Rios-Quiroz et al v. Williamson County, Tennessee

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 9/10/12. (rd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CLAUDIA RIOS-QUIROZ, et al.
v.
WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TN

)
)
) NO. 3-11-1168
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
)

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 19), Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 24), and Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Leave to File Agency Policy Statements (Docket No. 30).
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 19) is GRANTED; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 24) is
DENIED; and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Agency Policy Statements (Docket No. 30) is
DENIED.
FACTS1
All Plaintiffs voluntarily reported to the Williamson County Criminal Justice Center (“CJC”)
after each receiving a misdemeanor citation in lieu of custodial arrest. When Plaintiffs arrived at
the Williamson County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”), employees of the WCSO communicated with
the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) concerning the Plaintiffs.
ICE officials advised Defendant that ICE wished to take Plaintiffs into custody and
transmitted to the WCSO a civil immigration detainer request form for each Plaintiff. Plaintiffs were

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20 and 25).

The parties have stipulated, for purposes of these Motions, these facts (Docket Nos.

not allowed to leave the CJC during the time beginning when ICE officials advised Williamson
County personnel that they wished to take Plaintiffs into custody and ending when Williamson
County personnel received the detainer forms from ICE. Plaintiffs were also not allowed to leave
the CJC during the time between receipt of the ICE forms and ICE’s assumption of custody.
Defendant did not afford Plaintiffs probable cause hearings or Miranda warnings, and bail
was not set. Plaintiffs were not detained in the Williamson County Jail on any state charge but,
rather, the detention was under the authority of an ICE determination to issue immigration detainers.
Defendant did not offer Plaintiffs an opportunity to challenge their detention since their detention
was pursuant to an ICE detainer.
The parties agree that state and local law enforcement officers do not have general authority
to enforce violations of federal civil immigration law, although federal law specifically authorizes
state officers to assist in immigration enforcement in defined circumstances. No Williamson County
official has been trained or deputized as a federal immigration enforcement official pursuant to
federal law.
WCSO personnel are not authorized by the federal government to conduct arrests or
detentions solely on WCSO personnel’s suspicion of federal immigration violations. Neither state
nor local law authorizes WCSO personnel to make an independent determination to arrest or detain
an individual for civil violations of federal law. Defendant does not have an agreement with ICE
(pursuant to federal law) which would allow Defendant’s officers to carry out functions of
immigration officers in relation to the investigation, apprehension or detention of aliens in the U.S.
Plaintiffs filed this action as a purported class action and allege that Defendant’s practice and
custom of warrantless immigration arrests during their misdemeanor bookings violated Plaintiffs’

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Fourth Amendment rights; that Defendant’s practice and custom of depriving individuals of their
liberty without an opportunity to challenge the deprivation violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment rights; that Defendant’s practice and custom of discrimination based on perceived
national origin violated Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment; that Defendant’s actions violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and
that Defendant falsely imprisoned Plaintiffs without legal justification. Docket No. 10.
The parties have filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment and agree that the sole
legal issue for this Court at this time is whether a county or municipal law enforcement agency may
honor an ICE detainer issued for an individual who has reported to the law enforcement agency
solely for the purpose of completing the booking process related to a misdemeanor citation issued
in lieu of custody.
The Court held a hearing on the pending Motions on July 26, 2012. On July 27, 2012, the
Court invited the United States of America to state the position of the United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement regarding its interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 in the context of the pending
Motions herein. Docket No. 40. The United States declined the Court’s invitation. Docket No. 41.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pennington v. State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009). The party bringing the summary
judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and
identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material
facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may satisfy this

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burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element of the non-moving party’s claim
or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review all the evidence, facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk
Western Railroad, Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court does not, however, weigh the
evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court determines whether sufficient evidence
has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position will be insufficient to survive
summary judgment; rather, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
nonmoving party. Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 595.
DISCUSSION
Tennessee law provides that when a person is arrested, booked or confined for any period
in a county or municipal jail, the county or municipal officials shall verify the citizenship status of
that person, pursuant to a standardized written procedure, and report to the appropriate immigration
and customs enforcement office any such persons who are in violation of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-123.2
Defendant Williamson County asserts that it followed this state law procedure with regard
to the Plaintiffs when Plaintiffs came voluntarily to the Williamson County Jail to be booked on

