Chaffin v. Social Security Administration

Filing 27

ORDER: The Court finds substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ's decision and therefore, ADOPTS the Report in its entirety. Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. No. 15) is DENIED and the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Commi ssioner's Motion to Stay Because of Lapse of Appropriations (Doc. No. 26) is TERMINATED AS MOOT. This Order terminates this Court's jurisdiction over the above-styled action, and the case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Senior Judge John T. Nixon on 3/26/14. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(tmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION 

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JEFFERY KENDELL CHAFFIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant,

No 2:12-cv-00047 

Judge Nixon 
Magistrate Judge Knowles 

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jeffery Kendell Chaffin’s Motion for Judgment on
the Administrative Record (“Motion”) (Doc. No. 15), filed with a Memorandum in Support (Doc.
No. 16). Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) filed a Response. (Doc.
No. 23.) Magistrate Judge Knowles subsequently issued a Report and Recommendation
(“Report”), recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion be denied and that the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge be affirmed. (Doc. No. 24 at 28.) Plaintiff then filed Objections to
the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation. (Doc. No. 25.) Upon review of the Report and
for the reasons discussed herein, the Court ADOPTS the Report in its entirety and DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion. 
I.

BACKGROUND 
A. Procedural Background 
Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) (Tr. 92–100)1 and

Supplemental Security Income Benefits (“SSI”) (Tr. 101–04) on May 27, 2009, alleging a

1

An electronic copy of the administrative record is docketed in this case at Doc. No. 11.

1

disability onset date of February 1, 2007,2 due to depression and anxiety disorders, high blood
pressure, diabetes, “learning difficulties,” and hypothyroidism (Tr. 131). Plaintiff’s applications
were denied initially on September 8 and 21, 2009 (Tr. 59–62), and again upon reconsideration
on January 26, 2010 (Tr. 63–66). Plaintiff requested and received a hearing (Tr. 77–78, 88–89),
which was conducted on December 9, 2010, by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Frank
Letchworth (Tr. 17–41). The ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act and Regulations on January 27, 2011. (Tr. 54.)  
ALJ Letchworth made the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2013. 
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 30, 2008,
the amended onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq. and 416.971 et seq.).  
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: hypothyroidism,
hypertension, and depressive and anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified (20
CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).  
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926) 
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) with no more than occasional
climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and frequent performance of all other
postural activities. He should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold
temperatures. He is capable of carrying out simple one, two, and three step
instructions. He will have the ability to relate appropriately with peers and
supervisors, with only occasional interruptions from psychologically based
symptoms. He can work with the general public, with occasional interruptions
from psychologically based symptoms and is capable of adapting to routine
work place changes.  
6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a chicken hanger
and box assembler. This work does not require the performance of work related
activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR
404.1565 and 416.965).  

2

At his hearing, Plaintiff amended his disability onset date to May 30, 2008. (Tr. 20).  

2

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from May 30, 2008, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f)
and 416.920(f)). 

(Tr. 47–54.) 
Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the hearing decision. (Tr. 15.) On April 26,
2012, the Appeals Council issued a letter declining to review the case, rendering the decision of
the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1–3.) On June 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed this
action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
(Doc. No. 1.)
Pursuant to Judge Knowles’s August 27, 2012, order (Doc. No. 12), Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 15), along with a Memorandum in
Support (Doc. No. 16) on October 26, 2012. The Commissioner filed a Response on March 18,
2013 (Doc. No. 23), and Judge Knowles issued his Report recommending Plaintiff’s Motion be
denied on June 10, 2013 (Doc. No. 16). On June 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed Objections to the
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, asserting two main objections to Judge Knowles’s
Report. (Doc. No. 25.) The Court now reviews the Report, considering Plaintiff’s objections. 
B. Factual Background 
Plaintiff was born on November 10, 1965. (Tr. 59.) Plaintiff initially alleged the
following disabling conditions: anxiety, depression, “learning difficulties,” high blood pressure,
diabetes, and hypothyroidism. (Tr. 131.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has not performed
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability. (Tr. 47) At his hearing,
Plaintiff testified that he has no income apart from food stamps. (Tr. 20.) 
Plaintiff testified that he finished the twelfth grade and received a regular diploma,
though he attended some special education classes in elementary and high school. (Tr. 24–25.)
3

