People First of TN, et al v. Clover Bottom Devel, et al

Filing 1069

MEMORANDUM. An appropriate Order shall be entered. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 2/6/12. (tmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
PEOPLE FIRST OF TENNESSEE, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
CLOVER BOTTOM DEVELOPMENTAL
CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:95-1227
JUDGE SHARP

MEMORANDUM
Intervenor Parent Guardian Association of Clover Bottom Developmental Center (“PGA
Clover Bottom”) and Intervenor Parent Guardian Association of Greene Valley Developmental
Center (“PGA Greene Valley”) (collectively the “PGA” or the “Intervenors”) filed an
Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses (Docket Entry No.
1010) for monitoring and enforcement of activities from November 13, 2008 through June 30,
2010, to which Defendants, the State of Tennessee, et al. (the “State” or “Defendants”) filed a
response (Docket Entry No. 1020), and PGA filed a reply (Docket Entry No. 1035).
Additionally, the State filed a surreply (Docket Entry No. 1045), to which PGA filed a
surresponse (Docket Entry No. 1053). The Court has reviewed all the papers filed in support of,
and in opposition to, PGA’s application. For the reasons discussed herein, PGA’s application
will be granted.
I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case began in 1995, when Plaintiff, the United States, found that Defendants
violated the civil rights of residents of three of the State’s developmental centers: Nat. T.
Winston Development Center in Bolivar, Clover Bottom Developmental Center (“Clover
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Bottom”) (which includes Harold Jordan Center (“Harold Jordon”)) in Nashville and Greene
Valley Developmental Center (“Green Valley”), in Greenville (collectively, the “Centers”).
Based on the United States’ findings, the United States and People First of Tennessee, et al.
(“People First”) filed separate civil actions against the State.
actions.

This Court consolidated the

The State, People First, PGA, and the United States negotiated the Settlement

Agreement (Docket Entry No. 43). After a fairness hearing, the Court conditionally approved
the Settlement Agreement on July 3, 1997 (Docket Entry No. 167). On September 21, 1999, the
Court granted the parties’ motion to modify the Settlement Agreement to include additional
provisions requested by PGA (Docket Entry No. 299), and on November 23, 1999, the Court
unconditionally and finally approved the Settlement Agreement (Docket Entry No. 327). The
Settlement Agreement, among other things, named PGA as a party and signatory to the
agreement, which entitled it to enforce all provisions of the Agreement. (Id.).
In May 2000, PGA filed a motion for the award of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Docket
Entry No. 388). In a Memorandum and Order, entered March 4, 2004, the Court determined
PGA – as Plaintiff-Intervenors – were prevailing parties entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.
(Docket Entry Nos. 682-683).

Subsequently, in 2005 through 2008, PGA and the State

submitted four Joint Applications for awards of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses,
along with Agreed Orders, resolving those issues for various periods between March 11, 2004
and November 12, 2008. See (Docket Entry Nos. 735, 786, 821 and 885).
Unfortunately for all sides, the parties could not come to an agreement on the amount of
attorneys’ fees and costs for the period of November 13, 2008 through June 30, 2010. As such,
the current dispute ensued.1

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The Court notes that the parties attended a day-long mediation session with Magistrate Judge Brown, wherein this
issued was discussed. Magistrate Judge Brown noted, “[i]t appears that there may be, at the present time, an
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Prevailing Party Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
In the March 4, 2004, Memorandum and Order of the Court, Judge Echols found that
PGA was a “prevailing party entitled to an award of fees and costs.” In support of his finding,
Judge Echols stated:
The Intervenors’ efforts have not duplicated efforts of Plaintiffs, because the
intervening parents and guardians seek to protect the rights of some whose
interests were different than the original Plaintiffs. They have also raised concerns
about the class members that differ from Plaintiffs…[i]n doing so, the Intervenors
have also demonstrated that their efforts are directly related to upholding the civil
rights of the class members at issue in this case…[these] accomplishments…show
that they have had significant successes apart from Plaintiffs, and an award of fees
[and costs] to the Intervenors is appropriate.
(Docket Entry No. 682 at 8 and 10).
Pursuant to the Court’s Memorandum and Order, PGA now moves this Court for an
award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses for monitoring and enforcement
activities from November 13, 2008 through June 30, 2010. (Docket Entry No. 1011 at 1). PGA
asserts it is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees because it has demonstrated that it was a prevailing
party in its post-judgment activities; and subsequently, in every Joint Application between 2005
and 2008, the State represented to the Court:
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that the PGA are “prevailing parties” entitled to awards of reasonable attorneys’ fees and
expenses in this case;
 that the State has agreed the PGA shall be entitled to submit periodic requests for
reasonable fees and expenses, with the State reserving the right to object to the
reasonableness of any such fees and expenses; and
 that the Court should award the PGA attorneys’ fees and expenses for the specified
periods “in connection with monitoring and enforcement work in which the PGA has
been engaged.”
(Id. 1011 at 7-8).
impasse over whether the PGA is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and expenses for monitoring and enforcing
activities since November, 2008…[t]he PGA is free to seek the courts permission to file a motion for the awarding
of attorneys’ fees.” (Docket Entry No. 1007).

