Meeks v. Schofield et al

Filing 221

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The court finds that the proposed intervenors are not entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a), and that permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) is not warranted. The magistrate judge's recommendation (ECF No . 182) that the motions to intervene be denied is hereby ADOPTED AND ACCEPTED, and the motions to intervene (ECF Nos. 84, 85, 87, 89, and 91) are DENIED. Further, because the motions to intervene have been denied, the motions for appointment of co unsel (ECF Nos. 86, 88, 90, and 92) have been rendered moot. It is so ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 4/30/2013. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DANNY RAY MEEKS

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Plaintiff,
v.
DERRICK D. SCHOFIELD et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:12-cv-545
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Before the court are objections (ECF Nos. 197, 198, 199, 200, 212) submitted by the plaintiff and by
proposed intervenors to the magistrate judge’s order (ECF No. 182), denying the proposed intervenors’
motions to intervene.
A.

Procedural Background

On January 16, 2013, four individuals—David Cosgriff, James Hyde, Tommy Page, and William
Shatswell—filed separate motions to intervene in this case, in which they stated only that they were “asking
this court to let [them] proceed as a [sic] Intervenor Plaintiff in this case.” (ECF Nos. 85, 87, 89, 91.) None
of these proposed intervenors provided an argument or explanation as to why he should be permitted to
intervene as a plaintiff in this action. On the same day, a fifth individual, Donald Jett, filed a separate Motion
to Join Verified Complaint as Intervenor Plaintiff Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (ECF No. 84), in which he
provided a lengthy and detailed account of his becoming friends with plaintiff Danny Meeks, testifying for him
at a disciplinary hearing, and as a result being subjected to retaliatory actions and threats by Disciplinary
Board Chairman Dennis Davis and Deputy Warden Patrick Ryan, among others. The defendants filed a
response in opposition to the motions to intervene, arguing that the motions were not timely and that the
proposed intervenors failed to show they had a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of this suit.
(ECF No. 97 (citing Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 473 (6th Cir. 2000).)
Magistrate Judge Bryant entered an order on April 2, 2013 (ECF No. 182), denying the motions to
intervene on the basis that allowing the non-parties to intervene at this stage in the proceedings would unduly
complicate the management of the case and impose a substantial and unnecessary delay in resolving the

claims of the original plaintiff. The magistrate judge also noted that the motions of Cosgriff, Hyde, Page, and
Shatswell failed to demonstrate any grounds for intervention. (Id. at 1.) The magistrate judge denied the
motions without prejudice to the non-parties’ ability to file their own separate complaints if they wished to do
so, and the Clerk was directed to mail to each of the non-party movants a package containing a form § 1983
complaint.
In response, the proposed intervenors raise the following specific objections to the magistrate judge’s
denial of their motion1:
(1) The magistrate judge’s determination that intervention was inappropriate at this stage in the
proceedings was unfair in light of the magistrate judge’s delay of seventy-six days2 in ruling on the motions,
and was in contravention of the requirement in Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the
magistrate judge “promptly” rule on any matters pending before him;
(2) Any purported complicating effect intervention might have on the case is not attributable to the
movants and is due instead to the magistrate judge’s repeated delays in ruling on the plaintiff’s and
intervenors’ motions;
(3) The movants deny that intervention would have any adverse effect on plaintiff Meeks’s pursuit
of his claims and argue that consolidation of the claims would further the aims of judicial economy and the
ends of justice;
(4) The movants object to the magistrate judge’s finding that the motions of Cosgriff, Hyde, Page,
and Shatswell were unsupported, on the grounds that these movants are laymen “who are under extreme
duress and coercion on a daily basis” and therefore should have been permitted to correct any deficiency in

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In fact, Cosgriff, Hyde, Page, Shatswell, and Jett each filed a separate “Notice of Appeal” signaling
each movant’s intent to appeal to the district judge the magistrate judge’s denial of his motion to intervene.
These notices are identical, and all state the movants’ argument that their motions to intervene should be
granted because the movants were “associated with Plaintiff Danny Ray Meeks and the Court waited until
four months later to make a Ruling on myself to be an intervenor plaintiffs” [sic] and because of “Defendants’
discrimination and retaliation.” (ECF Nos. 197, 198, 199, 200, 213, at 1.) Danny Meeks himself filed, on
behalf of all the proposed intervenors, a more comprehensive argument titled “Intervenor Plaintiff’s Specific
Objections . . . to Magistrate Judge’s Order D.E. No. 182.” (ECF No. 212.) Although this document was not
signed by any of the proposed intervenors, the Court will consider it as if it were filed by the proposed
intervenors in support of their motions.
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In fact, barely two months passed between the filing of the defendants’ response to the motions
to intervene and the magistrate judge’s ruling.
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their filing (ECF No. 212, at 4); and
(5) The denial of the movants’ requests for appointment of counsel is an abuse of discretion and is
unfair since the State of Tennessee provides counsel to the defendants at the taxpayers’ cost.
(See ECF No. 212.)
B.

