PennyMac Loan Services, LLC v. Sutton et al
Filing
28
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Court grant PennyMac's motion 12 to remand and remand this action to state court. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alistair Newbern on 01/27/2025. (xc:Pro se party by regular mail.) (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(ad)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:24-cv-00014
v.
JOEL AARON SUTTON et al.,
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Alistair E. Newbern
Defendants.
To:
The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff PennyMac Loan Services, LLC (PennyMac), has filed a motion to remand this
unlawful detainer action to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 12.) This
case is one of two actions pending in this Court between PennyMac and pro se parties Joel Aaron
Sutton and Terry Melissa Sutton (the Suttons) related to the foreclosure and sale of the Suttons’
home. Joel Aaron Sutton initiated Case No. 2:23-cv-00064 against PennyMac and other
defendants on October 25, 2023, asserting claims of mortgage and securities fraud and antitrust
violations, among other claims. See Complaint, Sutton v. Penny Mac Loan Servs., LLC, No. 2:23cv-00064 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 25, 2023), ECF No. 1; Fifth Amended Complaint, Sutton v. Penny
Mac Loan Servs., LLC, No. 2:23-cv-00064 (M.D. Tenn. June 10, 2024), ECF No. 51. PennyMac
initiated this action in the Court of General Sessions of Macon County, Tennessee, on December
18, 2023, by filing an unlawful detainer complaint against the Suttons. (Doc. Nos. 1-4, 13-1.) The
Suttons removed the action to federal court (Doc. No. 1), and PennyMac filed a motion to remand
(Doc. No. 12).
On May 17, 2024, the Court found that the Suttons had not filed a response in opposition
to PennyMac’s motion to remand within the time allowed by this Court’s Local Rules and ordered
the Suttons to show cause why they should be allowed to file an untimely response and why the
motion should not be granted as unopposed. (Doc. No. 16.) In response to the Court’s show-cause
order, the Suttons filed a “motion to delay” this case or to “enjoin” it with the Suttons’ other federal
case (Doc. No. 17, PageID#146), and a “motion to dismiss” PennyMac’s motion to remand (Doc.
No. 18, PageID# 154). PennyMac has responded in opposition to the Suttons’ motions (Doc.
Nos. 19, 20), and the Suttons have filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss PennyMac’s
motion to remand (Doc. No. 21). The parties also filed supplemental briefs (Doc. Nos. 25, 26)
regarding PennyMac’s motion to remand, as ordered by the Court (Doc. No. 24).
For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Court grant
PennyMac’s motion to remand and remand this action to state court.
I.
Relevant Background
PennyMac filed its unlawful detainer complaint against the Suttons in the Macon County
General Sessions Court on December 18, 2023, seeking possession of the property located at 876
Nichols Road in Dixon Springs, Tennessee. (Doc. Nos. 1-4, 13-1.) PennyMac alleges that the
Suttons’ right to possess the property “terminated because of . . . [a] foreclosure sale” and the
Suttons received a written “notice to vacate” the property on November 17, 2023, with which they
refused to comply. (Doc. No. 1-4, PageID# 38; Doc. No. 13-1, PageID# 122.)
On March 4, 2024, the Suttons removed PennyMac’s unlawful detainer complaint to this
Court “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441[,] and 1446[.]” (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 1.) The
Suttons state that “[t]his Court has jurisdiction over this matter under . . . §[ ]1332(a) because there
is complete diversity of citizenship between the Plaintiffs and Defendants and more than
$75,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs, is at stake.” (Id. at PageID# 2, ¶ 5.)
2
PennyMac responded on April 24, 2024, by filing a motion to remand this action to state
court. (Doc. No. 12.) PennyMac argues that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over its
unlawful detainer claims against the Suttons because the “Notice of Removal fails to demonstrate
that this Court has federal question jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, fails
to allege facts demonstrating complete diversity of citizenship between the [Suttons] and
Penny[M]ac exists in this case, and likewise fails to establish that the minimum $75,000.00 amount
in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is satisfied in this case.” (Doc. No. 13,
PageID# 115–16.)
The Suttons did not file a response in opposition to PennyMac’s motion to remand within
the time allowed by this Court’s Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc.
