Lyles v. Rutherford County Adult Detention Center et al

Filing 61

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 48 , 52 be GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Clifton Knowles on 5/2/12. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(tmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

KENYATA K. LYLES,

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Plaintiff,
v.
RUTHERFORD COUNTY ADULT
DETENTION CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:11-0266
Judge Campbell / Knowles
Jury Demand

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction and Background
Pending before the Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment; one filed by
Defendants Dr. John Rudd, Cynthia Kovacs-Whaley, Keisha Wisdom, Summer Blais, and
Brenda Levin (collectively “Rudd Defendants”)(Docket No. 48); and one filed by Defendants
Rutherford County Adult Detention Center, Rutherford County, Sheriff Robert Arnold, and
Corporal Curtis Little (Docket No. 52). Along with those Motions, Defendants have filed
supporting Memoranda of Law (Docket Nos. 49, 54), Statements of Undisputed Material Facts
(Docket Nos. 50, 53), and the Affidavits of Defendants Little (“Little Aff.”), Arnold (“Arnold
Aff.”), and Rudd (“Rudd Aff.”)(Docket Nos. 52-1 - 52-3).
Plaintiff has not responded to either Motion or to either Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts.
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center at all times relevant
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to the case at bar, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis, action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Docket No. 1. Plaintiff complains of the
treatment he received after a suicide attempt in his cell. Id. Plaintiff sues Defendant Rutherford
County Adult Detention Center in its official capacity; Defendant Rudd in his individual and
official capacities; and Defendants Cynthia Kovacs-Whaley (incorrectly named Cindy Wayley in
the Complaint), Keisha Wisdom, Summer Blais, Brenda Levin, Curtis Little, and Robert Arnold
in their individual capacities. Id. Plaintiff contends that the Defendants associated with his
medical care should compensate him for “medical neglect” and for “pain and suffering,” while
Sheriff Arnold should compensate him “because he was in command over Captain Curtis Little
who orchestrated the whole ordeal,” and Rutherford County should compensate him because
“this incident took place on county property.” Id. Plaintiff seeks “a lump sum of 1 million
dollars from Rutherford County,” “a lump sum of 1 million dollars from Dr. Rudd,” “a lump sum
of $75,000 from Sheriff Robert E. Arnold,” “a lump sum of $50,000 from Captain Curtis Little,”
“a lump sum of $100,000 from Cindy Wayley,” “a lump sum of $40,000 from Keisha Wisdom,”
“a lump sum of $150,000 from Summer Blais,” and “a lump sum of $80,000 from Brenda
Levin.” Id. Plaintiff explained:
A. I am requesting the sum of 1 million dollars from Rutherford
County because the incident happened at a county facility. B. I am
requesting the sum of 1 million dollars from Dr. John Daniel Rudd
because the medical staff involved in this claim all work under his
supervision at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center. C.
I request the sum of $75,000 from Sheriff Robert E. Arnold
because after the incident occured [sic] and the facts were brought
to his attention due to the seriousness of the incident he denied
knowing anything except for, “The jail has nothing to do with the
medical depart [sic] at the jail.” And also because he is in
supervision of Captain Curtis Little who orchestrated a major part
of the events described in the “claim” above while working at the
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Rutherford County Adult Detention Center which is a county
facility. D. I request a lump sum of $50,000 from Captain Curtis
Little who is employed by Rutherford County Sheriff Robert E.
Arnold, and knowingly orchestrated pain and suffering/medical
mis-conduct [sic] with the medical staff at the Rutherford County
Adult Detention Center; who are all employed and supervised by
Dr. John Daniel Rudd in the claim, above. E. I request a lump
sum of $100,000 from Cindy Wayley who is employed by Dr. John
Daniel Rudd, at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center,
who knowingly took part in the “claim” stated, for pain and
suffering & medical neglect. G. [sic] I request a lump sum of
$40,000 from Keisha Wisdom who is employed by Dr. John
Daniel Rudd, at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center,
who knowingly took part in the “claim” stated, for pain and
suffering & medical neglect. H. I request a lump sum of $150,000
from Summer Blais who is employed by Dr. John Daniel Rudd, at
the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center, who injected me
with the medication (Haldol) knowing that I am allergic to that
medicine against my will. For pain and suffering, medical neglect
and medical malpractice, in the “claim” stated above. I. I request
a lump sum of $80,000 from Brenda Levin who is employed by
Dr. John Daniel Rudd, who tried to force me to take the
medication “Thorazine” against my will knowing it was not a part
of my perscribed [sic] medication that I was supposed to be taking.
For pain and suffering, medical neglect, and medical malpractice,
in the “claim” stated above.
Id.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because:
1) Plaintiff cannot sustain a § 1983 cause of action because he has not alleged physical injury;
2) Plaintiff’s constitutional rights have not been violated; 3) even if Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights had been violated, he cannot establish the requisite elements of a deliberate indifference
cause of action; 4) to the extent that Plaintiff’s “medical neglect” claims can be interpreted as
medical malpractice claims, those claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to
comply with the Tennessee requirements for medical malpractice claims; 5) negligent treatment
does not state a valid deliberate indifference claim; 6) Rutherford County Adult Detention
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Center is an improper party to this lawsuit; and 7) Sheriff Arnold and Cpl. Little possess
qualified immunity from the instant lawsuit. Docket Nos. 49, 54.
For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motions
for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
II. Facts1
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center on December
8, 2010, and continuing through March 8, 2011. Docket Nos. 51-1 and 52-3, Affidavit of Dr.
Rudd (“Rudd Aff.”), ¶ 6.2
On December 18, 2010, Rutherford County Adult Detention Center staff found Plaintiff
hanging by a noose he tied to his own neck. Docket No. 52-2, Affidavit of Sheriff Arnold
(“Arnold Aff.”), ¶ 5; Docket No. 52-1, Affidavit of Curtis Little (“Little Aff.”), ¶ 5. Detention
Center staff entered Plaintiff’s cell and removed him from the noose. Id. (Arnold and Little
Affs.), ¶ 6. Immediately upon removing Plaintiff from the noose, Detention Center staff
contacted their Crisis Team and Dr. Rudd and his staff to administer necessary care for Plaintiff.
Id. (Arnold and Little Affs.), ¶ 7.
Plaintiff was examined by the Detention Center’s medical staff after he attempted to hang
himself in the housing unit. Rudd Aff., ¶ 6. Plaintiff reported to the nurses that he wished to end
his life. Id. Plaintiff was transported to Stonecrest Medical Center for medical treatment. Id.
He was then transported back to the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center, stripped of his
clothes, and placed in a padded suicide cell on suicide watch in the booking area until he could

