Alajemba v. Rutherford County, Tennessee et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM. An appropriate Order will be entered. Signed by Chief Judge Todd J. Campbell on 6/29/11. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(tmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JONATHAN ALAJEMBA,

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Plaintiff,
v.
RUTHERFORD COUNTY
TENNESSEE, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:11-cv-00472
Judge Campbell

MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is incarcerated at the Rutherford
County Adult Detention Center in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. He brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Rutherford County, Tennessee, and Rudd Medical Management, alleging that his
constitutional rights are being violated by his continued segregation from the general inmate
population and by the defendants’ failure to properly treat his mental illnesses. (Docket No. 1). He
seeks his immediate release from segregation, immediate hospitalization for his mental health
illnesses, and damages in the amount of seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00). (Id.
at p. 5).
I.

Prison Litigation Reform Act Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the courts are required to dismiss a

prisoner’s complaint if it is determined to be frivolous, malicious, or if it fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous and warrants
dismissal when the claims “lack[] an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

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319, 325 (1989); see Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). Claims lack an arguable
basis in law or fact if they contain factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional, or if they are
based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless. Id. at 327-28; Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d
863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (6th Cir. 1990).
Although the courts are required to construe pro se pleadings liberally, see Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365 (1982), under the PLRA, the “courts have no discretion in permitting a plaintiff to
amend a complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal,” McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
II.

Facts
As alleged in the pro se complaint and construed liberally, the relevant facts are as follows:

The plaintiff was arrested for first degree murder in December 2008. He was incarcerated at the
Rutherford County Adult Detention Center, where he was placed in segregation.
The plaintiff states that he suffers from “many mental health illnesses” and that the
continued isolation of segregation has exacerbated his existing mental illnesses. The plaintiff has
filed grievances in an attempt to be removed from segregation. The plaintiff has attempted to harm
himself several times. He hears voices “in his head.” At times, he has been placed on suicide
watch. At one point, someone from the “Mental Health Crisis Center” evaluated the plaintiff and
recommended that the plaintiff be transferred to a mental hospital for further evaluation, but the
plaintiff was not transferred. Instead, he was permitted to see a jail nurse and was prescribed
medication that the plaintiff claims he previously “had a strong reaction to.” The plaintiff was later
taken to a hospital but not admitted. The jail nurses told the plaintiff that, if he went to sleep, he

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would stop hearing the voices and that they would “cross their fingers and hope that the voices go
away.” (Docket No. 1 at pp. 5-6).
III.

Section 1983 Standard
The plaintiff alleges claims under § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must

allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens
Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to
support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
IV.

Analysis
The plaintiff’s complaint names as defendants Rutherford County, Tennessee, and Rudd

Medical Management. Rutherford County, Tennessee, is the entity responsible for the operation of
the Adult Detention Center where the plaintiff is incarcerated. However, a claim of governmental
liability requires a showing that the alleged misconduct is the result of a policy, statement,
regulation, decision or custom promulgated by Rutherford County or its agent. Monell, 436 U.S.
658, 690-691. In short, for Rutherford County to be liable under § 1983, there must be a direct
causal link between an official policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
The plaintiff here has offered nothing to suggest that his rights were violated pursuant to a
policy or regulation of Rutherford County. Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim
against Rutherford County.

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The plaintiff also alleges § 1983 claims against Rudd Medical Management. Delays in
providing medical care, including care for mental health conditions, may give rise to a violation of
a prisoner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. However, such delays do not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation unless a plaintiff complains that he suffered a detrimental effect to his
health as a consequence of the alleged delay. Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789,
797 (6th Cir. 2005)(citing Napier v. Madison County, Kentucky, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Here, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant’s delay in providing mental health
treatment, such as prescribing appropriate medication for the plaintiff’s mental health disorders,
obtaining mental health evaluations for the plaintiff, and transferring the plaintiff to a mental health
facility, has caused and is causing the plaintiff to “hear voices” and attempt harm to himself, such
as cutting his arm and smashing his head against a concrete wall. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 5-6).
Although it is far from certain that the plaintiff ultimately can prevail on this claim, the court finds
that the plaintiff has sufficiently stated a non-frivolous claim under the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rudd Medical Management.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the complaint states at least one actionable

claim against Rudd Medical Management. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). However, the plaintiff’s claims
against Rutherford County, Tennessee, fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted under
§ 1983. Accordingly, all claims against Rutherford County, Tennessee, will be dismissed with
prejudice.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
____________________________
Todd J. Campbell
United States District Judge

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