Plaintiff lives with his mother, and has neither been married nor had children. (Tr. 20.) Plaintiff
has a driver’s license, though he testified that he only passed the written test after five attempts,
and did so with help from “the troopers.” (Tr. 24–25.) Plaintiff further testified that he can read
a newspaper and some, but not all, road signs. (Tr. 25–26.) Plaintiff worked for approximately
ten years at Perdue Farms driving a “tow motor” (fork lift) as well as performing other activities,
such as plucking chickens and putting boxes together. (Tr. 21–22.) However, he quit this job
due to “nerves,” depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 22–23.)  
Medical records indicate that Plaintiff began receiving treatment for hypertension and
hypothyroidism, along with obtaining prescription refills and laboratory work, at Satellite MedCookeville in April 2009. (Tr. 267–308.) Treatment notes consistently reported Plaintiff’s lack
of pain, depression, anxiety or agitation; intact judgment and insight for recent and remote
events; and proper orientation to time, place, and person. (Tr. 267–289.) In November 2009,
Plaintiff denied any problems or concerns and reported that he felt well. (Tr. 275–78.)
Mark Loftis, M.A., performed a consultative psychological evaluation on August 3, 2009,
in connection with Plaintiff’s SSA applications. (Tr. 228–32.) During the evaluation, Plaintiff
indicated that he sometimes helps clean the house, mows the yard, picks up groceries, and keeps
a small garden. (Tr. 229.) However, he explained that his mother does most of the housework
and cooking and also manages the household finances. (Id.) Plaintiff also told Mr. Loftis that he
has a girlfriend that he sees once or twice a week. (Id.) Mr. Loftis noted that Plaintiff’s verbal
skills were adequate and his affect and mood were normal. (Tr. 228.) Mr. Loftis also reported
that Plaintiff maintained good eye contact throughout the evaluation and that Plaintiff’s
“executive functioning skills” were intact. (Tr. 228–29.) Mr. Loftis found that Plaintiff was
well-oriented in “all spheres” of mental function, had an adequate general fund of knowledge, his
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thought content and processes were logical and coherent, and he could answer simple arithmetic
problems. (Tr. 230.) Mr. Loftis also stated that Plaintiff “appeared to be in the average range of
intellectual functioning.” (Id.) At the time, Plaintiff was not under psychiatric care and was not
taking medication for anxiety or depression, though he had previously been prescribed
medication for both after witnessing his father die from a brain hemorrhage. (Id.)
Mr. Loftis diagnosed Plaintiff with Anxiety Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (“NOS”),
and Depressive Disorder, NOS. (Tr. 231.) Mr. Loftis concluded that Plaintiff had mild
limitations in his ability (1) to adapt; (2) to understand and remember; and (3) to sustain
concentration, persistence, and pace; and that he had moderate limitations in his ability to
socially interact. (Id.) 
Andrew Phay, Ph.D., a Tennessee psychologist,3 conducted a Mental Residual Functional
Capacity (“RFC”) Assessment of Plaintiff by reviewing Plaintiff’s records on September 21,
2009, and concluded that Plaintiff was able to understand, remember, and execute simple one,
two, and three-step instructions, as well as multi-step instructions. (Tr. 260–63.) Dr. Phay
further explained that Plaintiff was able to make simple and independent work-related decisions,
and had the ability to maintain attention and concentration for periods of at least two hours and
complete a normal workweek with acceptable performance and productivity for certain tasks.
(Id.) Dr. Phay found that Plaintiff had the ability to relate appropriately with peers and
supervisors with occasional interruptions from psychologically based symptoms. (Id.)
Additionally, Dr. Phay determined Plaintiff was able to maintain basic standards of neatness and
cleanliness, set goals, adapt to routine work place changes, and travel to and from work. (Id.)