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The following facts are in a form required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and are undisputed.

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Docket Nos. 51-1 and 52-3 are two identical copies of Dr. Rudd’s Affidavit.
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be transported to the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute later that day. Id.; Arnold Aff., ¶
9; Little Aff., ¶ 9. Plaintiff remained at the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute until
December 23, 2010, when he was returned to the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center.
Rudd Aff., ¶ 7. Plaintiff was again placed on suicide watch at the recommendation of Middle
Tennessee Mental Health Institute providers. Id. Plaintiff was kept in solitary confinement in a
suicide cell to prevent him from harming himself; his clothes were taken away to prevent him
from using his clothes to harm himself; and he was allowed to make phone calls when policy
permitted. Arnold Aff., ¶ 11, Little Aff., ¶ 11.
On December 24, 2010, Plaintiff was found on his cell floor and appeared to be nonresponsive. Rudd Aff., ¶ 7. Upon becoming coherent, Plaintiff complained of chest pains and
was again transferred to Stonecrest Medical Center, where he was treated and returned to the
Rutherford County Adult Detention Center on the same day. Id. Plaintiff was removed from
suicide watch on December 27, 2010. Id., ¶ 8. At the recommendation of Defendant Little,
Plaintiff remained housed in the booking area of the Detention Center in order to allow for better
observation for his own safety. Id.
On December 28, 2010, Plaintiff refused to take his medication. Id. On December 30,
2010, Plaintiff was moved to the mental health annex to be housed. Id. By January 17, 2011,
Plaintiff was allowed to be housed in the general population, and he was taking his medications
as prescribed. Id. Plaintiff’s mental health seemed to improve, and he had no other behavioral
episodes for the remainder of his time spent at the Detention Center. Id. He was released to the
workhouse on March 8, 2011. Id.
Defendant Arnold, as the Rutherford County Sheriff, contracted with Defendant Rudd to

