Pigott v. Battle Ground Academy et al

Filing 68

MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT: For the following reasons, we deny Plaintiff's first motion in limine (Dkt. No. 52) and grant the second (Dkt. No. 53). We deny both of Defendants' motions in limine (Dkt. Nos. 4950). Signed by Judge Marvin E. Aspen on 4/25/13. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(af)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
AMY C. PIGOTT,
Plaintiff,
v.
BATTLE GROUND ACADEMY and
JOHN W. GRIFFITH,
Defendants.

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3:11-cv-0764
Judge Marvin E. Aspen

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARVIN E. ASPEN, United States District Judge:
In this case, Plaintiff Amy C. Pigott (“Plaintiff”) brought claims against Defendants
Battle Ground Academy (“Battle Ground”) and John W. Griffith (“Griffith”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 629 et seq., and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101
et seq., alleging discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Presently before us are the parties’
motions in limine. For the following reasons, we deny Plaintiff’s first motion in limine (Dkt. No.
52) and grant the second (Dkt. No. 53). We deny both of Defendants’ motions in limine (Dkt.
Nos. 49–50).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of its trials encompasses the
right to rule on motions in limine.” Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 551 F. Supp. 2d
173, 176–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Luce v. Unites States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4, 105 S. Ct. 460,
463 (1984)). “The Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure

and interpretive rulings of the Supreme Court and this court all encourage, and in some cases
require, parties and the court to utilize extensive pretrial procedures—including motions in
limine—in order to narrow the issues remaining for trial and to minimize disruptions at trial.”
U.S. v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999); see U.S. v. Huff, No. 10 CR 73, 2011 WL
4916195, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 27, 2011). Because a ruling on a motion in limine is “subject to
change as the case unfolds,” this ruling constitutes a preliminary determination in preparation for
trial. See Luce, 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S. Ct. at 163; U.S. v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir.
1994). A district court’s rulings on in limine motions will be reversed only where the court
abuses its discretion, that is, “when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, when it
improperly applies the law, or when it employs an erroneous legal standard.” U.S. v. Gunter, 551
F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Cline, 362 F.3d 343, 348–49 (6th Cir. 2004).
ANALYSIS
I.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
A.

Leading Questions

Plaintiff’s first motion asks us to issue an order allowing her to use leading questions in
her direct examination of three hostile witnesses associated with Defendants, while preventing
Defendants from using leading questions in their cross-examinations of the same witnesses.
(Dkt. No. 52 at 1.) As for the first part of her request, it is uncontroversial that a party may use
leading questions during direct examination of a hostile witness. Fed. R. Evid. 611(c)(2). This is
not an issue that needs to be addressed in a motion in limine—when Plaintiff actually calls the
witnesses at trial, she may explain that they are hostile and ask our permission at that time to use
leading questions. Absent any unusual circumstances, we will permit her to do so.
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As for the second part of her request, the Advisory Committee note to Rule 611(c)
addresses this specific situation. Fed. R. Evid. 611(c). It explains that the rule provides “a basis
for denying the use of leading questions when the cross-examination is cross-examination in
form only and not in fact, as for example the ‘cross-examination’ of a party by his own counsel
after being called by the opponent (savoring more of a redirect) . . .” Id.; see also Morvant v.
Constr. Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 1978) (“If the witness is friendly to the
examiner, there is the same danger of suggestiveness as on direct; and consequently the court
may, in its discretion, forbid the use of leading questions.”).
The language of the rule is not mandatory—whether to allow leading questions under
these circumstances is entirely within our discretion. Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1221
(6th Cir. 1997) (“[A] district court’s decision to allow leading questions when a party is crossexamining his own witness is a matter within the court’s traditional discretion to control the
mode of interrogation.”) (internal quotations omitted); Morvant, 570 F.2d at 635. We will be in
a better position to determine how to exercise our discretion during the course of testimony, so
we deny Plaintiff’s motion at this time. Our presumption at trial, however, will be to allow
leading questions during Defendants’ cross-examination of these witnesses for very limited
purposes only, such as undisputed preliminary matters. Defendants should expect to conduct the
substantial part of these witnesses’ testimony without leading questions.
B.