3

Throughout the record, certain medical professionals are referred to as “State Agency” professionals without
reference to the exact agency or governmental body for which such individuals worked. (See, e.g., Tr. 49.) As
Plaintiff lived in Tennessee during the relevant time periods and appears to have only sought treatment in Tennessee,
the Court assumes such medical professionals were employed by the state of Tennessee.

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On December 16, 2009, Brad Williams, M.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and affirmed
Dr. Phay’s initial determination. (Tr. 264.) 
In May 2010, Plaintiff sought treatment with the Volunteer Behavioral Health Care
System (“VBHC”). (Tr. 310.) His initial intake indicated Plaintiff met the criteria for Anxiety
Disorder, NOS, and Depressive Disorder, NOS. (Tr. 323–26.) He was referred for counseling
and prescribed Celexa to treat his depression and anxiety. (Tr. 316, 326.) At his June 9, 2010,
appointment, Plaintiff stated he didn’t think the Celexa was helping him, so the Celexa was
changed to Prozac. (Tr. 317–18.) Treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff’s girlfriend stated on
June 14, 2010, that Plaintiff had been improving since his last medication change: he had less
agitation, better sleep, and did more things for himself. (Tr. 313.) On July 7, 2010, Plaintiff
reported that he could tell the Prozac had helped, but he still felt depressed sometimes. (Tr. 319.)
On September 30, 2010, he stated that he was doing better and did not feel as anxious or
depressed. (Tr. 335.) Plaintiff further explained that he felt depressed once every two to three
weeks and this usually lasted for one to two hours. (Id.) He also stated that he was sleeping and
eating well and had been getting out more and enjoying himself while out. (Id.) During
Plaintiff’s treatment at the VBHC, his level of functioning was assessed at least twice on the
Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale.4 Plaintiff’s first recorded GAF score at VBHC
was 45 on May 10, 2010 (Tr. 316), and his last recorded GAF score at VBHC was 60 on
September 30, 2010 (Tr. 336).

4 The

Global Assessment of Functioning score is “a subjective determination that represents ‘the clinician’s
judgment of the individual’s overall level of functioning.’” Edwards v. Barnhart, 383 F. Supp. 2d 920, 924 n. 1
(E.D. Mich. 2005) (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 30 (4th
ed. 1994) (“DSM-IV”)). The score ranges from 100 (superior functioning) to 1 (persistent danger of severely
hurting self or others, persistent inability to maintain personal hygiene, or serious suicidal act with clear expectation
of death). Id. (citing DSM-IV at 32). Scores in the range of 41 to 50 show “serious symptoms OR any serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g. no friends, unable to keep a job).” Id. (quoting DSMIV at 32). Id. Scores in the range of 51 to 60 indicate “the existence of moderate difficulty in social or occupational
functioning.” Id. (citing DSM-IV at 32).

6

Plaintiff testified that he began treatment at Plateau Mental Health Center in May 2010,
and was being seen there every two to three months at the time of the ALJ’s determination. (Tr.
26–27.) He reported having seen some improvement in his nervousness and depression, but not
significant improvement. (Tr. 27.) Plaintiff maintained that the medication he has been
prescribed for nervousness and depression made a difference “every once in a while.” (Tr. 29.)
Plaintiff further testified he had crying spells “maybe twice a month” and had difficulty going to
the bathroom because that is where his father died. (Tr. 31–32.) He also stated he had problems
sleeping, got nervous and stressed when in a crowd, and had difficulty with his memory. (Tr.
32–34.) 
Plaintiff’s counsel requested a determination of the claimant’s IQ by Jerrell Killian, M.S.,
who performed a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff on November 17, 2010. (Tr. 328.) Mr.
Killian found that on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (“WAIS-IV”) test, Plaintiff’s
verbal comprehension and full-scale scores were within the mild mental retardation range. (Tr.
329.) Mr. Killian diagnosed Plaintiff with mild mental retardation and concluded that he was
capable of learning and sustaining simple one and two-step activities, but was limited in terms of
activities requiring assessment, reasoning, and problem solving. (Id.)  
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW  
The Court’s review of the Report is de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012). This review,

