Caplinger v. Social Security Administration

Filing 16

ORDER: The Court ADOPTS in part the Magistrate Judge's Report (Doc. No. 13), GRANTS in part Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. No. 8 ), VACATES the administrative decision, and REMANDS this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close this case. It is so ORDERED. Signed by Senior Judge John T. Nixon on 9/2/2015. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
MARK ANTHONY CAPLINGER,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-00020
Judge Nixon
Magistrate Judge Brown

ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Mark Anthony Caplinger’s Motion for Judgment on
the Administrative Record (“Motion”). (Doc. No. 8.) On November 25, 2014, Magistrate Judge
Brown issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) recommending that Caplinger’s Motion
be denied and the decision of the Social Security Administration be affirmed. (Doc. No. 13 at
25–26.) On December 10, 2014, Caplinger filed Objections to the Report (Doc. No. 14), to
which the Commissioner filed a Response (Doc. No. 15). For the reasons stated below, the Court
ADOPTS in part the Magistrate Judge’s Report, GRANTS in part Caplinger’s Motion,
VACATES the Administrative Decision, and REMANDS this case to the Commissioner for
further proceedings. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW1
The Court’s review of the Report is de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012). This review,

however, is limited to “a determination of whether substantial evidence exists in the record to
support the [Commissioner’s] decision and to a review for any legal errors.” Landsaw v. Sec’y of

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The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s description of the facts and procedural posture of this case. (Doc. No. 13
at 1–15.) The Court describes the facts only as necessary to facilitate analysis of the parties’ arguments below.

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Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Title II of the Social Security Act
provides that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, the reviewing
court will uphold the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence
is a term of art and is defined as “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It is “more than a mere scintilla of
evidence, but less than a preponderance.” Bell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F.3d 244, 245 (6th
Cir. 1996) (citing Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 229).
“Where substantial evidence supports the [Commissioner’s] determination, it is
conclusive, even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Crum v. Sullivan,
921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en
banc)). This standard of review is consistent with the well-settled rule that the reviewing court in
a disability hearing appeal is not to weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations
because these factual determinations are left to the ALJ and to the Commissioner. Hogg v.
Sullivan, 987 F.2d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 1993); Besaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d
1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992). Thus, even if the Court would have come to different factual
conclusions as to the Plaintiff’s claim on the merits than those of the ALJ, the Commissioner’s
findings must be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Hogg, 987 F.2d at 331.
II.

CAPLINGER’S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT
Caplinger objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations that (1) the ALJ followed

the good reasons requirement in declining to accord Dr. Wall’s medical opinion controlling
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weight; (2) the ALJ did not ignore evidence relating to Caplinger’s left knee in assessing his
Residual Functional Capacity; and (3) the ALJ properly considered Caplinger’s failure to
undergo surgery or submit to a functional capacity evaluation as part of his adverse credibility
determination. (Doc. No. 14 at 1.) The Court addresses each objection in turn.
A. Treating Physician Opinions
Dr. Wall is a treating source,2 thus the ALJ must accord Dr. Wall’s opinion “controlling
weight” if the following conditions are met: “(1) the opinion ‘is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’; and (2) the opinion ‘is not inconsistent
with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710
F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013), reh’g denied (May 2, 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2));
West v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 240 F. App’x 692, 696 (6th Cir. 2007). At the first prong,
medically acceptable techniques are those “in accordance with the medical standards that are
generally accepted within the medical community as the appropriate techniques to establish the
existence and severity of an impairment.” Soc. Sec. Admin., Titles II & XVI: Giving Controlling
Weight to Treating Source Med. Opinions, SSR 96-2P, 1996 WL 374188, at *3 (July 2, 1996)
[hereinafter SSR 96-2P]. The existence and severity of musculoskeletal impairments is
determined through “detailed descriptions of the joints, including ranges of motion, condition of
the musculature (e.g., weakness, atrophy), sensory or reflex changes, circulatory deficits, and
laboratory findings, including findings on x-ray or other appropriate medically acceptable
imaging.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.00(C)(1). “Whether a medical opinion is well                                                            
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Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502 and 416.902, a “treating source” is defined as the claimant’s “own physician,
psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides [the claimant], or has provided [the claimant], with
medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with [the claimant].”
The record indicates Dr. Wall treated Caplinger “at least monthly from January 30, 2009 through December 18,
2012” for back pain, osteoarthritis pain, knee pain, gout, and leg and foot pain. (Doc. No. 13 at 2.) Dr. Wall had an
ongoing treatment relationship with Caplinger and is a treating source under the regulation.

