Kuot v. John Doe Medical Contractor et al

Filing 179

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 166, 168) be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 8/24/18. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(af)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION

GAI KUOT, #507979,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF
AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:16-cv-00006
Judge Campbell / Frensley

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction and Background
This matter is before the Court upon two Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s most recently
Amended Complaint: the first, filed by Defendants Lindamood, Buttram, Dodd, McClain,
Inman,1 Coble, Hacker, Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), Medlin, Hininger,
Chapman, and Killingsworth (collectively referred to as “CoreCivic Defendants”2) (Docket No.
166); and the second, filed by Defendants Schofield,3 Woodall,4 Parker, and Foster (collectively
referred to as “TDOC Defendants”) (Docket No. 168). Each Motion is accompanied by a

1

Although Hank Inman is not included within the style of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
nor is he named as a party in Plaintiff’s listing of the parties, Mr. Inman is part of the CoreCivic
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See Docket Nos. 138, 142.
2

Corrections Corporation of America is now known as CoreCivic, and will be referred to
as such herein.
3

Defendant Schofield is no longer the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of
Correction (“TDOC”).
4

Defendant Woodall passed away on August 4, 2017. See Docket Nos. 151, 151-1.

supporting Memorandum of Law. Docket Nos. 167, 169.
Plaintiff has filed a “Motion in Opposition to Defendant’s [sic] CCA & TDOC et al.,
Motion to Dismiss” (Docket No. 173), which the undersigned will construe as a Response to
each of Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
A review of the relevant procedural history of this case is helpful to its resolution.
A. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint and Judge Sharp’s Frivolity Review
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in this matter on February 8, 2016. Docket No. 1.
Plaintiff’s original Complaint was 143 pages, plus an additional 47 pages of exhibits. Id.
Plaintiff’s original Complaint contained 723 paragraphs of allegations against 25 named and
Jane/John Doe Defendants, all of whom he sued in their individual and official capacities. Id.
On March 22, 2016, Judge Sharp conducted his frivolity review of Plaintiff’s original
Complaint and Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Docket Nos. 7, 8. Judge
Sharp thoroughly summarized the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint and characterized
Plaintiff’s Complaint as “rambling, repetitive, and far-reaching,” but found for purposes of
frivolity review that, except for Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against state officials in
their official capacity, Plaintiff’s claims could proceed. Docket Nos. 7, 8.
B. Plaintiff’s First Motion to Amend his Complaint and Defendants’ First Motions to
Dismiss
On May 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint. Docket No. 53.5
While that Motion to Amend was pending, both the TDOC Defendants and the Core Civic

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Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Complaint (Docket No. 53) was denied by Judge
Haynes as moot in light of his subsequently filed Motion to Amend to Amend (Docket No. 82).
Docket No. 117.
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Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss with supporting Memoranda of Law, arguing that Plaintiff’s
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and also for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Docket No. 65, 66, 71, 72.6 Plaintiff filed a
Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions, and also filed a “Motion to Treat Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment” and a Motion in Opposition to Summary
Judgment, each with a supporting Memorandum. Docket Nos. 87-91, 96.7
C. Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Amend his Complaint
On June 28, 2016, while Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss were pending, Plaintiff sought
leave to Amend his Complaint. Docket No. 82. Defendants filed Responses in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Complaint. Docket Nos. 92, 93.
D. Plaintiff’s “Third Amended Complaint,” Filed Without Leave of Court, and Judge
Haynes’ February 4, 2017 Order
While Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Complaint was pending, Plaintiff filed, without
leave of Court, his Third Amended Complaint. Docket No. 94. Defendants’ objected to
Plaintiff’s filing his Third Amended Complaint without leave of Court (Docket No. 98), and
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint was stricken by Judge Haynes in an Order signed on
January 3, 2017 and entered on January 4, 2017 (Docket No. 128). Judge Haynes’ Order stated
in its entirety:
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) this Motion is

