Davis v. Social Security Administration

Filing 17

ORDER: For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED and the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report in its entirety. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. This Order terminates this Court's jurisdiction over the above-styled action, and the case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Senior Judge John T. Nixon on 6/19/12. (afs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
DAREL NICKIE DAVIS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

No. 2:11-cv-00062
Judge Nixon
Magistrate Judge Brown

ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Darel Nickie Davis’s Motion for Judgment on the
Administrative Record (“Motion”) (Doc. No. 11), accompanied by a supporting Memorandum
(Doc. No. 12). Defendant Commissioner of Social Security filed a Response in Opposition.
(Doc. No. 13.) Magistrate Judge Brown issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”),
recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion be denied and that the decision of the Commissioner be
affirmed. (Doc. No. 14 at 13.) Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report (Doc. No. 15), to which
Defendant filed a Response (Doc. No. 16). Upon review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
for the reasons discussed herein, the Court ADOPTS the Report in its entirety and DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Social

Security Income (“SSI”) on December 19, 2007, with an alleged onset date of January 1, 2004.1

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During the ALJ hearing, the ALJ granted Plaintiff’s request that his alleged onset date be amended to January 1,
2007. (Tr. at 31-32.)

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(Tr. at 92, 94.)2 Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on February 20, 2008 (id. at 51-54),
and again after reconsideration on August 21, 2008 (id. at 58-60). Plaintiff filed a request for a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on October 3, 2008. (Id. at 61-62.) A
video hearing before ALJ Joan A. Lawrence, at which Plaintiff, his attorney, and a Vocational
Expert (“VE”) appeared, took place on December 1, 2009. (Id. at 27.) The ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision on April 12, 2010, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under Sections
216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2009, Plaintiff’s date last
insured. (Id. at 15, 26.) In her decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act on December 31, 2009.
2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity
during the period from his alleged onset date of January 1, 2004
through his date last insured of December 31, 2009 (20 CFR
404.1571 et seq.).
....
3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following
severe impairments: bipolar disorder; depression (20 CFR
404.1520(c)).
....
4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
....
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the
residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations:
mild limitations in [his] ability to deal with the public, maintain
attention/concentration, respond appropriately to changes in the
work setting, work closely to others without undue distraction,
complete a normal workweek and accept instructions/criticism
appropriately.
....

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An electronic copy of the administrative record is docketed in this case at Doc. No. 7.

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6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of
performing past relevant work as an auto body pain[ter] and
repair[man]. This work did not require the performance of work
related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).
....
7. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, at any time from January 1, 2004, the alleged onset
date, through December 31, 2009, the date last insured (20 CFR
404.1520(f)).
(Id. at 20-26.) The Appeals Council denied a request by Plaintiff to review the ALJ decision in a
letter dated April 15, 2011, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner
in this case. (Id. at 5-7.)
On June 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action to obtain judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. No. 1.) On October 14,
2011, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion (Doc. No. 11), along with a supporting Memorandum
(Doc. No. 12), to which the Defendant filed a Response on November 14, 2011 (Doc. No 13).
On April 4, 2012, Magistrate Judge Brown issued his Report, recommending that Plaintiff’s
Motion be denied and the action be dismissed. (Doc. No. 14 at 13.) Plaintiff filed Objections to
the Report on April 17, 2012. (Doc. No. 15.) Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff’s
Objections to the Report on May 1, 2012. (Doc. No. 16.) The Court discusses the merits of
Plaintiff’s objections below.
B. Factual Background
The Court adopts the factual background as described in the Review of the Record in the
Magistrate Judge’s Report. (Doc. No. 14 at 2-9.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s review of the Report is de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). This review, however,

is limited to “a determination of whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the
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[Commissioner’s] decision and to a review for any legal errors.” Landsaw v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Title II of the Social Security Act provides
that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, if the
Commissioner adopts the ALJ’s decision, the reviewing court will uphold the decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
Substantial evidence is a term of art and is defined as “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S 389,
401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It is “more than a
mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance.” Bell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F.3d
244, 245 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 229).
“Where substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s determination, it is conclusive,
even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
203 F.3d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1999); Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)). This standard of review is
consistent with the well-settled rule that the reviewing court in a disability hearing appeal is not
to weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, because these factual determinations
are left to the ALJ and to the Commissioner. Hogg v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 328, 331 (6th Cir.
1993); Besaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992). Thus,
even if the Court would have come to different factual conclusions as to the plaintiff’s claim on
the merits than those of the ALJ, the Commissioner’s findings must be affirmed if they are
supported by substantial evidence. Hogg, 987 F.2d at 331.
III.