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supported will depend on the facts of each case. It is a judgment that adjudicators must make
based on the extent to which the opinion is supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and requires an understanding of the clinical signs and
laboratory findings in the case record.” SSR 96-2P at *2.
The ALJ determined, and the Magistrate Judge agreed, that Dr. Wall’s opinion was not
well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques because the
“records show he supplied random opinions regarding the claimant’s ability to perform work
activity, his opinions were, if anything, generalizations noting the claimant was ‘unable to work,’
unable to sit or stand, and able to lift 20 pounds.” (Tr. 21.)3 Upon review of the record, the Court
agrees because, aside from occasional findings that Caplinger experienced muscle spasms (Tr.
373, 376, 448, 449, 469, 470, 490), the records do not contain any evidence of range of motion
testing, detailed descriptions of Caplinger’s joints, medically acceptable imaging, or any other
objective findings. Although Caplinger correctly points out that Dr. Wall’s records “reveal his
findings and diagnoses” (Doc. No. 14 at 5), a medical opinion is not entitled to controlling
weight unless it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques. Because Dr. Wall’s opinion was not so supported, the ALJ did not err in failing to
accord Dr. Wall’s opinion controlling weight.
Where a treating source’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the degree of
deference owed is determined according to the “length, frequency, nature, and extent of the
treatment relationship . . . as well as the treating source’s area of specialty and the degree to
which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and is supported by relevant
evidence.” Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376 (internal citations omitted). If the ALJ discounts a treating

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The Administrative Record is available electronically at Docket Number 5.

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source’s opinion, he must give “good reasons” for the weight accorded the opinion that are
supported by the evidence in the record and sufficiently specific to permit “meaningful review of
the ALJ’s application of the rule.” Id. (internal citations omitted). A failure to give good reasons
“denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified
based upon the record” and, unless it is harmless error, is grounds for remand. Friend v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486
F.3d 234, 243 (6th Cir. 2007)). Such an error might be harmless if:
(1) “a treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the Commissioner
could not possibly credit it”; (2) “if the Commissioner adopts the opinion of the
treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion”; or (3) “where the
Commissioner has met the goal of § 1527(d)(2)—the provision of the procedural
safeguard of reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the
regulation.”
Id. (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The ALJ accorded “significant weight” to Dr. Wall’s findings that “the claimant can lift
up to 20 pounds and must elevate his right leg and foot to alleviate his pain.” (Tr. 21.) The ALJ
gave the following reasons: (1) the opinion as a whole was not well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, (2) Dr. Wall’s treatment records were
inconsistent with his opinion, (3) the opinion was inconsistent with the record as a whole, and (4)
Dr. Wall’s finding that Caplinger must elevate his foot is consistent with Caplinger’s hearing
testimony that “he spent the majority of his day sitting in his recliner.” (Id.) As described above,
the first reason is supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, Caplinger testified that he sits
in his recliner to relieve leg pain. However, upon review of the record, the Court finds the ALJ’s
remaining reasons are not supported by the evidence in the record, and the combined reasoning is
not sufficient to permit meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.

