Burress v. City of Franklin, Tennessee

Filing 75

ORDER: For the reasons explained in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the defendant's motion 33 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is so ORDERED. This matter remains scheduled for trial to begin October 11, 2011. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas Wiseman on 8/17/11. (tmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

HAROLD DWAYNE BURRESS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-0938
Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.
JURY DEMAND

ORDER
In this action, Plaintiff Harold Dwayne Burress asserts claims under the Family Medical Leave Act
(“FLMA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et
seq. (“ADA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.,
and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) for violation of his equal-protection and due-process rights; the
plaintiff also asserts state-law claims under the Tennessee Disability Act (“TDA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 850-103, the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §4-21-101, et seq., and
Tennessee common law. (ECF No. 25.) Now before the Court is defendant City of Franklin’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 33), in which the City asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law in its favor regarding Burress’s claims against it. This motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for
consideration.
For the reasons explained in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the defendant’s motion is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as follows: The Court finds that material issues of disputed
fact preclude summary judgment on the plaintiff’s ADA discrimination and retaliation claims, the TDA
discrimination claim, and the post-termination retaliation claims. Summary judgment as to those claims is
therefore DENIED. However, because Burress has either opted to concede or to rest on his pleadings
without producing any probative evidence regarding his discrimination claims under the FMLA, THRA,
Title VII, and § 1983, as well as his claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a working compensation and
his due-process claim under § 1983, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact
pertaining to any of these claims. The City’s motion for summary judgment as to those claims is therefore

GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED.
It is so ORDERED.
This matter remains scheduled for trial to begin October 11, 2011.

Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.
Senior U.S. District Judge