Chaffin v. Social Security Administration
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 9/11/17. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(am)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
JEFFERY KENDELL CHAFFIN,
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security 1
CHIEF JUDGE CRENSHAW
Jeffery Kendell Chaffin filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)
to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s claim for a period of disability, Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), as provided under Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). The case is currently pending on Plaintiff’s Motion
for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 16), to which Defendant has responded
(Doc. No. 20).
Upon review of the administrative record as a whole and consideration of the parties’
filings, Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. No. 16) is DENIED and the decision of the Commissioner is
Chaffin first filed applications for DIB and SSI on May 18, 2009, with an alleged
disability onset date of February 1, 2007, in which he claimed that he was unable to work due to
Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017. Pursuant to
Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for former Acting
Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit.
depression, anxiety disorder, high blood pressure, diabetes, “learning difficulties,” and
hypothyroidism. (Doc. No. 10, Transcript of the Administrative Record at 19, 38-39.) 2 Both
applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 107. Following an
administrative hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied the claim. AR 19. The
Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s unfavorable decision on April 26, 2012, at which
point Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
AR 19. The court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner on March 26, 2014. AR 19, 38-56.
Plaintiff again filed applications for DIB and SSI on June 6, 2012. AR 136-37. Similar to
his first applications, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of February 1, 2007 and again
claimed that he was unable to work due to depression, anxiety, high blood pressure, and diabetes.
AR 182. 3
Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 176-77.
Pursuant to his request for an additional hearing before an ALJ, he appeared with counsel and
testified at a hearing before ALJ Joan A. Lawrence on July 24, 2014. AR 57. On November 12,
2014, the ALJ denied the claim. AR 16-18. On April 5, 2016, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision (AR 1-3), thereby making the ALJ’s decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. This civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the
Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Transcript of the Administrative Record is hereinafter referenced by the abbreviation “AR” followed
by the corresponding page number(s) as numbered in large black print on the bottom right corner of each page.
The Commissioner noted that Plaintiff had alleged a learning disability and a thyroid condition in his first
applications, and additionally stated that medical records indicated that he suffered from sinusitis. AR 182.
II. THE ALJ FINDINGS
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on November 12, 2014, in which she made the
following enumerated findings:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2013.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 1,
2007, the alleged onset date. (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: hypothyroidism,
hypertension, anxiety disorder, and depressive disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525,
404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except he could occasionally
climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds and frequently climb ramps and stairs,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He should avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme cold temperatures. He is capable of carrying out simple
and detailed one, two, and three step instructions.
6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a chicken hanger
and box assembler. This work does not require the performance of workrelated activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20
CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from February 1, 2007, through the date of this decision (20 CFR
404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).
III. REVIEW OF THE RECORD
The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and
testimonial evidence of the administrative record. Accordingly, the Court will discuss those
matters only to the extent necessary to analyze the parties’ arguments.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standard of Review
The determination of disability under the Act is an administrative decision. The only
questions before this Court upon judicial review are (i) whether the decision of the
Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence, and (ii) whether the Commissioner made
legal errors in the process of reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (adopting and defining substantial evidence standard in
context of Social Security cases); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir.
2010). The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence,
“even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite
conclusion.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v.
Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477
(6th Cir. 2003); Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999).
Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson,
402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007); LeMaster v. Weinberger, 533 F.2d 337,
339 (6th Cir. 1976) (quoting Sixth Circuit opinions adopting language substantially similar to
that in Richardson).
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to the record made in the
administrative hearing process. Jones v. Secretary, 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1991). A
reviewing court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions
of credibility. See, e.g., Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Myers v.
Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1268 (6th Cir. 1972)). The Court must accept the ALJ’s explicit
findings and determination unless the record as a whole is without substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s determination. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See, e.g., Houston v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1984).