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First, the Court disagrees with the ALJ’s assessment that Dr. Wall’s records were
inconsistent with his opinion because they showed Caplinger “was generally in no apparent
distress; well appearing; had an intact gait; and had no clubbing, edema, or deformities.” (Tr.
21.) To the contrary, to the extent that they are legible, Dr. Wall’s records indicate he often
checked “no” in response to “Alert, well-appearing, NAD, hydrated and active,” and checked
“no” at almost every visit in response to “No cyanosis, clubbing, edema or deformities, Pulses
full and =” and “Alert, oriented, CN II-XII grossly intact, SME intact, DTR’s 2+ and
symmetrical. No focal findings, N-N, H-S, Gait intact.” (Tr. 339, 340, 342, 343–45, 347, 349–53,
356–76, 379, 449–50, 452, 469–71, 490, 492–94.) By checking “no” to an absence of findings,
Dr. Wall indicated Caplinger had at least one symptom in each of those categories. The Court
also notes the ALJ credited Dr. Wall’s finding that Caplinger “can lift up to 20 pounds” (Tr. 21),
but this fact is not in the record: Dr. Wall’s treatment notes indicate Caplinger could not lift
twenty pounds (Tr. 220, 377), and Dr. Wall’s later opinion states Caplinger could only lift ten
pounds (Tr. 479). The ALJ did not explain the source in the record of this finding or why he
credited it.
Nor is the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Wall’s opinion is “not consistent with the record”
supported by substantial evidence. (Tr. 21.) Residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “is the
individual’s maximum remaining ability to perform sustained work on a regular and continuing
basis; i.e., 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. It is not the least an
individual can do, but the most, based on all of the information in the case record.” Soc. Sec.
Admin., Titles II & XVI: Determining Capability to Do Other Work—Implications of A
Residual Functional Capacity for Less Than A Full Range of Sedentary Work, SSR 96-9P, 1996
WL 374185, at *2 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ’s RFC assessment limited Caplinger to sedentary
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work, “except the claimant needs to elevate his leg approximately one foot high using a foot
stool.” (Tr. 18.) Sedentary work
involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or
carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary
job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and
standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if
walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are
met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). “The concept of sedentary work contemplates substantial sitting as well
as some standing and walking. Alternating between sitting and standing, however, may not be
within the definition of sedentary work.” Preston v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 854 F.2d
815, 819 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Wages v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 755 F.2d 495, 498
(6th Cir. 1985)). Dr. Wall’s opinion limited Caplinger to carrying and lifting a maximum of ten
pounds, standing and walking less than two hours a day, and sitting for up to four hours a day for
a maximum of forty-five minutes at a time, and noted “[b]ecause of his chronic pain, he
constantly changes positions.” (Tr. 479–82.) If Dr. Wall’s opinion were adopted, Caplinger
would be incapable even of sedentary work because he could not sit eight hours a day and would
constantly change positions.
The record also contains opinions by treating physicians Drs. Donald Arms and Jeffrey
Hazlewood, consulting examiner Dr. Donita Keown, and non-examining physicians Drs. Charles
Settle and Nathaniel Robinson. The opinions of treating physicians Arms and Hazlewood are
largely consistent with Dr. Wall’s opinion and, if adopted, would require a more restrictive RFC
assessment than the ALJ’s. Dr. Hazlewood’s January 2011 restrictions—“no lifting over 10
pounds; sit down work 70% of every one hour, change positions frequently; use ice as needed;
may not work more than 8 hrs. per day/40 hrs. per week”—could also limit Caplinger to less
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than sedentary work because he would be required to change positions frequently, and the ALJ
did not account for this restriction. (Tr. 488; see Tr. 484–87.) See Preston, 854 F.2d at 819.
Moreover, Dr. Arms’ restrictions of March 29, 2011, limited Caplinger to “Desk duty. No
kneeling/squatting/prolonged standing. Please allow foot elevation. Initially please limit work to
4° shifts for next 4 weeks.” (Doc. No. 14 at 6 (quoting Tr. 489).) Because Dr. Arms limited
Caplinger to four hour shifts, Dr. Arms’ opinion would also preclude sedentary work.
Even though Dr. Arms and Dr. Hazlewood are treating sources,4 the ALJ did not apply
the controlling weight analysis to their opinions. In fact, although the ALJ discussed some of
their treatment records in his Decision, he did not mention either medical opinion. Instead, the
ALJ’s summary of Caplinger’s medical records draws primarily from treatment notes issued
before Caplinger’s March 2010 injury. For instance, the ALJ notes Caplinger “was placed on
temporary work restrictions during his treatment history; however, the claimant generally
continued to perform his usual work and incurred additional injuries.” (Tr. 19.) However, the
ALJ did not mention that one of those additional injuries, sustained in March 2010, was the
injury that Caplinger contends made him unable to work. (Tr. 33–34.) The ALJ later noted Dr.
Hazlewood imposed restrictions but he “is working his same job at Walmart under his
restrictions.” (Tr. 19.) However, the ALJ did not mention that Caplinger attempted to work after
this injury but was eventually terminated around this time because his employer had no work that
met his restrictions. (Tr. 34.) The ALJ considered the fact that “Dr. Hazlewood calculated MMI
for the lumbar back at ‘2% whole person impairment rating’ due to subjective pain with no
objective findings based upon consistent complaints of spasms . . . [and] the claimant could

