Kuot v. John Doe Medical Contractor et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 3/22/16. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION

GAI KUOT, #507979
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA
et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:16-cv-00006
Chief Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Gai Kuot, a state prisoner confined at the South Central Correctional Facility (“SCCF”) in
Clifton, Tennessee, has filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following
defendants: the Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”); Damon Hininger, President and CEO of
CCA; Jason Medlin, Middle Tennessee Regional Director for CCA; Arvil Chapman, former Warden of
SCCF; Cherry Lindamood,1 current Warden of SCCF; seven other current and former employees of
SCCF, including Katherine Buttram, Benjamin Killingsworth, Daniel Dodd, Dan Deavers, Christopher
McClain, Mark Hacker, and Hank Inman; Derrick Schofield, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department
of Correction (“TDOC”); Jason Woodall,2 Deputy Commissioner of TDOC; Tony Parker, Assistant
Commissioner of TDOC; Joel Foster, liason for TDOC; Bryant Williams, contract monitor for TDOC; Mrs.
Rashti, head nurse for TDOC; Jane Doe Nurses #1, #2, and #3; Dr. Robert Coble,3 doctor and acting
health administrator for SCCF; John Doe Doctors #1 and #2; and John Doe Medical Health Services,
contractual healthcare provider and employer of Dr. Coble. (ECF No. 1.) All defendants are named in
their official and individual capacities. The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

1

The plaintiff identifies this defendant as “Cheryl” Lindamood, but the Court takes judicial notice
that Cherry Lindamood is the current warden of SCCF.
2

The plaintiff identifies this defendant as Jason “Woodal” in the case caption, but elsewhere in
the complaint sometimes identifies him as Jason “Woodall.” The Court takes judicial notice that TDOC’s
Deputy Commissioner of Operations is named Jason Woodall.
3

The plaintiff identifies this plaintiff variously as Dr. Cobble and as Dr. Coble.

2

I.

Standard of Review
Under the PLRA, the Court must conduct an initial review of any civil complaint brought by a

prisoner if it is filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), seeks relief from government entities or
officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, or challenges the prisoner’s conditions of confinement, 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). Upon conducting this review, the Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, that
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under [the PLRA] because the relevant statutory language tracks the
language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny
on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Nonetheless, in conducting the initial review, the Court must read the plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
II.

Factual Allegations
The plaintiff’s 145-page complaint is rambling, repetitive, and far-reaching. In summary, the

plaintiff alleges that he has been continually subjected to violent physical assaults and abuse at the hands
of other prisoners and to a continual and pervasive risk of harm at the hands of other prisoners since he
arrived at SCCF in 2012. He also alleges that the defendants have refused treatment for his serious
medical needs, including injuries inflicted by other inmates and chronic illnesses diagnosed after the
plaintiff arrived at SCCF.
A.

Risk of Harm by Other Inmates

The plaintiff is a forty-year-old, foreign-born native of South Sudan who is physically small in
height and weight and is not affiliated with any Security Threat Group (“STG”). He alleges that, despite his

