Jones v. Social Security Administration

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 9/2/2016. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(jw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
STANLEY GLENN JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2:15-cv-00007
Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record
(Docket Entry No. 13). The motion has been fully briefed by the parties.
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s
claim for disability insurance under Title II and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), as
provided by the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Upon review of the administrative record as a
whole and consideration of the parties’ filings, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s
determination that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Act is supported by substantial evidence in
the record as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed an application for Title II benefits on November 4, 2011 and for SSI on
November 30, 2011, alleging a disability onset date of August 31, 2011. Plaintiff had an initial
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May 15, 2013. The ALJ signed a
Notice of Decision-Unfavorable, which was mailed to Plaintiff on July 12, 2013. Plaintiff timely

1

filed an appeal with the Appeals Council, which issued a written notice of denial on November
26, 2014, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. This civil
action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II. THE ALJ FINDINGS
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on July 12, 2013. (AR p. 20). Based upon the
record, the ALJ made the following enumerated findings:
1.

The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through September 30, 2012.

2.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 31,
2011, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq. and 416.971 et seq.).

3.

The claimant has the following severed impairments: multilevel degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine, right shoulder impingement syndrome with probably
rotator cuff tear and hypertension (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that he can only frequently perform
postural activities and is precluded from pushing or pulling with his right upper
extremity. Furthermore, he is limited to no more than occasional overhead
reaching with his upper extremity.

6.

The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a production
supervisor. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities
precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and
416.965).

7.

The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, since August 31, 2011, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f)
and 416.920(f)).

(AR pp. 25-34).

2

III. REVIEW OF THE RECORD
The following summary of the evidence of record is taken from Plaintiff’s brief, Docket
Entry No. 13-1 at pp. 2-4 (emphasis in original):
Hearing Testimony and Other Evidence
a.Non-Medical Evidence:
Stanley Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, alleges that he was an almost 50 year-old
claimant at the date of alleged onset on August 31, 2011 due to multiple lumbar
spine impairments and severe shoulder impingement syndrome. (Tr. 170179). He has a high school education and no further vocational training and has
work[ed] as a factory worker/assembly line worker, cable lineman and farm hand.
b. Medical Evidence
Mr. Jones was working on a local farm, in a job where he performed constant
heavy lifting, when he suffered an onset of severe lower back pain, which caused
him to first have trouble walking. He was seen in the CMC ER on July 25, 2011,
(Tr. 243-252) with severe tenderness to the lumbar spine, decreased range of
motion to the lumbar spine and paravertebral muscles with muscle spasms.
He was referred to a local primary care physician, on August 8, 2011, (Tr. 263264), where he was having weakness of the legs, decreased range of motion
with flexion, extension, lateral flexion, and rotation as well as moderate
lumbar tenderness. He continued to work for a few weeks, but in late August
2011 (onset date August 31, 2011), he suffered a right shoulder injury and on
exam on September 12, 2011, (Tr. 260-262), he could not raise his arm above
his head. By January 2012, he was having severe shoulder pain and was
diagnosed with impingement syndrome. (Tr. 282-284). He continued to have
history of falls, weakness of both legs, and decreased lumbar range of motion. He
eventually was diagnosed with lumbar radiculopathy. (Tr. 306-331). He also
began to have chest pain, which was later attributed to a side effect of the
baclofen, (his anti-inflammatory med).
Mr. Jones was consultatively examined on January 9, 2012, (Tr. 275-279), by Dr.
Donita Keown, consultative examiner for DDS, where he had lumbar spine x-rays
which indicate that he has spondylolisthesis of L5 onto S1 with bilateral pars
defect (L5 has collapsed onto S1 causing the pars to separate or even fracture).
Dr. Keown, to have a stooped posture, waddling side to side gait to keep from
moving his irritated back. [sic] He had absent reflexes on the right lower
extremity and severely decreased measured range of motion at only 65 degrees on
dorsiflexion and only left/right lateral flexion of 15 degrees and only 10 degrees
extension. He had bilaterally positive straight leg raises at 60 degrees both
seated and supine. He could not properly tandem step, lift on his toes or heel
walk because of his irritated back. Dr. Keown noted that he gave good effort in
3