however, is limited to “a determination of whether substantial evidence exists in the record to
support the [Commissioner’s] decision and to a review for any legal errors.” Landsaw v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Title II of the Social Security Act
provides that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). Accordingly, the
7

reviewing court will uphold the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence is a term
of art and is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less
than a preponderance.” Bell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F.3d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing
Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 229). 
“Where substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s determination, it is conclusive, even
if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642,
644 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). This
standard of review is consistent with the well-settled rule that the reviewing court in a disability
hearing appeal is not to weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, because these
factual determinations are left to the ALJ and to the Commissioner. Hogg v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d
328, 331 (6th Cir. 1993); Besaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th
Cir. 1992). Thus, even if the Court would have come to different factual conclusions as to the
Plaintiff’s claim on the merits than those of the ALJ, the Commissioner’s findings must be
affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Hogg, 987 F.2d at 331. 
III.

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT
Plaintiff asserts two main objections to Judge Knowles’s Report. Plaintiff’s first

objection concerns the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of being
disabled because his condition did not meet or equal the severity requirements for an impairment
or combination of impairments under the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.
1. (Doc. No. 25 at 1–4.) Plaintiff’s second objection concerns the ALJ’s determination that
8

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not credible. (Id. at 5.) The Court evaluates each
argument in turn. 
A. ALJ Letchworth’s Determination Under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05  

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erroneously focused on isolated details taken out of context
and misconstrued the overall import of the evidence in finding that Plaintiff did not meet the
requirements of 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05 (2013) (“§ 12.05”). (Doc. No. 25 at
1.)
Under § 12.05, “intellectual disability” is defined as “[s]ignificantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the
developmental period.” In order to find that the disability “manifested during the development
period,” the evidence must “demonstrate[] or support[] onset of the impairment before age 22.”
Further, §12.05 states the severity requirement must be met by satisfying the requirement of one
of the four subsections (A, B, C, or D). Thus, to satisfy the requirements of showing
“intellectual disability” under § 12.05, a claimant must prove: “(1) the claimant suffers from
‘significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,’ (2) the claimant suffers from ‘deficits
in adaptive functioning,’ (3) such deficits initially manifested during the developmental period
(i.e., before age 22), and (4) one of the four criteria (A, B, C, or D) is met.” Daniels v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 70 F. App’x. 868, 872 (6th Cir. 2003). To satisfy § 12.05 (C), which is the only
subsection Plaintiff argues he meets, a claimant must show “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full
scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and
significant work-related limitation of function.” 
Plaintiff makes several separate objections to the ALJ’s finding regarding § 12.05.  First,
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to give adequate weight to the examination of Jerrell Killian,
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and that the ALJ was incorrect in his determination that Mr. Killian did not address adaptive
functioning. (Doc. No. 25 at 2.) Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ improperly relied on (1) the
opinion of Mark Loftis, and (2) Plaintiff’s function report and notes from his medical provider
that “did not address mental retardation at all,” in his determination. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff
claims that his level of functioning, basic activities, and education are consistent with mild
mental retardation. (Id. at 3.) The Court addresses each individual objection separately.
1. Deficits in Adaptive Functioning
The ALJ found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he suffered from the deficits in
adaptive functioning required by the introductory paragraph of § 12.05, and therefore was not
disabled under that section. (Tr. 50–51.) Plaintiff challenges this finding, arguing that it was
based on the ALJ’s mistaken conclusion that Mr. Killian did not address adaptive functioning in
his report when to the contrary, the report presented sufficient evidence of deficits in Plaintiff’s
adaptive functioning. (Doc. No. 25 at 2.)
“A loss of adaptive functioning is ‘manifested by difficulties in performing activities of
daily living, maintaining social relationships, or maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.’”
Burns v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-42, 2011 WL 7568592, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 7,
2011) (quoting 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §12.00(C)(4)). Activities such as cleaning,
shopping, cooking, and maintaining a residence, are considered “adaptive activities.” 20 C.F.R.
pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §12.00 (C)(1).
During his examination of Plaintiff, Mr. Killian administered the WAIS-IV test to
Plaintiff to evaluate his IQ. (Tr. 328–29.) Plaintiff’s full scale score was 70, and Mr. Killian
diagnosed Plaintiff with mild mental retardation. (Id.) Mr. Killian stated that Mr. Chaffin’s IQ
scores “seem consistent with Mr. Chaffin’s adaptive functioning.” (Tr. 329.) Additionally, Mr.
10