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vulnerability due to his small stature, age, lack of STG affiliation, and the huge language and cultural
barriers between him and most of the other inmates, he has continually been housed in units with gangaffiliation rates in excess of 80%. The plaintiff expressly alleges that, throughout the time that he has
been incarcerated at SCCF, he has been continually threatened, terrorized, extorted, and assaulted by
various violent inmates with STG affiliations. More to the point, for purposes of the present action, the
plaintiff contends that the defendants “created conditions which were conducive to the long term viability
and sustainability of the control and dominion of violent inmates” affiliated with STGs. (ECF No. 1, at 16.)
The plaintiff states that defendants Schofield, Parker, Foster, Williams, Woodall, CCA, Hininger, Medlin,
Chapman, Lindamood, Killingsworth, Hacker, Buttram, Dodd, McClain and Inman were all aware of and
specifically put on notice that STG-affiliated inmates constituted a serious threat to the plaintiff’s health
and safety but refused to take any action to protect him. (Id. at 16.)
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants’ actions were contrary to written TDOC and CCA policy,
as well as Tennessee law. He further alleges that defendant Schofield, in conjunction with defendants
Woodall and Parker, “implemented de facto policies and customs” to ensure that express written policies
and laws were ignored or violated.
As the plaintiff describes it, STG-affiliated inmates have
the unencumbered right to literally take over substantial portions of the housing unit, (i.e.
whole tiers and staircases; and the shower units, ice machine, and exit and entrance to
the very housing unit itself, as well as to the individuals cells/cell doors to enter the cells,)
and forcing Plaintiff Kuot to have to be subject to the control and dominion of these
violent STG affiliated inmates.
(ECF No. 1, at 18.4) The plaintiff states that these practices are in violation of written TDOC policy, but
that the defendants all knew about and implicitly condoned the activity to such an extent that it became de
facto policy at the prison to permit such behavior, enforced by SCCF staff. The plaintiff states that, as a
result of the STG-affiliated inmates’ practices of taking over his housing units, he has been screamed at,
slapped, threatened, and physically attacked for purportedly “breaking security” (as defined by the STG
members). (Id. at 20.) The plaintiff alleges that defendants Chapman, Killingsworth, Dodd, McClain, and
4

The page numbers referenced herein correspond with the page numbering assigned by the
Court filing system, CM/ECF and not with the plaintiff’s pagination. In any event, the Court notes that
Page 16 of the complaint is missing, which apparently contains most of the description of a practice to
which the plaintiff refers as “shower escorting.”

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Buttram knew of and allowed STG-affiliated inmates to conduct “shower escorts” and basically to take
over portions of the plaintiff’s housing unit, that they knew that inmates including Kuot face a “substantial
threat of serious bodily injury from pervasive STG activity,” and that they have affirmatively failed to take
reasonable steps to mitigate the risk or prevent the injuries. (Id. at 21.)
Other activities reported by the plaintiff include STG members’ tampering with the locking
mechanism of their cell doors so they can enter or exit their cells at any time, even during lockdown;
forcing the plaintiff and others to vacate their own cells so that STG members could conduct meetings in
the cells; and escorting fellow gang members to and from the showers, taking over entire portions of the
housing units while doing so. The plaintiff states that all these activities are caught on camera every day
and are done in full view of the defendants.
With regard to his own injuries, the plaintiff alleges more specifically that he has been an inmate
detained at SCCF since November 2012 and that he was seriously assaulted for the first time on July 7,
2013, during the first month after his arrival at SCCF, as a result of the above-referenced practices in
conjunction with his small stature and lack of familiarity with prison culture. The plaintiff states that he
“unwittingly and unknowingly failed to move fast enough out of the path of a shower escort.” (Id. at 22.) As
a consequence, he was told by the STG-affiliated inmates conducting the escort that he had to pay a
$100 fine for his transgression. Because the plaintiff lacked the financial ability to pay this “fine,” he was
punched in the mouth, kicked, and stomped on, suffering contusions to his head, face, ribs, neck, and
lower back. (Id.) He also suffered impaired vision, headaches, nightmares, and “uncontrollable anxiety.”
(Id. at 23.) The inmates who assaulted the plaintiff were not housed in his unit but were allowed to come
into the pod through the front door, because it was never secured as it was supposed to be. The plaintiff
states that “[t]his freedom of movement, was a de facto policy that C.C.A. staff members, seniors and
administration officials had allowed freely and with no restriction.” (Id. at 22.)
After the assault, the plaintiff was placed in a segregated unit for 18 days without receiving any
medical attention, despite having suffered serious injuries. Thereafter he was housed in Discovery Pod B,
where, for several weeks, he was “terrorized and violently assaulted” and extorted by inmates who
belonged to STGs.