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This requirement does not apply to any county or municipality that has entered into
and is operating under a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security concerning enforcement of federal immigration laws. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-123(c).
Defendant Williamson County has not entered into such an agreement. Docket No. 22, ¶ 15.
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state charges. Plaintiffs are not challenging the time period between the moment they came into the
jail and the Defendant’s call to ICE.
Federal regulations provide that “[A] detainer serves to advise another law enforcement
agency that [ICE] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency for the purpose
of arresting and removing the alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). The detainer is a “request” that the
agency advise ICE, prior to the release of the alien, so that ICE can arrange to assume custody. Id.
Federal regulations also provide: “Upon a determination by [ICE] to issue a detainer for an
alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours,3 excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in order to
permit assumption of custody by [ICE].” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).
The essential dispute on the pending Motions is the interpretation of these regulations and
whether the regulations require local authorities to detain subjects of ICE detainers. Subsection (a),
by its terms, applies to aliens “presently in custody” of the local agency. Subsection (d), by its
terms, applies to aliens “not otherwise detained.”
Defendant claims that its detention of Plaintiffs after the booking process was pursuant to
subsection (d), which Defendant argues is mandatory. Defendant argues that its actions were taken
under the direction and supervision of the federal government. Defendant contends that it had no
authority to make any unilateral determination (probable cause or otherwise) with regard to
detaining Plaintiffs for federal immigration violations and that it was relying on ICE’s determination
and detainer with regard to its actions.

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For purposes of the pending Motions, there is no allegation that Plaintiffs were
detained longer than 48 hours excluding Saturday and Sunday.
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Plaintiffs contend that the regulation is not mandatory and that Defendant’s choice to detain
Plaintiffs after the booking process was without legal justification in violation of their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs are challenging the time period between the moment the
booking process stopped and the moment when ICE assumed custody of Plaintiffs.4 Plaintiffs’
counsel represented at the hearing that Plaintiffs are not challenging, for purposes of the pending
Motions, the time before Defendant called ICE.
To establish municipal liability under Section 1983 for constitutional violations, Plaintiffs
must establish that their harm was caused by a constitutional violation and that a policy or custom
of the municipality was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of their rights. Miller v. Sanilac
County, 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010); Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2009).
Municipalities are liable for harms resulting from a constitutional violation only when the injury
resulted from an implementation of the municipality’s official policies or established customs. Id.5
Plaintiffs must also demonstrate a direct causal link between the policy and the alleged constitutional
violation in order to show that the municipality’s deliberate conduct can be deemed the “moving
force” behind the violation. Spears, 589 F.3d at 256.
Plaintiffs allege that the unconstitutional “policy” which was the moving force behind the
violations of their rights was Williamson County’s practice of honoring the ICE detainer requests.

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That time period includes the time between the call to ICE and receipt of the ICE
detainer and the time period between receipt of the ICE detainer and ICE’s assumption of custody.
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There are at least four avenues a plaintiff may take to prove the existence of a
municipality’s illegal policy or custom: (1) the municipality’s legislative enactments or official
agency policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of
inadequate training or supervision; and (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights
violations. Spears, 589 F.3d at 256.
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Defendant argues that the moving force behind Plaintiffs’ detention was the federal law which
required them to detain Plaintiffs.
A federal court in Indiana has held that an ICE detainer is not a criminal warrant, but rather
it is a voluntary request and local law enforcement may hold an individual pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(d) “if it chooses to do so.” Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F.Supp.2d 905, 911 (S.D.
Ind. 2011). On the other hand, a district court in Pennsylvania recently held that § 287.7(d)
“required” the local law enforcement agency to maintain custody of an individual identified as an
alien. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 2012 WL 1080020 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 2012).
The Court finds that the regulation at issue here, 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, is ambiguous. Subsection
(a) states that an ICE detainer is a “request.” Subsection (d) provides that the local law enforcement
agency “shall” maintain custody of the alien pursuant to an ICE detainer. The courts have not
definitively resolved this issue, and the United States specifically declined the opportunity to state
a position regarding ICE’s interpretation of this regulation.
Plaintiffs argue that “shall” in subsection (d) should be read as “shall maintain the individual
for no more than 48 hours,” requiring that if the agency takes the person into custody, that custody
shall last no longer than 48 hours. The Court disagrees. The subsection says “shall maintain,”
which indicates an obligation to maintain custody. For this reason, the Court finds that the
regulation is mandatory.
Plaintiffs argue that if we read the regulation as mandatory, then the regulation itself is a
violation of the Tenth Amendment because it requires the county to carry out a federal regulation

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with no reimbursement.6 That issue is not before the Court, however. Challenges to the regulation
itself should be addressed to the federal government, which is not a party to this case. Similarly,
Plaintiffs’ complaint that ICE detainers require neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to
issue is not a complaint addressed to Defendant. Such a complaint is properly made toward the
federal government which promulgated the regulations and issued the ICE detainers.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Agency Policy Statements (Docket No. 30) is DENIED
because those statements fall outside the agreed scope of these cross-motions. The Joint Case
Management Order (Docket No. 16) indicates that the parties agree that their cross motions for
summary judgment shall be filed based solely on the pleadings and stipulations, with no additional
affidavits or other evidence to be filed.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 19) is
GRANTED; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 24) is DENIED; and Plaintiffs’
Motion for Leave to File Agency Policy Statements (Docket No. 30) is DENIED.
This case is referred to the Magistrate Judge for further customized case management.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________________
TODD J. CAMPBELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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The pertinent regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 2.87(e), provides that no detainer issued as a
result of a determination issued thereunder shall incur any fiscal obligation on the part of ICE until
actual assumption of custody by the federal government.
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