcerated at SCCF. Id., ¶ 3.
At all times, Defendant Cummings acted in good faith in enforcing the policies and
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procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and she further acted in good faith without deliberate
indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 4.
III. Law and Analysis
A. Local Rules 7.01(b) and 56.01(c) and (g)
Local Rule 7.01(b) states, in pertinent part:
b. Response. Each party opposing a motion shall serve and file a
response, memorandum, affidavits and other responsive material
not later than fourteen (14) days after service of the motion, except,
that in cases of a motion for summary judgment, that time shall be
twenty-one (21) days after the service of the motion, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court. Failure to file a timely response
shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion.
Defendants filed the instant Motion on May 30, 2018. Docket No. 214. Plaintiff has
failed to respond to Defendants’ Motion.
Additionally, with respect to Motions for Summary Judgment specifically, Local Rules
56.01(c) and (g) state, in pertinent part:
c. Response to Statement of Facts. Any party opposing the
motion for summary judgment must respond to each fact set forth
by the movant by either (i) agreeing that the fact is undisputed; (ii)
agreeing that the fact is undisputed for the purpose of ruling on the
motion for summary judgment only; or (iii) demonstrating that the
fact is disputed. Each disputed fact must be supported by a citation
to the record. ...
...
g. Failure to Respond. Failure to respond to a moving party’s
statement of material facts, or a non-moving party’s statement of
additional facts, within the time periods provided by these Rules
shall indicate that the asserted facts are not disputed for the
purposes of summary judgment.
Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts or

15

file his own Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. Pursuant to Local Rule 56.01(g), Plaintiff’s
failure to respond indicates “that the asserted facts are not disputed for the purposes of summary
judgment.” Accordingly, there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and all that remains
to be determined is whether Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
It would be inappropriate to grant Defendants’ Motion solely on the ground that Plaintiff
has failed to respond. See Stough v. Mayville Community Schools, 138 F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir.
1998). As the Sixth Circuit has stated:
[A] district court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of the
movant simply because the adverse party has not responded. The
Court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment to ensure that he has discharged [his
initial] burden ... The federal rules require that the party filing a
Motion for Summary Judgment “always bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue as to a material fact.”
Id. (citations omitted). The Court will, therefore, consider whether Defendants have met their
burden under the appropriate summary judgment standards discussed below.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute is “genuine” only if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
In order to prevail on a Motion for summary judgment, the moving party must meet the
burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue as to material fact concerning an essential
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element of the opposing party’s claim. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.
1989). In determining whether the moving party has met its burden, the Court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 provides that the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but his or her response, by affidavits or otherwise,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If a nonmoving party,
however, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact because a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 273. When this occurs, the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; Williams v. Ford Motor
Co., 187 F.3d 533, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1999).
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Docket Nos. 1, 1-2. Section 1983 provides, in part, that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
17

proceeding for redress...
Thus, in order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254-55 (1988), citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct.
1908, 1913, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981) (overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 330-331, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986)); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 1733, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978). The traditional definition of
acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised
power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law.” Id. at 49, 108 S. Ct. 2255, quoting United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941).
D. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”)
Regarding claims against Defendants in their official capacities, this Court recently
explained, “RLUIPA does not authorize monetary damages as a form of relief against a
government or its officials for violations of its provisions.” Huddleston v. Wilson Cnty. Crim.
Justice Complex, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46599 (M.D. Tenn. April 5, 2016), citing Sossamon v.
Texas 563 U.S. 277, 280 (2011); Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 568-70 (6th Cir. 2014).
As to claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, the Sixth Circuit itself has
not directly addressed this issue, but the Eleventh Circuit in Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1274
(2007), held that because the RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ Article I spending
power and “the Spending Power cannot be used to subject individual defendants, such as state
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employees, to individual liability in a private cause of action,” the RLUIPA did not authorize
suits against persons in their individual capacities.
E. Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997e
A prisoner must exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a claim under
§1983 or any other federal law. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). See also, e.g., White v. McGinnis, 131
F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998); Wyatt v.
Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1999). The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides
in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Applicability of Administrative Remedies. No action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. ' 1997e(a) (emphasis original).
Additionally, the filing of an initial grievance is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of ' 1997e(a). Rather, the PLRA exhaustion of prison administrative remedies requires a
prisoner to pursue his prison grievance through the final level of administrative appeal.
Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 306 (6th Cir. 1999). In Hartsfield, the Sixth Circuit explicitly
stated:
Even if Plaintiff did file an initial grievance against [defendants],
he was required to continue to the next step in the grievance
process . . . . We have previously held that an inmate cannot simply
. . . abandon the process before the completion and claim that he
has exhausted his remedies. . .
When a defendant shows that a plaintiff has not Aexhausted all available state
administrative remedies,@ the only remaining question is whether Plaintiff=s claims have been
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brought with respect to Aprison conditions@ as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. ' 1997e(a).
The Sixth Circuit discussed the meaning of the term Aprison conditions@ as used in 42
U.S.C. ' 1997e(a) in Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999). In Freeman, Plaintiff
inmate brought a lawsuit against prison officials claiming that they had used excessive force
against him. The lower court had dismissed his complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. On appeal, Plaintiff argued in part that he was not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies because his excessive force claim did not involve a Aprison condition@
within the meaning of ' 1997e(a). The Freeman Court stated in part as follows:
The phrase Aaction . . . with respect to prison conditions@ is not
defined in ' 1997e. Because the question is one of statutory
construction, we must first look to the plain language of the statute.
Defendants argue that the term Aprison conditions@ as used in 18
U.S.C. ' 3626(g)(2), which was amended as part of the same
legislation as ' 1997e, does include claims such as excessive force
because it expressly includes Aeffects of actions of government
officials on the lives of confined persons@ as well as Aconditions of
confinement@ in defining Aprison conditions.@ . . . It is generally
recognized that when Congress uses the same language in two
different places in the same statute, the words are usually read to
mean the same thing in both places. . . .
Moreover, reading the term Aprison conditions@ to include claims
of excessive force finds support in the purpose and legislative
history of the Act. The Act was passed to reduce frivolous prisoner
lawsuits and to reduce the intervention of federal courts into the
management of the nation=s prison systems. A broad exhaustion
requirement that includes excessive force claims effectuates this
purpose and maximizes the benefits of requiring prisoners to use
prison grievance procedures before coming to federal court.
Prisons need to know about and address claims of excessive force
as they would any other claim concerning prison life so that steps
may be taken to stop problems immediately if they exist.