the exam, and regarding the shoulder, she also noted a suspected rotator cuff
tear and severely decreased right shoulder range of motion, pain and a 2 cm
atrophy of the right shoulder versus left, as well as crepitus on the left shoulder.
Since that time, Mr. Jones has only been able to treat conservatively but has been
consistent in his treatment. (Tr. 306-336). He has noted antalgic gait with severe
limping, and pain to both his back and lower extremities. He is unable to balance,
has poor reflexes and very limited range of motion lumbar spine with lower leg
radiculopathy as well as virtually no effective use of the right shoulder/upper arm.
A few months after the hearing, the claimant suffered a fall on September 1, 2013
that sent him to the ER, (Tr. 345-368), where he received x-rays and a CT of the
lumbar spine. He has multiple levels of impairment to the L-spine and T-spine,
which we contend have been present and were objectively confirmed in prior
studies and supported by these most recent studies.
He has a grade II spondylolisthesis at L5-S1 with advanced degenerative disc
disease at L5-S1 and degenerative facet hypertrophy at this level resulting in
moderate bilateral neural foraminal narrowing. (Tr. 354-358). At L4-5, he has a
broad based disc bulge effacing the ventral thecal sac and contacting the lateral
transversing L5 nerve roots. In addition, he has anterior wedging at T11,
indicative of an old fracture. He was ordered by the ER physician to ambulate
only with a cane for assistance. (Tr. 362).

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standard of Review
The determination of disability under the Act is an administrative decision. The only
questions before this Court are: (i) whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence; and (ii) whether the Commissioner made any legal errors in the process of
reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.
Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (adopting and defining substantial evidence standard in
context of Social Security cases); Kyle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010);
Landsaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986).
Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson,
4

402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L.
Ed. 126 (1938)); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). The
Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, “even if
there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.”
Blakely v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109
F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003);
Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999)).
The Court must examine the entire record to determine if the Commissioner’s findings
are supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Secretary, 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir.1991). A
reviewing court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions
of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Myers v.
Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1268 (6th Cir. 1972)). The Court must accept the ALJ’s explicit
findings and final determination unless the record as a whole is without substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s determination. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See, e.g., Houston v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1984).
B. Determining Disability at the Administrative Level
The claimant has the ultimate burden of establishing her entitlement to benefits by
proving her “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d) (1)(A).

The asserted impairment(s) must be demonstrated by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3) and
1382c(a)(3)(D); 20 CFR §§ 404.1512(a), (c), 404.1513(d). “Substantial gainful activity” not only

5

includes previous work performed by the claimant, but also, considering the claimant’s age,
education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy in
significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which the
claimant lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired
if she applied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In the proceedings before the Social Security Administration, the Commissioner must
employ a five-step, sequential evaluation process in considering the issue of the claimant’s
alleged disability. See Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001); Abbot
v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must show that she is not
engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time disability benefits are sought. Cruse v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007); 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
Second, the claimant must show that she suffers from a severe impairment that meets the twelve
month durational requirement. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). See also
Edwards v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 113 F. App’x 83, 85 (6th Cir. 2004). Third, if the claimant has
satisfied the first two steps, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry, regardless
of age, education or work experience, if the impairment at issue either appears on the regulatory
list of impairments that are of sufficient severity as to prevent any gainful employment or equals
a listed impairment. Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); 20 CFR
§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). A claimant is not required to show the existence of a listed
impairment in order to be found disabled, but such a showing results in an automatic finding of
disability that ends the inquiry. See Combs, supra; Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1122
(6th Cir. 1989).

6

If the claimant’s impairment does not render her presumptively disabled, the fourth step
evaluates the claimant’s residual functional capacity in relationship to her past relevant work.
Combs, supra. “Residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) is defined as “the most [the claimant] can
still do despite [her] limitations.” 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(1). In determining a claimant’s RFC, for
purposes of the analysis required at steps four and five, the ALJ is required to consider the
combined effect of all the claimant’s impairments, mental and physical, exertional and
nonexertional, severe and nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(B), (5)(B); Foster v. Bowen,
853 F.2d 483, 490 (6th Cir.1988). At the fourth step, the claimant has the burden of proving an
inability to perform past relevant work or proving that a particular past job should not be
considered relevant. Cruse, 502 F.3d at 539; Jones, 336 F.3d at 474. If the claimant cannot
satisfy the burden at the fourth step, disability benefits must be denied because the claimant is
not disabled. Combs, supra.
If a claimant is not presumed disabled but shows that past relevant work cannot be
performed, the burden of production shifts at step five to the Commissioner to show that the
claimant, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, can perform other
substantial gainful employment and that such employment exists in significant numbers in the
national economy. Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997)). See also Felisky v.
Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). In order to rebut a prima facie case, the
Commissioner must come forward with proof of the existence of other jobs a claimant can
perform. Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595. See also Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667
F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957, 103 S. Ct. 2428, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1315
(1983) (upholding the validity of the medical-vocational guidelines grid as a means for the