No. 16.) The Court therefore ordered the Suttons to show cause “by May 31, 2024, why the Court
should permit them to file an untimely response in opposition to PennyMac’s motion to remand
and why the Magistrate Judge should not recommend that the Court grant PennyMac’s motion as
unopposed.” (Id. at PageID# 145.) The Court further ordered the Suttons “to file any response in
opposition to PennyMac’s motion to remand by May 30, 2024.” (Id.)
On May 31, 2024, the Court received two filings from the Suttons by mail. (Doc. Nos. 17,
18.) The first filing is a “motion to delay” this case “until after [a] decision on case no. 2:23-CV00064 or [to] enjoin both” “because the two cases are intertwined.” (Doc. No. 17, PageID# 146,
147.) The Suttons state that “[h]aving these two cases going on at the same time has confused
the[m]” because “notices for both cases were sent out around the same time” and the Suttons
“mistakenly” thought that PennyMac filed its motion to remand in the other case. (Id. at
PageID# 147.) The Suttons “thank the court for giving [them] more time to answer” PennyMac’s
motion to remand and “apologize[ ] to the court” for their confusion. (Id.) The Suttons argue that
3
“[i]t would be unequitable for a trial to evict [them] when the matter is still undecided about [their]
claim that securities fraud and antitrust [ ] violations were in play to gain possession of [their]
home.” (Id.)
The second filing is a “motion to dismiss” PennyMac’s motion to remand. (Doc. No. 18,
PageID# 154.) The Suttons argue that “[j]urisdiction lies within this court because all securities
fraud in commerce resides in Federal Court” and, alternatively, that the Court has diversity
jurisdiction because the value of the house itself is more than $75,000.00. (Id. at PageID# 155.)
PennyMac responds that “the two cases are not ‘intertwined’” because “this case . . . is
strictly limited to the issue of Penny[M]ac’s legal right to post-foreclosure possession of the
Property following a November 14, 2023 foreclosure sale.” (Doc. No. 19, PageID# 166.) It further
argues that the Suttons have not established that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over its
unlawful detainer claims (Doc. No. 20) and that, “in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction over
this case, . . . the Court is without authority to take any action other than to remand the case back
to the Macon County, Tennessee General Sessions Court” (Doc. No. 19, PageID# 167).
The Suttons filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss PennyMac’s motion to
remand arguing, among other things, that (1) “[f]ederal court[s] always ha[ve] jurisdiction over
securities, securities fraud[,] and any violation of consumer law . . .”; (2) the Suttons’ “home is
worth over $300 thousand dollars . . .”; and (3) PennyMac is “part of a diabolical
collusion/conspiracy to commit mortgage securities fraud and has plotted to steal the [Suttons’]
home” and the Suttons, “as consumers, can only defend their claim in a Federal court of equity
according to the [Consumer Credit Protection Act].” (Doc. No. 21, PageID# 174–75.)
On July 30, 2024, the Court found that further briefing was required on PennyMac’s motion
to remand because “neither the Suttons nor PennyMac ha[d] addressed the appropriate method for
4
determining the value of PennyMac’s asserted right of possession in this case[,]” which is relevant
to determining the amount in controversy for purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 24,
PageID# 245–46.) The Court noted that, “[a]s the parties that removed this action to federal court,
the Suttons ultimately bear the burden of establishing that removal was proper and showing that
the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds $75,000.00.” (Id. at PageID# 246.)
Accordingly, the Court ordered the parties “to file any supplemental briefing and evidence
regarding the value of PennyMac’s asserted right to possess the property at issue by no later than
August 20, 2024.” (Id.) The Court warned the Suttons “that failure to present additional argument
and evidence [would] likely result in a recommendation that PennyMac’s motion to remand be
granted.” (Id.)
PennyMac and the Suttons filed supplemental briefs on August 20, 2024. (Doc. Nos. 25,
26.)
II.
