Anderson v. Lee
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 7/8/16. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
RANDY BEA ANDERSON,
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Petitioner,
v.
RANDY LEE, Warden
Respondent.
Case No. 1:16-cv-0016
Chief Judge Sharp
MEMORNADUM_OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner Randy Bea Anderson challenges the May 6, 2013, judgment of the Maury County
Circuit Court following his Best Interest Plea of Guilty. Respondent filed an answer to the
petition (ECF No. 15), along with a copy of the underlying state-court record (ECF No. 14).
The matter is ripe for review and this Court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
Because the issues presented can be resolved with reference to the state-court record, the Court
finds that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 464, 474
(2007) (holding that if the record refutes a petitioner’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes
habeas relief, the district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing (citing Totten v.
Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998).) Upon review and applying the AEDPA standards,
the petition will be denied and this matter dismissed.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about September 4, 2012, Petitioner was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury
on one count each of aggravated burglary, theft over $1,000, and theft up to $500. (Technical
Record (“Rec.”), ECF No. 14-1 at 1-3.) On May 6, 2013, in accordance with a plea agreement,
Petitioner entered a Best Interest Plea of Guilty to one count of Class C Aggravated Burglary,
one count of Class D Felony theft and one count of Class A Misdemeanor Theft. (Id. at 4-6.)
Petitioner was sentenced as a Range II offender to a total effective prison term of 10 years with a
release eligibility of thirty-five percent. (Id.)
On August 7, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for state post-conviction relief. (Id.
at 7-15.) After reviewing the pro se petition, on January 1, 2014, the trial court appointed
counsel (Id. at 28-29), who filed an amended petition on January 31, 2014 (Id.at 30-34). In the
amended petition, Petitioner asserted that his guilty plea was involuntary and requested a new
trial. (Id. at 30-34.) On March 31, 2014, the State responded to the amended petition denying
that Petitioner’s plea was involuntary, and to the extent Petitioner was suggesting his counsel
was ineffective, the State denied that claim as well. (Id. at 35.) On November 24, 2014, the trial
court held a hearing at which petitioner and his trial counsel, Mr. Bates, testified. (Trial
Transcript (“Tr.”), ECF No. 14-2.)
On December 9, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying the petition. (Rec., ECF
No. 14-1 at 35-42.) Petitioner, through counsel filed an appeal, specifying, what had heretofore
been suggested, that Petitioner was raising two grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel: (1)
that “trial counsel failed to address [Petitioner’s] mental history and lack of [,] or change of [,]
medication prior to entering [a] plea of guilty; and (2) that [t]rial counsel failed to effectively
communicate the terms of the plea agreement.” (ECF No. 14-3 at 4.) The trial court’s decision
denying Petitioner relief was affirmed on appeal. Anderson v. State, No. M2015–00112–CCA–
R3–PC, 2016 WL 552884 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2016). Petitioner did not seek
permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
2
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the evidence presented at the
post-conviction hearing as follows:
At the November 24, 2014 post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified
that he had previously been diagnosed with two psychological disorders:
schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder. He claimed that since his arrest and
incarceration on August 3, 2012, his medication regimen was altered multiple
times, and that he did not consistently receive his medication. The Petitioner
claimed that this caused him to attempt suicide on at least two occasions while in
the State's custody. Finally, the Petitioner testified that at approximately 4:30 a.m.
on the morning of his plea submission hearing, he was asleep in an observation
cell when an officer came in to confiscate a cup of water. The official report of
incident, which was read into the record during the post-conviction proceeding,
reflected that the cup contained the Petitioner's urine and that the Petitioner threw
the cup at the officer. The Petitioner said that he “accidently hit [the officer] in the
face,” at which point the officer shot the Petitioner with a taser. The Petitioner
informed trial counsel of the incident and showed him the entry wound from the
taser dart. The Petitioner told trial counsel that he believed the guards were trying
to kill him.
The Petitioner claimed that trial counsel misled him as to the terms of his
plea agreement. The Petitioner testified that until the morning of his plea
submission, the only offer trial counsel had relayed to him from the State was
“[e]ight years' probation.” The Petitioner said that on the morning of his plea
submission, trial counsel told him that if he did not accept the State's final offer of
ten years with a release eligibility of thirty-five percent, the court would sentence
him to twenty-six years with a release eligibility of sixty percent. On crossexamination, the Petitioner conceded that he did not remember the plea
submission proceeding and could not recall whether he informed trial counsel
about the modifications to his medication regimen. After being read portions of
the transcript from his plea submission, the Petitioner agreed with the State that
he told the court that his judgment was not impaired by his medications prior to
the court accepting his guilty plea. He further admitted that he told the trial court
that he was satisfied with his attorney and that he understood that his attorney had
negotiated a plea deal wherein the Petitioner would be sentenced as a Range II
offender when, in reality, he was subject to being sentenced as a Range III
offender.