B. Determining Disability at the Administrative Level
The claimant has the ultimate burden of establishing an entitlement to benefits by proving
his “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 432(d)(1)(A). The asserted impairment(s) must be demonstrated by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 432(d)(3) and
1382c(a)(3)(D); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), (c), and 404.1513(d). “Substantial gainful activity”
not only includes previous work performed by the claimant, but also, considering the claimant’s
age, education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy
in significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which the
claimant lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired
if he applied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In the proceedings before the Social Security Administration, the Commissioner must
employ a five-step, sequential evaluation process in considering the issue of the claimant’s
alleged disability. See Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001); Abbot
v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must show that he is not
engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time disability benefits are sought. Cruse v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
Second, the claimant must show that he suffers from a severe impairment that meets the twelve
month durational requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). See also
Edwards v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 113 F. App’x 83, 85 (6th Cir. 2004). Third, if the claimant has
satisfied the first two steps, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry, regardless
of age, education or work experience, if the impairment at issue either appears on the regulatory
list of impairments that are sufficiently severe as to prevent any gainful employment or equals a
listed impairment. Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). A claimant is not required to show the existence of a listed
impairment in order to be found disabled, but such showing results in an automatic finding of
disability that ends the inquiry. See Combs, supra; Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1122
(6th Cir. 1989).
If the claimant’s impairment does not render him presumptively disabled, the fourth step
evaluates the claimant’s residual functional capacity in relationship to his past relevant work.
Combs, supra. “Residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) is defined as “the most [the claimant] can
still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In determining a claimant’s RFC,
for purposes of the analysis required at steps four and five, the ALJ is required to consider the
combined effect of all the claimant’s impairments, mental and physical, exertional and
nonexertional, severe and nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(B), (5)(B); Foster v. Bowen,
853 F.2d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 1988). At the fourth step, the claimant has the burden of proving an
inability to perform past relevant work or proving that a particular past job should not be
considered relevant. Cruse, 502 F.3d at 539; Jones, 336 F.3d at 474. If the claimant cannot
satisfy the burden at the fourth step, disability benefits must be denied because the claimant is
not disabled. Combs, supra.
If the claimant is not presumed disabled but shows that past relevant work cannot be
performed, the burden of production shifts at step five to the Commissioner to show that the
claimant, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, can perform other
substantial gainful employment and that such employment exists in significant numbers in the
national economy. Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997)). See also Felisky v.
Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). To rebut a prima facie case, the Commissioner must
come forward with proof of the existence of other jobs a claimant can perform. Longworth, 402
F.3d at 595. See also Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983) (upholding the validity of the medical-vocational
guidelines grid as a means for the Commissioner of carrying his burden under appropriate
circumstances). Even if the claimant’s impairments prevent the claimant from doing past
relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d
647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Tyra v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.2d 1024,
1028-29 (6th Cir. 1990); Farris v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 773 F.2d 85, 88-89 (6th Cir.
1985); Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1985).
If the question of disability can be resolved at any point in the sequential evaluation
process, the claim is not reviewed further. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). See also Higgs v. Bowen,
880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that resolution of a claim at step two of the evaluative
process is appropriate in some circumstances).
C. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation of Plaintiff
Here, the ALJ resolved Plaintiff’s claim at step four of the five-step process. The ALJ
found that Plaintiff met the first two steps, but determined at step three that Plaintiff was not
presumptively disabled because he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform past
relevant work as a chicken hanger and box assembler, and thus concluded that Plaintiff has not
been under a disability since the alleged onset date of February 1, 2007. AR 22-31.
D. Plaintiff’s Assertions of Error
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff did not meet Listing 12.05C.
(Doc. No. 17 at 18.) Plaintiff therefore requests that this case be reversed and benefits awarded
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), or, alternatively, remanded for further
consideration. (Id. at 20.)
Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states the following:
The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the
record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a
“In cases where there is an adequate record, the [Commissioner’s] decision denying benefits can
be reversed and benefits awarded if the decision is clearly erroneous, proof of disability is
overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking.” Mowery
v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, a court can reverse the decision and
immediately award benefits if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record
adequately establishes a claimant’s entitlement to benefits. Faucher v. Secretary, 17 F.3d 171,
176 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (1994). The Court addresses
Plaintiff’s assertion of error below.
Listing 12.05C 4
Plaintiff’s lone assertion of error involves the ALJ’s conclusion that his condition did not
meet the requirements of Listing 12.05C. This listing involves intellectual disability and requires
a claimant to meet three criteria: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning with
deficits in adaptive functioning that initially manifested prior to age 22; (2) a valid verbal,
performance, or full scale IQ score of 60 through 70; and (3) a physical or other mental
impairment that significantly limits the claimant’s ability to work. West v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
240 F. App’x 692, 697 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). 5 The claimant bears the burden
of demonstrating that he meets a particular listing, Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir.