Legal Standard
Federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction and can adjudicate only
those claims authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City
of Cleveland, 695 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2012). Article III of the Constitution extends the federal
judicial power “to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States,” and several other categories of cases not at issue here. 1 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Congress has also
granted federal courts diversity jurisdiction over civil actions in which the parties are citizens of
1
For example, cases involving ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls and cases
between two states or in which the United States is a party. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
5
different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Whether the
Court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a “threshold” question in any action. Am. Telecom Co. v.
Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007). This reflects the fundamental principle
that “‘[j]urisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506, 514 (1868)); see also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 2015) (“In the
absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, a federal court must dismiss the lawsuit—no matter how
far along the litigation has progressed (including to the last-available appeal), no matter whether
the parties forfeited the issue, no matter indeed whether the parties have waived it.”).
III.
Analysis
A.
The Suttons’ Motions
One of the Suttons’ motions asks the Court to delay or enjoin this case and case No. 2:23CV-00064 because the two cases are intertwined. (Doc. No. 17.) The Court construes this motion
as a motion to consolidate the actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), which provides:
(a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common question of law or
fact, the court may:
(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or
(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1)–(3). “To consolidate two actions under Rule 42(a), however, the Court
must have separate jurisdictional bases for each case.” Williams v. Shamburger, Case No. 1:22cv-202, 2022 WL 3718484, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2022); see also Heck v. Bd. of Trs., Kenyon
Coll., 12 F. Supp. 2d 728, 747 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (finding that “consolidation under Rule 42(a) was
6
improper” where one “case was not properly removed and pending before this court prior to
consolidation”); U.S. ex rel. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Brandt Constr. Co., 826 F.2d
643, 647 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that “Rule 42(a) requires that both actions be ‘pending before
the court’ and an improperly removed action does not meet this criterion”). Because subject-matter
jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the Court must address PennyMac’s motion to remand before
addressing the Suttons’ Rule 42(a) motion.
The Suttons’ other motion asks the Court to dismiss PennyMac’s motion to remand. (Doc.
No. 18.) Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor this Court’s Local Rules provide for the
filing of a motion to dismiss another party’s motion. The Court will therefore construe the Suttons’
motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 18) as the Suttons’ response in opposition to PennyMac’s motion to
remand (Doc. No. 12).
B.
PennyMac’s Motion to Remand
“On a motion to remand for lack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction, the party that removed
the case to federal court ‘bears the burden of establishing that removal was proper.’” Huether v.
Cont’l Aerospace Techs., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 3d 507, 510 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (quoting Tenn. ex rel.
Slatery v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 896, 902 (M.D. Tenn. 2018)); see also Ahearn v.
Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 453–54 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Removing defendants bear
the burden of establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction.”). “[T]he determination of federal
jurisdiction in a diversity case is made as of the time of removal.” Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
230 F.3d 868, 871 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Ahearn, 100 F.3d at 453 (“We look to the complaint
at the time of removal . . . and determine whether the action was properly removed in the first
place.”). “Materials outside the pleadings may be considered, as appropriate, in deciding a motion
to remand.” Wellgen Standard, LLC v. Maximum Legal Holdings, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00275, 2019
WL 1043395, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2019) (citing Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695
7
F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2012)). Because “[d]ue regard for state governments’ rightful independence
requires federal courts scrupulously to confine their own jurisdiction to precise statutory limits[,]”
Ahearn, 100 F.3d at 454, “‘all doubts’ about whether removal is proper must be resolved in favor
of remand[,]” Tenn. ex rel. Slatery, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 902 (quoting Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999)).
The Suttons’ notice of removal relies on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
as grounds for this Court’s removal jurisdiction. (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-2.) “To establish diversity
jurisdiction, one must plead the citizenship of the corporate and individual parties.” Hayes v.
Shelby Cnty. Tr., 971 F. Supp. 2d 717, 726 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp.
v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Section 1332(c)(1) provides that “a corporation
shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated
and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(1). The Suttons’ notice of removal states that PennyMac’s “corporate office is located
in Westlake Village” and the civil cover sheet attached to their notice or removal specifies that
Westlake Village is located in “Los Angeles [C]ounty[,]” “Californi[a][.]” (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 2,
¶ 6; Doc. No. 1-2, PageID#21.) The Suttons state in another filing that PennyMac “formed in
Delaware[.]” (Doc. No. 21, PageID# 174.) With respect to their own citizenship, the Suttons’
notice of removal states that they reside in Dixon Springs, Tennessee (Doc. No. 1), and the civil
cover sheet attached to their notice or removal indicates that they are citizens of Tennessee (Doc.
