Courts v. Walden Security
Filing
55
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that defendant Walden Security's motion for summary judgment 39 should be GRANTED, and the complaint DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 4/17/12. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(tmw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
RONALD COURTS,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
WALDEN SECURITY,
Defendant.
NO. 3:10-1157
Judge Trauger/Bryant
TO: The Honorable Aleta A. Trauger
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendant
Walden
Security
has
filed
its
motion
for
summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 39). Plaintiff Courts has filed
his response in opposition (Docket Entry No. 45).
Defendant has
filed a reply (Docket Entry No. 49).
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be
granted and the complaint dismissed with prejudice.
Statement of the Case
Plaintiff Ronald Courts, who is proceeding pro se, has
filed this employment discrimination case pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e et seq. and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et
seq..
Plaintiff alleges that his employment as a security officer
with defendant was wrongfully terminated on January 21, 2010, due
to his race and age.
Plaintiff is a 52-year-old African-American.
Defendant has filed an answer denying liability (Docket
Entry No. 12).
Standard of Review
A party may obtain summary judgment by showing “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant
is
entitled
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Covington v. Knox County School Sys., 205 F.3d
912, 914 (6th Cir. 2000). The moving party bears the initial burden
of satisfying the court that the standards of Rule 56 have been
met.
See Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 239 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986).
The ultimate question to be addressed is whether there exists any
genuine dispute of material fact.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Covington, 205 F.3d at 914 (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
If so,
summary judgment is inappropriate.
To
defeat
a
properly
supported
motion
for
summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
If the
party does not so respond, summary judgment will be entered if
appropriate.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
The nonmoving party’s burden of
providing specific facts demonstrating that there remains a genuine
issue of material fact for trial is triggered once the moving party
shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
A genuine issue of material fact exists
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
2
verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
drawing all justifiable inferences in its favor.
See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary of Pertinent Facts
Plaintiff Courts was employed as a security guard with
defendant Walden Security from February 2007 until his termination
in January 2010. Plaintiff was assigned to work at office buildings
owned by the State of Tennessee and located in downtown Nashville.
Defendant Walden Security provided security officers for these
buildings pursuant to a contract with the State.
Between July 26, 2007, and December 22, 2009, plaintiff
Courts was the subject of twelve disciplinary write-ups for various
alleged
workplace
infractions
(Docket
Entry
No.
42-3).
These
infractions included tardiness or attendance problems (July 26,
2007, December 30, 2008, and January 13, 2009), improper uniform
infractions (August 6, 2007 and November 6, 2008), leaving his
assigned post in violation of policy (October 12, 2007 and December
22, 2009), sleeping on his post (October 17, 2007), profanity and
raising voice in the workplace (August 6, 2008), failure to follow
post orders (August 6, 2008) and “misconduct/insubordination”
involving heated arguments with fellow officers (January 7, 2009
and January 8, 2009).
3
Plaintiff’s
employment
was
initially
terminated
in
October 2007 after his supervisor allegedly observed him sleeping
at his post. Plaintiff, however, denied that he had been sleeping,
offered an explanation, and asserted that the supervisor had been
mistaken in thinking that plaintiff was asleep. Plaintiff sought
reinstatement
and
thereafter
was
allowed
to
return
to
his
with
and
employment.
Plaintiff
Courts,
then
and
now,
disagreed
disputed a number of the disciplinary write-ups referenced above.
At least four of the “Employee Counseling Records” evidencing these
occurrences indicate that plaintiff Courts refused to sign the
write-up form when requested to do so.
On another, plaintiff
Courts wrote the words “not true, not true” above his signature,
suggesting that he disagreed with the summary of events appearing
on this write-up form (Docket Entry No. 42-3 at 6).
The
event
that
immediately
resulted
termination occurred on January 18, 2010.
in
plaintiff’s
On that date, plaintiff
Courts and his supervisor, Shannon O’Connor, who is white, became
involved in a heated dispute concerning plaintiff Courts’s lunch
break. Supervisor O’Connor’s account of this event, as recorded in
the Incident Report (Docket Entry No. 42-1 at 2), stated that
plaintiff Courts
became irate and began to berate me angrily and
loudly, with lots of pacing and arm waving. At one
point he began to move towards me pointing and
yelling, in a ever more aggressive manner, to which
4
I responded by telling him to ‘back away from me,’
as I felt threatened. He back[ed] up and said I
had threatened him.
(Docket Entry No. 42-1).
Mr. Courts’s account, as recorded on his
written report, states in part that
we got into a disagreement and we went back and
forth and Supervisor O’Connor threaten[ed] me that
if I walk up on him he was going to use force and I
said to Supervisor O’Connor that I was nowhere near
you. We where (sic) talking.
(Docket Entry No. 42-2).
Another Walden employee, Darrell Peak, reported the
foregoing encounter between plaintiff and O’Connor to Shannon
Meffert, defendant’s Human Resource Manager for the Nashville
branch office.
