Holbrooks v. Social Security Administration

Filing 20

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the administrative record ( 17 ) be DENIED and the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara D. Holmes on 6/3/19. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.) (gb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
MELISA MICHELLE HOLBROOKS
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL
Acting Commissioner of Social Security

To:

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)
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)
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No. 2:18-0039

The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., Chief District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial
review of the final decision of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), denying
Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) as provided under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). The case is currently pending on Plaintiff’s motion for judgment
on the administrative record (Docket Entry (“DE”) 17), to which Defendant has responded. DE 18.
Plaintiff has also filed a reply brief. DE 19.
Upon review of the administrative record as a whole and consideration of the parties’
filings, the undersigned Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s motion (DE 17)
be DENIED.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on January 6, 2015, in which she alleged that she was
unable to work because of chronic sciatica, pinched nerves, degenerative disc disease, mental

1

health illnesses, and numbness in the knee. See Transcript of the Administrative Record (DE 15)
at 67, 83. 1 She alleged a disability onset date of May 1, 2014. AR 55.
Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 67, 80. Pursuant
to her request for a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), Plaintiff appeared with
counsel and testified at a hearing before ALJ William Callahan on May 10, 2017. AR 26. On
August 23, 2017, the ALJ denied the claim. AR 8-10. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review of the ALJ’s decision (AR 1-4), thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. This civil action was subsequently filed and the Court has
jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

THE ALJ FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following enumerated findings as part of his denial of Plaintiff’s claim:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 6,
2015, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following medically determinable impairments: paraspinal
muscle spasms; mild lumbar degenerative disc disease (DDD); early left knee
degenerative joint disease (DJD); depression/affective disorder with mixed
anxiety; hypertension; GERD; and obesity (416.922 et seq.).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
has significantly limited (or is expected to significantly limit) the ability to
perform basic work-related activities for 122 consecutive months; therefore, the
claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments
(416.922 et seq.).

1

The Transcript of the Administrative Record is referenced by the abbreviation “AR”
followed by the corresponding page number(s) as numbered in the large black Bates stamps on the
bottom right corner of each page.
2

4. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, since January 6, 2015, the date the application was filed (20 CFR
416.920(c)).
AR 13-21.
III.

REVIEW OF THE RECORD

The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and
testimonial evidence of the administrative record. Accordingly, the Court will discuss those
matters only to the extent necessary to analyze the parties’ arguments.
IV.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Standard of Review
The determination of disability under the Act is an administrative decision. The only
questions before this Court upon judicial review are: (i) whether the decision of the Commissioner
is supported by substantial evidence, and (ii) whether the Commissioner made legal errors in the
process of reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (adopting and defining substantial evidence standard
in context of Social Security cases); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir.
2010). The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence,
“even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite
conclusion.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v.
Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477
(6th Cir. 2003); Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999). Substantial
evidence is defined as “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)); Rogers v.
3