Killian made observations about Plaintiff’s life that could indicate a deficit in adaptive
functioning, including his enrollment in special education classes in high school, that he often
has trouble understanding “big words,” that it took Plaintiff several attempts to pass the written
portion of the driver’s license test, that he has not lived on his own and has assistance from his
mother with whom he lives, and that has not done laundry or cooked except for the use of a
microwave. (Tr. 328–29.) 
Section 12.05 makes clear that Plaintiff must show both subaverage intellectual
functioning and deficits in adaptive functioning. While Mr. Killian’s report clearly addresses
Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning, his report provides little regarding adaptive functioning.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Mr. Killian’s statement that Plaintiff’s scores “seem consistent
with” his adaptive functioning does not constitute an analysis of Plaintiff’s adaptive functioning,
as such a conclusory statement establishes neither that Plaintiff actually possesses deficits in
adaptive functioning nor the severity of any such deficits. While Mr. Killian’s discussion of
Plaintiff’s various limitations could be evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning, it does not
require the conclusion that Plaintiff possesses the requisite deficits to satisfy § 12.05. Further,
the Court finds the ALJ reasonably relied on other evidence in the record that indicates Plaintiff
actually possesses adaptive functioning skills. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff received a high
school diploma and passed school proficiency tests while in school. (Tr. 50.) The ALJ also
determined Plaintiff showed good adaptive functioning in his later life because he is “capable of
such activities as using a checkbook, driving, and shopping without assistance.” (Id.) Further,
the record indicates that Plaintiff is capable of performing a variety of activities of daily living,
including driving a car, going grocery shopping, and maintaining a relationship with his
girlfriend of over ten years. (Tr. 25, 28, 33; see also Burns, 2011 WL 7568592, at *7) (noting the
11

plaintiff’s ability to perform household chores and participate in some social and recreational
activities regularly precluded a finding that he lacked adaptive functioning).) 
Additionally, there is virtually no evidence in the record to show that any alleged deficits
Plaintiff possesses manifested before age twenty-two, as required by § 12.05.  Mr. Killian’s
testing was performed in November 2010 when Mr. Chaffin was forty-five years old (Tr. 328),
far past the statutory deadline of twenty-two. Plaintiff does not address this issue, mentioning
only that his enrollment in special education classes during high school demonstrates
longstanding deficits in his adaptive functioning. (Doc. No. 25 at 2.) However, the ALJ was
aware of these special education classes and noted the conflicting evidence that Mr. Chaffin
ultimately completed the twelfth grade and passed school proficiency tests during his
developmental period. (Tr. 24–25, 47, 50.)
Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ properly determined that Mr. Killian’s report did
not fully analyze Plaintiff’s adaptive functioning. Further, the Court finds the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff had not shown the necessary deficits in adaptive functioning was
supported by substantial evidence.
2. Weight Assigned to Mr. Killian’s Examination and Mr. Loftis’s Examination  

