Aguirre et al v. Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. et al

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 10/17/2012. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

LIZBETH AGUIRRE and JORGE ALVAREZ, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
MITSUBISHI MOTORS NORTH AMERICA, )
INC. and MITSUBISHI MOTORS
)
CORPORATION,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 3:11-cv-00225
Judge Aleta A. Trauger

MEMORANDUM
Defendants Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
(collectively “Mitsubishi”) have filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 55),
to which the plaintiffs, Lizbeth Aguirre and Jorge Alvarez, filed a Response in opposition
(Docket No. 63), and Mitsubishi filed a Reply (Docket No. 68).1 For the reasons stated herein,
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied, subject to several conditions described
herein.
BACKGROUND
The basic background facts are set forth in the court’s previous Memorandum concerning

challenges to certain experts retained by the plaintiffs. Aguirre v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am.,

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In support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Mitsubishi filed a
Memorandum of Law (Docket No. 56) and a Statement of Undisputed Facts (Docket No. 57). In
support of their Response in opposition, the plaintiffs filed a Response to the Defendants’
Statement of Undisputed and Plaintiffs’ Additional Facts (Docket No. 64), and two Appendices
with attached exhibits (Docket Nos. 65 (Exs. A-P) and 66 (Ex. Q)). In support of its Reply,
Mitsubishi filed a Reply Statement to Plaintiffs’ Additional Facts (Docket No. 67).
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Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00225, 2012 WL 4506009, at *1-*3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2012) [Docket No.
60 in this case]. Briefly, while Aguirre was making a left turn at an intersection in her 2003
Mitsubishi Eclipse, a drunk driver ran a red light and crashed into the side of her car. Her car
did not contain a side airbag, which, at the time, Mitsubishi only offered as optional equipment.
The lateral impact from the crash caused Aguirre to suffer serious pelvic and abdominal injuries.
The plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the 2003 Eclipse was defectively designed because a side
airbag was not a standard (i.e., non-optional) safety feature and that, had Aguirre’s Eclipse been
equipped with a side airbag, Aguirre’s injuries would have been mitigated substantially.
Among other forms of relief, the plaintiffs seek an award of punitive damages against
Mitsubishi under Tennessee law. The defendants contend that the undisputed facts preclude the
plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 requires the court to grant a motion for summary judgment if “the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2011). At the summary judgment stage, the moving party
bears the initial burden of identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact. Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir.
2009); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265
(1986). However, if the moving party seeks summary judgment on an issue for which it does not
bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may meet its burden by showing that there is
an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325). “When the moving party has carried this burden, ‘its opponent must do more than simply

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show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d
538 (1986).) The non-moving party also may not rest upon its mere allegations or denials of the
adverse party’s pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Id.
At this stage, “‘the judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Moldowan, 578
F.3d at 374 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). “In evaluating the evidence, the court must draw all inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (citing Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587). But “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving
party’s position will be insufficient,” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
252), and the non-movant’s proof must be more than “merely colorable.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249. An issue of fact is “genuine” only if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the non-moving party. Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (citing Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587).
ANALYSIS
I.

Applicable Law
To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant “acted either (1) intentionally, (2) fraudulently, (3)
maliciously, or (4) recklessly.” Sanford v. Waugh & Co., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 836, 848 (Tenn.
2010) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992)); accord Meals v.

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Ford Motor Co., No. W2010-01493-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1264454, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 15, 2012). The purpose of punitive damages is to punish a defendant, to deter the defendant
from committing acts of a similar nature, and to make a public example of the defendant.
Sanford, 328 S.W.3d at 849. Therefore, punitive damages are available in “cases involving only
the most egregious of wrongs.” Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 901. “Thus, the Tennessee Supreme
Court has reserved punitive damages for conduct that was so reprehensible that it must be both
punished and deterred.” Meals, 2012 WL 1264454, at *8 (citing Duran v. Hyundai Motor Am.,
Inc., 271 S.W.3d 178, 206 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)).
With respect to punitive damages, the Tennessee Supreme Court has articulated the
standard for showing that a defendant acted intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, or recklessly
as follows:
A person acts intentionally when it is the person’s conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result. A person acts fraudulently when (1) the
person intentionally misrepresents an existing, material fact or produces a false
impression, in order to mislead another or to obtain an undue advantage, and (2)
another is injured because of reasonable reliance upon that representation. A
person acts maliciously when the person is motivated by ill will, hatred, or
personal spite. A person acts recklessly when the person is aware of, but
consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of such a nature that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances.
Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 901 (internal citations omitted). With respect to recklessness, “[w]hile
evidence of compliance with government regulations is certainly evidence that a manufacturer
was not reckless, it is not dispositive.” Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 536
(Tenn. 2008).
The standard for establishing punitive damages is high:
Because punitive damages are to be awarded only in the most egregious of cases,

