Jackson et al v. Sumner County Board of Education et al

Filing 118

ORDER denying 104 Motion for Attorney Fees; denying 113 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas Wiseman on 04/29/2011. (ab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CHARLIE AND MARY JACKSON Individually
and o/b/o JANE DOE, a minor,

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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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SUMNER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
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and DONNA WEIDENBENNER Individually and )
in her official capacity as Special Needs Teacher )
of Station Camp Elementary School,
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Defendants.
)

Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-1004
Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin

ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Sumner County Board of Education’s and Defendant Donna
Weidenbenner’s separate Motions for Attorney Fees (Doc. Nos. 104 & 113).
“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section . . . 1983 . . . , the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). However, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that “[a]n award of attorney fees against
a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action is an extreme sanction, and must be limited to truly egregious cases
of misconduct.” See, e.g., Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The standard established by the Supreme Court for an award of attorney’s
fees to a prevailing defendant in civil rights actions is that “a plaintiff should not be assessed his
opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless,
or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir.1984) (applying the same standard to
an award of attorney’s fees to defendants under § 1988), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
Further, the Supreme Court has cautioned that district courts should “resist the understandable
temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately
prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment Co.,
434 U.S. at 421–22. Rather, “[t]o determine whether a claim is frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, the

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court must determine plaintiff’s basis for filing the suit.” Riddle, 266 F.3d at 548. In the present case, the
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of § 1983, under a number of theories, against both defendants
based upon Defendant Weidenbenner’s alleged abuse of Plaintiff’s minor child. The Court ultimately
concluded that, while Weidenbenner’s alleged treatment of the minor child might plausibly be
characterized as abusive, it did not amount to a violation of her constitutional rights.
The question of whether the prevailing Defendants should be awarded attorneys’ fees is a close
one in this case. Despite extensive discovery, the evidence of actual abuse of Plaintiffs’ child was quite
scant, and Plaintiffs themselves were in possession of all the relevant information supporting their claims
even before filing suit in this case. In addition, the Complaint contained numerous allegations regarding
abuse allegedly perpetrated against other children than Jane Doe, and many of these allegations
apparently were entirely without evidentiary foundation. Notwithstanding, while the undisputed evidence
in this case was insufficient to support a claim under § 1983, the Court cannot find that the Plaintiffs’
claims were entirely frivolous or groundless from the outset, or that Plaintiffs continued to litigate after it
should have become clear that their claims were groundless. Plaintiffs confronted a challenging factual
situation in light of their child’s youth, developmental disabilities, and limited ability to communicate, and
reasonably argued for extending the frontier of what constitutes abuse arising to a constitutional violation
in the pedagogical context when the victim of the alleged abuse is a special-needs child. The Sixth
Circuit has recognized that “[t]he primary purpose of the attorney fee statute was to encourage plaintiffs to
bring suit in new and undeveloped areas of civil rights laws.” Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City
Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 635 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980). Finally, while the suit was of
dubious merit from the outset, the Court cannot find that it represents a “truly egregious case[] of
misconduct.” Riddle, 266 F.3d at 547.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions (Doc. Nos. 104 & 113) are hereby DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.

Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.
Senior U.S. District Judge