Eads v. State of Tennessee et al

Filing 98

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 46 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Mitchell Eads, 71 MOTION to Strike filed by Mitchell Eads. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Inunc tion (Docket No. 46) and Motion to Strike (Docket No. 71) be DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley on 5/1/2019. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail. ) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION

MITCHELL EADS
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.
Defendants.

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Docket No. 1:18-cv-00042
Judge Campbell/Frensley

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by pro se prisoner
Plaintiff, Mitchell Eads, in this matter. Docket No. 46. Defendants have filed a response in
opposition. Docket No. 60. Also pending is a motion filed by the pro se Plaintiff under Rule 12(f)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to strike Defendants’ response in opposition to the Motion
for Preliminary Injunction. Docket No. 71. Defendants have filed a response in opposition to the
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. Docket No. 74. For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned
recommends Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Inunction (Docket No. 46) and Motion to Strike
(Docket No. 71) be DENIED.
RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff, Mitchell Eads, is an inmate now housed at the South Central Correctional Facility
(“SCCF”). He has brought this pro se complaint under 42 U. S. C § 1983 for violation of his civil
rights. Docket No. 1. After conducting an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”), the Court dismissed numerous of Plaintiff’s complaints but allowed certain of his
claims to proceed.
At the time Plaintiff filed the instant motion for preliminary injunction was housed at the

Turney Center Industrial Complex (“TCIX”). Docket No. 46. His motion asked that the Court
require that Defendants provide him with law books and legal reference materials while he is in
segregation at TCIX. Id. He argues that the denial of these materials has “hindered and obstructed”
the Plaintiff’s access to the Courts and “severely impeded and obstructed” his ability to investigate
the issues in this case. Docket No. 46. He asks that he be provided with law books and legal
reference materials immediately and unconditional or that Defendants be fined and/or disciplined
for every 24-hour period they fail to provide him with such materials. Id.
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion is moot as he has now been
transferred to another prison facility since filing the Motion. Docket No. 60. They further argue
that he cannot meet the burden to show why injunctive relief should be granted and that the Court
has no authority to discipline the Defendants related to their jobs as prison officials dispite
Plaintiff’s request as part of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Id. They point out Plaintiff
has not attempted to show he is likely to succeed on the merits apart from his conclusory statement
to that effect, has failed to show the need for the injunction to prevent a risk of injury or that the
injunction would benefit the public interest. Id.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Motion to Strike Defendants’ Response arguing that it is
“immaterial and impertinent” as “it does not address Plaintiff’s property issue in any manner.”
Docket No. 71. 1
Defendants filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Strike on the grounds that
“Defendants response brief precisely addressed the Motion for Preliminary Injunction this court

1 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this matter under Seal (Docket No. 27) related to his personal
property. It appears Plaintiff believes the Court ordered Defendants to respond to that motion rather than to the instant
motion.

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ordered Defendants to address.” Docket No. 74, p. 2. They note that it appears the Plaintiff
mistakenly believes that his Motion for Preliminary Injunction pertaining to his personal property
was filed under Docket No. 46 and thus Defendants response is immaterial or impertinent. Id. at
p. 3.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff Eads has the burden of showing that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction. He
must show that he is “likely to succeed on the merits,” and that he is “likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of injunctive relief, that the balance of equities tip in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S.
7, 22-23, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed 2d 249 (2008); see also Cooper v. Honeywell, Int’l, Inc. 884
F. 3d 612, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2018).
Since filing his motion for preliminary injunction against staff at TCIX and seeking to
enjoin them from denying access to legal materials, Eads has been transferred to SCCF,
asevidenced by his filing of a notice of change of address. Docket No. 53. None of the Defendants
identified in the Motion for preliminary injunction work at SCCF. Docket No. 1. As a general
matter, a transfer to another prison moots a prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief related to prison
conditions if the alleged risk of harm does not travel to his new location. Compare Colvin v.
Caruso, 605 F. 3d 282, 295 (6th Cir. 2010)(finding injunctive relief claim not mooted by transfer
when challenged Kosher meal policy also applied to Plaintiff at new prison), with Proctor v.
Applegate, 661 F. Supp 2d, 743, 763 (E. D. Mich. 2009)(finding injunctive relief claim moot where
none of the alleged acts that took place and none of the named Defendants was employed at a
facility where any Plaintiff was then housed). “Underlying [this] Rule is the premise that injunctive
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relief is appropriate only where Plaintiff can show a reasonable expectation or a probability that
he is in immediate danger of sustaining direct future injury as the result of the future injury as the
result of the challenged official conduct.” Proctor, 661 F. Supp 2d at 762, see also Kensu v. Haigh,
87 F. 3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)(finding claims for declaratory injunctive relief regarding mail
moot because prisoner was no longer at the institution that searched his mail).
Here, Eads has only pled the denial of legal materials by staff at TCIX. Docket No. 46.
Because the conduct about which Plaintiff complains specifically related to TCIX and the
Defendants named therein, Plaintiff cannot show that irreparable injury in likely in the absence of
an injunction. Because Plaintiff’s allegations relate only to his alleged treatment at TCIX his claims
for injunctive relief are moot since he was transferred to SCCF. Further, he cannot establish in
light of the transfer that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury or otherwise satisfy the elements
required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. For these reasons, the undersigned
recommends that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 46) be DENIED.
The undersigned further recommends that because Defendants’ response specifically addresses the
issues raised in the Plaintiff’s instant motion for preliminary injunction and Plaintiff’s apparent
confusion regarding the pleadings he has filed that his Motion to Strike (Docket No. 71) be
DENIED as well.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
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and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).

JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
U. S. Magistrate Judge

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