Ms. Meffert reviewed the Incident Report that Mr.
O’Connor prepared, and on January 19, 2010, she met with plaintiff
Courts and asked him to prepare a report of his version of this
incident. Ms. Meffert thereafter reviewed the records of plaintiff
Courts’s
previous
disciplinary
infractions
and
met
with
Gary
Fitzgerald, defendant’s Nashville General Manager. Ms. Meffert, in
the affidavit filed in support of defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, testified that she and Mr. Fitzgerald made the decision
to terminate plaintiff Courts’s employment because of his reported
misbehavior with Supervisor O’Connor on January 18, 2010, and his
past history of disciplinary infractions.
She terminated Mr.
Courts for these reasons on January 21, 2010 (Docket Entry No. 42
5
at 2-3).
Plaintiff Courts on January 25, 2010, filed a charge of
employment discrimination based upon his race and age with the
EEOC, and he received a right-to-sue letter dated November 29, 2010
(Docket Entry No. 1 at 6-7).
In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff Courts has
filed his six-page response to defendant’s statement of undisputed
facts (Docket Entry No. 45).
Plaintiff’s response contains the
acknowledgment of a Notary Public which states that the foregoing
response was “subscribed and sworn to before me in my presence” on
October 19, 2011.
In his response, plaintiff Courts states that his first
supervisor with Walden Security, named Anderson, “was establishing
a hostile working environment based on race because his manner
conveyed ‘superiority’ instead of equality.” Plaintiff states that
he heard Anderson making racist remarks to a white Walden guard
about “blacks getting hung on ropes,” and that plaintiff reported
this incident “but nothing was done.”
(Docket Entry No. 45 at 3).
Plaintiff states that he was thereafter removed from the building
where he had previously been working.
Although plaintiff Courts acknowledges that a write-up
about his tardiness was warranted, he states that other Walden
supervisors lodged written infractions against him in “retaliation
against me for reporting Anderson’s racist and hostile behavior
6
(incidents reported) to white supervisors.”1 (Id.)
Plaintiff Courts states in his response that he continued
to receive written disciplinary write-ups in 2008 for uniform
infractions and going to another building during his lunch break,
but that white security officers were not written up for the same
behaviors.
(Id. at 4).
Plaintiff Courts states that when he
became involved in an argument with a white male officer regarding
a parking space plaintiff Courts was written up but the white
officer was not.
Describing
the
January
18,
2010,
incident
that
immediately preceded his termination, plaintiff Courts states that
he “felt threatened by O’Connor when he moved towards me.”
He
further states that “O’Connor lied in his report and the matter was
not investigated fairly or equally.”
However, plaintiff admitted
in his deposition that he did not know what steps defendant had
taken to investigate this incident (Docket Entry No. 40-2 at 27 and
34). Plaintiff Courts states that Supervisor O’Connor was not
placed on suspension, but that he was.
He further states that
Supervisor O’Connor was not terminated but that plaintiff Courts
was.
He states that “the investigations were always one-sided and
white supervisors were given credibility over me.”
Finally, in his response plaintiff Courts states: “I was
1
Plaintiff did not assert retaliation in his charge before
the EEOC (Docket Entry No. 1 at 7) nor does he assert a claim for
retaliation in his complaint. (Id. at 3).
7
replaced by a younger white female and told (from her personally)
that she was replacing ‘Ronald Courts.’” (Docket Entry No. 45 at
7).
In his deposition, when asked why he believed he had been
the object of discrimination based upon race, plaintiff Courts
testified: “Well, white supervisor.”
28).
(Docket Entry No. 40-2 at
When asked in followup to state the facts upon which he based
his claim of racial discrimination, plaintiff continued:
That’s basically it. A white supervisor. All –
all my incidents have been with who?
White
supervisors, or white – white officers. It’s like
I’m – you know, I’m a – I’m an older black man, and
it’s like I’m just getting harassed by white
officers, or white supervisors.
(Docket Entry No. 40-2 at 29).
When asked if he thought that Supervisor O’Connor’s
decision not to relieve plaintiff for lunch was based upon his
race, plaintiff responded: “What else would it be?” (Docket Entry
No. 40-2 at 31).
When asked if he had evidence that Supervisor
O’Connor’s actions were based upon race, plaintiff responded: “No,
I don’t have any evidence.”
(Id.)
Finally, plaintiff was asked
the basis for his claim that he had been replaced at Walden
Security by a younger white female officer.
Plaintiff testified
that a younger white female had said as much to him.
He testified:
Oh, she was – she was – she was running off – she
was, I guess, saying something, telling people that
Ronald – Ronald Courts would no longer be here,
that I’ll be here at his post full-time now – from
now on out.
8
(Docket Entry No. 40-2 at 30).
However, when asked this female
officer’s name, plaintiff could remember neither her name nor the
date when she allegedly made this statement.
(Id.)