Trial counsel testified that he was appointed to represent the Petitioner in
2012. He recalled that he met with the Petitioner several times both at the jail and
in court prior to the Petitioner's appearances. Trial counsel stated that he was
aware the Petitioner had previously attempted suicide and that during one meeting
the Petitioner “said that something about having trouble getting his medications.”
However, trial counsel also testified that the Petitioner was always able to engage
in meaningful and intelligent conversations with him and that he never saw any
3
indication that the Petitioner needed a mental evaluation. Trial counsel further
recalled that on the date of the plea submission, the Petitioner was able to
converse with him in a clear and cogent manner, and stated that he would not
have let the Petitioner enter a plea if he was not fully convinced that the Petitioner
understood the proceedings.
As to the plea agreement, trial counsel testified that the State initially
offered to resolve all three charges for an effective sentence of eleven years with a
release eligibility of forty-five percent as a Range III offender. After multiple
negotiations, the State agreed to resolve all three charges for an effective sentence
of ten years with a release eligibility of thirty-five percent as a Range II offender.
Trial counsel testified that he never received an offer of eight years' probation and
never relayed such an offer to the Petitioner. Trial counsel testified that he had
multiple discussions with the Petitioner about the terms of the plea agreement
before the Petitioner decided to accept it. Specifically, trial counsel recalled that
on the day of the plea submission he asked another attorney to give the Petitioner
a second opinion on the quality of the plea offer prior to the Petitioner deciding to
accept the deal. Trial counsel was convinced that the Petitioner fully understood
the terms of his plea agreement and was competent to enter a plea.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court took the matter
under advisement, and on December 9, 2014, entered an order denying postconviction relief on all grounds. In that order, the post-conviction court found that
the Petitioner failed to prove that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel
by clear and convincing evidence. The court determined that trial counsel met
with the Petitioner on at least four occasions prior to the Petitioner's plea
submission, and concluded that the Petitioner received “excellent representation
by an experienced and very thorough and conscientious counsel, who protected
and safeguarded his rights at every stage.”
Id., 2016 WL 552884, at *1-2.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In his Amended Petition, Petitioner raises the following two grounds for relief:
Claim 1: He was not given a mental evaluation
Claim 2: His trial counsel coerced him into pleading guilty.
(ECF No. 7 at 5, 7)
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Exhaustion and Procedural Default
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Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal
district court may not entertain a petition for the writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has
first exhausted all available state-court remedies for each claim in his petition. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1). While exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement, it is a strictly enforced doctrine
designed to promote comity between the states and the federal government by giving the state an
initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Consequently, as a condition precedent to
seeking federal habeas corpus relief, the petitioner is required to fairly present his claims to
every available level of the state court system. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–20 (1982); see
also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (“[A] federal habeas petitioner . . . [must]
provide the state courts with a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts
bearing upon his constitutional claim.”). Moreover, “the doctrine of exhaustion requires that a
claim be presented to the state courts under the same theory in which it is later presented in
federal court.” Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 1998). Once a petitioner’s federal
claims have been raised in the highest state court available,1 the exhaustion requirement is
satisfied, even if that court refused to consider the claims. Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878,
883 (6th Cir. 1990).
A habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he has properly and fully
exhausted his available state court remedies with respect to the claims he presents for federal
habeas review. Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1420 n.3 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
Moreover, if a habeas petitioner retains the right under state law to raise a claim by any available
1
In Tennessee, review by the state Supreme Court is not required for exhaustion. Instead, “once
the Court of Criminal Appeals has denied a claim of error, ‘the litigant shall be deemed to have
exhausted all state remedies available for that claim.’” Adams v. Holland, 330 F.3d 398, 402 (6th
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procedure, he has not exhausted that claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). Ordinarily, habeas petitions
containing unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice in order to permit the petitioner
the opportunity to pursue them in state court. Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2002)
(citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 518, 520–22); see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005)
(confirming the continued relevance of Rose under AEDPA).
