Crump v. Brothers et al

Filing 5

ORDER: The Clerk will file the complaint in forma pauperis. For the reasons explained above, this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under the Younger abstention doctrine. To the extent that the plaintiff is asking the court to intervene in a pending state court action, it cannot do so. Entry of this Order shall constitute the judgment in this action. It is so ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/22/11. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(tmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JOHN WALTER CRUMP,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE f/n/u BROTHERS, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:11-cv-01049
Judge Sharp

ORDER
Plaintiff John Walter Crump is a resident of Nashville, Tennessee. He brings this pro se

action against Judge f/n/u Brothers and the Sixth Circuit 20th Judicial District Court (Docket No. 1),
alleging that the defendants are attempting to deprive the plaintiff of his federal constitutional right
to a jury trial in state court.
The plaintiff has submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docket No. 2).
A review of the plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis shows that he has insufficient
financial resources to pay the filing fee in this action. Therefore, the Clerk will file the complaint
in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
The Court can infer from the complaint that the plaintiff is involved in a state court action
before Judge Thomas Brothers in the 20th Judicial District Court in Nashville, Tennessee. The
complaint alleges that Judge Brothers signed an order in the plaintiff’s case requiring the parties to
mediate. The plaintiff states that he has a right to a jury trial, and he wishes to exercise that right.
The plaintiff asks this court to stop the mediation that Judge Brothers ordered for November 1, 2011,
and to set the plaintiff’s state court action for a jury trial. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 2-3).

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The abstention doctrine counsels federal courts to abstain from hearing challenges that
involve pending state proceedings, where interference by federal courts would disrupt the comity
between federal and state courts. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 37-38 (1971); Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987); see Tindall v. Wayne County Friend of the Court, 269 F.3d
533, 538 (6th Cir. 2001). Abstention in favor of state courts is proper where: (1) state proceedings
are ongoing; (2) an important state interest is implicated; and (3) there is adequate opportunity in
the state judicial proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Tindall, 269 F.3d at 538; Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d
415, 419 (6th Cir. 1995). If, however, a plaintiff demonstrates extraordinary circumstances such as
bad faith, harassment, flagrant unconstitutionality, or other unusual circumstances, then a federal
court may decline to abstain. See Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996).
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the state court proceedings about which the
plaintiff complains are ongoing. Although the court is unaware of the nature of the allegations
raised by the plaintiff in the state action, the plaintiff does not claim that he was prevented in any
way from bringing his constitutional challenges to the order of mediation to Judge Brothers’
attention in state court. In fact, the plaintiff has not alleged that he even attempted to bring his
concerns before the state court. On the contrary, it appears that the plaintiff opted to challenge
Judge Brothers’ order by filing a federal lawsuit. Finally, the plaintiff does not allege bad faith,
harassment, flagrant unconstitutionality, or another unusual circumstance that would justify the court
disregarding the Younger abstention doctrine.
For the reasons explained above, this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Watts v. Burkhart 854 F.2d 839, 844 (6th Cir. 1988)(the

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Younger abstention doctrine contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit). To the extent
that the plaintiff is asking the court to intervene in a pending state court action, it cannot do so.
Entry of this Order shall constitute the judgment in this action.
It is so ORDERED.

Kevin H. Sharp
United States District Judge

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