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The plaintiff states that he was attacked again several months later by an inmate affiliated with a
different STG for using “their” shower, one of the eight showers in the plaintiff’s housing pod. (Id. at 23.)
The plaintiff asserts that the administrative officials at the prison knew of and tacitly permitted this STG to
assert a claim of ownership over a particular shower. It is unclear from the plaintiff’s allegations if this is
the same assault as the one he alleges took place on August 2, 2014. After that assault, he was again
moved to a segregated unit, this time for eleven days, where he again received no medical attention. The
plaintiff asserts that the lack of medical care following these assaults further compounded the problems
the plaintiff was experiencing with headaches, impaired vision, nightmares, and anxiety. The plaintiff
states that his physical stature as well as his severe unrelated medical conditions (Hepatitis B and
profound bacterial infection of the gastrointestinal tract) make it impossible for him to defend himself, that
he has been repeatedly housed with cellmates who are affiliated with one STG or another, and that he
has repeatedly been subjected to incidents in which he was terrorized, assaulted and extorted by STG
members, under conditions that the defendants permitted to flourish. The plaintiff explains that the
extortion consists of STG-affiliated inmates’ assessing financial fines and charges against him for
“perceived shower security slights” or simply “strong-arming” the plaintiff by telling him he owes them for
living in the pod.
In November 23, 2014, the plaintiff was moved to “pre-honor pod Gemini B.”5 The plaintiff
remained in this pod until February or March 2015, when defendant Derrick Schofield, TDOC
Commissioner, specifically ordered SCCF to terminate its honor pods. The plaintiff alleges that the only
time during his tenure at SCCF that he has not witnessed “wide scale organized STG activity, permitted
and condoned by the administration,” was while he was housed at the pre-honor pod. (ECF No. 1, at 15.)
After the reorganization, he was again subjected to continuous extortion and assaults and put in constant
fear for his life.
The plaintiff maintains that, to the present day, he remains under a “pervasive threat of serious
bodily injury due to the rampant and uncontrolled” activity by STG-affiliated inmates, and that the
“[c]onditions of rampant and widespread participation in coordinated STG activity were a direct result of

5

The plaintiff does not explain what a “pre-honor pod” is.

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Defendant Schofield’s orders and intentional decisions.” (Id. at 26.) In support of this assertion, the
plaintiff explains that, pursuant to a directive by Commissioner Schofield, numerous inmates have been
downgraded from maximum-security classification and released into the general medium- or minimumsecurity level population at SCCF, simply in order to reduce prison costs. According to the plaintiff, these
inmates know that they are not likely to be placed back into maximum security or in segregation, even for
egregious behavior. The plaintiff states that it is common knowledge among prison staff and inmates that
defendants Schofield, Woodall, and Parker implemented state-wide policies pursuant to which CCA and
TDOC prison staff were (1) discouraged from reporting assaults as assaults, in order to hide the true level
of violence at TDOC prisons; (2) encouraged to reduce the number of STG members in maximum
security in order to save money and reduce costs; (3) directed to create a “militaristic environment” in
which plaintiff and other inmates were made to suffer for no real reason. (Id. at 26.) Thus, even though
the plaintiff reported his victimization and attacks to the defendants, the inmates responsible for the
attacks were never punished or subject to any adverse consequences for their actions. And, in fact,
according to the plaintiff, the victimizers were aware that they would not be subject to punishment or
adverse consequences.
The plaintiff alleges that he specifically reported the assaults and his continued fear for his safety
to defendants Chapman, Killingsworth, Dodd, McClain, Buttram, and Hacker. He was repeatedly told not
to be weak and that mere fear of gang attacks was not sufficient to warrant protective custody. Instead,
he would have to be a snitch or report being in possession of dope, a telephone or some other
contraband to go into protective custody. (ECF No. 1, at 29.) In other words, the plaintiff explains, he
would have to engage in criminal conduct punishable by more time in prison in order to qualify for
protective custody.
After his first assault, the plaintiff spoke with defendant Buttram, who did nothing and did not
report his injuries to medical. The plaintiff specifically requested that Warden Chapman place him in
protective custody after the first assault, but the warden refused. The warden also made no effort to stop
the out-of-control and violent behavior by STG members at SCCF. Defendants McClain, Sullivan, and
Dodd likewise refused to take any action to protect the plaintiff or to control the gang activity at the prison.