Similar to his objection above, Plaintiff also disputes the ALJ’s decision not to assign
“significant probative weight” to Mr. Killian’s examination—which yielded a full scale IQ score
of 70—“because the testing and diagnosis were obtained after the developmental period and the
claimant passed school proficiency tests.” (Doc. No. 25 at 1–2.) Plaintiff also appears to object
to the reliance or weight assigned by the ALJ to Mr. Loftis’s examination as Plaintiff argues Mr.
Loftis concluded, “without testing,” that Plaintiff was functioning in “at least the average range
of intelligence.” (Id.)
12

An ALJ must weigh medical opinions in the record based on certain factors. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c) (2013). When determining how much weight to afford a particular opinion, an ALJ
must consider: (1) the examining relationship; (2) the treatment relationship—length, frequency,
nature and extent; (3) its supportability; (4) its consistency; and (5) its specialization. Id.; see
also Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2010).  
In his decision, the ALJ declined to assign significant probative weight to Mr. Killian’s
exam for several reasons: (1) The testing and diagnosis were provided long after the
developmental period described in § 12.05; (2) Mr. Killian provided no analysis of the claimant’s
adaptive functioning, which is a crucial element to be considered in determining whether § 12.05
criteria are satisfied; and (3) Mr. Killian’s report was inconsistent with other evidence in the
record, including Plaintiff’s self-assessment, Mr. Loftis’s report, and Plaintiff’s school records.
(Tr. 50.)
The ALJ explained that he placed more weight on Mr. Loftis’s report because it was
consistent with the assessments of medical professionals from the state of Tennessee (Dr. Phay
and Dr. Williams), and also with the objective and clinical evidence of record. (Tr. 53.) The
ALJ acknowledged that because Dr. Phay and Dr. Williams were non-examining, their reports
generally are not given as much weight as those of an examining or treating psychologist. (Id.)
However, the ALJ concluded that they do deserve “some weight, particularly in a case like this
in which there exist a number of reasons to reach similar conclusions.” (Id.) As such, because
Mr. Loftis’s examination and Dr. Phay’s and Dr. Williams’s opinions were “largely consistent”
with each other and the objective and clinical evidence, Mr. Loftis’s examination was accorded
significant weight. (Id.) 

13

As discussed above, the Court has already found the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff
lacked the requisite deficits in adaptive functioning was supported by substantial evidence. See
supra Part III.1.A. Further, as is clear from the record and the ALJ’s analysis, Mr. Killian’s
examination was inconsistent—while Mr. Loftis’s examination was in accord— with other
record evidence in determining the level of Plaintiff’s cognitive limitations. Additionally, the
ALJ clearly explained his reasoning for assigning different weight to each examination. As such,
the Court finds the ALJ properly discounted Mr. Killian’s report and properly afforded
significant weight to Mr. Loftis’s report, after scrutinizing both reports and comparing them with
other evidence in the record. The Court thus finds the weight afforded to both reports by the
ALJ is supported by substantial evidence.
3. Plaintiff’s Diagnosis of Mild Mental Retardation 

Plaintiff’s final objection to the ALJ’s determination under § 12.05 focuses on Plaintiff’s
diagnosis of mild mental retardation. First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly relied on
Exhibits 6E (Plaintiff’s function self-report) and 6F (“notes from [Plaintiff’s] medical provider”)
to reject Mr. Killian’s diagnosis of mild mental retardation because these exhibits do not address
mention retardation. (Doc. No. 25 at 2.) Plaintiff also contends that Mr. Chaffin’s level of
functioning is consistent with mild mental retardation as described in the DSM–IV, and the basic
activities performed by Mr. Chaffin are consistent with mild mental retardation. (Id. at 3.)
Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that he has debilitating depression that meets the “second requirement of
Listing 12.05C.” (Id. at 4.) 
As an initial matter, Plaintiff appears to misinterpret the import of a diagnosis of mild
mental retardation in determining whether a claimant meets the requirements for disability under
§ 12.05. In his decision, the ALJ used Plaintiff’s function report and other medical evidence in
14