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Because Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint, Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss his original Complaint were denied by Judge Haynes as moot. Docket No.
119.
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Because Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint, these Motions were
also denied by Judge Haynes as moot. Docket Nos. 122-124.
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GRANTED. Yet, a third amended complaint was filed without
leave of Court (D/E No. 94) and that complaint is STRICKEN.
Plaintiff has 20 days to file a superceding amended complaint with
a short statement of facts for his claims as to each defendant.
Docket No. 128.
E. Plaintiff’s Subsequent Untimely Amended Complaint and Defendants’ Second Set of
Motions to Dismiss
On February 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, alleging 128 federal claims
and 29 state law claims. Docket No. 138. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was untimely as it
was filed outside the 20 days set forth in Judge Haynes’ Order, and, despite Judge Haynes’
instruction to “file a superceding amended complaint with a short statement of facts for his
claims as to each defendant” (Docket No. 128), with only a few minor adjustments, Plaintiff
essentially re-filed his original Complaint.8
Defendants’ filed new Motions to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 139, 142) with supporting
Memoranda of Law (Docket Nos. 140, 143), seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint again for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and also for failure to state a claim
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ new
Motions to Dismiss, along with two supporting Memoranda of Law. Docket Nos. 144-146.
F. The Undersigned’s Initial Report and Recommendation
On December 28, 2017, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 139, 142) be granted because
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Other than minor changes to the style of the case, minor changes to the contents of a few
paragraphs, minor reorganizations of his paragraphs, the naming of the parties, and claiming the
relevant time period of the action was November 2012 through the present (rather than
November 2012 through October 2015), Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint filed February 10, 2017
largely mirrors his original Complaint. Compare Docket No. 138 with Docket No. 1.
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Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint failed to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in
Judge Haynes’ Order (Docket No. 128) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and because the allegations of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint were conclusory and failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) against either the TDOC Defendants or the
CoreCivic Defendants. Docket No. 153. Specifically, the undersigned stated:
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff filed his original
Complaint in this action on February 8, 2016. See Docket No. 1.
As has been discussed above, there is a one year statute of
limitations in § 1983 actions in Tennessee. See, e.g., Roberson v.
Tenn., 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
claims arising prior to February 8, 2015 are time-barred and should
be dismissed.
Addressing Plaintiff’s official capacity claims arising on or
after February 8, 2015, Plaintiff cannot sustain his official capacity
claims against the individual TDOC Defendants because they stand
in the shoes of the State of Tennessee, and the law is well-settled
that the State is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.
Thus, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the individual
TDOC Defendants should be dismissed.
Turning to Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the
individual CoreCivic Defendants, those claims are redundant, as
those employees stand in the shoes of their employer, CoreCivic,
and CoreCivic is itself a Defendant in this action. Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims against the individual CoreCivic
Defendants, therefore, should likewise be dismissed.
Regarding Plaintiff’s claims against CoreCivic itself,
Plaintiff’s allegations that CoreCivic’s lack of policy enforcement
violated his constitutional rights are conclusory. It is insufficient
to simply aver in a conclusory manner that CoreCivic has policies,
practices, or customs that violated his constitutional rights.
Considering next Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims, as
discussed above, in order for Defendants to be held liable in their
individual capacities, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each
Defendant personally condoned, encouraged, or participated in the
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conduct that allegedly violated his rights; conclusory allegations
are not enough. As has been demonstrated in the recitation of
Plaintiff’s averments above, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory.
Plaintiff has simply failed to demonstrate that each individual
Defendant personally condoned, encouraged, or participated in the
allegedly violative conduct. Absent the establishment of the causal
connection between the misconduct complained of and the official
sued, Plaintiff cannot sustain his claims.
Id.
Additionally, because the undersigned recommended that Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss (Docket Nos. 139, 142) be granted, the undersigned further recommended that this Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims; and
instead dismiss those claims without prejudice. Id., citing United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966).
G. Judge Crenshaw’s February 1, 2018 Order
On February 1, 2018, Judge Crenshaw entered an Order stating:
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (Doc.
No. 153) in which the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court
grant the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff has filed
Objections (Doc. No. 154) and Defendants have filed a Response
(Doc. No. 155). The Court has conducted a de novo review of this
matter.
Plaintiff, an inmate currently housed at South Central
Correctional Facility for committing first degree murder, filed his
original Complaint in this action two years ago. Plaintiff’s 143page Complaint alleged numerous purported constitutional and
state claims. After initial review of this matter, the Hon. Kevin
Sharp described the Complaint as “rambling, repetitive, and farreaching.” (Doc. No. 7.) However, process was issued for all of
the named defendants. The Defendants subsequently moved the
court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to comply with Rules 8