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT
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A. Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s recommendation that the ALJ properly evaluated
Plaintiff’s credibility.
Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the ALJ properly
evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility. (Doc. No. 15 at 1.) Plaintiff refers to his testimony from the
administrative hearing in which he described his alleged pain, physical limitations, and limited
treatment options aside from pain medications. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff emphasizes an MRI dated
March 25, 2009, arguing that it is sufficient to establish the underlying medical conditions
causing Plaintiff’s alleged pain, specifically: a herniated disc at L5-S1, lumbar spondylosis, and
facet arthritis. (Id. at 2.) Further, Plaintiff states that his testimony at the hearing is consistent
with the statements he gave to various doctors and administration personnel in the past. (Id.) As
a result, Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s evaluation of his
credibility. (Id.)
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to sufficiently consider his experiences of
irritability, sleep problems, and mood swings, though Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence in
the medical record that the ALJ allegedly failed to consider. (Id.) Plaintiff also argues that the
ALJ failed to consider positive evidence of his bipolar condition. (Id.) Plaintiff particularly
notes his short attention span, problems dealing with the public, attempted suicide, limited daily
activities, and problems with rages and anxiety. (Id.) He states that, while he was relatively
stable at the time of his hearing, he generally stays at home to avoid anxiety attacks. (Id. at 2-3.)
Plaintiff argues that his testimony is supported by reports from his healthcare providers, without
specifying which reports provide such support. (Id. at 3.)
In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff merely reiterates the arguments he raised in
his Motion and that the Magistrate Judge correctly analyzed and rejected these arguments in the
Report. (Doc. No. 16 at 1.) With respect to the substance of Plaintiff’s objections, Defendant
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refers the Court to the arguments set forth in his Response to Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. No. 13).
(Doc. No. 16 at 1.) There, Defendant argued that the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff’s
statements regarding his pain were not entirely credible, noting that the ALJ discussed and
adequately supported her conclusion that Plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with the
evidence in the record. (Doc. No. 13 at 10-11.) Defendant detailed the various pieces of
evidence the ALJ used in her analysis of Plaintiff’s mental complaints, and summarized that
“Plaintiff fails to point to any specific error with the ALJ’s thorough credibility analysis, and it is
supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at 12-14.)
Since an ALJ is “charged with the duty of observing a witness’s demeanor and
credibility,” the credibility findings of an ALJ are “to be accorded great weight and deference.”
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Villarreal v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 818 F.2d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1987)). If an ALJ finds evidence
contradictory to a claimant’s allegations in the record, she may make an adverse credibility
finding against the claimant. Id. (citing Bradley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d
1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1988)). An ALJ’s credibility determination must be thoroughly supported
by substantial evidence, see id. (citing Beavers v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 577 F.2d
383, 386-87 (6th Cir. 1978)), and an ALJ may not simply ignore a claimant’s subjective
complaints, see Blacha v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1990).
An ALJ may not make credibility determinations based merely on an “intangible or intuitive
notion about an individual’s credibility.” SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (1996).
In making such an adverse credibility determination, an ALJ must explain his decision so
that it is “sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” Id.
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Essentially, “blanket assertions that the claimant is not believable will not pass muster, nor will
explanations as to credibility which are not consistent with the entire record and the weight of the
relevant evidence.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir. 2007). For
example, the Sixth Circuit held that an ALJ’s finding that a claimant’s allegation of disabling
pain was not credible was adequately supported by evidence including the claimant’s failure to
seek significant medical treatment, reliance on non-prescription pain medication, and ability to
drive. See Blacha, 927 F.2d at 231. Even where there is medical evidence that could reasonably
support the claimant’s complaints, the ALJ is not required to find the claimant credible. See
Jones v. Comm’ r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at
531).
The validity of a claimant’s subjective complaints is evaluated using the two-step test
articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d
847 (6th Cir. 1986). First, the ALJ must address whether there is objective medical evidence of
an underlying impairment. Id. at 853. If such objective medical evidence is present, then the
ALJ must find that either: (1) objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the claimed
pain arising from the underlying impairment, or (2) the objectively established medical condition
is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. Id.
All relevant evidence is to be considered, including: the claimant’s daily activities; the location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; precipitating or aggravating
factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain
or other symptoms; treatment, other than medication, received; any measures used to relieve pain
or other symptoms; and other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions. Felisky
v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1038 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). The relevant
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regulation emphasizes that claimant’s statements about his symptoms should be carefully
considered because symptoms can reveal a severity of impairment beyond that shown by
objective medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
While there are many potential factors that an ALJ may consider when evaluating a
claimant’s symptoms, a few factors are particularly relevant to the instant case. First, an ALJ
may rely on indications of conservative treatment when assessing credibility. See Ashworth v.
Sullivan, No. 91-5699, 1991 WL 278961, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1991); Villarreal, 818 F.2d at
463. Second, a showing that the claimant failed to follow the course of treatment can defeat a
claim when assessing credibility. See Webster v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 84-5857,
1985 WL 13523, at *3 (6th Cir. July 8, 1985) (finding that the refusal to follow a prescribed
course of treatment defeats a claim in the absence of proof of incapacity to follow the course).
In the case at bar, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ relied on substantial
evidence3 when discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. (Doc. No. 14 at 13.) As summarized in the
Report, “the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s credibility based on his daily and social activities, the
conservative treatment for both his back pain and me[n]tal health issues, and his drug use,”
which was noted to be as recent as February of 2007. (Id. at 12.) The Magistrate Judge further
noted that Plaintiff did not seek treatment for his back pain until fairly recently, in 2009, and that
it was then treated conservatively. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge also placed emphasis on the fact
that Plaintiff’s mental complaints were fairly stable from May of 2008 through October of 2009,