7

Commissioner of carrying his burden under appropriate circumstances). Even if the claimant’s
impairments prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work, if other work exists in
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not
disabled. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Tyra v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 1990); Farris v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 773 F.2d 85, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1985); Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966,
969-70 (6th Cir. 1985).
If the question of disability can be resolved at any point in the five-step sequential
evaluation process, the claim is not reviewed further. 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4). See also Higgs v.
Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that resolution of a claim at step two of the
evaluative process is appropriate in some circumstances).
C. Plaintiff’s Assertion of Error
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that (1) his spinal disorder meets or
equals Listing 1.04(A) in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and further failed to properly
assess the objective test results and subjective symptoms in the record; and (2) improperly
evaluated his residual functional capacity and improperly assigned controlling weight to nonexamining and non-treating physicians. (Docket Entry No. 13-1). Plaintiff contends that the
Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, or in the alternative, remanded for further
consideration. (Id. at 5).
Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states as follows:
The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the
record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing.

8

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). “In cases where there is an adequate record, the
[Commissioner’s] decision denying benefits can be reversed and benefits awarded if the decision
is clearly erroneous, proof of disability is overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and
evidence to the contrary is lacking.” Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985).
Additionally, a court can reverse the decision and immediately award benefits if all essential
factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a claimant’s entitlement
to benefits. Faucher v. Secretary, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Newkirk v. Shalala,
25 F.3d 316, 318 (1994). Plaintiff’s assertions of errors are addressed below.
1. The ALJ’s Consideration of Listing 1.04
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that his impairments would meet or
medically equal Listing 1.04(A), found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Plaintiff
asserts the evidence “shows that Mr. Jones satisfies all of the criteria of Listing 1.04(A) as he has
a spinal disorder at several levels as shown by CT and other objective testing.” (Docket Entry
No. 13-1 at 7).1
In order for Plaintiff to meet the criteria of Listing 1.04(A), he must show that he has a
disorder of the spine (i.e., degenerative disc disease) with:
Evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution
of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated
1

Plaintiff makes the additional argument that new evidence was submitted and not considered. However,
this evidence appears to be from September 2013. (Id. at p. 7). The ALJ signed the decision in July
2013. (AR at p. 20). The evidence Plaintiff refers to was submitted to the Appeals Council and was not
before the ALJ. The Sixth Circuit “has repeatedly held that evidence submitted to the Appeals Council
after the ALJ's decision cannot be considered part of the record for purposes of substantial evidence
review. Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Cline v. Comm'r of Social Security, 96
F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996)) (“[W]here the Appeals Council considers new evidence but declines to
review a claimant's application for disability insurance benefits on the merits, the district court cannot
consider that new evidence in deciding whether to uphold, modify, or reverse the ALJ's decision.”). “The
district court can, however, remand the case for further administrative proceedings in light of the
evidence, if a claimant shows that the evidence is new and material, and that there was good cause for not
presenting it in the prior proceeding.” Id. In the instant case, the evidence submitted was not relevant to
the decision before the ALJ since it consists of treatment after July 2013.
9

muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and,
if there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting
and supine).
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, Listing 1.04(A). It is well-settled that to “meet” a Listing, a
claimant's impairments must satisfy each and every element of the Listing. See Sullivan v.
Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990) (“For a claimant to show that
his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An
impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not
qualify.”); Blanton v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 118 F. App'x 3, 6 (6th Cir. 2004) (“When all the
requirements for a listed impairment are not present, the Commissioner properly determines that
the claimant does not meet the listing.”).
In making his finding, the ALJ gave the following analysis:
There is no medical evidence of the nerve root or spinal cord compromise, as
required by Listing 1.04, and therefore the additional components required are not
necessary to discuss. The medical record does not consist of medically acceptable
imaging that demonstrate any compromise of the nerve root or spinal cord. . .[t]he
records show that the claimant can ambulate effectively without an assistive
device. Moreover, during the consultative examination he walked unassisted
despite demonstrating a “waddling” gait (Exhibit 3F at 3). . . No cane or assistive
device has been recommended or prescribed by any treating physicians within the
submitted evidence. The undersigned has reviewed the record and finds the
requirements of Listing 1.04 have not been met as the medical record fails to
demonstrate the requisite determination of spinal function. The claimant has
some alleged limitations in this area due to his back pain; however, as discussed
in more detail below, these allegations do not rise to listing level.
(AR at pp. 26-27). If the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, his
decision is conclusive and must be affirmed. Warner v. Comm. Of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390
(6th Cir. 2004).

The Court therefore finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination that Plaintiff’s condition does not meet Listing 1.04.