and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 65.)
Plaintiff sought and was granted leave to amend his Complaint.
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(Doc. No. 82.) The Hon William J. Haynes, Sr. granted Plaintiff’s
request, but explicitly directed him to file his “superseding
amended complaint with a short statement of the facts for his
claims as to each defendant.” (Doc. No. 128.) Other than making
some minor changes to dates, parties, and paragraphs, the latest
version of the 137-page Complaint essentially mirrors the original
Complaint (and references its many exhibits).
“The objective of Rule 8 . . . was to make complaints
simpler, rather than more expansive.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957). Thus, “the only permissible pleading in a federal
district court is a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief on any legally sustainable
grounds.” Harrell v. Dirs. of Bur. of Narcotics & Dangerous
Drugs, 70 F.R.D. 444, 446 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). “This is to avoid
situations, such as is presented here, wherein the pleading is so
verbose that the Court cannot identify with clarity the claim(s) of
the pleader and adjudicate such claim(s) understandingly on the
merits.” Id. It is, therefore, axiomatic that complaints that are
too long, circuitous, disorganized, confusing, or argumentative
may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See,
e.g., Plymale v. Freeman, 191 U.S. App. LEXIS 6996, at *1-3
(6th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with
Rule 8(a)); Morales v. New York, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71137,
at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014) (observing that “complaints that
are argumentative, disjointed and needlessly ramble have
routinely been dismissed. . . .”); Smith v. City of Chattanooga,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134171, at *4-5 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 17,
2010) (dismissing complaint that is “replete with so much
irrelevant information that the Court is unable to determine the
precise nature of [plaintiff’s] claims”); Schied v.Daughtrey, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104697, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2008)
(“When faced with voluminous pleadings, neither the Court nor
opposing counsel should be required to expend time and effort
searching through large masses of conclusory, argumentative,
evidentiary and other extraneous allegations in order to discover
whether the essentials of claims asserted can be found in such a
melange.”); Barnard v. Beckstrom, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38864, at *9 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007) (finding complaint
violated Rule 8 where it contained “circuitous diatribes far
removed from the heart of the claim. . . .”); Brown v. Knoxville
News–Sentinel, 41 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (dismissing
117-page complaint because it was “so prolix, loosely drawn and
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involved as to be unintelligible”).
Plaintiff’s latest Complaint is neither short nor plain. The
allegations therein are not simple, concise, and direct. It is 137
pages in length and contains innumerable footnotes, legal
arguments, and references to numerous extraneous exhibits. It
veers from conclusory to disorganized, and from specific to
overly broad. Given these factors, responding to the Complaint
would place an undue burden on Defendants, and – just as
importantly – the continuation of this action as currently devised
would impose a huge burden on the Court in attempting to
manage this case.
Of course, this Court must be liberal in its view of the
pleadings and procedures when a litigant undertakes to present a
claim or defense personally. It is not lost on the Court that when
Senior Judge Haynes ordered Plaintiff to re-file his Complaint
containing a short and plain statement of the facts, Plaintiff was
not explicitly warned that dismissal could result from
noncompliance. While this warning was not expressly necessary,
as the issue had been raised by the Defendants in their briefing,
the Court thinks fairness (and the fact that this case initially
survived Judge Sharp’s frivolity review) calls for such an express
warning and the provision of one more opportunity for Plaintiff to
comply with Rule 8.
Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation is
ADOPTED IN PART, as to finding the Complaint wanting
under Rule 8. However, rather than outright dismissal, Plaintiff is
ORDERED to, within thirty (30) days, file a further amended
Complaint containing a short and plain statement of his claims.
The statement should be short because unnecessary prolixity in a
pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party
who must respond to it because they are forced to select the
relevant material from a mass of verbiage. Plaintiff should avoid
legal argument, conclusory statements, tangential discussions, and
the provision of unnecessary supporting evidence. Stated
differently, Plaintiff need only allege what is necessary to put
Defendants on notice that they are entitled to relief on any legally
sustainable grounds.
Defendants shall answer or otherwise plead in response to
any amended Complaint within the time prescribed by the Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure.
Given the Court’s decision under Rule 8 and the provision
for re-pleading, the Court SETS ASIDE the Report and
Recommendation as to Rule 12.
Docket No. 156.
On March 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Extension of time to Amend his
Complaint (Docket No. 163), which was granted by the undersigned on March 15, 2018
(Docket No. 164).
H. Plaintiff’s Next Amended Complaint and Defendants’ Third Set of Motions to Dismiss
On March 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed another Amended Complaint in this action. Docket
No. 165. This Amended Complaint is 80 pages and generally consists of the same lengthy
allegations as his original Complaint and his prior Amended Complaint. Compare Docket Nos.
1, 138, and 165.
On February 11, 2018, Defendants filed their third set of Motions to Dismiss and
supporting Memoranda of Law, again seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for
failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and also for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Docket Nos. 166-169. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’
third Motions to Dismiss, along with a supporting Memorandum of Law. Docket Nos. 173,
174.
I. Plaintiff’s Current Motion to Amend his Complaint
On May 16, 2018, Plaintiff has filed yet another Motion to Amend his Complaint
(Docket No. 171), to which Defendants have filed a Response in Opposition (Docket No. 175).