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The Magistrate Judge uses the term “significant evidence” in certain instances in the Report. (Doc. No. 14 at 13.)
The Court understands “significant evidence” to be synonymous with “substantial evidence,” given that the
Magistrate Judge properly described the applicable standard as “substantial evidence.” (Id. at 10, 12.)

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with a consistent GAF4 of 60 and continued positive responses by Plaintiff to the prescribed
course of medicine. (Id.) The Report noted that the ALJ found it particularly relevant that
“Plaintiff was able to maintain a social relationship outside his marriage and could take care of
his personal needs.” (Id. at 12-13.) Lastly, the Magistrate Judge highlighted Plaintiff’s
motorcycle trip with his wife only six months after his inpatient hospitalization for suicide
ideation. (Id. at 13.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the ALJ had sufficient evidence
to discount Plaintiff’s credibility. (Id.)
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the ALJ properly
evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility in connection with both his alleged physical and mental health
concerns. As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Objections reiterate the original
arguments he asserted in his Motion. (Doc. No. 12 at 11; Doc. No. 15 at 1.) Regarding
Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling physical pain, the Court finds that the ALJ relied on
substantial evidence to discount Plaintiff’s credibility regarding the degree and severity of his
back problems. Such substantial evidence included conservative treatment, the fact that surgery
was not required, the lack of significant abnormalities shown by objective scans and tests, the
fact that treating physicians made no note of nor delivered any opinion that Plaintiff’s activities
were limited by his pain, and Plaintiff’s reported daily and social activities. (Tr. at 24.) As noted
above, conservative treatment is a proper source of evidence for an ALJ’s findings. See
Ashworth, 1991 WL 278961, at *7; Villarreal, 818 F.2d at 463. In Dr. Kenneth Lister’s final
evaluation, he wrote that Plaintiff had experienced merely transient relief from injections, but
concluded that Plaintiff’s pain could be controlled through nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory

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The GAF scale considers “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of
mental health-illness.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 43 (4th ed.
2000).