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Defendants Lindamood and Deavers came to work at SCCF as warden and assistant warden in
March 2015. The plaintiff spoke to Warden Lindamood about his past assaults and the continuing threat
the STG members posed to him. Lindamood acknowledged that the situation was “tough” but told him
that he had to be careful and that there was nothing she could do about the situation. (Id. at 32.) When
the plaintiff told her he had written to Schofield about the problems he was experiencing, Lindamood told
him the situation was Schofield’s fault. (Id.) After the plaintiff suffered another inmate assault in April
2015, defendant Deavers told him: “it’s dangerous here and the staff is unprofessional, but there was
nothing that could be done.” (Id. at 33.)
After a serious incident in which an inmate assaulted a guard in February 2015, CCA dispatched
Jason Medlin, Mid-South Regional Director, to SCCF. When the plaintiff and other inmates attempted to
speak to Medlin about the gang activity at the prison, Medlin denied the existence of a gang problem and
told the plaintiff he would have to work with his unit team to solve any problems he was having at the
institution. Medlin also told the plaintiff that he had seen video footage of inmates engaged in the pod
shower escort but that the situation was “not that bad” and inmates needed to stop “whining and do their
time.” (Id. at 34.) Medlin refused to take any steps to ameliorate the gang activity despite express
knowledge of it. He also purportedly told the plaintiff that the prison was being run “the way his bosses in
Nashville” (i.e., defendant Damon Hininger and other CCA corporate officers) wanted it run. (Id. at 34.)
The plaintiff reiterates that, for the last three years, defendants Chapman, Dodd, Lindamood, Hacker,
McClain, Killingsworth, Deavers, Inman, and Buttram knowingly and intentionally refused to enforce the
written STG-affiliation and classification policies, resulting in multiple instances in which the plaintiff was
assaulted, injured, and extorted.
The plaintiff asserts that, besides failing to protect the plaintiff from gang activity at SCCF, the
defendants also failed and refused to transfer him to a prison with a lower security level where gang
activity is not an issue. The plaintiff maintains that, if they had done so, he would not have been
repeatedly and continuously victimized over the preceding years.
The plaintiff cites to specific TDOC policies regarding the treatment of gang-related activity and
the identification and placement of gang members at TDOC institutions. He alleges that the defendants
have knowingly failed to comply with these regulations. He specifically avers that defendant Hank Inman,

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institutional STG Coordinator, has been ordered by defendants Chapman, Killingsworth, Dodd, McClain,
Buttram, and Hacker not to enforce or abide by these regulations. He asserts that the defendants acted
willfully, intentionally, and unreasonably in failing to enforce these regulations and failing to ensure that
the plaintiff, specifically, was compatible with the violent, STG-affiliated inmates with whom he was
housed.
The plaintiff alleges that the fact that no gang activity is permitted in the federally funded
Residential Drug Abuse Program at SCCF, so as not to jeopardize the receipt of federal funds, shows
that the defendants could enforce the STG-related regulations elsewhere within SCCF if they chose to,
but instead knowingly allow it to continue to occur and knowingly and intentionally fail to train prison staff
to control the conduct, or to hire sufficient staff. The plaintiff cites to numerous known and documented
instances of inmate-upon-inmate violence, caught on video camera, in which the attackers were allowed
to return to the main compound after a mere 30-day stay in HSA. The plaintiff states that he is in
possession of “literally hundreds of different examples that he could provide which would constitute
objective credible evidence of the same pattern of deliberate indifference” that caused his injuries
beginning in November 2012, and that the defendants have been and continue to be deliberately
indifferent to the unfettered, violent STG activity, uncontrolled movement between cells by STG members,
and dangerous interference with door-locking mechanisms by STG members. (Id. at 45.) As a result, the
plaintiff has lived in “utter fear and terror of being attacked” and even killed throughout his imprisonment
at SCCF. (Id. at 48.)
In his 145-page complaint, the plaintiff includes numerous other allegations about the defendants’
policy-level failures, and statements by individuals including Jerry Lester, former warden of the West
Tennessee State Penitentiary, who testified under oath before a Tennessee State Senate Select
committee that there has been “[pervasive] violence as a result of sweeping policy changes” at TDOC,
specifically including Commissioner Schofield’s “decision to reclassify about half of the system’s
maximum security inmates” in order to reduce costs. (ECF No. 1, at 68 (purportedly quoting Tennessean
article quoting Lester, attached as exhibit to complaint, ECF No. 1-7).)
In summary, the plaintiff alleges that:

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(1) as a result of the defendants’ knowing failure to control the activities of STG-affiliated
inmates at SCCF, the plaintiff has been continually subjected to physical assault and
abuse, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(2) as a result of the defendants’ permitting violent gangs to control whole units and tiers
of the housing units in the prison, the plaintiff has been violently assaulted and seriously
injured, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(3) in their effort to increase profits, streamline operations, and appear to be “tough on
crime,” the defendants created dangerous and uncontrolled conditions at SCCF, as a
result of which the plaintiff was assaulted and seriously injured and remains at risk of
serious harm at all times, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(4) as a result of their intentional failure to adequately train staff to deal with STGaffiliated inmates, the defendants created dangerous and uncontrolled conditions that led
to the plaintiff’s injuries and to his remaining at risk of serious harm, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment;
(5) the defendants’ intentional failure to adequately train staff to deal with STG-affiliated
inmates resulted in the plaintiff’s repeatedly being assigned to share a cell with STG
members, with no consideration of his lack of compatibility with such inmates, thus
creating an inherently dangerous and uncontrollable situation in which the plaintiff was
put at serious risk of serious injury, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and
(6) the defendants’ failure to adequately staff the prison created dangerous and
uncontrollable conditions that led to the assault and serious injury of the plaintiff and
placed him continuously at serious risk of serious injury, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
(See id. at 108–10.)
B.

Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff’s Serious Medical Needs

The plaintiff also brings claims arising from prison officials’ failure or refusal to treat his serious
physical injuries and chronic illnesses. He alleges that the non-medical defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his severe head, neck, back and other injuries suffered during the assaults by other inmates
and refused to send him for medical treatment after his various assaults. He asserts that the medical
personnel denied him treatment for chronic illnesses because of the cost.
More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that, in September 2013, a doctor at the Maury County
Regional Medical Center diagnosed the plaintiff as having Hepatitis B and a bacterial infection of the
gastrointestinal tract, and sent him back to SCCF with orders for the prison medical staff to treat both
conditions. The defendants, however, never gave the plaintiff any treatment for either disorder. The
plaintiff alleges that he suffers stomach pain, headaches, nausea, and vomiting, all of which are
symptoms of these conditions, and that his symptoms are worsening over time as a result of the lack of

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treatment. The plaintiff alleges that he has been denied treatment by the named medical defendants: Mrs.
Rashti, head nurse for TDOC; Jane Doe Nurses #1, #2, and #3; Dr. Robert Coble, doctor and acting
health administrator for SCCF; and John Doe Doctors #1 and #2. According to the plaintiff, these
individuals have recognized that the plaintiff has serious medical conditions but have told him that they
are not authorized to provide treatment for his conditions because it is too expensive. In addition, Jane
Doe Nurse #3 at SCCF, who saw the plaintiff on December 18, 2015, was “absolutely unhelpful and
unprofessional” and refused to provide treatment for the plaintiff’s severe symptoms or to refer him to a
doctor for follow up.
The plaintiff states that he has been in continuous pain and attempted to get medical attention
from the medical staff at SCCF throughout the past three years, to no avail. He filled out sick-call slip after
slip-call slip in an attempt to receive treatment. The plaintiff alleges that he has attempted to file
grievances about the matter, but as a matter of strict TDOC policy, is not permitted to file a grievance on
matters related to healthcare. The plaintiff also alleges that the medical staff’s employer, whom he
identifies only as Private Sector Employer John Doe Medical Health Services, intentionally instructs its
employees as a matter of policy to refuse treatment for expensive and chronic conditions such as the
plaintiff’s in order to save money and realize higher profits for the company.
The plaintiff alleges that he has repeatedly petitioned defendants Schofield, Woodall, Parker,
CCA, Hininger, Medlin, Chapman, Killingsworth, Dodd, McClain, and Buttram, asking that they intervene
on his behalf to facilitate his receipt of adequate medical treatment, but they have all refused to intervene
despite actual knowledge of his conditions and that he was not being treated as a result of the purported
cost of treatment.
The plaintiff also complains that the defendants at SCCF have implemented a policy pursuant to
which inmates housed at SCCF are forced to walk with “military precision, in line with their hands behind
their back,” while being moved from one area to another within the prison. (ECF No. 1, at 120–21.) The
plaintiff alleges that the layout of the prison and the hilly terrain make this practice particularly risky and
difficult and that it has predictably resulted in numerous falls on wet, slippery concrete in the rain. The
plaintiff alleges that he fell and seriously injured himself several times as a result of this practice. The
plaintiff avers that the defendants were aware that forcing the plaintiff, “as an older physically small . . .