If, however, an unexhausted claim would be procedurally barred under state law, for
instance by a statute of limitations or a state rule barring successive petitions, then the claim is
deemed exhausted (because no further state review is available) but procedurally defaulted
(because it was not presented to a state court for review), and may not be considered by the
federal court on habeas review except under extraordinary circumstances. Alley, 307 F.3d at
385–86 (citations omitted); In re Cook, 215 F.3d 606, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2000). Specifically, in
order to obtain consideration of a claim that is procedurally defaulted, a petitioner must
demonstrate both “cause” for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the
alleged constitutional errors, or alternatively that failure to consider the claims will result in a
“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 311 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750
(1991)).
B.
Fully Exhausted Claims
Cir. 2003) (quoting Tenn. S. Ct. R. 39).
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Even when a petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
raises claims that have been properly exhausted in the state courts, this Court’s review is
governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PUB. L. 104-132, 110 STAT.
1214 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). The AEDPA “prevents
federal habeas ‘retrials’” and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent
possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). In this Court, an application
for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction
cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the adjudication:
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the “clearly established” holdings,
and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey v.
Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether federal law is clearly
established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Lopez v, Smith,
___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct.1, 2 (2014); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 655; Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940,
943 (6th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “clearly established Federal law” does not include decisions of
the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v.
Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to an examination of the legal
landscape as it would have appeared to the state courts in light of Supreme Court precedent at
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the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th
Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44).
Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Bell, a federal habeas court “may issue the writ
under the ‘contrary to’ clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set
forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). The federal
habeas court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause “if the state court
correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it
to the facts of the particular case.” Id. A federal habeas court may not find a state adjudication
to be “unreasonable” “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the
relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord Bell, 535 U.S. at 699. Rather, the issue is whether the state
court’s application of clearly established federal law is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 410.
“[R]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application clause if, and only if, it is so
obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no
‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697,
1706-07 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011)).
Finally, the AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v.
Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state
court is presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by
clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429
(6th Cir. 2003); Bailey, 271 F.3d at 656. This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings
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of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546
(1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).
V. DISCUSSION
In his first claim for relief, Petitioner states “Didn’t give mental evaluation.” (ECF No. 7
at 5.) Respondent argues that this claim must be denied because it is insufficiently pled or is
procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not raise it in the state courts.
Although
Respondent recognizes that Petitioner raised this issue in the state courts in the form of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he apparently believes that Petitioner has not done so
here, and argues that because Petitioner did not raise this claim as a “freestanding claim” in the
state courts, it is defaulted. (ECF No. 15 at 10.)
Respondent’s argument is not well-taken. Petitioner filed a form Petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (ECF No. 7.) The form
Petition required Petitioner to note whether he raised in a post-conviction motion the same issue
raised in “Ground One;” Petitioner marked “yes” and explained that the issues were raised in an
“Amended post-conviction [petition].” (Id. at 5.) Likewise, Petitioner noted that he received a
hearing on the issue raised in “Ground One,” that he appealed from the denial of his postconviction petition and that he raised the issue raised in “Ground One” on appeal. (Id. at 6.)
While the Petition is sparse, at best, it does contain sufficient information from which the Court
can determine that Petitioner intends to raise as Claim 1, the same claim his counsel raised in the
state court; to wit, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to address Petitioner’s mental
health history prior to allowing him to enter a guilty plea.
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In his second claim for relief, Petitioner states “attorney coerced me into plea bargain.”
(ECF No. 7 at 7.) He notes that he raised this issue in a post-conviction petition. (Id.)2
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s second claim for relief is insufficiently pled or that AEDPA
bars relief because the state court’s rejection of this claim was reasonable. As with Claim 1,
there is scant, but sufficient, information from which this Court can discern that Claim 2 here is
the same claim as was raised by Petitioner in the state courts, that is, that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to effectively communicate with Petitioner regarding the plea agreement.
Accordingly, the Court will consider the merits of Claims 1 and 2.3
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), the Supreme Court established
a two-prong test by which to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must prove:
(1) that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair
outcome.
A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must “indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689. The defendant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
2
Other than responding “yes” to the question about whether he raised the issue in Claim 2 in a
post-conviction petition, Petitioner did not respond to any other questions regarding Claim 2.
3
Error! Main Document Only.Even if one or both of Petitioner’s claims were procedurally
defaulted, the United States Supreme Court has held that federal courts are not required to
address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits. See
Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518,
525 (1997) (“Judicial economy might counsel giving the [other] question priority, for example, if
it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved
complicated issues of state law.”), and Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1997)
(deciding against the petitioner on the merits even though the claim was procedurally
defaulted)). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may
be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies
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challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)); see also Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130, 135 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that counsel’s strategic decisions were hard to attack).
