Minick et al v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee et al
Filing
192
MEMORANDUM & ORDER denying 181 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 2/25/15. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(af)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
HEATHER MINICK, individually and as
)
surviving spouse of MICHAEL MINICK, and as )
co-administrator of the Estate of Michael
)
Minick,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
)
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
)
TENNESSEE, CHRISTOPHER FOSTER,
)
individually and in his official capacity,
)
MATTHEW BARSHAW, individually and his )
official capacity; JEFFREY DAVIDSON,
)
individually and his official capacity; MORRIS )
CRAVEN, individually and in his official
)
capacity,
)
)
Defendants.
)
Case No. 3:12-cv-0524
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
(“Metro Nashville”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Certify Questions to
the Tennessee Supreme Court (Docket No. 181), to which the plaintiff has filed a Response in
opposition (Docket No. 186), and Metro Nashville has filed a Reply (Docket No. 189).
This is the fourth round of motion practice related to the vicarious liability claim against
Metro Nashville under the Sheriff’s Statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302. (See Docket Nos. 156,
167, and 176.) Metro Nashville now moves to dismiss the Sheriff’s Statute claim on
jurisdictional grounds or, in the alternative, to certify two questions to the Tennessee Supreme
1
Court. 1 In support of its Reply, Metro Nashville has introduced additional factual materials,
including a copy of an Intergovernmental Agreement between Metro Nashville and the Nashville
General Hospital (“NGH”) for security services, personnel and training records related to the
four defendant officers, and a copy of a Letter Agreement between Metro Nashville and the
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office (“DCSO”) in effect when the underlying incident occurred. In
its Reply, Metro Nashville argues, for the first time, that construction of the damages recoverable
under the sheriff’s bond also presents at least two novel or complex issues of Tennessee law. 2
Metro Nashville’s motion does not seek a merits determination from this court; instead, it
argues that a Tennessee court – not this court – should decide the merits of the Sheriff’s Statute
claim. Metro Nashville contends that adjudicating the Sheriff’s Statute claim requires the
resolution of novel or complex issues of Tennessee law that a Tennessee court should resolve in
the first instance, particularly where the issues ultimately involve potential waiver of the
county’s governmental immunity. Metro Nashville urges the court to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Sheriff’s Statute claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). By
contrast, the plaintiff argues that the law and the facts are sufficiently clear to permit this court to
(a) retain jurisdiction over the Sheriff’s Statute claim and (b) make a merits ruling at an
appropriate time, without the need to certify any questions to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The
1
The two proposed questions are as follows: “(1) What, if anything, is the legal distinction
between a jailer/corrections officer and a Deputy Sheriff for purposes of a county’s liability
under Tennessee law? (2) Can an employee of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office who was
not appointed by a Court or any formal tribunal, and in some instances is not even a civil service
employee, be a “Deputy Sheriff” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302?”
2
Specifically, Metro Nashville contends that it is unclear (1) whether the amount of the bond is
the bond in place at the time of the incident ($50,000) or at the time of a judgment (currently
$100,000), and (2) whether the plaintiff may recover the amount of the bond once relative to the
entire incident one relative to each officer defendant (i.e., four times).
2
briefs concerning Metro Nashville’s motion contain the parties’ most cogent and comprehensive
discussions of the Sheriff’s Statute to date.
Briefly, the sheriff is charged with maintaining the county jail, a responsibility he may
discharge “personally, or by deputy or by jailer.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201(a)(3). Here, the
plaintiff’s brief outlines the statutory distinctions between a “deputy” and “jailer.” For instance,
on pain of criminal liability, deputies must take a special oath of office before assuming the
responsibility of a deputy (Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 8-18-112 to 113), and deputies may thereafter
discharge the sheriff’s numerous duties, including executing and returning process, levying writs,
and overseeing the jail. By contrast, a jailer’s responsibilities are limited to overseeing the jail,
the jailer need not take the special oath of office required of deputies under Tenn. Code Ann. § 818-112, and a jailer must only meet specific qualifications set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-4144. The plaintiff’s brief outlines the procedures by which a sheriff may employ deputies, a
process that involves either an agreement between the sheriff and the county concerning the
number of “deputies and assistants” or an adversary proceeding by the sheriff against the county
if they cannot agree on the right number of employees. Tenn. Code Ann. 8-20-101.
The Tennessee Code allocates civil responsibility for injuries caused by jailers and by
deputies: for injuries caused by jailers, a sheriff is “civilly responsible” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-4101); for injuries caused by “deputies appointed by the sheriff,” the county is liable, provided
that (a) the deputies were acting by “virtue of or under color of the office” and (b) the injurycausing actions were non-negligent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302; see Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty.,
3
736 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. 1987), abrogated on other grounds in Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59
S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2001). 3
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the four DSCO Officers who injured Minick were deputies
acting under color of office at the time of the incident. Thus, the plaintiff alleges that, under the
Sheriff’s Statute, Metro Nashville is liable for any injuries caused by the officers’ non-negligent
conduct. Metro Nashville’s position seems to be that, at the time of the incident, the four officers
were in fact “jailers,” for whose conduct only the sheriff (not the county) is “civilly
responsible.” 4
At deposition, each officer testified that Sheriff Hall administered an oath of office to him
(presumably the oath for a deputy set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-112) and that the DSCO
gave him an official badge identifying him as a “Deputy Sheriff.” 5 Notwithstanding these
indicia of deputization, Metro Nashville argues that the DCSO officers are not “deputies” under
3
Jenkins addressed the interaction between the Sheriff’s Statute and the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”), concluding that, following passage of the TGTLA,
the Sheriff’s Statute waived the county’s immunity only as to non-negligent actions.