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inmate with a chronic medical condition, and in deteriorating health,” to comply with this policy placed him
at grave risk of and did actually result in serious physical injury. (Id. at 121.) The plaintiff alleges that he
continues to be in pain as a result of the untreated injuries suffered as a result of this policy.
Next, the plaintiff takes issue with a prison policy pursuant to which, if he leaves his cell, he
cannot enter it again until at least thirty minutes have passed, which means he must wait at least thirty
minutes before having access to bathroom facilities. Somewhat confusingly, and without much
explanation, he further claims that this practice forces him to leave his cell and enter into the pod area,
which is overrun with and controlled by STG-affiliated inmates, because if he does not come out from his
cell during the thirty-minute interval and chow call is made for his pod, the plaintiff will not be permitted to
eat. Thus, the plaintiff asserts that he is forced to choose between entering the pod area under the control
of STG-affiliated inmates, where he risks being assaulted, or skipping meals and starving.
Finally, the plaintiff complains about SCCF officials’ inspection policy, which sometimes requires
inmates to stand at attention for forty-five to ninety minutes at a time while waiting for prison officials to
inspect the housing units and cells. During this inspection period, the plaintiff and other inmates are not
permitted to sit down, use the bathroom, walk around, or stretch. The plaintiff alleges that the purpose of
this practice is “part and parcel of Defendant Schofield’s interpretation of his mandate, by order of the
Tennessee State Governor Bill Haslam, to make [each] inmate’s time in the TDOC more harsh and
punitive and miserable. So as to exact a greater toll psychologically and physiologically.” (Id. at 123.) The
plaintiff’s inability to use the bathroom for such extended periods of time has caused him to experience
pain and suffering, exacerbated by his chronic and untreated gastrointestinal infection and Hepatitis.
Based upon all of these facts, the plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law.
He further argues that the statute of limitations does not bar his claims because the defendants’ actions
and his injuries are still continuing.
The plaintiff seeks relief from the defendants in their official capacity in the form of prospective
injunctive and declaratory relief, and he seeks compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants
in their individual capacity.
III.

Discussion
Section 1983 confers a private federal right of action against any person who, acting under color

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of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or
federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to state a § 1983
claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and (2) that “the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F. 3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
There is no question here that all the defendants, whether employed by CCA, a medical
contractor, or the state, are state actors for purposes of a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (a private medical provider contracted to provide medical care to prisoners
is a state actor for purposes of § 1983); Street v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)
(CCA acts under color of state law because it performs the traditional state function of operating a prison).
Generally speaking, “[t]he Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
protects prisoners from the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d
428, 434 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). Proving an Eighth
Amendment claim requires that the plaintiff make a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of
prison officials. Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 835 (1994)); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
Deliberate indifference has two components to it: objective and subjective. Harrison, 539 F.3d at
518. The objective component first demands a showing that the detainee faced a substantial risk of
serious harm. Id. The objective component further “requires a court to assess whether society considers
the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of
decency”—that is, it “is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 36 (1993). Therefore, the objective component of deliberate indifference is met upon a showing that a
detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that such a risk is one that society chooses not to
tolerate.
To prove the subjective component, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had “a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Harrison, 539 F.3d at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted). This state of mind is
shown “where ‘the official knows of and disregards’” the substantial risk of serious harm facing the
detainee. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). That is, “the official must both be aware of facts from

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which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Direct evidence about a defendant’s knowledge is not necessary;
rather, an individual’s subjective knowledge can be inferred from the obviousness of the harm stemming
from the risk. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (“We may infer the existence of this
subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious.”).
A.