Analysis
Plaintiff has made a claim that defendant Walden Security
discriminated against him based upon his race and age (Docket Entry
No. 1), violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.
Plaintiff has not shown direct evidence of intentional
race discrimination by the defendant.
See, e.g., Amini v. Oberlin
Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2006) (direct evidence “requires
the
conclusion
that
unlawful
discrimination
motivating factor in the employer’s actions”).
was
at
least
a
Because plaintiff
Courts has not shown direct evidence of discrimination, the threestep burden-shifting analysis is applied.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analysis, plaintiff must
first set forth a prima facie case of discrimination.
Once
plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to
articulate
actions.
some
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
its
If the defendant employer carries this burden, plaintiff
must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons
offered by the employer were a pretext for discrimination. (Id.)
A prima facie case for employment discrimination based
9
upon circumstantial evidence requires that the plaintiff prove four
elements: (1) that he was a member of a protected class; (2) that
he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) that he was qualified
for the position; and (4) that he was replaced by someone outside
the protected class or was treated differently than a similarly
situation, nonprotected employee. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408,
415 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff Courts has stated facts regarding
the first three elements of his claim: he is an African-American,
his employment with defendant Walden Security was terminated, and
he was qualified for the position of security officer.
However,
plaintiff Courts has failed to produce admissible evidence on the
fourth prong of his prima facie case: that he was replaced by
someone outside the protected class or was treated differently than
similarly situated, nonprotected employees.
Plaintiff’s
replacement
consists
only
of
evidence
his
own
of
the
testimony
identity
regarding
of
his
hearsay
statements by an unidentified “younger female white officer” on a
date that plaintiff Courts could not remember (Docket Entry No. 402 at 30).
This testimony by plaintiff Courts is clearly hearsay
pursuant to Rule 801, Federal Rules of Evidence, and is therefore
inadmissible.
failed
to
Rule 802.
identify
any
In addition, plaintiff likewise has
similarly
situated
employee
of
a
nonprotected class with a comparable record of disciplinary writeups who was not terminated.
10
Even if one were to assume that plaintiff had established
a prima facie case of discrimination, defendant Walden Security has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he received multiple disciplinary
write-ups for tardiness and violations of the employer’s uniform
policy.
heated
He also does not dispute that he was engaged in multiple
arguments
with
fellow
employees
that
resulted
in
disciplinary write-ups, although plaintiff argues that he was
provoked by actions or statements by the other employees involved.
Finally, plaintiff does not deny that he was engaged in a heated
argument with Supervisor O’Connor, including gestures that could be
fairly interpreted as physically threatening.
Plaintiff does,
however, assert that Supervisor O’Connor was the aggressor in this
final
incident
Security
has
rather
thus
than
the
shown
that
plaintiff.
there
Defendant
was
a
Walden
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination.
See Reeves
v. Swift Trans. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2006).
At
the
third
step
of
the
burden-shifting
analysis,
plaintiff Courts has again failed to carry his burden.
Plaintiff
has not demonstrated facts that would show by a preponderance of
the evidence that defendant’s reasons for terminating him were a
pretext for discrimination.
From his testimony, plaintiff argues
that his multiple disputes at work all arose with white supervisors
and
other
employees,
and,
therefore,
11
these
disputes
must
be
motivated by racial discrimination.
In the absence of some
supporting evidence of racial discrimination, plaintiff’s arguments
are insufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant’s stated reasons for his termination were pretexts for
discrimination.
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge finds that plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based upon
race must fail, and that defendant’s motion for summary judgment
should be granted.
For the same reasons, plaintiff’s age discrimination
should fail.
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., a plaintiff’s prima facie case
of age discrimination consists of four categories of evidence.
Tuttle v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 317 (6th Cir.
2007).
Plaintiff must prove that: (1) he was 40 years or older;
(2) that he was qualified for the particular position; (3) that he
was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) that he was
replaced by a younger individual.
Id.
Assuming plaintiff has
proven the first three elements of his claim, he has not shown
through admissible evidence that he was replaced by a younger
individual, or, in the alternative, that similarly situated younger
employees were treated more favorably than he was.
As discussed
above, plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he was told by an
unnamed “younger female white officer” that she had been hired by
12
defendant to replace him is inadmissible hearsay.
Therefore,
plaintiff has likewise failed to produce evidence to establish the
fourth
required
discrimination.
element
of
a
prima
facie
case
of
age
For this reason, the undersigned Magistrate Judge
finds that plaintiff’s claim that he was discriminated against
based upon his age should fail.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge
RECOMMENDS
that
defendant
Walden
Security’s
motion
for
summary judgment should be GRANTED, and the complaint DISMISSED
with prejudice.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any party has fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and
Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation, with the District Court.
Any party opposing said
objections shall have fourteen (14) days from receipt of any
objections filed in this Report in which to file any responses to
said objections.
Failure to file specific objections within
fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation can
constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111
(1986).
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ENTERED this 17th day of April 2012.
s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge
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