Bates v. Melton et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 3/11/14. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

GREGORY ALLEN BATES,
Plaintiff,
v.
W.B. MELTON (SHERIFF) et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 2:14-cv-00019
Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Gregory Allen Bates, a prisoner in state custody at the Overton County Justice Center in
Livingston, Tennessee, has filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). The Court has
granted the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court is required to perform an initial review
of the complaint and to dismiss any in forma pauperis or prisoner action if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court
must read the plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972),
and accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Based on these standards, the Court will permit the plaintiff’s claim
of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs to proceed against one defendant, Debbie Deck,
but will dismiss all claims against the remaining defendants.
I.

Standard of Review
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under [the PLRA] because the relevant statutory language tracks the
language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny
on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim

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has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
II.

Factual Allegations
In this action, the plaintiff names as defendants Overton County Sheriff W.B. Melton, Jail

Administrator Shannon Harvey, Nurse Debbie Deck, and Shift Sergeant Rodney Phillips. He asserts three
separate claims (denominated as “complaints”), as follows:
(1) In his first “complaint,” the plaintiff alleges very generally that the “administrative staff” of the
Overton County Justice Center (“OCJC”) are negligent in their treatment of the inmates at the OCJC.
Sheriff Melton and Administrator Harvey “let[] their staff just do what ever they please. . . . Our cares and
needs are not being met which puts me [the plaintiff] in emotional stress, harm and anxi[e]ty, and fear.”
(ECF No. 1, at 9.) The plaintiff alleges that he personally has been “neglected in several ways physically,
emotionally, fear based.” (Id.)
The plaintiff provides only a few specific examples of the purported neglect. One example is that
the inmates at the OCJC went for “almost a month without visits” from family members because the jail
changed the locks in the “max unit and it blew out the main control pannel [sic] in the control tower.” (Id.
at 10.) As a result, corrections officers had to use actual keys to open cell doors, and inmates were told
that it was a security risk to have visits from family members during this time frame.
The plaintiff also claims that the intercom system in the cells does not work, so the inmates have
no way of contacting jail officials in the event of an emergency. The plaintiff does not allege that he or any
other inmate has actually been harmed as a result of the jail’s failure to ensure each cell has a functional
intercom.
Third, the plaintiff alleges that Shift Sgt. Rodney Phillips harmed two inmates “in the same day” as
a result of his negligence and the fact that he was improperly trained and supervised. (Id. at 11.) The
plaintiff does not allege that he was physically harmed by Sgt. Phillips’ actions.
(2) In his second “complaint,” the plaintiff alleges that he and the other inmates at OCJC are
being “demoralized as a human” as a result of Sheriff Melton’s decision to require all inmates to wear pink
uniforms. (Id. at 13.) The plaintiff alleges that the inmates at OCJC have become the “laughing stock” of

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the community because of the pink uniforms and that he has suffered stress, anxiety, and fear as a result.
(Id.)
(3) Last, the plaintiff complains that the OCJC is charging him $5.00 per month for medication
that is sent to the jail by his doctor and should not cost anything. The plaintiff also complains about being
charged for toilet paper and “indigent packs (shampoo, comb, deod., pencil and 1 piece paper and a
envelope) ($3.00).” (Id. at 16.) He also claims that defendant Debbie Deck is unqualified in that she did
not properly test the plaintiff for TB when he was first admitted at the jail and that she has “caused [him]
extreme harm” by refusing to allow him to have medications prescribed by his doctor, including an inhaler
and “IB” for migraines and shoulder pain. (Id. at 18.) The plaintiff also alleges that he has requested to
see the “Mental Health people” at the OCJC but so far has been refused. The plaintiff claims this has
been very stressful and that he has had difficulty sleeping, and that he has been diagnosed as manicdepressive in the past and believes he needs medication for his mental health condition. (Id. at 19.)
III.