When considering an ineffective assistance claim, the court must determine whether, in
light of the circumstances as they existed at the time of counsel’s actions, “the identified acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690. Even if a court determines that counsel’s performance was outside that range, the
defendant is not entitled to relief if counsel’s error had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691.
Because the state courts decided petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on their
merits, their decision must be afforded deference under AEDPA. See Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct.
10, 15-16 (2013); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. To receive habeas relief, petitioner
must demonstrate that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or represented an unreasonable
application of, Strickland v. Washington. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002).
Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently has observed, while “‘[s]urmounting Strickland’s high
bar is never an easy task,’ . . . [e]stablishing that a state court’s application was unreasonable
under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.”
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)). Because the standards under both
Strickland and § 2254(d) are highly deferential, “when the two apply in tandem, review is
‘doubly’ so.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123
(2009)). In those circumstances, “[t]he question before the habeas court is “whether there is any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.
available in the courts of the State.”).
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The two-part Strickland test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective
assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Regarding the first prong, the
court applies the same standard articulated in Strickland for determining whether counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. In analyzing the prejudice
prong, the focus is on whether counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance affected the
outcome of the plea process. “[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.
Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) for failing to address his
mental health history prior to allowing him to enter a guilty plea; and (2) for failing to effectively
communicate with him regarding the plea agreement.
Expressly applying the Strickland standard, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
analyzed Petitioner’s claims as follows:
In the present case, the Petitioner complains that trial counsel mislead him
as to the terms of his plea agreement and failed to investigate the effect of the
changes to his medication regimen on the Petitioner's ability to enter a guilty plea.
In denying the petition, the postconviction court stated, “[i]t is clear from the
[plea submission] transcript that Petitioner freely, voluntarily, and knowingly
chose to forego a jury trial and to enter a best interest guilty plea under the agreed
terms. It
is clear from the transcript that Petitioner knew the consequences of his plea.”
The post-conviction court also noted that the Petitioner affirmed that his
medication did not interfere with his ability to understand the proceedings and
that both the Court and trial counsel were careful to ensure that the Petitioner
heard and understood his plea agreement and sentence. The court concluded that
the Petitioner failed to “articulate any fair and just reason for withdrawal of his
best interest plea of guilty.”
The record does not preponderate against the postconviction court’s
findings and supports its conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective. Trial
counsel testified that he recalled that the Petitioner had some difficulty receiving
his prescribed medication; however, the record is devoid of any evidence as to
what changes were made or how those changes may have impacted the
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Petitioner's competency to enter a guilty plea. Furthermore, the postconviction
court read extensively from the Petitioner’s guilty plea colloquy, wherein he
assured the court that he was not under the influence of any medication that might
affect his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. See Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (noting that a defendant's testimony at a guilty
plea hearing “constitute[s] a formidable barrier” in any subsequent collateral
proceeding because “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong
presumption of verity”). Finally, there is no evidence, beyond the Petitioner’s
own testimony, supporting his contention that the State offered a plea deal of
eight years to be served on probation. The Petitioner's trial counsel denied that
any such offer was made or that he ever relayed such an offer to the Petitioner.
The State affirmed that they never made such an offer.
Accordingly, we agree with the post-conviction court’s determination that
trial counsel did not mislead the Petitioner as to the terms of his plea agreement
and that the Petitioner fully understood the consequences of his decision to enter a
guilty plea.
Anderson, 2016 WL 552884, *4.
As set forth above, the state court rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims because he failed to demonstrate that his best interest guilty plea was not freely,
voluntarily, and knowingly entered and because it was clear that Petitioner was sufficiently
competent to understand the consequences of his plea. Petitioner has identified no error in the
state court’s legal reasoning or factual findings. Applying the doubly deferential standard
applicable to the state-court’s determinations on habeas review, Petitioner has demonstrated no
basis for granting relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition will be denied and this matter dismissed with
prejudice.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal of the denial of a habeas
petition may not proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. §
2253. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires that a district court issue or deny a
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COA when it enters a final order. A COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner
satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district
court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller- El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
327 (2003). The district court must either issue a COA indicating which issues satisfy the
required showing or provide reasons why such a certificate should not issue. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
The Court finds that the petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right with respect to his claims and that they do not merit further review. The
court will deny a COA.
An appropriate order is filed herewith.
Kevin H. Sharp
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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