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007); LeMaster v. Weinberger, 533 F.2d 337,
339 (6th Cir. 1976) (quoting Sixth Circuit opinions adopting language substantially similar to that
in Richardson).
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to the record made in the
administrative hearing process. Jones v. Secretary, 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1991). A
reviewing court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of
credibility. See, e.g., Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Myers v.
Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265, 1268 (6th Cir. 1972)). The Court must accept the ALJ’s explicit
findings and determination unless the record as a whole is without substantial evidence to support
the ALJ’s determination. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See, e.g., Houston v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1984).
B. Determining Disability at the Administrative Level
The claimant has the ultimate burden of establishing an entitlement to benefits by proving
her “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The asserted impairment(s) must be demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques. Id. §§ 423(d)(3) and 1382c(a)(3)(D). “Substantial gainful activity” not only
includes previous work performed by the claimant, but also, considering the claimant’s age,
education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy in
significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which the
claimant lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired if
she applied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
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In the proceedings before the Social Security Administration, the Commissioner must
employ a five-step, sequential evaluation process in considering the issue of the claimant’s alleged
disability. See Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001); Abbot v. Sullivan,
905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must show that she is not engaged in
“substantial gainful activity” at the time disability benefits are sought. Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). Second, the claimant must
show that she suffers from a severe impairment that meets the 12-month durational requirement.
Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). See also Edwards v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 113 F. App’x 83, 85 (6th Cir.
2004). Third, if the claimant has satisfied the first two steps, the claimant is presumed disabled
without further inquiry, regardless of age, education or work experience, if the impairment at issue
either appears on the regulatory list of impairments that are sufficiently severe as to prevent any
gainful employment or equals a listed impairment. Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640,
643 (6th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). A claimant is not required to show the existence of a
listed impairment in order to be found disabled, but such showing results in an automatic finding
of disability that ends the inquiry. See Combs, supra; Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1122
(6th Cir. 1989).
If the claimant’s impairment does not render her presumptively disabled, the fourth step
evaluates the claimant’s residual functional capacity in relationship to her past relevant work.
Combs, supra. “Residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) is defined as “the most [the claimant] can
still do despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). In determining a claimant’s RFC, for
purposes of the analysis required at steps four and five, the ALJ is required to consider the
combined effect of all the claimant’s impairments, mental and physical, exertional and
nonexertional, severe and nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(B), (5)(B); Foster v. Bowen, 853
5

F.2d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 1988). At the fourth step, the claimant has the burden of proving an inability
to perform past relevant work or proving that a particular past job should not be considered
relevant. Cruse, 502 F.3d at 539; Jones, 336 F.3d at 474. If the claimant cannot satisfy the burden
at the fourth step, disability benefits must be denied because the claimant is not disabled. Combs,
supra.
If a claimant is not presumed disabled but shows that past relevant work cannot be
performed, the burden of production shifts at step five to the Commissioner to show that the
claimant, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, can perform other
substantial gainful employment and that such employment exists in significant numbers in the
national economy. Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997)). See also Felisky v. Bowen, 35
F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). To rebut a prima facie case, the Commissioner must come
forward with proof of the existence of other jobs a claimant can perform. Longworth, 402 F.3d at
595. See also Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 957, 103 S. Ct. 2428, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1315 (1983) (upholding the validity of the
medical-vocational guidelines grid as a means for the Commissioner of carrying his burden under
appropriate circumstances). Even if the claimant’s impairments prevent the claimant from doing
past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647,
652 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Tyra v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.2d 1024, 1028-29
(6th Cir. 1990); Farris v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 773 F.2d 85, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1985);
Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1985).

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If the question of disability can be resolved at any point in the sequential evaluation
process, the claim is not reviewed further. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).
C. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation of Plaintiff
The ALJ in the instant case resolved Plaintiff’s claim at step two of the five-step process.
Because Plaintiff was not found to have any severe impairments at step two, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 13-21.
D. Plaintiff’s Assertions of Error
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly concluded at step two of the process that she does
not suffer from a severe impairment. DE 17-1 at 9. Plaintiff requests that this case be reversed and
remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration and an
additional administrative hearing. Id. at 13.
Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states the following:
The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,
a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “In cases where there is an adequate record, the [Commissioner’s] decision
denying benefits can be reversed and benefits awarded if the decision is clearly erroneous, proof
of disability is overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is
lacking.” Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, a court can reverse
the decision and immediately award benefits if all essential factual issues have been resolved and
the record adequately establishes a claimant’s entitlement to benefits. Faucher v. Secretary, 17
F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (1994).

