Williams v. Social Security Administration

Filing 19

ORDER: The Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 15 ) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED. The Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 12 ) is DENIED and the final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk shall enter j udgment pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and close the case. Signed by Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr on 5/24/18. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COOKEVILLE DIVISION
LAYLA D. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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NO. 2:17-00040
CHIEF JUDGE CRENSHAW

ORDER
Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 15) in which the
Magistrate Judge recommends denying Layla D. Williams’ Motion for Judgment on the
Administrative Record (Doc. No. 12) and affirming the final decision of the Commissioner
denying Williams disability benefits. Williams has timely filed objections (Doc. No. 16), the
Commissioner has responded (Doc. No. 17), and Williams has filed a reply (Doc. No. 18). The
Court has conducted a de novo review of the relevant issues.
Review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards. Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d
931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Heston v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
substantial evidence standard . . . presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the
decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir.

1986)). Thus, the Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on substantial
evidence, even if there is substantial evidence that would also have supported an opposite
conclusion. Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007).
In a one-page filing, Williams lodges two objections to the Report and Recommendation.
First, Williams argues that the ALJ improperly omitted discussion of the opinion of treating
physician Dr. Rodney McMillin (although the ALJ had previously discussed and disregarded that
opinion in her first decision in 2012). (Doc. No. 16 at 1.) The Magistrate Judge correctly rejected
this argument in the Report and Recommendation. To the extent the ALJ’s failure to directly
discuss Dr. McMillin’s 2011 opinion in the ALJ’s second decision in 2017 was error, it was
harmless error because the opinion was (1) outside Dr. McMillin’s area of expertise and (2) plainly
inconsistent with the record. The clearest example of this is that Dr. McMillin opined in 2011 that
Williams could not meet the standards for operating in a workplace setting, however Williams
undisputedly continued to perform substantial gainful activity for the next five years. As the
Commissioner properly asserts, remanding this case for the ALJ to disregard a patently deficient
opinion would serve no purpose because the Commissioner would not possibly credit it.
Second, Williams contends that the ALJ improperly failed to discuss the opinion of
examining physician Dr. Sanjay Thakur. (Doc. No. 16 at 1.) Again, the Magistrate Judge correctly
dismissed this argument. The opinions of examining physicians, unlike treating physicians, are not
entitled to any special deference. Peterson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 552 F. App’x 533, 539 (6th
Cir. 2014); Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 1994). In addition, the ALJ must take into
account the amount of relevant evidence supporting a source’s opinion. Karger v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 414 F. App’x 739, 751 (6th Cir. 2011). Dr. Thakur’s opinion – the result of only two
examinations – was provided in “checkbox” form without supporting objective evidence. This

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alone entitles the ALJ to give it little weight. Ellars v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 647 F. App’x 563,
566 (6th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). Beyond this, Dr. Thakur’s opinion was inconsistent with
other medical evidence of record. Williams has not identified any additional underlying objective
support for Dr. Thakur’s opinion. In sum, the ALJ was not obligated to provide “good reasons”
for rejecting Dr. Thakar’s non-treating-source opinion, Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 461 F.
App’x 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2012), and, regardless, Dr. Thakar’s opinion was of little, if any,
assistance to the ALJ.
Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding
that Williams’ allegations of disability were not established by the record. The ALJ considered the
medical evidence and the Magistrate Judge properly evaluated the ALJ’s decision. At the very
least, the ALJ’s determination was reasonable based upon an allowable consideration of record
evidence and fell within the permissible “zone of choice” within which the ALJ could “go either
way, without interference by the courts.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th
Cir. 2009). It is therefore inappropriate to disturb the ALJ’s conclusions. Accordingly, the Report
and Recommendation (Doc. No. 15) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED. The Motion for Judgment
on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED and the final decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk shall enter judgment pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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