8
No. 1-2). 2 The Court therefore finds that the Suttons have adequately alleged that they are citizens
of Tennessee and that PennyMac is a citizen of another state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.3
The next question in determining whether the Court may exercise diversity jurisdiction
over this action is whether there is more than $75,000.00 in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
The removal statute provides that, “[i]f removal of a civil action is sought on the basis of [diversity]
jurisdiction . . . , the sum demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the
amount in controversy . . . .”Id. § 1446(c)(2). If, however, “the initial pleading seeks”
2
Federal courts recognize that “[a]n individual is not necessarily a citizen of the place in
which that individual resides. Rather, an individual is a citizen of the state in which that individual
is domiciled, as defined by the individual’s (1) physical presence within a state; and (2) intent to
remain indefinitely.” Blaszczyk v. Darby, 425 F. Supp. 3d 841, 845 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (citing Miss.
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989)). However, “according to some
federal courts, ‘proof that a person is a resident of a state is prima facie evidence that he is a citizen
thereof . . . .’” 13E Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3611 (3d ed. suppl. June 2024) (quoting Kelleam v. Md. Cas. Co. of Baltimore, 112 F.2d 940,
943 (10th Cir. 1940), rev’d on other grounds, 312 U.S. 377 (1941)); see also Wellgen Standard,
LLC, 2019 WL 1043395, at *1 (finding that “complete diversity of citizenship exist[ed]” where
“none of the defendants reside[d] in the same states as [p]laintiff” and the “[p]laintiff [ ] presented
no countervailing evidence” regarding the parties’ citizenship).
3
Removal would typically be inappropriate based on the Suttons’ Tennessee citizenship
because, under the forum defendant rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), “[a] civil action otherwise
removable solely on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] . . . may not be removed if any of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). However, it is well established that “§ 1441(b)(2) is
non-jurisdictional and must be raised by the plaintiff in a motion to remand” filed within thirty
days after the filing of the notice of removal. Southwell v. Summit View of Farragut, LLC, 494 F.
App’x 508, 511 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012) (first citing Plastic Moldings Corp. v. Park Sherman Co., 606
F.2d 117, 119 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979); and then citing RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Wasserman, 316 F.
App’x 410, 411–12 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also Cincinnati Ins. Cos. v. Broan Nu-Tone, LLC,
No. 3:22-cv-00829, 2023 WL 1120874, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2023) (Crenshaw, C.J.) (“All
ten of the Circuits to have addressed the issue have held that the forum defendant rule is a nonjurisdictional, waivable defect, subject to the 30-day time limit under Section 1447(c).”).
PennyMac filed its motion to remand more than thirty days after the Suttons filed their notice of
removal and did not raise the forum defendant rule. (Doc. Nos. 13, 13-1.) The argument is
therefore waived. See Southwell, 494 F. App’x at 511 n.2; Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 2023 WL 1120874,
at *2.
9
“nonmonetary relief[,]” then “the notice of removal may assert the amount in controversy . . . .”
Id. § 1446(c)(2)(A)(i). Removal of an action seeking nonmonetary relief “is proper . . . if the
district court finds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds
[$75,000.00].” Id. § 1446(c)(2)(B). “A removing defendant has the burden of showing that the
amount in controversy ‘more likely than not’ meets the statutory threshold.” Endrawes v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 737 F. App’x 731, 734 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481
F.3d 369, 375 (6th Cir. 2007)).
