Cloyd v. Corizon Health Care et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Accordingly, the Court rules as follows: (1) The R & R (Doc. No. 53 ) is ADOPTED and APPROVED; (2) Cloyd's Objections (Doc. No. 58 ) are OVERRULED; and (3) Cloyd's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No . 45 ) is DENIED. This case is hereby returned to Magistrate Judge Brown for further pretrial case management. Signed by Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 2/15/2018. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(mg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
TIMOTHY W. CLOYD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON HEALTH CARE, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 1:17-cv-0008
Chief Judge Crenshaw
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Magistrate Judge Brown has entered a Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 53) that
recommends Timothy W. Cloyd’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 45) requesting
medical treatment be denied. In accordance with Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Cloyd has filed several specific Objections (Doc. No. 58) to the R & R.
Cloyd first objects to Magistrate Judge Brown’s observation that Cloyd did not reply to
Defendant’s response. While Cloyd acknowledges this is a true statement, he claims that this failure
was due to the fact that the inmate helping him was shipped to another institution. This objection
is irrelevant because Magistrate Judge Brown was merely identifying the documents on which his
decision was based. Replies are not mandatory and, in fact, are often not allowed without leave of
the Court.
Cloyd next objects to the statement that “the medical records in this case are not as clear as
they could be[,] and the Plaintiff has not provided specific examples of some of the treatment he
claims was ordered but not carried out.” (Doc. No. 53 at 3). In this regard, Cloyd points to a
medical record from May 10, 2017 that he claims shows an MRI was ordered but not taken.
However, that record merely states that Cloyd complained of “chronic back pain” and that he “may
need repeat MRI.” (Doc. No. 58 at 8). This exhibit does not definitively state that Cloyd is to
receive an MRI, or when such a repeat MRI is needed. In this respect, the document merely
confirms Magistrate Judge Brown’s observation that the medical records are far from clear.
Cloyd also objects to Magistrate Judge Brown’s statement that, “although the Plaintiff
complains of back pain[,] he was performing fairly heavy work and requesting transfer to another
institution where he could work and earn more money.” (Doc. No. 53 at 3). Cloyd claims “he is
a class B medical status, which does not allow him to be placed on such labor intensive job,” and
that “CoreCivic put him in this job against policy.” (Doc. No. 58 at 2). As support he points to an
exhibit which shows his classification on February 24, 2015 to be “Class B Limited Duty,” (Doc.
No. 58 at 12). Nevertheless, on an exhibit dated August 9, 2017 that was attached to the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Cloyd wrote that he has “done industrial cleaning and landscaping[,] hard
labor for behavior and program credit called good days[.]” (Doc. No. 45 at 5). In that same exhibit,
Cloyd complains that CoreCivic would not allow him to go to the “Transition Center,” even though
he had been engaged in “hard labor jobs.” (Doc. No. 45 at 5). Thus, regardless of how it came
about, Magistrate Judge Brown did not err in observing that Cloyd performed hard labor.
Cloyd also objects to Magistrate Judge Brown’s statement that he did not attend several
physical therapy sessions. Cloyd claims this was impossible because physical therapy was not
ordered until May 20, 2017, it started on June 8, 2017, and it finished on July 24, 2017. He also
claims that his “personal calendar” shows that he did not miss any physical therapy session, and that
he only missed sick calls when he was on lock-down or when he was not notified by staff of the
appointment. Whatever Cloyd’s personal calendar may show, it is not evidence before the Court
and the medical records before Magistrate Judge Brown indicate that Cloyd was a “no show” for
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numerous medical appointments between and March 21, 2017 and June 7, 2017. (Doc. No. 45 at
6; Doc. No. 49 at 5).
The remainder of Cloyd’s objections are in the nature of argument. He asserts that, while
the medical records show some minor medical treatment, they amount to “no treatment at all[.]”
(Doc. No. 58 at 3). He also argues in a conclusory fashion that “irreparable harm has been shown,”
and that he has shown deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Id.).
As the one moving for “extraordinary relief” in the form of a preliminary injunction, Mich.
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Snyder, 729 F.3d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 2013), it is Cloyd’s burden
to establish (1) “that he is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips in his favor,” and
(4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
20 (2008). Cloyd has established none of those elements.
Cloyd’s claim is for deliberate indifference to his medical needs, which “requires him to
show both that the ‘alleged mistreatment was objectively serious,’ and that the officials ‘subjectively
ignored the risk to the inmate's safety.’” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 509 F. App’x 510, 513–14 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011)). Even assuming Cloyd’s
medical condition is serious, he has not shown that his complaints were ignored. To the contrary,
the medical records before the Court establish that, when Cloyd asserted a variety of complaints,
those complaints were addressed by the medical staff. While he may not like the treatment he
received, and while he may believe it could have been better or more thorough, “a disagreement over
the wisdom or correctness of a medical judgment is insufficient for the purpose of a deliberate
indifference claim,” and, as a general rule, “where a plaintiff has received care, he will not be able
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to sustain a claim of deliberate indifference.” Id. (collecting cases).
Nor has Cloyd presented any evidence that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction. While verifying medical evidence may be excused “where a plaintiff’s
claims arise from an injury or illness ‘so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention,’” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted), Cloyd has not shown that to be the case here. Rather, his Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction is based on the fact that he did not receive an MRI and that he had an
enlarged prostate. As to the former, he claims Dr. Soldo “said he would recommend a[n] MRI,” and,
as to the latter, he claims Dr. Soldo “imediately [sic] precripd [sic] proscar.” (Doc. No. 45 at 1, 2).
This hardly suggests inattention or an obvious need for treatment that was ignored.
Cloyd’s failure to show either a substantial likelihood of success or irreparable harm also
leads to the conclusion that neither the equities, nor the public interest, support his request for
injunctive relief. A federal court “ must remember that the duty to protect inmates’ constitutional
rights does not confer the power to manage prisons or the capacity to second-guess prison
administrators[.]” Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 278 (6th Cir. 2009). Rather, “[t]he medical care
of prison inmates is entrusted to prison doctors, to whose judgment and training courts owe
substantial deference.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990); see Hayward v.
Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 1:16-CV-2555, 2018 WL 447326, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2018) (same);
Georgetown v. Tran, No. CIV.A. 01-1584, 2002 WL 818079, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 2002) (same).
“By granting the requested injunctive relief in this case, the Court would be in the untenable position
of second-guessing Defendants’ medical decisions, a task for which [it is] particularly ill-equipped.”
Mitchell v. Badawi, No. 14-11346, 2015 WL 4094372, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015); see
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Gaybor v. Pugh, No. 4:14-CV-00318, 2014 WL 4184372, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2014)
(observing that a court “is ill-equipped to micro-manage medical treatment or second-guess the
BOP’s administrative decisions, including transfers”).
Accordingly, the Court rules as follows:
(1) The R & R (Doc. No. 53) is ADOPTED and APPROVED;
(2) Cloyd’s Objections (Doc. No. 58) are OVERRULED; and
(3) Cloyd’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 45) is DENIED.
This case is hereby returned to Magistrate Judge Brown for further pretrial case management.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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