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II. Law and Analysis
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (d), (e)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (d), (e) set forth the requirements for a pleading that states a claim
for relief as follows:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has
jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include
relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
...
(d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative
Statements; Inconsistency.
(1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise,
and direct. No technical form is required.
(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense. A party
may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or
defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative
statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is
sufficient.
(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party may state as
many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of
consistency.

(e) Construing Pleadings. Pleadings must be construed so as to
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do justice.
B. The Case at Bar
As can be seen, this has been an almost 2 ½ year cycle of Plaintiff filing a Complaint,
Defendants filing a responsive pleading or dispositive motion, Plaintiff filing a motion to
amend his Complaint or filing an Amended Complaint with or without leave of Court,
Defendants filing a responsive pleading or dispositive motion, Plaintiff filing a motion to
amend his Complaint or filing an Amended Complaint with or without leave of Court, etc. The
undersigned, along with Judges Sharp, Haynes, and Crenshaw, have each remarked in one way
or another on the “rambling, repetitive, and far-reaching” nature of the allegations of Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Amended Complaints (which have ranged from 143 pages to 80 pages). See
Docket Nos. 7, 8, 128, 153, 156. Judge Crenshaw, in his Order entered February 1, 2018 agreed
with the undersigned’s Report and Recommendation recommending dismissal for failure to
comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (Docket No. 153) stating:
Plaintiff’s latest Complaint is neither short nor plain. The
allegations therein are not simple, concise, and direct. It is 137
pages in length and contains innumerable footnotes, legal
arguments, and references to numerous extraneous exhibits. It
veers from conclusory to disorganized, and from specific to
overly broad. Given these factors, responding to the Complaint
would place an undue burden on Defendants, and - just as
importantly - the continuation of this action as currently devised
would impose a huge burden on the Court in attempting to
manage this case.
Docket No. 156.
Despite agreeing that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8 or Judge Haynes’ Order, Judge Crenshaw felt that because Plaintiff had not been explicitly
warned by Judge Haynes that noncompliance could result in dismissal of this action, the
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interests of justice counseled that Plaintiff should be granted one final chance to file an
Amended Complaint that complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Id. Accordingly, Judge Crenshaw
gave Plaintiff one final bite at the apple, noted that noncompliance could result in dismissal,
and explicitly instructed:
Plaintiff is ORDERED to, within thirty (30) days, file a further
amended Complaint containing a short and plain statement of his
claims. The statement should be short because unnecessary
prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court
and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to
select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage. Plaintiff
should avoid legal argument, conclusory statements, tangential
discussions, and the provision of unnecessary supporting
evidence.
Id.
Plaintiff’s operative Amended Complaint fails to comply with either Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
and Judge Crenshaw’s Order. In light of Plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8 despite the Orders from Judge Haynes and Judge Crenshaw to do so, the injustice to
Defendants of mounting expenses related to repeatedly having to file responsive pleadings
and/or dispositive motions on the same issues, the injustice to Defendants in enduring the undue
delay in resolving this action, and Judge Crenshaw’s explicit warning that he was awarding
Plaintiff one final chance to amend his Complaint and that dismissal for noncompliance could
result, the undersigned again recommends dismissal of this action for failure to comply with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 166, 168) be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to
this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have
fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any
response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this
Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985),
reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

_______________________________
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge

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