4
Late in this litigation, the plaintiff sought leave to assert a vicarious liability claim against
Davidson County Sheriff Daron Hall under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-4-101, alleging that Sheriff
Hall was responsible for the officers’ actions to the extent that those officers were acting as
“jailers” at the time of the incident. The court denied the plaintiff’s request because the claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.
5
Officer Foster’s testimony is representative: “[W]hen you were hired fully, what was your job
title? A: Just a deputy. . . . Q: [W]ere you sworn in as a deputy sheriff? A: Yes. Q: Were you
issued a badge? A: Yes. . . . Q: [D]escribe the badge for me. A. It’s like a – pretty much like a
regular deputy badge with the stars, like a six-pointed star. Q: [] Are there any words on the
badge? A: Yes. Davidson County Sheriff’s Office, you know, deputy. Q: [] And were you
issued that badge at that ceremony when you were sworn in? A: Yes. Q: Did the sheriff himself
conduct the ceremony? A: Yes, he was present. Q: Did he administer the oath to you? A: Yes.)
(Docket No. 175, Ex. 2, Foster Deposition Transcript at 12:10-12 and 13:12 to 14:6.)
4
the Sheriff’s Statute because the Letter of Agreement between the county and Sheriff Hall only
identifies one class of employee as a “deputy” (the “Chief Deputy”), whereas the four officers
fall under the line item request for 425 “correctional officers.” 6 As the court understands the
argument, Metro Nashville argues that a Tennessee court – not this court – should decide
whether to classify “correctional officers” as “deputies” (rather than as “jailers”) under the
Sheriff’s Statute.
Metro Nashville also raises a separate argument in its Reply. In support of its Reply,
Metro Nashville has produced a copy of an Intergovernmental Agreement between NGH and the
DSCO that was in effect at the time of the incident, whereby the DSCO had agreed to provide
security at NGH facilities during the time frame at issue. Metro Nashville represents that three
of the four officer defendants were providing hospital security at NGH under the terms of this
agreement and that, therefore, those officers “were certainly not ‘deputies’ at the time of the
incident.” (Docket No. 189 at p. 5.) Metro Nashville does not explain why this conclusion
should follow from the fact of the Intergovernmental Agreement, which does not, by its own
terms, appear to sever the employment relationship between the officers and the DSCO. 7
Notably, Metro Nashville has not explained why Sheriff Hall would have administered an
oath and delivered “Sheriff’s Deputy” badges to the four officers in this lawsuit if he was not, in
fact, appointing them as his deputies. 8 The court is increasingly convinced that Metro
6
Thus, it appears that the sheriff employed the officers in this case by agreement under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 8-20-101, without the need for an adversary proceeding against the county.
7
Because the issue was raised for the first time in Metro’s Nashville Reply, the court does not
have the benefit of a response from the plaintiff concerning the potential effect of the
Intergovernmental Agreement on the court’s analysis.
8
The record contains no representations by Sheriff Hall.
5
Nashville’s legal position is incorrect, that the issue may involve an issue of fact rather than an
issue of law, or that, at a minimum, Metro Nashville should be estopped from taking the position
that these four officers were not “deputies.”
In light of these considerations, the court finds no compelling reason to relinquish
jurisdiction over the Sheriff’s Statute claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) or to certify a question to
the Tennessee Supreme Court at this time. With respect to the jurisdictional issue, the court may
be able to resolve the county’s potential liability for the officers’ conduct (if not the county’s
total monetary exposure) on the merits. Also, at least at this stage, the court is concerned that it
would not serve the interests of judicial economy and fairness to create a serious risk of parallel
litigation and potentially inconsistent verdicts as to the merits of the officers’ underlying
conduct. As to the proposed certified questions, the first question is vague and may be
unnecessary in light of the facts of the case; as to the second question, it is unclear to the court
what meaningful distinctions Metro Nashville is attempting to draw with respect to civil service
protections and the appointment of deputies. Finally, although Metro Nashville raises a
potentially valid issue concerning the scope of liability under the sheriff’s bond, the issue was
raised for the first time in Metro Nashville’s Reply, and the court sees no reason why it could not
address that issue at a later stage, with benefit of a response from the plaintiff.
For these reasons, Metro Nashville’s motion is DENIED. Perhaps in conjunction with
briefing the merits of the Sheriff’s Statute claim in a Rule 56 motion, Metro Nashville may seek
to renew its request to dismiss the claim or to certify certain (more focused) questions to the
Tennessee Supreme Court, although it is now less concerned that either step will be necessary in
this case.
It is so ORDERED.
6
Enter this 25th day of February 2015.
_____________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?