Eads v. State of Tennessee et al

Filing 94

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 27 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Filed Under Seal Pursuant to Rule 5.2 (d) filed by Mitchell Eads. Pending before the Court is the pro se prisoner Plaintiff's Rule 65(a) Motion for Preliminary Injunctio n filed under seal pursuant to Rule 5.2(b). Docket No. 27. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be DENIED. Further, the undersigned finds that there is no basis to maintain this pleading under seal and therefor e recommends that the seal be removed and this pleading be made part of the publicly accessible docket in this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 4/24/2019. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION

MITCHELL EADS
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 1:18-cv-00042
Judge Campbell/Frensley

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the pro se prisoner Plaintiff’s Rule 65(a) Motion for
Preliminary Injunction filed under seal pursuant to Rule 5.2(b). Docket No. 27. For the reasons
stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be DENIED. Further, the undersigned
finds that there is no basis to maintain this pleading under seal and therefore recommends that the
seal be removed and this pleading be made part of the publicly accessible docket in this case.
RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff Mitchell Eads, an inmate now housed at the South Central Correctional Facility
(“SCCF”) in Clifton, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U. S. C § 1983 for violation of
his civil rights. Docket No. 1. Among the claims asserted by Plaintiff was that much of his personal
property was lost or stolen when it was removed from his cell following his segregation at
Northeast Correctional Facility and subsequent transfer to Turney Center Industrial Complex.
Docket No. 1, pp. 12-13. The Complaint contends this was a violation of his rights under the
Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Plaintiff’s instant motion seeks a preliminary
injunction ordering that the Plaintiff be restored to his “previously enjoyed personal property
rights.” Docket No. 27. Specifically, he seeks an Order that the Defendants allow him to replace a

number of personal property items which he alleges were lost or taken from him in violation of
Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
ANALYSIS
LEGAL STANDARD
The moving party has the burden of proving that the circumstances “clearly demand” a
TRO or a Preliminary Injunction. Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t., 305 F. 3d
566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). The court must balance four factors in deciding whether to issue a
preliminary injunction or TRO “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether
issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public
interest would be served by issuance of the injunction.” City of Pontiac Retied Employees Ass’n.
v. Schimmel, 751 F. 3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014)(en banc)(internal quotation marks omitted).
These four factors are “factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met.” Michael
v. Futhey, 2009 WL 4981688, at *17 (6th Cir., December 17, 2009)(quoting Six Clinics Holding
Corp., II v. Cafcomp Systems, 119 F. 3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 1997)). Nonetheless, it remains that the
hallmark of injunctive relief is the likelihood of irreparable harm. Patio Enclosures, Inc. v. Herbst,
39 Fed. Appx. 964, 967 (6th Cir. 2002)(“[t]he demonstration of some irreparable injury is a sine
qua non for issuance of an injunction.”); see also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 22-23, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed 2d 249 (2008)(rejecting the notion that a mere
“possibility” of irreparable injury was sufficient for a preliminary injunction and holding that
“plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief [are required] to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely
in the absence of an injunction”)(emphasis in original). “A finding that there is simply no

2

likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal.” Gonzalez v. National Board of Medical
Examiners, 225 F. 3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000).
The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating his entitlement to a preliminary injunction,
and his burden is a heavy one. Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy which should be
granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly
demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t., 305 F. 3d 566, 573 (6th Cir.
2002). Further, where a prison inmate seeks an order enjoining state prison officials, this court is
required to proceed with the utmost care and must be cognizant of the unique nature of the prison
setting. See, Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F. 2d 432, 438, n. 3 (6th Cir. 1984).
THE CASE AT BAR
What Eads seeks by his motion is not maintenance of the status quo pending trial. Instead
he asks that the Court order Defendants to allow him to replace items of personal property which
he says were lost or taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights. Eads’ motion thus falls
into the category of “particularly disfavored” requests for injunctive relief and is subject to the
Court’s heightened scrutiny. Schrier v. University of Colorado, 427 F. 3d at 1253, 1259 (10th Cir.
2005).
1.

Likelihood of success on the merits

Plaintiff contends that his likelihood of prevailing at trial “is all but certain and absolute.”
Docket No. 27, p. 6. He contends that he will easily prevail on the merits based on the failure of
corrections officers to investigate the loss of his property or make reasonable efforts to recover the
property. Docket No. 27, p. 9. He contends the correctional officials breached their duty to make
reasonable attempts to recover the stolen property which is more than sufficient to establish a
3

likelihood he will prevail on the merits at trial. Id. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s beliefs in this regard,
the Court, in its initial review of his Complaint found that he fails to state a claim for the loss of
his property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Docket No. 17, p. 24. The Court also concluded
that he could not state a claim under the Fourth or Eighth Amendments and that the claim was only
properly advanced under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at p. 23, n. 4.
Because Plaintiff’s claims related to his property have already been dismissed by the Court
in this matter on initial review, there is no likelihood of success on the merits and thus Plaintiff’s
request should be denied on that ground alone. Nonetheless, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the other
elements required to obtain injunctive relief. As the Court also found, here appear to be adequate
state post-deprivation remedies available to the Plaintiff for the loss of his property. Docket No.
17, p. 24. For this reason, Plaintiff cannot establish that irreparable injury will result if he does
not obtain injunctive relief. Furthermore, whether Plaintiff may replace his items of personal
property seems to fall squarely within the “day to day management of prisons” which courts have
long expressed reluctance to involve themselves in. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472, 42
(1995). Thus, the public interest in effective prison administration will weigh against injunctive
relief if there has not been a sufficient showing of constitutional harm. Because Eads’ claims were
dismissed by this Court in initial review, he has adequate state post deprivation remedies available
and the public has an interest in effective prison administration which is not outweighed by the
other considerations in this case, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 27) be DENIED.
As noted above, Plaintiff filed this action under seal. The Court ordered Plaintiff to file the
required motion to seal providing sufficiently compelling reasons why the pleading should remain
4

under seal. Docket No. 54. Plaintiff has not provided any explanation as to why his motion should
be under seal. The undersigned has reviewed the motion and supporting documents and does not
believe that there is a compelling reason to seal the documents. There does not appear to be any
sensitive information contained within the pleading and the substance of the pleading i.e. the items
Plaintiff seeks to replace, are all identified in his Complaint along with the legal arguments
surrounding his belief that he is entitled to the relief sought. For these reasons, the undersigned
further recommends that Plaintiff’s motion (Docket No. 27) be publicly available on the docket in
this matter.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).

________________________________
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge

5