2001), and a claimant does not satisfy the listing unless all of the requirements of that listing are
In January 2017, the Social Security Administration removed Listing 12.05C from Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Because the complaint was filed in June 2016, however, Listing 12.05C applies to the undersigned’s analysis. See
Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The Act does not generally give the SSA the
power to promulgate retroactive regulations.”); Cameron v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-169, 2016 WL 4094884, at *2 (E.D.
Tenn. Aug. 2, 2016) (“It is well-established that, absent explicit language to the contrary, administrative rules do not
apply retroactively.”) (internal citation omitted).
As noted by Defendant, the phrase “intellectual disability” has replaced the previous term, “mental
retardation,” in Listing 12.05. The court may refer to “mental retardation” in some instances out of necessity due to
the term’s use in the record, although the terms are interchangeable for purposes of this memorandum.
present. Hale v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 816 F.2d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing
King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984)).
With respect to the first requirement, the American Psychiatric Association has defined
adaptive-skills limitations as “[c]oncurrent deficits or impairments . . . in at least two of the
following areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and
safety.” Hayes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 357 F. App’x 672, 677 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citation
omitted). A person demonstrates deficits in adaptive functioning “when at least one domain of
adaptive functioning . . . is sufficiently impaired that ongoing support is needed in order for the
person to perform adequately in one or more life settings at school, at work, at home, or in the
community[.]” Davis v. Colvin, No. 2:10-cv-0088, 2015 WL 3504984, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May
28, 2015) (citing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 38 (5th ed. 2013)).
As discussed above, Plaintiff previously filed suit in this District to obtain review of the
ALJ’s prior denial of Plaintiff’s applications for DIB and SSI. Notably, Plaintiff presented the
same argument to the court regarding the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not meet Listing
12.05C, based primarily on the same evidence provided in the instant case, which was rejected in
a well-reasoned opinion by Senior Judge John T. Nixon (adopting in its entirety the report and
recommendation of Magistrate Judge Knowles). AR 38-56. While verbal comprehension and full
scale IQ scores derived from a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test (“Wechsler”) administered
by Jeffery Killian were “within the mild mental retardation range,” 6 the opinion explained in
Plaintiff received a score of 70 for verbal comprehension and full scale IQ, which Mr. Killian later
described as “at the low end of the borderline range or at the high end of the mild mental retardation range
depending on adaptive functioning.” AR 778, 807. Plaintiff received additional scores of 73 in perceptual reasoning,
83 in working memory, and 76 in processing speed. AR 807.
detail how substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s determination that Plaintiff did
not meet the criteria of Listing 12.05C, including the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff had “failed
to demonstrate that he suffered from the deficits in adaptive functioning required by the
introductory paragraph of § 12.05, and therefore was not disabled under that section.” AR 47.
The opinion specifically dealt with the inadequacy of Plaintiff’s reliance on Mr. Killian’s
Section 12.05 makes clear that Plaintiff must show both subaverage intellectual
functioning and deficits in adaptive functioning. While Mr. Killian’s report
clearly addresses Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning, his report provides little
regarding adaptive functioning. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Mr. Killian’s
statement that Plaintiff’s scores “seem consistent with” his adaptive functioning
does not constitute an analysis of Plaintiff’s adaptive functioning, as such a
conclusory statement establishes neither that Plaintiff actually possesses deficits
in adaptive functioning nor the severity of any such deficits.
AR 48 (emphasis in original).
In an attempt to rectify this deficiency, Plaintiff returned to Mr. Killian on July 9, 2014
for an additional examination, during which Mr. Killian interviewed Plaintiff’s girlfriend,
Charlene Quarles, to provide a “formal assessment” of Plaintiff’s adaptive functioning. AR 778.
