Scott v. Lindamood et al

Filing 22

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge respectfully RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 16) filed by Defendant Doreen Trafton be GRANTED and that Defendant Trafton be DISMISSED from the lawsuit. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 12/22/2017. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION

MITCHELL SCOTT
v.
WARDEN CHERRY LINDAMOOD, et al.

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NO: 1:17-0007

TO: Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., Chief District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
By Order entered April 6, 2017 (Docket Entry No. 10), the Court referred this prisoner civil
rights action to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and
(B), Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Court.
Presently pending is the motion to dismiss filed by Doreen Trafton (Docket Entry No. 16),
to which Plaintiff has not filed a response. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the motion be granted and Defendant Trafton be dismissed from this
action.

I. BACKGROUND
Mitchell Scott (“Plaintiff”) is an inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC”) currently confined at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility in Whiteville,
Tennessee. He filed this lawsuit pro se and in forma pauperis on January 30, 2017, seeking
monetary and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights

alleged to have occurred during his previous confinement at the South Central Correctional Facility
(“SCCF”) in Clifton, Tennessee.
Upon the Court’s initial review of the lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A,
Plaintiff was found to have alleged: 1) an arguable First Amendment claim against Correctional
Sergeant Doreen Trafton (“Trafton”)1; and 2) an arguable Eight Amendment claim against Trafton
and Correctional Officer Donald Bright (“Bright”). See Memorandum Opinion (Docket Entry No. 9)
at 5-8.2 With respect to the First Amendment claim, Plaintiff asserts that he is a Muslim who prays
five time a day. He alleges that Defendant Trafton refused to provide him with a cleaning kit to
clean his cell from November 30, 2016, to December 4, 2016, which he contends interfered with his
ability to engage in his prayers because it would be disrespectful to pray in a “filthy” cell.” See
Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1) at 2. In support of his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff alleges
that he was subjected to the use of excessive force on December 26, 2016, when Bright slammed the
“pie flap” slide door on Plaintiff’s wrist while Plaintiff had his arm extended through the cell door
opening. See Amended Complaint (Docket Entry No. 3-1) at 6. Plaintiff alleges that an unnamed
correctional sergeant and Captain f/n/u Keeton subsequently came into the area and failed to punish
or reprimand Bright when Bright said that he “did not care” and that he “should have broken”
Plaintiff’s wrist. Id. at 8.
Defendant Bright has filed an answer. See Docket Entry No. 18. In lieu of an answer,
Defendant Trafton has filed the pending motion to dismiss. Defendant Trafton argues that she

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Plaintiff incorrectly spelled Defendant Trafton’s last name in his pleadings as “Trefton.”

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Plaintiff’s claims against several other defendants were dismissed for failure to state a
colorable claim for relief under Section 1983. Id. at 8-9.
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should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because
Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim against her upon which relief can be granted.
She contends that Plaintiff’s allegation that she did not give him cleaning supplies fails to show that
she infringed upon Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freely exercise his religious beliefs. With
respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, Defendant Trafton contends that Plaintiff’s
allegations fail to specifically identify her as being involved in using excessive force against Plaintiff
in any manner and, even if it is assumed that she was the unnamed sergeant referred to by Plaintiff
in his pleadings, his allegations are not sufficient to show that she acted or failed to act in a manner
that would support a claim of constitutional liability against her.
Plaintiff has not responded in any manner to the motion to dismiss. In fact, the docket does
not show that Plaintiff has made any filings in this action since returning completed service packets
to the Clerk’s Office in April 2017. See Docket Entry No. 13.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
reviewed under the standard that the Court must accept as true all of the well-pleaded allegations
contained in the complaint and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11-12 (6th Cir. 1987). Although a complaint need
not contain detailed factual allegations, the factual allegations supplied must be enough to show a
plausible right to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-61, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim has
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facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court need not accept as true legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences. See Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000).

III. CONCLUSIONS
The motion to dismiss of Defendant Trafton should be granted. Even when Plaintiff’s factual
allegations are taken as true and are given the most generous reading, his allegations are simply
inadequate to support constitutional claims upon which relief can be granted against Defendant
Trafton.
While prison inmates do not lose their First Amendment right to exercise their religion
because of their incarceration, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct.2400, 96
L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), “the circumstances of prison life may require some restriction on prisoners’
exercise of their religious beliefs.” Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 929 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff’s
allegation that he was not immediately provided with a cleaning kit and could not clean his cell for
approximately four days until he obtained a cleaning kit on what appears to be the regularly
scheduled day for distributing cleaning kits is an allegation that simply fails to show an event that
rises to the level of a constitutional infringement upon Plaintiff’s ability to practice his religious
beliefs. The First Amendment does not require that prison officials provide inmates with the best
possible means of exercising their religious beliefs nor does it require that general prison policies
and concerns become subordinate to the religious desires of any particular inmate, and the internal
administration of a correctional facility is a function legitimately left to the discretion of prison
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administrators. See O’Lone, supra; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d
447 (1979); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974),
overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d
459 (1989).
Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his excessive force claim are likewise insufficient to
support a claim for relief against Defendant Trafton. A defendant cannot be held individually liable
under Section 1983 for constitutional violations absent a showing that the defendant was personally
involved in some manner in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Miller v. Calhoun County, 408
F.3d 803, 817, n.3 (6th Cir. 2005); Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff
does not allege that Trafton used excessive force against him, and he further fails to specifically
identify her as having a role in the aftermath of the use of force by Defendant Bright. Trafton is not
specifically mentioned anywhere in Plaintiff’s pleadings regarding this claim. Although an unnamed
correctional sergeant is referred to by Plaintiff in his pleadings, there are no facts upon which a
reasonable inference can be made that Trafton is the unnamed individual.3 The Court cannot supply
facts that are not alleged by Plaintiff, and the Court is not required to create Plaintiff’s claims for
him. See Thompson v. A.J. Rose Mfg. Co., 208 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2000); Guarino v. Brookfield
Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 1992); Bell v. Tennessee, 2012 WL 996560 at *9
(E.D. Tenn. March 22, 2012).

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Two facts weigh against any reasonable inference that Defendant Trafton was the unnamed
correctional sergeant. First, Plaintiff was clearly aware of Defendant Trafton’s identity by late
December 2016, when the excessive force claim arose since the cell cleaning events involving
Trafton occurred in November 2016. Second, Defendant Trafton is a female, yet Plaintiff uses a
male pronoun “he the sergant (sic) just look at me” in referring to the unnamed sergeant. See Docket
Entry No. 3-1 at 6.
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge respectfully RECOMMENDS that
the motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 16) filed by Defendant Doreen Trafton be GRANTED and
that Defendant Trafton be DISMISSED from the lawsuit.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
Court within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with
particularity the specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made.
Failure to file written objections within the specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to
appeal the District Court's Order regarding the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.
1981).
Respectfully submitted,

BARBARA D. HOLMES
United States Magistrate Judge

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