The CCA Defendants

The CCA defendants include CCA itself; CCA President and CEO Damon Hininger; Regional
Director Jason Medlin; Arvil Chapman; Cherry Lindamood; and seven other current or former SCCF
employees, including Katherine Buttram, Benjamin Killingsworth, Daniel Dodd, Dan Deavers, Christopher
McClain, Mark Hacker, and Hank Inman.
As for the individual-capacity claims against the CCA employees, the Court finds that the
complaint states colorable claims based upon allegations that the individuals all had personal knowledge
of and encouraged the implementation of de facto policies at SCCF regarding the treatment of STGaffiliated inmates, the impact of these policies upon the plaintiff personally, and the defendants’ refusal to
take steps to protect the plaintiff from known and obvious risks associated with the conditions of his
confinement at TDOC. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (“A prison official’s ‘deliberate
indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”); Bishop
v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (inmate’s right to be free from deliberate indifference to
assault is clearly established); Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that a
prisoner-plaintiff can demonstrate deliberate indifference on the part of individual prison officials by
presenting evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude “that the official was subjectively aware of
the risk” and “disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it” (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 829, 847)).
Regarding the claims against CCA itself, the entity cannot be held liable solely on the basis that it
employs tortfeasors, because “[r]espondeat superior is not a proper basis for liability under § 1983.”
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006). Instead, a private entity can be held
responsible for an alleged constitutional deprivation only if there is a direct causal link between a policy or
custom of the entity and the alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

14

694 (1978); see also Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Like a municipality, a
government contractor cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory. . . . [A] private contractor is
liable for a policy or custom of that private contractor. . . .”). Simply stated, the plaintiff must “identify the
policy, connect the policy to the [entity] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of
the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill.
of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)).6
In this case, the petitioner has identified de facto policies which, he alleges, CCA’s corporate
officers knew about and encouraged, specifically policies involving the classification of potentially violent
inmates, the inaccurate or misleading recording of violent incidents, and the treatment of STGs and STGaffiliated inmates at state prisons and SCCF in particular. At this juncture, the Court must accept as true
the plaintiff’s allegations. According to the plaintiff’s allegations, the de facto policies at issue have placed
the plaintiff at an unreasonable and known risk of harm, in violation of his right to be from cruel and
unusual punishment. The Court finds that the plaintiff has stated colorable claims against CCA and,
consequently, against CCA’s corporate officers in their official capacity. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802,
810 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]ndividuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they
represent.” (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985))).
B.

The TDOC Defendants

The TDOC defendants include TDOC Commissioner Derrick Schofield; Deputy Commissioner
Jason Woodall; Assistant Commissioner Tony Parker; TDOC Liason Joel Foster; and TDOC contract
monitor Bryant Williams. Any claims against the state officials in their official capacity for money damages
are subject to dismissal, because “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
6

This is the law in the Sixth Circuit and every other circuit that has addressed the issue, but a
panel of the Seventh Circuit has recently observed that the matter is deserving of “fresh consideration.”
Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1024 (2015). That
court noted that the Supreme Court has never directly considered the question of whether Monell applies
to private corporations, and that “there are substantial grounds to question the extension of the Monell
holding for municipalities to private corporations.” Id. at 790. Specifically, “[i]nsulating private corporations
from respondeat superior liability significantly reduces their incentives to control their employees’ tortious
behavior and to ensure respect for prisoners’ rights. The results of the current legal approach are
increased profits for the corporation and substandard services both for prisoners and the public.” Id. at
794.