Based on answers provided by Ms. Quarles, Mr. Killian conducted a “Vineland Adaptive
Behavior Scales” and found that the results of such testing confirmed his initial impression that
Plaintiff’s Wechsler scores “seem consistent with [Plaintiff’s] adaptive functioning.” AR 77879. 7
Despite procuring this additional evaluation from Mr. Killian, the court notes that
Plaintiff fails to identify any actual errors in the ALJ’s analysis. Plaintiff restates Mr. Killian’s
conclusion that he suffers from an intellectual disability, based on a full scale IQ score of 70, to
The ALJ found that this evaluation represented “new and material evidence” that warranted “departure”
from the previous ALJ decision and additional consideration of Plaintiff’s condition. AR 19-20.
argue that he meets the requirements of Listing 12.05C. (Doc. No. 17 at 19.) However, the ALJ
did not reject Mr. Killian’s diagnosis, but instead emphasized that Mr. Killian’s testing and
diagnosis failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff experienced deficits in adaptive functioning prior to
age 22, as required by Listing 12.05C. AR 23. 8 Even assuming that Mr. Killian’s July 2014
interview of Plaintiff’s girlfriend yielded a valid assessment of Plaintiff’s adaptive functioning,
the accompanying report does not establish that Plaintiff experienced deficits in adaptive
functioning prior to age 22. Conspicuously, Plaintiff does not assert that Mr. Killian’s additional
examination proves the existence of such deficits during this developmental period, and his
reiteration of findings from this evaluation does not establish any error committed by the ALJ.
See Peterson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 552 F. App’x 533, 540 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Merely
marshalling evidence to suggest that [the claimant] is disabled, however, is insufficient; to
prevail on appeal, [the claimant] must demonstrate that the ALJ’s determination that he was not
disabled is not supported by substantial evidence.”).
Instead, Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate that he suffered from adaptive functioning
deficits prior to age 22 by identifying a letter from his sister indicating that she and her mother
assisted Plaintiff with homework assignments, as well as a letter from a high school math teacher
explaining that Plaintiff was unable to “master” algebra concepts. AR 323-24, 330. However,
Plaintiff’s struggles with high school algebra and his sister’s statement that he received help with
homework assignments from his family do not establish the existence of adaptive functioning
deficits during the developmental period. See Hayes, 357 F. App’x at 677 (“[T]his Court has
never held that poor academic performance, in and of itself, is sufficient to warrant a finding of
The ALJ did note that a separate consultative examination had resulted in a finding that Plaintiff
“appeared to have average intellectual functioning.” AR 23.
onset of subaverage intellectual functioning before age twenty-two.”). Indeed, Plaintiff identifies
no evidence from an examiner or medical provider suggesting that he experienced such deficits
prior to age 22, which is significant in light of the Sixth Circuit’s indication that such evidence
weighs against a finding that deficits existed during the developmental period. See Eddy v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 506 F. App’x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that claimant failed to
establish deficits in adaptive functioning prior to age 22 “because the psychological evaluations
and other medical evidence in the record did not address the relevant period”).
In light of the lack of evidence that Plaintiff suffered from deficits in adaptive functioning
prior to age 22, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
Plaintiff does not meet all of the criteria required under Listing 12.05C. See Sullivan v. Zebley,
493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (the alleged impairment must meet all of the listing’s specified criteria
because an impairment that “manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does
not qualify”). As discussed by the ALJ, Plaintiff obtained a high school diploma, which tends to
support a conclusion that Plaintiff did not experience such deficits prior to age 22 regardless of
whether he was enrolled in special education classes. Cf. Sheeks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
544 F. App’x 639, 642 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that claimant’s involvement in special education
classes and failure to finish high school did not establish deficits in adaptive functioning before
age 22). 9 Plaintiff’s claim that he “cheated his way” through all of his high school classes by
“looking at other people’s papers” (Doc. No. 17 at 18) strains credulity and fails to establish
meaningful evidence of adaptive functioning deficits experienced prior to age 22. See Sheeks,
544 F. App’x at 642 (holding that fulfillment of the criteria of a particular listing “requires more
It is unclear from the record whether Plaintiff was actually enrolled in special education. He testified that
he took part in “special classes” (AR 62) and Mr. Killian noted that Plaintiff “had some special education” (AR
778), yet Plaintiff initially reported that he did not attend special education classes. AR 255.
than what [the claimant] has put forth here, a mere toehold in the record on an essential element
of the listing”). The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s assertion of error and affirms the
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative
Record (Doc. No. 16) is DENIED.
An appropriate Order will accompany this memorandum.
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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