7

1. Step Two Finding.
Although the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several “medically determinable
impairments,” he concluded that none of these conditions constituted a “severe” impairment, thus
necessitating a non-disability finding. AR 13-14, 21. An impairment is considered “severe” at step
two of the evaluation only if it “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to
do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Step two is considered “a de minimis hurdle that
a claimant clears unless the impairment is only a slight abnormality that minimally affects work
ability.” McGlothin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 299 F. App’x 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citation
and quotations omitted). However, it is the claimant’s burden to prove both that her impairment
significantly limits her work-related activities and that her impairment has lasted or is expected to
last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Harley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 485 F. App’x
802, 803 (6th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider relevant evidence by noting that
two non-examining State agency physicians who reviewed her medical records, Drs. Alawode
Oladele and Jayant Desai, each opined that degenerative disc disease (“DDD”) represents a severe
impairment, with Dr. Desai additionally concluding that “dysfunction-major joints” and obesity
constitute severe impairments. AR 60, 73. Both physicians also proffered functional limitations
relating to Plaintiff’s physical condition, including mild restrictions on her ability to lift, carry,
stand, and walk. AR 76-77. 2 The ALJ accorded “little weight” to these opinions based primarily
on their inconsistency with the findings of a consultative examiner, Dr. Ashok Kancharla (AR 20,
296-99), which Plaintiff contends is a violation of the ALJ’s duty to refrain from “play[ing] doctor

2

Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ improperly determined that her alleged mental
impairments are non-severe.
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and mak[ing] [his] own independent medical findings,” Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 344 F.
App’x 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted), because Dr. Kancharla’s report does
not contain any functional limitations and therefore fails to constitute a “medical opinion.” DE 171 at 11-12.
The Court first notes that Plaintiff’s complaint about the ALJ’s designation of
Dr. Kancharla’s report as a medical “opinion” is immaterial. While it is true that a medical opinion
is generally defined as a statement from an acceptable medical source that includes any physical
or mental limitations caused by the subject claimant’s condition, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(1),
Plaintiff concedes later in her brief that the ALJ did not accord weight to the “opinion” of
Dr. Kancharla, but instead explicitly gave weight to the examining provider’s “findings.” DE 171 at 11. 3 Regardless, this argument holds no water since the existence of a “medical opinion” from
Dr. Kancharla is not required to discount the opinions of the non-examining state physicians. Cf.
Ziomber v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 205 F. App’x 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming ALJ’s decision
to

reject

treating

physician’s

opinion

based

on

its “inconsisten[cy] with

the

clinical findings of other physicians”) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s reliance on the Simpson holding is similarly misplaced as the ALJ in that case
improperly rejected a treating physician’s proposed functional limitations based on the entirely
unsupported independent finding that such restrictions were “inconceivable,” 344 F. App’x at 194,
while the instant ALJ appropriately relied on specific findings from an examining source that
contrasted with those from two non-examining sources. AR 20. The ALJ thus did not err by relying

3

Plaintiff also employs hyperbole by claiming that the ALJ “repeatedly” referenced the
medical “opinions” of Dr. Kancharla, but notes only one occurrence in the administrative opinion
in which this designation is used. DE 17-1 at 11.
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on Dr. Kancharla’s report. See Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013)
(holding that ALJ who rejected State agency physician’s proposed exertional limitations “was not
required to base her determination on a medical opinion, and substantial evidence, including
objective medical evidence, supported her decision”).
The pertinent issue is instead whether the ALJ’s step two determination is supported by
substantial evidence. The ALJ concluded that the non-examining physicians’ opinions were
entitled to little weight because they were not based on objective medical evidence, but instead
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. AR 20. Plaintiff asserts, however, that the objective medical
evidence is “highly indicative of a severe impairment” (DE 17-1 at 12), and points to a CT scan
from June of 2014 that revealed DDD “without focal disc herniation or spinal stenosis,” but
“borderline” neural foraminal stenosis at the L3-4 level. AR 259-60. She additionally relies on a
questionable letter from “Dr[.] Wood,” dated July 22, 2014 and addressed to Plaintiff, in which
the author claims that Plaintiff suffers from “left sided nerve impingement” that causes “constant
and excruciating pain.” AR 275. Plaintiff further references a note documenting an emergency
room encounter on July 27, 2014, during which she exhibited a limited range of motion due to left
leg pain (AR 331, 336), as well as a chest x-ray that demonstrated “mild thoracic spondylosis.”
AR 320.
A common thread in the evidence cited by Plaintiff is that almost all of these encounters
took place well before the January 6, 2015 application date, which is the beginning of the relevant
time period for purposes of SSI consideration. See Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987
F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The proper inquiry in an application for SSI benefits is whether
the plaintiff was disabled on or after her application date.”). See also Grimes v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 3:13-CV-299, 2015 WL 4550338, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2015) (noting that the relevant
10