15

‘persons’ under § 1983” for purposes of a suit for damages. Will v. Mich. State Police, 491 U.S.58, 71
(1989).
However, insofar as the petitioner seeks prospective injunctive relief against the state officials in
their official capacity, his claims are not barred by the 11th Amendment or sovereign immunity. See id. at
71 n.10 (1989) (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief,
would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the State.’” (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985))). The Court
finds that the plaintiff states official-capacity claims against the TDOC officials for the same reason that he
states official-capacity claims against CCA and the CCA officials: TDOC officials allegedly knew about
and encouraged specific policies, written and unwritten, involving the classification of potentially violent
inmates, the inaccurate or misleading recording of violent incidents, and the treatment of STGs and STGaffiliated inmates at state prisons and SCCF in particular. The plaintiff also alleges facts which, if true,
establish a causal connection between the continued implementation of these policies at SCCF and his
injuries, and he seeks prospective injunctive relief.
The Court also finds that the plaintiff states colorable claims against defendants Schofield,
Woodall, Foster, and Williams and Woodall in their individual capacities, based upon the plaintiff’s
allegations that they were personally involved in the promulgation and the implementation of the policies
that injured the plaintiff and had actual knowledge about the effect of such policies on the plaintiff and
others. See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty, 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (the plaintiff must allege the
personal involvement of each defendant in the events giving rise to his claims, in order to state a cause of
action against that individual).
For purposes of the initial review, the Court finds that these claims too should be permitted to
proceed.
C.

The Medical Defendants

The plaintiff’s claims against medical personnel at SCCF are based on the individuals’ alleged
failure to provide adequate medical care. The Eighth Amendment, by its terms, prohibits the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In its
application by the courts, the Eighth Amendment has been specifically construed to prohibit the

16

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality
opinion), and conduct repugnant to “evolving standards of decency,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion). While the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), it does require humane ones, and it is clear that “the treatment a
prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The amendment imposes affirmative
duties on prison officials to “assume some responsibility for [each prisoner’s] safety and general wellbeing,” and to “provide for his basic human needs,” including medical care. DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989). “Contemporary standards of decency require
no less.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 32 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976)).
In Estelle, the Supreme Court concluded that, although accidental or inadvertent failure to provide
adequate medical care to a prisoner would not violate the Eighth Amendment, “deliberate indifference to
the serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment, because it constitutes the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” contrary to contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 104.
Under this analysis, what constitutes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” will vary depending on
the nature of the alleged constitutional violation, but the Supreme Court has clarified that the question of
whether a prisoner's claim based on prison officials’ failure to provide adequate medical care involves
both a subjective and an objective component.
The objective prong asks whether the harm inflicted by the conduct is sufficiently “serious” to
warrant Eighth Amendment protection. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). The Sixth Circuit has
defined a “serious medical need” as “either one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently
culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or

17

omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. Under
Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
In this case, the plaintiff alleges that each of the named individuals involved in his medical
treatment were personally aware that he had serious medical conditions or had suffered serious injuries
but failed to provide necessary medical care for those injuries. The individual-capacity claims against Mrs.
Rashti; Jane Doe Nurses #1, #2, and #3; Dr. Robert Coble; and John Doe Doctors #1 and #2 that are
based on such allegations will be permitted to proceed.
The plaintiff also alleges that the John Doe Medical Health Services is liable to him in its official
capacity on the basis that it promulgates policies, which the individual medical practitioners are required
to follow, pursuant to which necessary medical care is denied to prisoners with chronic conditions
because the care is deemed to be too expensive. The plaintiff alleges that he is a prisoner with chronic
conditions to whom care has been denied on the basis of cost. The Court finds, for purposes of the initial
review, that the plaintiff states a colorable claim against the John Doe Medical Health Services contractor
on this basis.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, to the extent that the complaint may be construed to seek

monetary damages against state employees in their official capacity, such a claim will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. The remaining claims will be permitted to proceed.
An appropriate order is filed herewith.

KEVIN H. SHARP
Chief Judge
United States District Court