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medications. (Tr. at 497.) A review of the record also supports the ALJ’s finding that objective
scans and tests did not reveal significant abnormalities, particularly in the notations of only
minor changes and no significant abnormalities in the MRIs performed in 2009. (Id. at 493-94.)
The Court further agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ correctly assessed
Plaintiff’s credibility regarding his mental health. The ALJ supported her findings with
substantial evidence, including Plaintiff’s single inpatient hospitalization, during which time
Plaintiff used drugs illegally; conservative psychotropic medication prescriptions; the absence of
specific limitations assigned by treating mental health professionals; the focus on situational
stressors in his mental health treatment; the finding that the mental function assessments of
record from the state agency psychologists comported with the residual functional capacity
determination made by the ALJ; and Plaintiff’s failure to continue counseling, which, as noted
above, is a consideration appropriate for this analysis, see Webster, 1985 WL 13523, at *3. (Id.
at 24.)
While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to give sufficient consideration to [his] reports
of irritability, sleep problems and mood swings,” Plaintiff fails to point to specific evidence in
the record tending to show that these issues manifested in a way that would contradict the
general positive baseline from May of 2008 through October of 2009. (Doc. No. 15 at 2.)
Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that there is positive evidence of his bipolar condition (id. at 2) is
not at issue because the ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe impairments, including bipolar
disorder (Tr. at 20). The Court also finds persuasive the Magistrate Judge’s emphasis on the
stabilization of Plaintiff’s mental health complaints from May of 2008 through October of
2009—a significant period of time. (Doc. No. 14 at 12.) Thus, the Court agrees with the