time period in SSI claim is between the application date and the date of the ALJ’s decision).
Plaintiff makes no distinction between pre-application and post-application evidence, even in reply
to the Commissioner’s emphasis on this issue. See DE 18 at 4. This is significant because the
sparse medical evidence from the relevant period in this case bolsters the ALJ’s step two finding.
Dr. Kancharla’s examination on April 10, 2015 produced almost entirely normal findings based
on numerous measurements, including range of motion, straight leg raising (“SLR”), and strength.
AR 296-99. Dr. Kancharla additionally found that Plaintiff’s gait and station were normal. AR 298.
A physical examination on May 26, 2015 similarly revealed normal findings with respect to
Plaintiff’s back and extremities. AR 388. A nurse’s note from June 4, 2015 documents Plaintiff’s
complaint of “pain in left leg” (AR 344), but an examination less than three weeks later yielded no
abnormalities or functional deficits. AR 343. Simply put, there is very little evidence that
Plaintiff’s alleged impairment meets the 12-month durational requirement or significantly limits
her ability to perform basic work activities. Rogers v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:14-cv-1322, 2017
WL 3674840, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2017).
Plaintiff’s reliance on the aforementioned “medical letter” that was purportedly written by
Dr. Morgan Wood in July of 2014 is unavailing for multiple reasons. DE 17-1 at 4, 12. The
document contains no heading or other caption that might verify its origin, nor does it identify the
full name of the individual who allegedly authored the letter. There is instead a signature line
designated for “Dr [sic] Wood” with an accompanying signature that does not correspond to the
name “Morgan Wood,” as well as the handwritten name of a facility in Palm Beach Gardens,
Florida, which is approximately 700 miles from Plaintiff’s residence in Martin, Georgia. AR 8,

11

275. Even assuming the authenticity of this document, 4 there is no indication in the record that
Plaintiff has ever treated with Dr. Morgan Wood. The letter also appears to be based entirely on
Plaintiff’s reported complaints, which further diminishes its import. See Young v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 925 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that an opinion that does no more than
repeat a claimant’s allegations is not well-supported). The ALJ therefore appropriately discounted
this dubious exhibit.
Finally, and significantly, Plaintiff has identified no medical opinion that suggests the
presence of any disabling condition, as is her burden. Ferguson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d
269, 275 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). She emphasizes the “severity” findings of
Drs. Oladele and Desai while overlooking their accompanying opinions that Plaintiff is capable of
medium-level work and that she can perform her past relevant work as a cashier. AR 63, 65, 76,
78. The ALJ, based on a vocational expert’s testimony regarding the vocational requirements
delineated in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, classified this cashier position as “light”
exertional capacity, a classification more restrictive, and thus more favorable to Plaintiff, than the
“medium” level work capability suggested by Drs. Oladele and Desai. AR 51. 5 As such, even if
the ALJ had accorded full weight to the opinions of Drs. Oladele and Desai and adopted all of their
proposed functional limitations, such a finding would not prevent Plaintiff from performing her
past relevant work as a cashier, which would preclude a conclusion that she is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv) (“If you can still do your past relevant work, we will find that you are

4

The undersigned highlights the following questionable statement in the document: “[Y]ou
should possibly consider applying for some type of governmental assistance assist [sic] you in
getting medical help to be able to return to functioning to obtain work.” AR 275.
5