Collateral Source Benefits and Payments

Plaintiff’s second motion asks us to exclude “any evidence of any payments made to or
received by [Plaintiff] for unemployment compensation or any other collateral source benefit or
payment that she has received or may receive at any time.” (Dkt. No. 53.) In the Sixth Circuit,
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“the collateral source rule is a substantive rule of law that bars a tortfeasor from reducing
damages owed to a plaintiff by the amount of recovery the plaintiff receives from sources that are
collateral to the tortfeasor.” Hamlin v. Charter Twp. of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 1999);
Jackson v. City of Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354, 1359 (6th Cir.1994). Defendant has not opposed the
motion, and we see no reason to deviate from the general rule. Accordingly, we grant Plaintiff’s
second motion in limine.
II.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
Defendants ask us to exclude two subjects from evidence on relevancy grounds: the death

of Plaintiff’s husband (Dkt. No. 49) and Plaintiff’s job performance (Dkt. No. 50).
A.

Death of Plaintiff’s Husband

We will not preclude testimony on the death of Plaintiff’s husband for two reasons. First,
Plaintiff is suing both for monetary and emotional damages related to her job loss. (Pl.’s Resp.,
Dkt. No. 54 at 2.) Although Defendant is certainly not liable for any financial hardship or
emotional distress caused by the death of Plaintiff’s husband, the circumstances are so closely
intertwined that we do not see how it would be possible for Plaintiff to testify about the damages
caused by her job loss without at least mentioning the death of her husband. In our view, the risk
of unfair prejudice to Defendants is not so substantial as to justify precluding the subject of her
husband’s death altogether. Second, Defendants themselves raised the issue in Plaintiff’s
deposition, when they asked questions about her husband’s income and the emotional support he
provided her. (Id.) If Defendants considered the presence of his income and emotional support
to be relevant, then its subsequent absence is surely relevant as well. For these reasons, we deny
Defendants’ first motion in limine.
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As with any motion in limine, however, this is a preliminary assessment subject to change
during the course of trial. If, during the course of Plaintiff’s testimony, it appears that evidence
of her husband’s death is likely to confuse the jury with respect to damages or unfairly prejudice
Defendants, then we will reconsider the objection at that time.
B.

Plaintiff’s Job Performance

Evidence of Plaintiff’s job performance is relevant to the issue of Defendants’
justification for terminating Plaintiff’s employment. One of the dispositive issues in this case is
whether Defendants’ insistence that Plaintiff obtain a master’s degree was pretextual. Mem. Op.
at 16–21, Nov. 15, 2012 (Dkt. No. 29) (denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
Plaintiff asserts that Griffith made repeated statements during the relevant time period that
Plaintiff was a “marginal teacher” who needed to “improve her job performance,” and that was
his reason for requiring her to pursue additional education. (Dkt. No. 54 at 1–2.) Plaintiff
apparently intends to show that this reason was pretextual by offering evidence of her satisfactory
job performance. Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s termination was unrelated to her job
performance and based solely on her failure to obtain a master’s degree. (Dkt. No. 51 at 2.) As
shown in Judge Sharp’s review of the record in his summary judgement opinion, however,
Defendants’ justification for dismissing Plaintiff changed over time. (Dkt. No. 29 at 17–19.)
Accordingly, Defendants’ reasons for requiring Plaintiff to obtain a master’s degree and for firing
her remain a disputed question for the jury to resolve. Under these circumstances, we will not
hold as a matter of law that evidence of Plaintiff’s job performance is irrelevant. Therefore, we
deny Defendants’ second motion in limine. We do encourage the parties, however, to consider
the possibility of stipulating to the fact the Plaintiff’s job performance was satisfactory, for the
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purpose of streamlining the trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, we deny Plaintiff’s first motion in limine (Dkt. No. 52) and
grant the second (Dkt. No. 53). We deny both of Defendants’ motions in limine (Dkt. Nos.
49–50).
SO ORDERED:

Marvin E. Aspen
United States District Judge
Dated:

Chicago, Illinois
April 25, 2013

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