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Dr. Arms treated Caplinger regularly from July 2008 through February 2012 (Tr. 280–337, 380–85, 465–67), Dr.
Hazlewood treated Caplinger from June 2008 through March 2011 (Tr. 390–416, 484–88), and both are physicians,
thus both doctors are treating sources.

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continue his regular job without restrictions and without chronic medications.” (Tr. 20.)
However, the ALJ did not explain that the quoted treatment record was issued in October 2009,
months before Caplinger’s March 2010 injury. (Tr. 402–03.)
Failure to following the treating source rule is grounds for reversal unless the error is
harmless, even if “a different outcome on remand is unlikely.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 546; accord
Friend, 375 F. App’x at 551. In this case, the Arms and Hazlewood opinions are no so deficient
that they could not possibly be credited, the ALJ did not adopt opinions consistent with the
treating source opinions, and because the ALJ did not mention their opinions or their most recent
treatment records in his Decision, the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasoning for this Court or
the claimant to understand why the Arms and Hazlewood opinions were not adopted.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to follow the treating source rule as to Drs. Arms and Hazlewood
is, in itself, grounds for remand.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Wall’s opinion was inconsistent with the
record is not supported by substantial evidence because, as explained above, Dr. Wall’s opinion
was largely consistent with the opinions issued by Drs. Arms and Hazlewood. Although the
record contains contrary opinions issued by a consulting and two non-examining sources, the
ALJ determined these opinions were not entitled to significant weight because they were overly
optimistic and did not account for all of the relevant medical evidence. (Tr. 20–21.) Even if the
opinions were entitled to greater weight, however, the opinions of consulting and non-examining
physicians are “entitled to little weight if [they are] contrary to the opinion of the claimant’s
treating physician,” Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 1987), and contrary
consulting or non-examining source opinions are not substantial evidence to justify disregarding
treating source opinions, Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009).
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The Court finds the ALJ’s failure to give good reasons supported by the record for
rejecting Dr. Wall’s opinion was not harmless error. His opinion, based on years of regular
treatment and consistent with other opinions in the record, is not so patently deficient that it
could not possibly be credited. The ALJ did not make findings consistent with Dr. Wall’s
opinion. Finally, the ALJ did not meet the goal of the good reasons requirement because, as
explained above, the ALJ did not provide a sufficient explanation to permit this Court or
Caplinger to understand the ALJ’s reasoning. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s
Recommendation on this point is REJECTED and Caplinger’s Motion GRANTED.
B. Left Knee Pain
Caplinger contends the ALJ’s RFC assessment was not supported by substantial evidence
because it did not account for Caplinger’s need to elevate his left knee. The Magistrate Judge
determined there “is no objective medical evidence in the record that establishes plaintiff’s
alleged left knee pain. Plaintiff’s alleged left knee pain is based solely on his subjective
complaints. Moreover, there is no medical evidence in the record, objective or otherwise, that
plaintiff has to elevate both his left leg and his right leg.” (Doc. No. 13 at 18.) Upon review of
the record and Caplinger’s Objection, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s assessment.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation on this point is ADOPTED and
Caplinger’s Motion DENIED.
C. Credibility
Finally, Caplinger objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the ALJ properly
considered Caplinger’s failure to undergo surgery or submit to a functional capacity evaluation
(“FCE”) as part of the adverse credibility determination. In assessing a claimant’s subjective
complaints, the ALJ follows a two-step analysis:
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First, the ALJ will ask whether the there is an underlying medically determinable
physical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s
symptoms. Second, if the ALJ finds that such an impairment exists, then he must
evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the
individual’s ability to do basic work activities.
Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the ALJ determined Caplinger’s underlying medically determinable physical impairments
could reasonably be expected to produce his symptoms. (Tr. 19.) Therefore, the ALJ was
required to evaluate the effects of Caplinger’s symptoms by considering the following:
the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate symptoms; the type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate the symptoms;
