Jones et al v. Elite Emergency Services, LLC et al

Filing 129

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motions for Leave to file Amended Answers 30 , 31 and 32 be DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Clifton Knowles on 8/23/13. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(dt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

WANDA FAYE JONES,
KELLY DORRIS PENDERGRASS, and
TIFFANY SHEA JONES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ELITE EMERGENCY SERVICES, LLC, and
SAMUEL C. CLEMMONS, and
SHANNON CLEMMONS, Individually and
d/b/a Elite Emergency Services, LLC,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:12-cv-0203
JUDGE NIXON / KNOWLES

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court upon three identical Motions “For Leave to File Amended
Answer,” filed on May 3, 2013, by Defendants Samuel C. Clemens, Shannon Clemens, and Elite
Emergency Services, LLC. Docket Nos. 30-32. Defendants have attached a proposed “Second
Amended Answer” to each of these Motions.1 Id.
Plaintiffs have filed Responses in Opposition to the Motions. Docket Nos. 34-36.
Plaintiffs, residents of Robertson County, Tennessee, filed this pro se action against
Defendants Samuel C. Clemmons, Shannon Clemmons, and Elite Emergency Services, LLC
(hereinafter “Elite”) pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 201, et seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a). Docket No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs aver that while

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While the three Defendants individually submitted their Motions to Amend and
proposed Second Amended Answers, these documents are identical and the Court will consider
them together.

they were employed by Defendants, Defendants failed to pay them overtime wages by
improperly classifying them as independent contractors. Id. Plaintiffs further aver that, as a
result of this improper classification, Defendants failed to pay the employers’ share of the
Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”) taxes, and, accordingly, were unjustly enriched.
Id. Finally, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants “exercised dominion over and appropriated such
funds for their own use and benefit, depriving Plaintiffs of the rights and benefits thereto.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that this behavior constitutes conversion. Id.
Defendants’ Motions to Amend the Answer, filed May 3, 2013, request permission to
amend their Answers in order to assert the affirmative defense that “[a]ny recovery of Plaintiffs
Wanda Faye Jones, Tiffany Shea Jones, and Kelly Doris Pendergrass is barred due to Defendants
acting in good faith in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act codified in 29 U.S.C.
§ 260.” Docket No. 30-32. Defendants argue that they filed the instant Motion without undue
delay and that leave to amend their Answers will not result in any prejudice to Plaintiff Wanda
Faye Jones. Id. Defendants further argue that Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for liberal amendment when justice so requires. Id.
Plaintiffs respond that the Case Management Order states that no amendments to the
pleadings shall take place after August 30, 2013.2 Docket No. 34. Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants were aware of the procedures and deadlines for filing a motion to amend when they

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In their Responses, Plaintiffs allege that the Case Management Order states that any
motions to amend the pleadings shall be filed by April 30, 2012. Docket Nos. 34-36. In fact,
Judge Nixon’s April 30, 2012 Order specifies that the deadline for motions to amend the
pleadings was August 30, 2012. Docket No. 18. Plaintiffs’ statement that Defendants “timely
filed their First Amended Answers [Doc. 25, 26, 27] on August 6, 2012, in accordance with the
Case Management Order deadline” is consistent with the correct August 30, 2012 deadline.
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timely filed their First Amended Answers on August 6, 2012. Id., citing Docket Nos. 25, 26, 27.
Plaintiffs further contend that they will be prejudiced if Defendants are allowed to now amend
their Answers because they have relied on Defendants’ stated affirmative defenses which did not
contain the “good faith” defense. Docket Nos. 34-36. Plaintiffs argue that they would need
additional discovery to fully explore the contention of Defendants’ “good faith” defense, but also
note that “[t]he discovery deadline of January 13, 2013 has long passed.” Id. Finally, Plaintiffs
maintain that reopening discovery would further prejudice Plaintiffs from a cost perspective and
cause the delay of the dispositive motion deadline and trial date. Id.
Defendants correctly note that Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
supports a liberal policy for amendments to pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides in relevant
part:
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the
court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, provides that “[a]
schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” The Sixth Circuit
has articulated several factors to be consider in determining whether the Court should give a
party leave to amend:
Undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad
faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiency by
previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and
futility of amendments are all factors which may affect the
decision. Delay by itself is not sufficient reason to deny a motion
to amend. Notice and substantial prejudice to the opposing party
are critical factors in determining whether an amendment should
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be granted.
Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 458-59 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit has also
noted that “[w]hen amendment is sought at a late stage in the litigation, there is an increased
burden to show justification for failing to move earlier.” Id. at 459.
As an initial matter, Defendants’ Motions are unduly delayed. The Court’s Case
Management Order of April 30, 2012 (Docket No. 18), and Order of November 12, 2012
(Docket No. 27), set and reconfirmed an August 30, 2012 deadline for all motions to amend
pleadings. The instant Motions (Docket Nos. 30-32) were filed eight months after the Court’s
deadline, and are therefore unduly delayed.
Additionally, granting Defendants’ Motions would result in substantial prejudice to
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that they have relied on Defendants’ stated affirmative defenses in
conducting discovery and in preparing for litigation. Docket Nos. 34-36. Plaintiffs also
maintain that reopening discovery would be prejudicial from a cost perspective and create
difficulties in scheduling depositions and issuing interrogatories before the dispositive motion
deadline. Id. Plaintiffs further contend that granting Defendants’ Motions to Amend would
most likely cause a continuance of the discovery deadline, thereby delaying the dispositive
motion deadline and the trial date. Id.
Finally, Defendants have failed to demonstrate good cause for failing to file their
Motions to Amend before the deadline set by the Court’s Case Management Order. In fact,
Defendants have failed to state any reason whatsoever for the delay in filing their Motions to
Amend. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motions for

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leave to file Amended Answers be DENIED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to
this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have
fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any
response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this
Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985),
reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

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E. Clifton Knowles
United States Magistrate Judge

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