the record to determine that the criteria of § 12.05 was not satisfied. As explained in the
Magistrate Judge’s Report, the § 12.05 inquiry is distinct from a diagnosis of mild mental
retardation by a medical professional as the criteria under § 12.05 are different than the
description of mild mental retardation in the DSM-IV. (Doc. No 24 at 19–22.) While both
“intellectual disability” under § 12.05 and “mental retardation” under the DSM-IV address
similar issues, the only relevant factors for purposes of this analysis are those contained in the
regulations as such provide the framework within which eligibility for disability benefits are
determined. The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled under §12.05 was based in
part on lack of deficits in adaptive functioning (Tr. 50), which is not necessarily defeated by
simply pointing to a diagnosis of mild mental retardation. While Exhibits 6E and 6F5 may or
may not be relevant to a determination of whether Plaintiff should be diagnosed with mild
mental retardation, they are clearly relevant in a § 12.05 determination as they pertain to
Plaintiff’s intellectual and adaptive functioning. Further, whether Plaintiff’s level of functioning
or daily activities are consistent with a diagnosis mild mental retardation is not dispositive for a
disability determination under § 12.05 as it does not fully address the criteria provided by that
section.
Finally, Plaintiff’s assertion that he has depression that is significantly limiting and meets
the “second requirement of Listing 12.05C,” (Doc. No. 25 at 4) fails to overcome the ALJ’s

5

In his Report, Judge Knowles noted that Exhibit 6F in the record, (Tr. 228–32), is not notes from Plaintiff’s
medical provider as described by Plaintiff, but rather Mr. Loftis’s notes, and further explained Mr. Loftis was a nonexamining consultant, not Plaintiff’s medical provider. (Doc. No. 24 at 16 n.4.) As Plaintiff does not clarify which
portion of the record he is referring to, Judge Knowles declined to address Plaintiff’s argument based on “notes of
his medical provider,” outside of explaining that the court had previously reviewed and credited Mr. Loftis’s
evaluation in connection with the § 12.05 criteria. (Id.) As Plaintiff has failed to provide any clarification on this
point in his Objections, the Court similarly declines to address any argument based on “notes of his medical provider”
and further notes the Court has already found the ALJ properly assigned significant weight to Mr. Loftis’s report.
See supra Part III.1.B. 

15

initial finding pursuant to § 12.05. While not entirely clear from Plaintiff’s argument, the Court
interprets Plaintiff’s objection as referring to the § 12.05(C) requirement that the mental
impairment impose a significant work-related limitation of function. As evidence that his
impairment meets this requirement, Plaintiff points to Mr. Loftis’s diagnoses of Anxiety
Disorder, NOS, and Depressive Disorder, NOS, and Mr. Loftis’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s
social skills, particularly his observation that Plaintiff is “moderately limited in social interaction
skills necessary to deal with coworkers and supervisors.” (Id.) Plaintiff presents as further
support that he sought treatment for his anxiety and depression, his self-rating of his depression,
and his GAF score. (Id.) 
In his exam, Mr. Loftis opined that Plaintiff was “moderately limited” in his social
interaction skills, (Tr. 231), while the language of the regulation clearly requires a severe
limitation. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was
able to perform myriad activities, including driving, shopping by himself, and keeping a garden.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s having sought treatment and his low GAF score are not necessarily
persuasive as to the significance of his impairment, given that the record shows improvement in
both his condition and his GAF score after receiving treatment. (Tr. 313, 319, 336.) However,
regardless of whether Plaintiff can establish he meets the “second requirement of Listing of
12.05C,” Plaintiff still cannot show the necessary deficits in adaptive functioning required for a
finding of disability under § 12.05. As a finding of disability requires the claimant to show both
the deficits enumerated in § 12.05 and the level of severity of subsection (A), (B), (C), or (D),
whether Plaintiff satisfies § 12.05(C) does not affect the ALJ’s finding that Mr. Chaffin did not
satisfy § 12.05. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is not
disabled under § 12.05 is supported by substantial evidence.
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B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints and Credibility Determination  