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Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility as to
his complaints regarding his mental and physical issues.
Next, the ALJ considered the credibility of Plaintiff’s statements regarding his alleged
physical pain in the absence of objective medical evidence regarding the intensity, persistence,
and effects of Plaintiff’s symptoms to determine the extent to which Plaintiff’s ability to work is
limited in accordance with the second step of the Duncan analysis. (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff’s reported social and daily activities were “not suggestive of a totally
disabled individual,” and noted, in key part, that Plaintiff is able to take care of his personal
needs and maintain a social relationship outside of his marriage. (Id.) First, the ALJ looked to
the observation that Plaintiff required only conservative treatment for his back pain, as detailed
by Dr. Lister in 2009. (Id. at 24, 490-98.) Relatedly, citing Dr. Lister’s evaluation, the ALJ
noted that Plaintiff did not require surgical intervention, and that his pain was chronic in nature.
(Id. at 24.) The ALJ also emphasized that Plaintiff’s objective scans and tests did not reveal any
significant abnormalities. (Id.) The ALJ found additional support for discounting Plaintiff’s
credibility in reports from physicians who treated Plaintiff, in which the physicians neither
assigned any specific physical limitations to Plaintiff’s activities nor opined that he was disabled
as a result of his alleged back pain. (Id.) In sum, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s reported daily
and social activities, including his ability to care for his personal needs, discredit his allegations
of disabling back pain. (Id.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s credibility as to his mental health concerns, the ALJ first noted that
Plaintiff required only conservative treatment for his mental health issues. (Id. at 20.) As an
illustration of Plaintiff’s conservative treatment, the ALJ referenced a singular instance of
inpatient hospitalization following an episode of suicide ideation, and noted that while Plaintiff
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denied drug use at the time, he tested positive for prescription pain medicine, which he had
obtained illegally. (Id. at 24, 301-04.) Additionally, the ALJ cited the conservative prescription
of psychotropic medicines and the absence of specific limitations noted in the medical record by
any of Plaintiff’s treating mental health professionals. (Id. at 24.) The ALJ also noted that most
of the Plaintiff’s mental health treatment focused on situational stressors and emphasized
Plaintiff’s failure to continue counseling. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ noted that the only mental
function assessments in the record are those from state agency psychologists, which comport
with the residual functional capacity determined by the ALJ. (Id.)
In sum, the Court agrees with and hereby adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommended
finding that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility by relying on substantial evidence.
B. Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s recommendation that the ALJ properly found Mr.
Davis has no physical limitations.
Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly recommended that the ALJ
properly found that Plaintiff has no physical limitations. (Doc. No. 15 at 3.) In making this
assertion, Plaintiff points only to an MRI dated March 25, 2009, with related physician reports,
and notes that he received steroid injections in an effort to control his pain. (Id.) Plaintiff thus
argues that the ALJ erred in finding no physical limitations at any exertional level. (Id.)
In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff merely reiterates the arguments he raised in
his Motion and that the Magistrate Judge correctly analyzed and rejected these arguments in the
Report. (Doc. No. 16 at 1.) With respect to the substance of Plaintiff’s objections, Defendant
refers the Court to the arguments set forth in his Response to Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. No. 13).
(Doc. No. 16 at 1.) There, Defendant argued that the ALJ properly evaluated the Plaintiff’s
alleged physical limitations in her assessment of Dr. Lister’s medical records. (Doc. No. 13 at
15.) After summarizing and analyzing the evidence considered by the ALJ, Defendant argued
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that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 1516.)
When there is no proof of physically disabling pain and “without detailed corroborating
medical evidence, [the Sixth Circuit] will generally defer to the ALJ’s assessment.” Blacha, 927
F.2d at 230 (citing Houston v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 367 (6th Cir.
1984)). This is in keeping with the above-discussed standard of review, where the reviewing
court should uphold the administrative decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See
Garner, 745 F.2d at 387. In connection with the instant case, it is useful to note that medical
issues can be found to be successfully controlled by drugs, see Hardaway v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 823 F.2d 922, 927 (6th Cir. 1987), and that the severity of a condition is not to be
assumed based on a “mere diagnosis,” see Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988).
In the case at bar, the Magistrate Judge recommended finding that the ALJ properly
determined Plaintiff to have no physical limitations. (Doc. No. 14 at 13.) The Magistrate Judge
found that the ALJ “clearly evaluated” the Plaintiff’s medical records, and noted that the
Plaintiff’s pain was controlled with anti-inflammatory medicines. (Id.). As with the analysis of
Plaintiff’s credibility regarding his physical complaints, the Magistrate Judge looked to the
ALJ’s finding that the Plaintiff’s treating physicians did not assign any “specific physical
limitations to his ability to function and none opined that he was disabled due to physical
impairments.” (Id.) The Magistrate Judge emphasized that Plaintiff did not seek treatment for
his pain until 2009, and that his problems were treated conservatively, and thus concluded that
the ALJ had substantial evidence for her finding that Plaintiff has no physical limitations. (Id.)
As discussed in the analysis of Plaintiff’s first objection above, the Court finds that the
ALJ properly relied on substantial evidence when evaluating Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling
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physical pain and its limiting effects, including such considerations as the lack of surgery, the
absence of significant abnormalities, and the fact that no notations or opinions by physicians
supporting Plaintiff’s alleged disability were in the record. The Court notes that this objection by
Plaintiff reiterates an argument made in his Motion. (Doc. No. 12 at 15; Doc. No. 15 at 3.) In
addition, the Court believes the objection is further addressed by noting the ALJ’s alternative
findings at step five of the sequential evaluation process, where she found that a hypothetical
individual with Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations and a restriction to a light exertional level
would be able to find work. (Tr. at 24-25.) Therefore, the Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge that the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial evidence.
The ALJ cited conservative treatment, the fact that surgery was not required, the lack of
significant abnormalities shown by objective scans and tests, the fact that treating physicians
neither noted nor delivered any opinion that Plaintiff’s activities were limited by his pain, and
Plaintiff’s reported daily and social activities. (Id. at 24.) Additionally, the ALJ questioned the
VE at the hearing about the potential work available for a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s
non-exertional limitations and no exertional restrictions, or in the alternative, with exertional
restrictions to either the medium or light level. (Id. at 45-47.) If a hypothetical individual with
Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations were restricted to a light exertional level of work, the VE
testified that there was work available as a parking lot attendant, quality control specialist, or
production assembler. (Id. at 46.) The ALJ cited this testimony when concluding that, through
the date last insured, Plaintiff was capable of making a successful adjustment to other work, and
that therefore a finding that Plaintiff was not disabled was appropriate. (Id. at 26.)

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In sum, the Court agrees with and hereby adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommended
finding that the ALJ relied on substantial evidence to find that Plaintiff had no physical
limitations.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion and ADOPTS the Report in its
entirety.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED and the Court ADOPTS the

Magistrate Judge’s Report in its entirety. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
This Order terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over the above-styled action, and the case is
DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case.
It is so ORDERED.
Entered this

19th

day of June, 2012.

________________________________
JOHN T. NIXON, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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