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provide medical care to inmates. Arnold Aff., ¶¶ 2-3. Defendant Rudd is a physician who has
been continually licenced to practice medicine in Tennessee since 1980, and who has practiced
internal medicine in Murfreesboro, Tennessee since 1984. Rudd Aff., ¶ 1. Defendant Rudd’s
practice at all times relevant to the instant action included providing medical services to inmates
at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center (including Plaintiff) and supervising the
medical staff (including Defendants Whaley, Wisdom, Blais, and Levin). Id., ¶ 3.
Based upon his education, training, and experience, Dr. Rudd is familiar with the
recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the medical community of
Murfreesboro, Rutherford County, Tennessee applicable to the care and treatments of patients
such as Plaintiff, as that standard existed from December 2010 through and including March
2011, when care and treatment were provided to Plaintiff during his incarceration at the
Rutherford County Adult Detention Center. Id., ¶ 4. Based upon his education, training,
experience, and personal knowledge of the medical care and treatment rendered to Plaintiff, Dr.
Rudd “can state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty” that he and the medical staff at
the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center complied with the applicable recognized standard
of acceptable professional practice at all times that care and treatment were provided to Plaintiff.
Id., ¶ 5.
Additionally, the actions taken by the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center’s staff
in removing Plaintiff from his noose and contacting medical personnel were done as
expeditiously as possible under the circumstances and prevented further harm to him. Id., ¶ 6;
Arnold Aff., ¶ 8; Little Aff., ¶ 8. No employees or agents of the Rutherford County Adult
Detention Center and/or Rutherford County ever delayed, denied, or interfered with the

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provision of medical care to Plaintiff. Rudd Aff., ¶ 9; Arnold Aff., ¶ 10; Little Aff., ¶ 10.
Nothing Defendant Rudd or his staff did or did not do caused Plaintiff any injury that would not
otherwise have occurred. Id. Neither Defendant Rudd nor his staff knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff, or acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
of Plaintiff. Id., ¶ 10.
Because Dr. Rudd has a level of expertise in administering medical care that neither the
Sheriff nor the Detention Center staff has, the Detention Center staff should not second guess
medical decisions made by Dr. Rudd, or unduly interfere with medical care provided by him.
Arnold Aff., ¶ 4; Little Aff., ¶ 4.
III. Analysis
A. Local Rules 7.01(b) and 56.01(c) and (g)
Local Rule 7.01(b) states, in pertinent part:
b. Response. Each party opposing a motion shall serve and file a
response, memorandum, affidavits and other responsive material
not later than fourteen (14) days after service of the motion,
except, that in cases of a motion for summary judgment, that time
shall be twenty-one (21) days after the service of the motion,
unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Failure to file a timely
response shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion.
Defendants filed the pending Motions on December 2, 2011 and December 15, 2011.
Docket Nos. 48, 52. Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants’ Motions.
Additionally, with respect to Motions for Summary Judgment specifically, Local Rules
56.01(c) and (g) state, in pertinent part:
c. Response to Statement of Facts. Any party opposing the
motion for summary judgment must respond to each fact set forth
by the movant by either (i) agreeing that the fact is undisputed; (ii)
agreeing that the fact is undisputed for the purpose of ruling on the
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motion for summary judgment only; or (iii) demonstrating that the
fact is disputed. Each disputed fact must be supported by a citation
to the record. ...
...
g. Failure to Respond. Failure to respond to a moving party’s
statement of material facts, or a non-moving party’s statement of
additional facts, within the time periods provided by these Rules
shall indicate that the asserted facts are not disputed for the
purposes of summary judgment.
Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants’ Statements of Undisputed Material Facts.
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.01(g), Plaintiff’s failure to respond indicates “that the asserted facts
are not disputed for the purposes of summary judgment.” Accordingly, there are no genuine
issues as to any material fact and all that remains to be determined is whether Defendants are
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
It would be inappropriate to grant Defendants’ Motions solely on the ground that Plaintiff
has failed to respond. See Stough v. Mayville Community Schools, 138 F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir.
1998). As the Sixth Circuit has stated:
[A] district court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of the
movant simply because the adverse party has not responded. The
Court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment to ensure that he has discharged [his
initial] burden ... The federal rules require that the party filing a
Motion for Summary Judgment “always bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue as to a material fact.”
Id. (citations omitted). The Court will, therefore, consider whether Defendants have met their
burdens under the appropriate summary judgment standards discussed below.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