Plaintiff’s last objection is to the ALJ’s discounting of Plaintiff’s own complaints of
depression and anxiety, and the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility. (Doc. No. 25 at 5.)
The Sixth Circuit has established the following criteria for evaluating a plaintiff’s
subjective complaints: 
[S]ubjective allegations of disabling symptoms, including pain, cannot alone
support a finding of disability. . . . [T]here must be evidence of an underlying
medical condition and (1) there must be objective medical evidence to confirm the
severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition or (2) the objectively
determined medical condition must be of a severity which can reasonably be
expected to give rise to the alleged pain.
Duncan v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 852–53 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When analyzing subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must also
consider the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the
claimant’s pain; the precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, and effect of
medication; and other treatment or measures used to relive pain. See Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d
1027, 1039–40 (6th Cir. 1994) (construing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)). After evaluating these
factors in conjunction with the evidence in the record, and by making personal observations of
the claimant at the hearing, an ALJ may determine that a claimant’s subjective complaints of
pain and other disabling symptoms are not credible. See, e.g., Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). Discounting credibility is appropriate when the ALJ finds
contradictions among the medical reports, the claimant’s testimony, the claimant’s daily
activities, and other evidence. Id. If the ALJ rejects a claimant’s testimony as not credible, the
ALJ must clearly state the reasons for discounting the testimony. Felisky, 35 F.3d at 1036.  

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An ALJ may not ignore a claimant’s subjective complaints, but the ALJ’s findings
regarding the credibility of a claimant’s testimony is entitled to great deference. Blacha v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1990); Williamson v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 796 F.2d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1986). The ALJ observes the claimant’s demeanor
and credibility, and therefore his or her opinion regarding a claimant’s credibility is especially
relevant. See, e.g., Walters, 127 F.3d at 531. 
Here, ALJ Letchworth reached his credibility determination by examining the objective
medical evidence, Plaintiff’s own report of his daily activities, and Plaintiff’s demeanor at the
hearing. (Tr. 53–54.) The ALJ noted that, “[o]bjective findings are minimal despite the
claimant’s complaints.” (Tr. 54.) Additionally, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s failure to seek ongoing
mental health treatment prior to May 2010 was inconsistent with the extent of psychological
symptoms he alleged he experienced. (Tr. 53.) The ALJ further determined that the treatment
for Plaintiff’s allegedly disabling conditions had been “brief, routine, and conservative in nature.”
(Id.) The ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff’s own statements regarding his daily activities
and explained that, “[t]he claimant’s admitted daily activities are not limited to the extent one
would expect, given his complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations. His ability to carry
out a range of daily activities tends to negate the credibility of his subjective complaints.” (Tr.
53–54.) The ALJ also recorded his own observations of Plaintiff during the hearing: “The
claimant demonstrated no abnormal social behaviors during the hearing . . . At the hearing, the
claimant demonstrated average intellectual functioning and was able to follow the hearing
proceedings and all lines of questioning.” (Tr. 51.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medical
records indicate that treatment resulted in improvement of his condition. (Tr. 53.)  

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The Court finds the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff’s complaints were
inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and could not be considered fully credible after
examining Plaintiff’s clinical and diagnostic records, his demeanor at the hearing, and his
statement of daily activities. The Court further finds the ALJ considered all relevant evidence in
assessing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and clearly stated his reasons for discounting
Plaintiff’s credibility. The ALJ is entitled to weigh the objective medical evidence against
Plaintiff’s subjective claims of pain and reach a credibility determination. See, e.g., Walters, 127
F.3d at 531. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s determination regarding Plaintiff’s
credibility is supported by substantial evidence in the record.  
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ’s decision and
therefore, ADOPTS the Report in its entirety. Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. No. 15) is DENIED and
the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Commissioner’s Motion to Stay Because
of Lapse of Appropriations (Doc. No. 26) is TERMINATED AS MOOT. This Order
terminates this Court's jurisdiction over the above-styled action, and the case is DISMISSED.
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case.  
It is so ORDERED.
Entered this the __26th ____ day of March, 2014.

___________________________________
JOHN T. NIXON, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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