10

2. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Residual Functional Capacity
Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously accepted the findings of the nonexamining and non-treating state agency physician, and his physical and mental residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) was not supported by substantial evidence. (Docket Entry No. 13-1
at 5). Plaintiff further argues,
. . . the Honorable ALJ gave more weight to an non-examining/non-treating
physician, Dr. Joseph Curtsinger (Tr. 107-116), who did only a cursory review of
a portion of the file [], and the ALJ did not provide any further basis for her
findings of a light RFC, when evidence clearly points to an RFC of less than
sedentary, as provided by Dr. Keown, and upon accepted testimony of the VE.
(Id. at p. 6).
The residual functional capacity is the most an individual can still do despite the work
related limitations that arise from their impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
However, the residual functional capacity need only include those limitations that the ALJ found
credible. See, Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F.App’x 149, 155-56 (6th Cir. 2009)(citing 20 §
404.1545). Moreover, the ALJ is not required to discuss all of the evidence submitted, and his
failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that is was not considered. Daniels v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 152 F. App’x 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted)).2
The ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform light work”
as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), “except that he can only frequently
perform postural activities and is precluded from pushing or pulling with his right upper
extremity.” (AR at p. 27). And furthermore, that he is “limited to no more than occasional

2

Generally more weight is given to a doctor who examined the claimant, while generally even more
weight is given to well-supported opinions from treating medical sources who have established a treating
relationship with the claimant – non-examining physicians’ opinions are also considered.. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c)(1-2) and (e), 416.927(c)(1-2) and (e). The opinions of State agency medical consultants
must be considered. See, SSR 96-6p.
11

overhead reaching with his right upper extremity.”

(Id.).

The ALJ made the following

determinations as it related to Plaintiff’s credibility:
The evidentiary record chronicles no doctor visits, therapy or treatment for back
pain until July 25, 2011 (Exhibit 1F). The claimant alluded to a long standing
history of lumbar pain radiating into his lower extremities. However, the
objective medical evidence lacks any prior physician treatment notes or
observations regarding the claimant’s back troubles.
***
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause some of the alleged symptoms. However, the claimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are
not credible due to the absence of objective signs, diagnoses, and limitations.
The undersigned finds that the claimant’s subjective complaints of disabling
physical limitations are disproportionate to the objective clinical and diagnostic
medical evidence. . . The claimant’s contention regarding the nature, frequency,
severity and duration of his back and shoulder pain is inconsistent with the
delayed and sporadic doctor visits.
Additionally, the medical evidence does not support his contention that
musculoskeletal pain and residual lower extremity issues prevent him from
standing or walking for extensive periods.
***
In terms of his alleged debilitating shoulder troubles, the medical evidence does
not support this. There is no evidence of widespread complications other than
residual pain, which is consistent with the conservative treatment measures.
***
His credibility is further in question in light of his self-reported denial of any
alcohol use. Depending on the situation, he failed to disclose his alcohol intake.
He consistently professed he was a “non-drinker” in direct contradiction to his
occasional drinking as noted in the record (Exhibits 2F at 4, 3F at 2, and 6F).
(AR at pp. 28-30)(emphasis in original). As for the opinion evidence, the ALJ found the
following:

12

The undersigned gives little weight to the consultative examiner Dr. Donita
Keown opinion [that] the claimant was limited to sedentary exertion, as this
opinion[] is without substantial support from other evidence in the record. . .
Some weight is given to Joseph Curtsinger, M.D., who reviewed the file and
opined that despite chronic shoulder and back pain, the claimant remained able to
frequently perform postural activities (Exhibit 6A). . .
Little or no weight is given to pain clinic physician Richard Smith, M.D., as his
opinion contains unsupported functional assessment as he has never treated or
examined the claimant (Exhibit 7F). The claimant testified that he has never
received care from Dr. Smith and the treatment notes confirm all visits were with
the physician assistant (Exhibits 2F and 4F).

(Id. at pp 30-31).
Consequently, the record reflects that the ALJ considered such factors as Plaintiff’s
allegations to the extent they were found credible and his retained level of functioning as
reflected by the evidence, medical opinions (wherein explanations were given regarding the
weight of each opinion), as well as the medical evidence. The Court finds that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination as to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court concludes that the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole, and are free from legal error. With such support, the ALJ’s
decision must stand, even if the record also contains substantial evidence that would support the
opposite conclusion. E.g., Longworth c. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005).
For all of the reasons stated, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the
Administrative Record (Docket Entry No. 13).
An appropriate Order shall be entered.
_________________________________________
KEVIN H. SHARP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13