196 F.3d at 643-644 (footnote omitted).
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The U. S. Supreme Court has also held that A' 1997e(a)=s exhaustion requirement applies
to all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences.@ See Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 520, 122 S.Ct. 983, 986 (2002). As the Porter Court stated:
Beyond doubt, Congress enacted ' 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity
and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress
afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address
complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal
case. In some instances, corrective action taken in response to an
inmate=s grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy
the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation. . . . In other
instances, the internal review might Afilter out some frivolous
claims.@ . . . And for cases ultimately brought to court, adjudication
could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the
contours of the controversy.
...
For the reasons stated, we hold that the PLRAs exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether
they allege excessive force or some other wrong.
122 S.Ct. at 988, 992 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
F. The Case at Bar
As an initial matter, under the reasoning of Porter and Freeman, Plaintiff=s claims in the
case at bar fall within the meaning of the term “prison conditions” as used in ' 1997e(a). He is,
therefore, required to exhaust his administrative remedies as set forth in the PLRA.
The undisputed facts establish, inter alia, that, SCCF follows the TDOC policy that
allows inmates to submit a written complaint / grievance concerning the substance or application
of a written or unwritten policy or practice, any single behavior or action toward an inmate by
staff or other inmates, or any condition or incident within SCCF, which personally affects the
inmates pursuant to TDOC policies and procedures, and that an inmate has exhausted his
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administrative remedies when the inmate has filed an appropriate and proper grievance and
appealed the response all the way through the TDOC Commissioner’s Office. Staggs Dec., ¶¶ 4,
8.
The undisputed facts further establish that, upon arrival at SCCF, each inmate is given a
copy of the “TDOC Inmate Grievance Procedures” (an inmate grievance handbook) which
explains the policies and procedures for using the grievance process. Id., ¶ 5. The undisputed
facts demonstrate that Plaintiff utilized the grievance process at SCCF, properly filing four (4)
grievances and improperly filing an additional four (4) illegible grievances. Id., ¶¶ 12-16, 23. It
is undisputed that Plaintiff had the ability to appeal the determination that the four (4) improper
grievances were not legible on all copies, but Plaintiff did not revise and resubmit said
grievances, nor did he appeal any determinations related to said grievances. Id., ¶¶ 17, 21, 22.
Additionally, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not deterred from revising and resubmitting said
grievances and/or appealing the determination related to the sufficiency of said grievances in any
way. Id., ¶ 18. Because Plaintiff did not appeal his grievance responses through to the TDOC
Commissioner’s Office as required under TDOC policies and procedures, Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, this action should be dismissed.
Even if Plaintiff had properly exhausted his administrative remedies, however, the
undisputed facts establish that Defendants did not violate his constitutional rights. Specifically,
the undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants did not knowingly or intentionally limit
Plaintiff’s access to the courts as inmates at SCCF are provided access to the library and to
computers and are not denied the ability to print and/or copy legal documents due to an inability
to pay for said printouts/copies; indigent inmates are provided monthly indigent kits containing,
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inter alia, envelopes, paper, and pens; and Plaintiff received copies and/or the services of a
notary on May 20, 2015; June 29, 2015; July 14, 2015; September 18, 2015; September 22, 2015;
October 9, 2015; October 12, 2015; October 20, 2015; October 21, 2015; November 3, 2015;
November 19, 2015; December 4, 2015; December 9, 2015; December 14, 2015; and January 12,
2016. Caperton Dec., ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 8; Woods Dec., ¶¶ 3-6; Spears’ Dec., ¶¶ 3-6. The undisputed
facts further demonstrate that Defendants did not deny Plaintiff a religious meal and in fact
provided a Halal meal option at each meal. Runions Dec., ¶ 9. Additionally, the undisputed
facts establish that at no time did Defendants improperly or illegally confiscate or destroy any
permitted items of Plaintiff’s property or belongings. Stillman Dec., ¶ 4. Finally, it is undisputed
that, at all times relevant to the instant action, all Defendants acted in good faith in enforcing the
policies and procedures of TDOC/CCA/SCCF, and further acted in good faith without deliberate
indifference as to the rights or freedoms of Plaintiff. Staggs Dec., ¶ 24; Caperton Dec., ¶ 8;
Woods Dec., ¶ 6; Lindamood Dec., ¶ 5; Brewer Dec., ¶ 9; Stillman Dec., ¶ 5; Runions Dec., ¶ 10;
Spears Dec., ¶ 6; Cummings Dec., ¶ 4.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies as required under the PLRA. The undersigned further finds that the
undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
such that Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The undersigned therefore
recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 214) be GRANTED,
and that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
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days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to
this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have
fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any
response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this
Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985),
reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

________________________________
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge

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