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any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute is “genuine” only if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
In order to prevail on a Motion for summary judgment, the moving party must meet the
burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue as to material fact concerning an essential
element of the opposing party’s claim. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir.
1989). In determining whether the moving party has met its burden, the Court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 provides that the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but his or her response, by affidavits or otherwise,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If a nonmoving party,
however, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact because a complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 273. When this occurs, the moving party
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; Williams v.
Ford Motor Co., 187 F.3d 533, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1999).
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 / Eighth Amendment

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Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eighth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Docket No. 1. Section 1983 provides, in part, that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress...
Thus, in order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254-55 (1988), citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct.
1908, 1913, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981) (overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 330-331, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986)); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 155, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 1733, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978). The traditional definition of
acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised
power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law.” Id. at 49, 108 S. Ct. 2255, quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S. Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941).
In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must satisfy a two-prong
test: (1) the deprivation alleged must be objectively serious; and (2) the official responsible for
the deprivation must have exhibited deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994).
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
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‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429
U.S. at 104. The Supreme Court explained that “whether the indifference is manifested by
prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once
prescribed,” it states a claim under § 1983. Id. at 104-05.
Not every prisoner’s allegation of inadequate medical treatment, however, is a violation
of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. For instance, courts have held that the
accidental, inadvertent, or negligent failure to provide adequate medical care does not state such
a claim. Id. at 105-06 (citations omitted).
Pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit held, in Hunt v. Reynolds, that
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims must contain both an objective component,
“that [plaintiff’s] medical needs were sufficiently serious,” and a subjective component, “that the
defendant state officials were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s needs.” 974 F.2d 734, 735
(6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
In order to satisfy the objective requirement, the Supreme Court requires that an inmate
demonstrate evidence of a current harm or evidence of a medical complaint or condition of
confinement that “is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.” Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2480, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1993). Under the Eighth
Amendment, inmate plaintiffs, therefore, are not required to prove they suffer from an actual
physical injury. Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1155 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Parrish, 800 F.
2d at 610). At the very least, however, plaintiffs must allege unnecessary pain or suffering due
to prison officials’ deliberate indifference. Id.

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As for the subjective element, the Sixth Circuit has held that “a determination of
deliberate indifference does not require proof of intent to harm.” Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d
185, 187 (6th Cir. 1993). However, there must be a showing of deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s serious medical needs. Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added) (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F. 2d 857, 860 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1976)). In fact,
“[k]nowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence
of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.” Horn v. Madison County
Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The inquiry, therefore,
according to the Sixth Circuit, is “[w]as this individual prison official aware of the risk to the
inmate’s health and deliberately indifferent to it?” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 402 (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837, 844).
D. The Case at Bar
As has been noted, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The undisputed facts, however, demonstrate that the actions
taken by the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center’s staff in removing Plaintiff from his
noose and contacting medical personnel were done as expeditiously as possible under the
circumstances and prevented further harm to Plaintiff. The undisputed facts further demonstrate
that Plaintiff received appropriate and timely medical attention; that nothing Defendant Rudd or
his staff did or did not do caused Plaintiff any injury that would not otherwise have occurred;
and that no employees or agents of the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center and/or
Rutherford County ever delayed, denied, or interfered with the provision of medical care to
Plaintiff. Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was kept in solitary confinement in a suicide

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cell to prevent him from harming himself; that Plaintiff’s clothes were taken away to prevent him
from using his clothes to harm himself; and that Plaintiff was permitted to make phone calls
when policy permitted. Finally, it is undisputed that neither Defendant Rudd, nor his staff, knew
of and disregarded an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff, or acted with deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need of Plaintiff. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment be GRANTED.3
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to
this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have
fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any
response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this
Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985),
reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

___________________________________
E. CLIFTON KNOWLES
United States Magistrate Judge

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With the adoption of the Report and Recommendation, all Defendants will be terminated
as parties.
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