Cantrell v. Hale et al

Filing 71

ORDER: Inasmuch as the Plaintiff did not file a motion to amend his complaint with a proposed amendment attached to it by June 29th. That Motion for Extension of Time to Amend 66 is terminated as MOOT. The Plaintiff, instead of filing a request to file an amended complaint, merely filed a proposed amended complaint 68 . The proposed amended complaint is DENIED. In view of this ruling to deny the proposed amended complaint, the motion to strike 69 is terminated as MOOT. The Clerk is directed to advise the Plaintiff of the cost of copying the new proposed amended complaint, and the Clerk shall send Plaintiff a copy upon payment of that amount. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 8/3/12. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(dt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
RICARDO D. CANTRELL,
Plaintiff
v.
PAMELA HALE, et al.,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 3:11-1142
Judge Campbell/Brown
Jury Demand

O R D E R
Presently pending are two motions in this matter. First,
Docket Entry 66 is a motion to extend time for leave to file an
amended complaint to June 29, 2012.
Inasmuch as the Plaintiff did not file a motion to amend
his complaint with a proposed amendment attached to it by June 29th.
That motion (Docket Entry 66) is terminated as MOOT. The Plaintiff,
instead of filing a request to file an amended complaint, merely
filed a proposed amended complaint (Docket Entry 68). The original
complaint in this matter was 59 pages long.
complaint 85 pages long.

The proposed amended

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure states that a claim for relief must state a short and
plain statement of the grounds of the Court’s jurisdiction, a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief sought.

Neither a

58-page or an 85-page complaint complies with this Rule.

However,

the original complaint has been filed in this matter, although it
is clear that at some point some of the claims will be subject to

dismissal since the Plaintiff has sued the Metropolitan Government
of Nashville, Davidson County, and the City of Nashville. The City
of Nashville and Davidson County are not separate entities of the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, and at some
point the Magistrate Judge will recommend their dismissal from this
case.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that motions to amend should be freely granted.

However, once a

deadline for amending the complaint has passed, the Rule changes
from the “freely granted in the interest of justice” standards of
Rule 15(a)(2) to the more stringent requirement of Rule 16(b)(4),
which states that the scheduling order may be modified only for
good cause and the Court’s consent. In this case the Plaintiff has
attempted to file an amended complaint after the May 31, 2012,
deadline set in the scheduling order (Docket Entry 32), and even
the June 29th extension he requested (Docket Entry 66).

The

Plaintiff has failed to provide any explanation as to why he needs
to add an additional 26 pages.

It is not the Magistrate Judge’s

duty to wade through 144 pages to find what changes the Plaintiff
is seeking to make.
As the Defendants point out in their motion to strike
(Docket Entry 69), they have already proposed discovery based on
the original complaint, and if the new complaint is allowed at this
late date they may well have to change a number of their discovery

2

requests to meet any new allegations.

They point out that the

Plaintiff did not file a motion to amend, which would describe the
changes in the proposed amended complaint and the reasons they were
necessary.
The Magistrate Judge would note that in their motion to
strike the Defendants cite cases decided by the 5th, 9th, 10th, and
11th Circuit and District Court cases from the Eastern District of
California and the Northern District of New York.

While these

cases are undoubtedly interesting, it would have been far more
helpful had the Defendants cited cases from the Sixth Circuit,
which are readily available.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 (“Rule 16”) governs
the scheduling order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15 (“Rule 15”) governs motions for leave to amend
pleadings.
Rule 16 provides that the district judge
shall enter a scheduling order that limits the time to
join other parties and to amend the pleadings. Leary v.
Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 906 (6th Cir. 2003).
The rule “is designed to ensure that at some point both the parties
and the pleadings will be fixed.” Id.

Rule 16 also “permits

modification to the scheduling order ‘upon a good cause and by
leave of the district judge.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)).
As for amending pleadings, Rule 15(a)(2) states that
“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
The Sixth Circuit has identified factors relevant to the court’s
decision to grant leave: “Undue delay in filing, lack of notice to
the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the

3

opposing party, and futility of amendment[.]” Sony/ATV Music Pub.
LLC v. D.J. Miller Music Distributors, Inc., 3:09-CV-01098, 2010 WL
3872802, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2010) (quoting Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 402 (6th Cir. 2004)).
Delay in filing, by itself, “does not justify denial of leave to
amend.”

Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2002).

“At

some point, however, delay will become undue, placing an unwanted
burden on the court, or will become prejudicial, placing an unfair
burden on the opposing party.”
F.2d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 1984)).

Id. (quoting Adams v. Gould, 739
In determining potential prejudice

the court considers whether the amendment would “require the
opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct
discovery and prepare for trial [or] significantly delay the
resolution of the dispute.”
(6th

Cir.

1994).

In

Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 663

Leary,

the

interplay between Rules 15 and 16.

Sixth

Circuit

discussed

the

See also Hill v. Banks 85 Fed.

Appx. 432, 433 (6th Cir. 2003). The court established that a party
must first show good cause under Rule 16 for failure to seek leave
prior to the scheduling order deadline before the court will
consider Rule 15.

Leary, 349 F.3d at 909. Additionally, the court

held that “a determination of the potential prejudice to the
nonmovant also is required when a district court decides whether or
not to amend a scheduling order.”

Id.

The Sixth Circuit has highlighted the requirement that
district courts “determine the degree of prejudice to the adversary

4

before granting or denying an amendment.”

Moore v. City of

Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 1986). Denying leave to amend
a

complaint

requires

“at

least

prejudice to the opponent.” Id.

some

significant

showing

of

In the past, the Sixth Circuit

“has held that allowing amendment after the close of discovery
creates significant prejudice, and other Circuits agree.”

Duggins

v. Steak ‘N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted).
leave

to

file

a

Affirming the district court’s denial of
second

amended

complaint

in

Miller

v.

Administrative Office of Court, 448 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir. 2006),
the court stated that “[b]ecause the discovery deadline had already
passed and the deadline for filing dispositive motions . . . was
imminent, the defendants would have been prejudiced if a further
amendment had been permitted[.]”
Prejudice may also result from the substantive claims
asserted by a proposed amendment.

In Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d

795, 801 (6th Cir. 2002), the court vacated the district court’s
denial of leave to amend, reasoning that the defendant “does not
have to substantially revise any present defense strategy because
the

plaintiffs’

proposed

second

amendment

does

not

add

new

substantive claims or overhaul plaintiffs’ theory of the case[.]”
The court noted that “another round of motion practice . . . does
not rise to the level of prejudice that would warrant denial of
leave to amend.”

Id.

Similar reasoning is found in Sony/ATV,

where the plaintiff was granted leave to amend less than three

5

months after filing the initial complaint: “There is no allegation
of lack of notice . . . and no undue prejudice to [defendants] at
this relatively early stage of the discovery process[.]” 2010 WL
3872802, at *3.

In Duggins, however, the Sixth Circuit affirmed

the district court’s denial of leave to amend because otherwise
allowing it “would create significant prejudice to the defendants
in having to reopen discovery and prepare a defense for a claim
quite different from the [original claim].” 195 F.3d at 834.
Denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend was also affirmed in Wade v.
Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2001).

Noting the

district court’s finding that allowing amendments would prejudice
the defendant, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that “significant
discovery [had] been completed . . . [and] some if not all of the
depositions already taken would have to be supplemented to address
the multiple issues raised in the proposed amendments[.]” Id. at
459.
In this case the deadline for written discovery is August
31, 2012.

Granting the motion would require extensions of all

discovery deadlines with added written discovery.

In the absence

of any justification by the Plaintiff why he needs to add an
additional 26 pages to his complaint and a summary of what the
proposed amendment would change, and in view of the prejudice to
the Defendants, the proposed amended complaint

6

is DENIED.

In view of this ruling to deny the proposed amended
complaint, the motion to strike (Docket Entry 69) is terminated as
MOOT.
The Magistrate Judge notes that in his letter (Docket
Entry 68) the Plaintiff requested the Clerk to send him a copy of
the amended complaint, which he filed. The Clerk will only provide
copies upon payment of the copying fee.

The Clerk is directed to

advise the Plaintiff of the cost of copying the new proposed
amended complaint, and the Clerk shall send Plaintiff a copy upon
payment of that amount.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/ Joe B. Brown
JOE B. BROWN
United States Magistrate Judge

7