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a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s intentional, fraudulent, or reckless conduct
by clear and convincing evidence. This higher standard of proof is appropriate
given the twin purposes of punishment and deterrence: fairness requires that a
defendant’s wrong be clearly established before punishment, as such, is imposed;
awarding punitive damages only in clearly appropriate cases better effects
deterrence.
Id. In this context, “[c]lear and convincing evidence means evidence in which there is no serious
or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Id. at
901 n.3; accord Flax, 272 S.W.3d at 531 (Tenn. 2008).
With respect to car crash cases in particular, the defendants have identified several
Tennessee cases addressing whether particular factual circumstances could justify a jury verdict
in favor of a plaintiff on the issue of punitive damages.2 Notably, in all of these cases, the trial
court permitted the plaintiffs to present evidence at trial concerning punitive damages, before
determining whether to issue a directed verdict in favor of the defendants on that issue.
Here, although the plaintiffs’ theories of punitive damages liability are not a model of
clarity or internal consistency, the court construes the plaintiffs as asserting punitive damages

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See Meals, 2012 WL 1264454, at *8-9 (finding that trial court erred in not granting a
directed verdict to defendant on punitive damages issue, but holding that error was harmless,
because jury did not ultimately award punitive damages); Mohr v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No.
W2006-01382-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4613584, at *9-*12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2008)
(finding that punitive damages award against defendant was justified, where, inter alia, defendant
rushed car into production, knowingly compromised overall passenger safety simply to comply
with particular federally mandated crash test to avoid production delays, essentially rigged crash
test in order to pass it, and scuttled an internal working group that had expressed frustration with
the car’s safety platform); Flax, 272 S.W.3d at 532 (finding that punitive damages award against
defendant car manufacturer was justified, where, inter alia, defendant had identified potential
safety design flaw decades earlier, received reports of children sustaining injuries due to that
design flaw, declined to issue any warnings with respect to that issue, directed employees to
destroy minutes of meetings reflecting internal task force’s determination that safety design was
unacceptable, and fired employee whistleblower who had threatened to inform regulators about
his concerns with car’s safety design).

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theories of recklessness only. Indeed, based on the existing record, the court finds no grounds for
for a claim that Mitsubishi acted intentionally, fraudulently, or maliciously.
Based on the existing record, the court is skeptical that the plaintiffs’ evidence at trial will
be sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages based on recklessness. Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs’ evidence concerning punitive damages appears to substantially overlap with their
evidence concerning product defect, the evidence in this case is remarkably complex, the
appropriate conclusions to be drawn from that evidence are highly disputed, and the defendants
have not identified any decision in which the trial court prevented the plaintiffs from presenting
evidence concerning punitive damages at trial. Given these considerations, the court is reluctant
to preclude an award of punitive damages until the plaintiffs have at least had the opportunity to
present their evidence on this issue at trial.3
However, given the legitimate possibility that the court will grant a directed verdict to
Mitsubishi before the issue reaches the jury, the court is concerned that the plaintiffs’ opening
statements relating to the issue of punitive damages could involve heated rhetoric that might
unduly prejudice Mitsubishi with regard to the plaintiffs’ compensatory damages claims. Indeed,
in Meals, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed this issue. There, the trial court had refused
to grant a directed verdict in favor of the defendant car manufacturer Ford Motor Company on
the issue of punitive damages. 2012 WL 1264454, at *4. Although the jury refused to award

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In their Reply to the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts, the defendants raise evidentiary
objections to several facts relied upon by the plaintiffs. (See Defs. Reply to Pltfs. Additional
Facts, at Responses 17-19, 23, 24, and 34-36). The court makes no findings at this stage
concerning the validity of these objections, to which the plaintiffs have not had the opportunity
to respond. To the extent the admissibility of the materials subject to these objections remains in
dispute, those issues can be addressed through motions in limine in accordance with the
operative pre-trial deadlines. (See Docket No. 11, Order Setting Case for Trial.)
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punitive damages, it issued a significant compensatory damages award that Ford believed
improperly reflected a desire to punish it. Id. at *8-*10. On appeal, Ford argued that “because
the trial court did not dismiss the claim for punitive damages, the jury heard inflammatory
statements that it never should have,” thereby prejudicing it on the compensatory claims. Id. at 8
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Tennessee Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court
had committed reversible error by refusing to grant the directed verdict, but found that, because
the jury did not ultimately award punitive damages and because the compensatory damages
award was not unreasonable, the error was not prejudicial. Id. at *8-*10. Thus, the Meals court
essentially engaged in a post hoc analysis to determine whether Ford had actually been
prejudiced at trial from the inflammatory statements.
Here, unlike the appellate court in Meals, this court must address the issue of potential
prejudice prospectively. Accordingly, while the court will permit the plaintiffs to present
evidence relating to their punitive damages theories at trial, the court will not permit the plaintiffs
to argue the issue of punitive damages in their opening statement. If, after the presentation of
evidence, the court finds that argument concerning the punitive damages claims is warranted –
i.e., that the issue may be submitted to the jury for consideration – the court will permit the
plaintiffs to argue the issue of punitive damages at that time.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein:
•

Mitsubishi’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied;

•

The plaintiffs may present evidence at trial supporting their punitive
damages claims, but they will not be permitted to make an opening
statement or submit argument concerning the issue of punitive damages to
the jury without further court order; and

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•

Following the presentation of evidence at trial, the court will address
whether the plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to withstand a
directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages, in which case the court
will permit the parties to argue that issue to the jury.

An appropriate order will enter.
_____________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge

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