other treatment undertaken to relieve symptoms; other measures taken to relieve
symptoms, such as lying on one’s back; and any other factors bearing on the
limitations of the claimant to perform basic functions.
Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a)). In evaluating the effects of the
claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ considers the claimant’s credibility. Soc. Sec. Admin., Titles II &
XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual’s
Statements, Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-7P, 1996 WL 374186, at *3 (1996) [hereinafter SSR 96-7P].
“Credibility determinations regarding the applicant’s subjective complaints of pain rest with the
ALJ and are afforded great weight and deference as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence.” Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 535 F. App’x 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2013); Rogers, 486
F.3d at 249.
The claimant’s medical treatment history is a proper consideration as part of the
credibility assessment, and “the individual’s statements may be less credible . . . if the medical
reports or records show that the individual is not following the treatment as prescribed and there
are no good reasons for this failure.” SSR 96-7P at *7. However, the ALJ may not draw adverse
inferences about a claimant’s condition from his failure to follow a treatment recommendation
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“without first considering any explanations that the individual may provide, or other information
in the case record” that may explain the failure. Id.; accord Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834,
840 (7th Cir. 2014); Johnson, 535 F. App’x at 507 (holding ALJ’s failure to ask claimant to
explain why he refused surgery was harmless error because adverse credibility determination
was otherwise supported by substantial evidence).
Upon review of the record, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ
properly considered Caplinger’s refusal to have back or knee surgery in making the credibility
determination because the ALJ asked Caplinger why he did not have surgery and considered the
evidence in the record on this point. The ALJ explained “[w]ith regard to the right knee, the
record shows the claimant decided against operative treatment, as continually requested by his
physicians.” (Tr. 19.) In the hearing, Caplinger’s attorney asked about the recommended
surgeries, and Caplinger explained he did not want knee surgery, and that his doctor told him he
should not get a knee replacement surgery at his age if he could ambulate. (Tr. 38.) The record,
however, indicates Dr. Arms repeatedly recommended knee surgery to Caplinger and explained
Caplinger would not experience further medical improvement without surgery, but that
Caplinger declined because he did not want the surgery, felt the risks outweighed the benefits,
and believed his knee pain was not serious enough to justify surgical intervention. (Tr. 295, 301–
02, 304, 306, 308, 313, 314, 316, 320, 323, 326, 329, 332.) As to his back pain, the record shows
Caplinger sought a referral to a neurosurgeon in 2011 (Tr. 337), but when asked about back
surgery at the hearing, Caplinger stated he did not want the surgery (Tr. 38).
Caplinger also contests the ALJ’s decision to discount his credibility in part because he
refused to undergo “functional capacity evaluations to determine his ability to perform workrelated activities.” (Tr. 21.) The record indicates Dr. Arms believed Caplinger had reached
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maximum medical improvement as to his knee, provided Caplinger would not undergo knee
surgery, and recommended he schedule a functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”) to determine
his level of permanent impairment for workers’ compensation purposes, but Caplinger refused.
(See, e.g., Tr. 384, 337, 332.) Caplinger did not provide a legal argument as to why this
consideration was erroneous in his briefings before the Magistrate Judge (see Doc. No. 13 at 23–
24) or this Court (Doc. No. 14 at 7). As explained above, the ALJ may consider most relevant
evidence in assessing the claimant’s credibility, and Caplinger has not explained why this
consideration was improper.
Caplinger does not challenge the ALJ’s credibility determination as a whole, only the
consideration of his refusal to submit to surgery or a FCE. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s
Report on this point is ADOPTED and Caplinger’s Motion DENIED.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS in part the Magistrate Judge’s Report

(Doc. No. 13), GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. No. 8), VACATES the administrative
decision, and REMANDS this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. The Clerk of
the Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
It is so ORDERED.
Entered this the _2nd ____ day of September, 2015.

____________________________________
JOHN T. NIXON, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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