Discussion
The plaintiff seeks to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate alleged violations of his

federal constitutional rights. Section 1983 confers a private federal right of action against any person who,
acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution or federal laws. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 44 n.3 (1984); Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159,
161 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that “the deprivation was caused
by a person acting under color of state law.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F. 3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In this case, the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted in his first and
second “complaints” against Sheriff Melton, Administrator Harvey, and Shift Sergeant Phillips. Going for a
less than a month without visitation from family members because of security considerations at the jail
does not give rise to a claim of constitutional dimension. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137
(2003) (noting that the permanent or lengthy withdrawal of visitation privileges, or an arbitrary denial of
visitation, might constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment); Kanitz v. Cooke, Nos. 03-cv-10180, 03cv-10322, 2008 WL 2218259, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2008) (“Plaintiffs have no constitutional liberty

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interest in visitation.”). The plaintiff does not allege that he or any other inmate has suffered actual harm
or even that he is imminently threatened with actual harm as a result of the absence of functional
intercoms in the cells. He therefore fails to state a claim based on the absence of intercoms. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or
other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing
of physical injury.”); Horn by Parks v. Madison Cnty. Fisc. Court, 22 F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[A]
violation of a federally secured right is remediable in damages only upon proof that the violation
proximately caused injury.”). For the same reason, the plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1983 based
on the humiliation he has allegedly endured as a result of being required to wear a pink uniform. See
Jones v. Daviess Cnty. Detention Ctr., 4:12CV-P15-M, 2012 WL 414265, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 8, 2012)
(noting that the Sixth Circuit has “repeatedly dismissed claims for purely emotional injury, humiliation, or
affronts to dignity as lacking the requisite physical injury” required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). Likewise, the
plaintiff does not allege that he suffered physical injury as result of Sgt. Phillips’ actions and therefore
cannot state a § 1983 claim against Sgt. Phillips. Moreover, the plaintiff does not have standing to
complain about Sgt. Phillips’ treatment of other inmates. See Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 276–77 (6th
Cir. 2009) (an inmate does not have standing to raise arguments on behalf of others).
With respect to the plaintiff’s third “complaint,” generally speaking, to state a valid claim based on
the conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must show an “extreme” deprivation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff complains that the jail charged him, an indigent
inmate, $3.00 for a kit containing necessary personal-hygiene items, but he does not allege either that he
lacked the funds to pay for the kit or, alternatively, that he was ever deprived of necessary items of
personal hygiene because of inability to pay. The Court therefore finds that the plaintiff fails to allege an
“extreme deprivation” and therefore fails state an Eighth-Amendment claim based on being charged
$3.00 for “indigent packs.”

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Likewise, while the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
requires jails to provide basic medical care to inmates, there is no requirement that jails provide the
medical care free of cost. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173–74 (3rd Cir. 1997) (deliberate
indifference standard does not guarantee prisoners the right to be entirely free from cost considerations
that figure in medical-care decisions made by most non-prisoners in society). Inmates may be
constitutionally required to pay for their own medical expenses, if they can afford to do so. Roberson v.
Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999) (requiring inmates to pay for their own medications if they
can afford to do so is not a federal constitutional violation). It is only when medical care is denied to
inmates because of their inability to pay that deliberate indifference is implicated.
In this case, it is unclear whether the plaintiff was actually deprived of necessary medication
because of inability to pay or is simply complaining about being charged for it. Regardless, the plaintiff
also appears to be asserting that Nurse Deck refused to provide him necessary medication that had been
prescribed by an outside doctor and refused his request to see a mental-health practitioner. The Eighth
Amendment prohibits prison officials from “unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain” on prisoners by
acting with “deliberate indifference” to their “serious medical needs.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390
F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such a claim has both a
subjective and objective component. Id. The objective component mandates a sufficiently serious medical
need. Id. The subjective component is concerned with prison officials’ state of mind. Id. Deliberate
indifference “entails something more than mere negligence, but can be satisfied by something less than
acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at
895–96 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The prison official must “be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.” Id. at 896 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Construing the complaint very liberally, the Court finds for purposes of the initial review that the
plaintiff has alleged sufficiently serious medical needs (migraine headaches, difficulty sleeping, shoulder
pain, a need for an inhaler, and mental health issues), giving rise to a permissible inference that Nurse
Deck was aware of and was deliberately indifferent to these serious medical needs. Although the

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complaint fails to state a claim as to any of the other named defendants, the Court will, for purposes of
the initial review, permit the claims against Debbie Deck to proceed.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the claims set forth in the “1st Complaint” and “2nd Complaint”

against Sheriff W.B. Melton, Jail Administrator Shannon Harvey, and Shift Sergeant Rodney Phillips will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
claims in the “3rd Complaint” against Nurse Debbie Deck related to the purportedly deliberate indifference
to the plaintiff’s allegedly serious medical needs will, for purposes of the initial review, be permitted to
proceed.
An appropriate order is filed herewith.

Kevin H. Sharp
United States District Judge