The initial pleading in this action is PennyMac’s unlawful detainer complaint, which only
seeks possession of the property and does not demand monetary relief. (Doc. Nos. 1-4, 13-1.) The
Suttons argue that the amount in controversy requirement is met because the property “is worth
over $300 thousand dollars compared to . . . like home[s] in the area and properties in the area
. . . .” (Doc. No. 21, PageID# 174.) But the Suttons have not presented any authority to support
their argument that, under the circumstances here, the amount in controversy equals the value of
the property. PennyMac’s complaint alleges that it already acquired legal title to the property
through a foreclosure sale and that PennyMac is only seeking possession of the property, i.e. the
Suttons’ eviction. Cf. PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Lanou, Civ. Action No. 14-10495, 2015 WL 162911,
at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 2015) (finding that where “[p]laintiff makes clear in the [ ] complaint that
it has already acquired legal title to the property through [ ] [a] foreclosure sale . . . [and] is
primarily seeking possession of the property[,]” “the amount in controversy is not measured by
the entire value of the property”). Consequently, “the amount in controversy does not equal the
value of the property but instead the value of the right to possess the property.” YA Landholdings,
LLC v. Sunshine Energy, KY I, LLC, 871 F. Supp. 2d 650, 652 (E.D. Ky. 2012); see also PHH
Mortg. Corp., 2015 WL 162911, at *3 (finding that in unlawful detainer action seeking possession
10
“the object, or purpose, of the litigation is not the value of the physical property—which, according
to Plaintiff, it already owns—but, rather, the value of Plaintiff’s purported right to possession”);
id. (collecting authority for the proposition that “where [p]laintiff merely seeks possession of
property it already owns . . . , courts have held that the amount in controversy is not the value of
the property”).
The question therefore becomes “how to determine the monetary value of the right of
possession[.]” YA Landholdings, LLC, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 652. Some courts have found “that the
value of the possession right is equal to the property’s rental value.” Id. at 652–53 (collecting
authority). “Another way of evaluating the amount in controversy in an action seeking injunctive
relief is to total the costs of complying with the injunction.” Id. at 653 (citing Everett v. Verizon
Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 829 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)). “Similarly, some courts have valued the amount in controversy in an
action [seeking injunctive relief] . . . as the amount that the defendant stands to lose if the plaintiff
is successful.” Id. at 654 (collecting authority). Alternatively, at least one “court determined the
value of the right of possession in a forcible detainer action was equal to ‘the marginal change in
plaintiff’s economic position if it obtains possession.’” Id. (quoting A. Levet Props. P’ship v. Bank
One, N.A., No. Civ.A. 03-1708, Civ.A. 03-1373, 2003 WL 21715010, at *3 (E.D. La. July 21,
2003)).
This Court found that neither the Suttons’ nor PennyMac’s initial briefing “addressed the
appropriate method for determining the value of PennyMac’s asserted right of possession in this
case” and that the parties had not “presented sufficient evidence for the Court to determine the
value on its own.” (Doc. No. 24, PageID#245–46.) The Court therefore provided the parties an
opportunity to submit “supplemental briefing and evidence regarding the value of PennyMac’s
11
asserted right to possess the property at issue” and warned the Suttons “that failure to present
additional argument and evidence [would] likely result in a recommendation that PennyMac’s
motion to remand be granted.” (Id. at PageID# 246.) But the Suttons’ supplemental brief continues
to assert that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied because the value of the house
exceeds $75,000.00. (Doc. No. 26.) The Suttons argue that the “case law” rejecting this approach
“does not apply to this case” because PennyMac is a “swindler[ ] of the worst sort” and its actions
are “unlawful and unconstitutional . . . .” (Id. at PageID# 253.) But allegations regarding
PennyMac’s conduct have no relevance to establishing the amount in controversy and, thereby,
the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. Because the Suttons have not established the value of
PennyMac’s asserted right to possession despite the Court’s warning that failure to do so would
likely result in a recommendation that this case be remanded to state court, they have not met their
burden as the removing party to show that this Court has jurisdiction to consider their claims. See
Huether, 580 F. Supp. 3d at 510.
The Court should grant PennyMac’s motion to remand.
IV.
Recommendation
For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that PennyMac’s motion to
remand (Doc. No. 12) be GRANTED.
Any party has fourteen days after being served with this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen days of receipt
of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of appeal of the matters decided.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).
12
A party who opposes any objections that are filed may file a response within fourteen days after
being served with the objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Entered this 27th day of January, 2025.
____________________________________
ALISTAIR E. NEWBERN
United States Magistrate Judge
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?