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The State initially argued in their Response that “[s]ince 2004, both the law regarding the
award of attorney fees and the facts supporting the finding that PGA is a prevailing party in this
matter have changed. In light of current circumstances, an award of attorneys’ fees to intervenor
PGA for its claimed post-judgment work is not reasonable.” (Docket Entry 1020 at 5). They,
however, assert in their Surreply that (1) “[a]s noted by PGA, the Sixth Circuit has recognized
that once a party has establish [sic] prevailing party status, fees may be available for postjudgment compliance monitoring and enforcement,” citing Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246, 256
(6th Cir. 1998),… and (2) the State “[has not] disputed that it previously agreed that PGA would
be entitled to submit future requests for reasonable fees and expenses.” (Docket Entry No. 1045
at 2). Rather, the State asserts that the issue in this matter is “whether PGA’s current request for
fees and expenses is reasonable in light of all circumstances…” (Id.).
Since the State has all but conceded its initial position as to PGA’s prevailing party
status, the Court will move to the reasonableness of PGA’s attorney fees and expenses.
B. Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
The amount of attorneys’ fees sought in PGA’s application is $229,198.75. This amount
is calculated by multiplying the numbers of hours worked on this case by Dudley M. West
(“West”) and Mary Martin Schaffner (“Schaffner”) between November 13, 2008 and June 30,
2010, times the hourly rate of $275.00 per hour.2 See (Docket Entry No. 1012, West Affidavit at
¶¶ 5, 6 and 9; Docket Entry No. 1013, Schaffner Affidavit at ¶¶ 5-7). PGA seeks a fee award for
West’s services in the amount of $76,848.75 for 279.45 hours incurred between November 13,
2008 and June 30, 2010, and further seeks a fee award for Schaffner’s services in the amount of
$152,350.00 for 554 hours expended between April 13, 2009 and June 30, 2010. (West Aff. at ¶
9; Schaffner Aff. at ¶ 7). Additionally, PGA seeks out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the
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West’s customary hour rate is $310.00 per hour. (West Aff. at ¶ 5).
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amount of $159.62 during the period between November 13, 2008 and June 30, 2010. (West
Aff. at ¶ 11).
The State contends the amount of fees and expenses sought by PGA are not reasonable.
(Docket Entry No. 1020 at 5). It claims PGA’s application for attorneys’ fees and expenses
includes hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise not necessary. (Id. at 6).

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specifically, “[t]hey are not reasonable in light of current circumstances, due to both the specific
hours and activities claimed and the duplication of the role of People First [of Tennessee], as
plaintiffs and class representatives.” (Docket Entry No. 1045 at 3).
PGA, however, claims its fees are indeed reasonable, and the State has failed to carry its
burden of showing the hours documented by PGA’s attorneys are not reasonable. (Docket Entry
No. 1035 at 9). It further asserts that “[a]lthough PGA and People First [of Tennessee] have
often worked cooperatively to achieve their common goals, their efforts have not been the same
and, therefore, have not been ‘duplicative’.” (Docket Entry No. 1053 at 3-4).
A determination of reasonableness begins with the "lodestar" method of calculation, i.e.,
determining a reasonable fee based on a reasonable hourly rate and reasonable number of hours
of service. The United States Supreme Court described the lodestar method in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 76 L.Ed.2d 40, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983), as follows:
The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to
make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services. The party seeking an
award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates
claimed. Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may
reduce the award accordingly.

A list of many of the factors to consider in establishing the lodestar fee and adjusting the
fee was enunciated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
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Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The Johnson factors have now become part
of the settled law of lodestar analysis under both the United States Supreme Court and Sixth
Circuit decisions. These factors include:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3)
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9)
the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and (12) awards in similar cases.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.4; Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 92 n.5, 103 L.Ed.2d 67, 109
S.Ct. 939 (1989); Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1999).
Based on a thorough review of the information and supporting documents before the
Court, in conjunction with an analysis of the aforementioned lodestar factors, the Court finds that
the total number of hours for West will be reduced by 20%, which results in a fee award of
$61,479.00. Further, the total number of hours for Schaffner will be reduced by 25%, which
results in a fee award of $114,262.50. Additionally, the Court finds that PGA shall be awarded
West’s out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of $159.62. Therefore, PGA shall be awarded
$175,901.12 for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs associated with post-judgment monitoring
and enforcement activities between November 13, 2008 and June 30, 2010.
Lastly, PGA requests that the Court require “the State to bear full financial responsibility
for its bad faith and unreasonable delay in fulfilling its obligations as well as its meritless
opposition to PGA’s entitlement to fees.” (Docket Entry No. 1035; also see Docket Entry No.
1011 at 16-17). The Court finds the State did not act in bad faith; rather, the State was diligently
representing the interests of its clients. Consequently, there will be no upward adjustment of the
fees in this matter.
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III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated, PGA’s Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and
Reimbursement of Expenses is hereby GRANTED. PGA shall be awarded $175,901.12 for
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses for post-judgment monitoring and enforcement activities
between November 13, 2008 and June 30, 2010.
An appropriate Order shall be entered.

_________________________________________
KEVIN H. SHARP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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