Medium work is defined as work that “involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. If someone can do medium
work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary and light work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c).
12

not disabled.”). Therefore, any error committed by the ALJ at step two would be rendered
harmless. See Pelfrey v. Astrue, No. CIV.A.09-97-GWU, 2010 WL 1872905, at *6 (E.D. Ky.
May 10, 2010) (holding that ALJ’s lack of “severe” impairments finding represented harmless
error because the claimant “did not carry her burden of showing she could not return to her past
relevant work”).
Plaintiff’s reply brief is again silent in response to Defendant’s elucidation of these
circumstances. DE 18 at 10-11. Plaintiff instead repeats her assertion that the ALJ “discounted the
only opinions of record” (DE 19 at 1), which she attributes to Drs. Oladele and Desai, despite the
fact that neither opinion would disqualify her from performing past relevant work, which would
transform remand of the ALJ’s decision into “an idle and useless formality.” Wilson v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). She also reiterates her
claim that the ALJ improperly “play[ed] doctor” by concluding that her impairments were not
severe (id.), yet this inaccurately portrays both the current ALJ’s analysis, which emphasizes the
normal physical findings documented by an examining physician, and the role of the ALJ in
general, which requires “weigh[ing] the evidence, resolv[ing] material conflicts, [and] mak[ing]
independent findings of fact.” Blair v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 178 F.3d 1293 (6th Cir. 1999). See
also VanSingel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 26 F. App’x 488, 490 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[i]t is
squarely within the province of the ALJ” to weigh relevant, conflicting evidence). The ALJ in the
current matter properly considered the factors delineated in 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c), including the
consistency and supportability of the physicians’ opinions. AR 20. The Court also notes that the
Sixth Circuit has held, in a case strikingly similar to the instant one, that substantial evidence
supports an ALJ’s conclusion that no severe impairment exists when the “only medical evidence
suggesting [the claimant] has any impairment at all comes from the non-examining state agency
13

physicians, who specifically found that she could perform medium-level work.” Long v. Apfel, 1
F. App’x 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2001).
Although the determination of whether an impairment is “severe” at step two of the
evaluation should be “liberally construed” in favor of the claimant, Griffeth v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 217 F. App’x 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2007), achieving this level of severity is not a foregone
conclusion. See Despins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 257 F. App’x 923, 930 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming
ALJ’s step two finding of no severe impairment because the claimant’s “host of medical
impairments ... does not establish that [the claimant] was significantly limited from performing
basic work activities for a continuous period of time”). Plaintiff in this case claims that she
continues to experience disabling pain, yet the record is essentially bereft of any indication that
she exhibited symptoms relating to degenerative disc disease after her application date of
January 6, 2015, which is significant given that a reviewing judge is obligated to “only analyze the
medical evidence immediately preceding, and after, Plaintiff’s [SSI] application date.” Russell v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CIV.A. 10-12118, 2012 WL 882889, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 26,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 10-12118, 2012 WL 882802 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 14, 2012). Even if all pre-application evidence is considered, there is no suggestion from a
treating physician that Plaintiff suffers from any functional limitations due to a physical
impairment, which weighs against a finding of severity. See Long, 1 F. App’x at 332 (affirming
ALJ’s non-severe step two finding given that the “record ... does not contain a single statement by
a treating physician indicating that [the claimant’s] health problems result in any specific workimpairing limitations”). The Court thus concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence.

14

The ALJ correctly noted that Plaintiff continued to be employed through the date of her
administrative hearing and exhibited no significant physical symptoms during multiple physical
examinations following her application date. AR 13, 15-16. Furthermore, even if the ALJ’s step
two conclusion lacked the support of substantial evidence, there is no medical opinion or other
evidence to suggest that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, which would render
harmless any error committed at step two. Accordingly, the Court declines to “convert judicial
review of [this] agency action into a ping-pong game” that fails to advance Plaintiff’s claim in any
meaningful way. M.G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 861 F. Supp. 2d 846, 859-60 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(internal citation omitted). This assertion of error is therefore rejected.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the above stated reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the
administrative record (DE 17) be DENIED and the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
Court within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation, and must state
with particularity the specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is
made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any responses to objections to this Report and Recommendation
must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the objections. Id.; M.D. Tenn. R. 72.01(b).
Failure to file specific written objections within the specified time can be deemed to be a waiver
of the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466,
88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985); Cowherd v. Milton, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Respectfully submitted,
__________________________
BARBARA D. HOLMES
United States Magistrate Judge
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