Standard of Review

As an initial matter, the court must decide whether a motion to intervene is non-dispositive such that
the court’s review of the magistrate judge’s order is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Rule 72(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or dispositive such that review is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)
and Rule 72(b).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a magistrate judge is not authorized to “determin[e]” matters
that are “dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.” Vogel v. U.S. Office Products Co., 258 F.3d 509, 514
(6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether a particular motion is dispositive, the court must perform a functional
analysis of the motion’s potential effect on litigation. Id. at 514–15. “The list of dispositive motions contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) is nonexhaustive, and unlisted motions that are functionally equivalent to those
listed in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) are also dispositive.” Id. at 515 (citation omitted).
This court concludes that the denial of a motion to intervene is functionally equivalent to several of
the motions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),3 and that a motion to intervene is dispositive as to the pro se
movants who seek to intervene. See Callier v. Gray, 167 F.3d 977, 981 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that a motion
for default judgment is dispositive because it is “substantially similar to several of the listed motions”); Massey
v. City of Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 509–10 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a motion for Rule 37 sanctions is
dispositive); Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co., 984 F.2d 168, 169–70 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a motion to
certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal is dispositive); Bennett v. General Caster Serv., 976 F.2d
995, 997 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that a motion for Rule 11 sanctions is dispositive); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that, because a motion to realign parties would

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The list includes “a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary
judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in
a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
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either destroy or preserve diversity jurisdiction, motions to realign are dispositive); Woods v. Dahlberg, 894
F.2d 187, 187–88 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is dispositive because
it is the functional equivalent of an involuntary dismissal).
Accordingly, the court will construe the magistrate judge’s order denying the motions to intervene as
a Report and Recommendation subject to the standard of review set forth in Rule 72(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(c). Under these provisions, the district court must review, de novo, any finding or recommendation
of the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation to which specific objections have been raised. The
district court need only review the magistrate judge’s factual or legal conclusions to which either party
specifically objects. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
C.

Analysis and Discussion
1.

Intervention as of Right

The right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arises only if the
court finds that a person seeking intervention has established three elements: (1) an interest in the subject
matter of the pending litigation; (2) a substantial risk that the litigation will impair the interest; and (3) existing
parties do not adequately protect that interest. The Sixth Circuit adds timeliness to these factors. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 2007) (“We have explained that a
proposed intervenor must establish four factors before being entitled to intervene: (1) the motion to intervene
is timely; (2) the proposed intervenor has a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) the
proposed intervenor’s ability to protect their interest may be impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4)
the parties already before the court cannot adequately protect the proposed intervenor’s interest.” (citation
omitted)). The elements are not factors to be weighed; rather, all of the elements must be satisfied before
an applicant may exercise a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). See Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 922 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that an intervenor must
satisfy all the elements of the Rule 24 standard).
In this case, it is clear that the proposed intervenors have not made the necessary showing that they
have an interest in the subject matter of the pending litigation or that the pending litigation will impair any such
interest. Danny Meeks, the current plaintiff, brought suit alleging that he suffers from paruresis and that the

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removal of the bathroom doors in the prison unit where he was housed violated his federal rights under the
ADA and the RA. He also brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged retaliation and disclosure of
confidential medical information. The plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint to allege that he was
subjected to retaliation arising from the filing of grievances and this lawsuit related to the bathroom-doors
issue, and that his access to the courts had been impeded. (ECF No. 28.) All of these claims relate solely
to the plaintiff personally. Jett, the only proposed intervenor who provided factual support for his motion to
intervene, seeks to bring claims related to allegations of retaliation against him personally, based both on his
friendship with Meeks and his own work assisting other inmates in pursuing their own legal claims. These
retaliation claims are personal to Jett. Even if the court presumes that the other movants would raise similar
retaliation claims, such claims would be personal to them. In short, the alleged retaliation against the
proposed intervenors in connection with the movants’ relationships with Meeks does not establish that the
movants have any legal interest in the subject matter of the pending litigation brought by Meeks, much less
a “substantial” interest; nor does it suggest that the outcome of Meeks’s litigation will impair any of their own
interests. Accordingly, even if this court were to conclude that the motions to intervene were timely, the
proposed intervenors cannot establish any of the remaining four elements necessary to establish that they
are entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a). The court therefore finds as a matter of law that the
proposed intervenors have not established that they have a right to intervene under Rule 24(a).
2.

Permissive Intervention

Under Rule 24(b), a court may permit intervention to any party who “has a claim or defense that
shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). The rule further
provides that the court, in exercising its discretion, must consider whether a proposed intervention “will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). Rule 24(c) also
states that a motion to intervene must be accompanied by a “pleading that sets out the claim or defense for
which intervention is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c).
While Jett’s motion was arguably accompanied by the required pleading, the other four movants’
motions were not, and to date the court has no inkling what claims those proposed intervenors seek to raise.
In other words, all movants except Jett failed to comply with Rule 24(c), which alone provides a basis for

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denial of their motions. And while it is true that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe,
951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not
require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (cited
in Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Further, however, while Meeks believes his pursuit of his claims would not be prejudiced by the
proposed interventions, and Meeks obviously does not object to the proposed intervention, the defendants
do, and the court finds in the exercise of its discretion that joining five new plaintiffs at this late date to a
lawsuit that has been pending for a year already would unnecessarily prolong and complicate matters. One
factor that renders joinder of numerous plaintiffs in a prison case all the more complicated is that all litigants
must sign all pleadings. The logistical problems posed by this requirement are illustrated by the fact that
Meeks, though he provided signature lines for all the proposed intervenors in his most recent filing,
nonetheless did not obtain the signatures of even one of the proposed intervenors on the objections he filed
to the magistrate judge’s denial of the motions to intervene. In addition, conducting discovery with five
additional plaintiffs would cause additional unnecessary complications and inevitable delays. And, while the
proposed intervenors seek to blame any adverse effect of delay on the magistrate judge, the fact is that the
magistrate judge ruled on the motions to intervene just 62 days after they became ripe. The proposed
intervenors, by contrast, did not file their motions to intervene until 9 months after the filing of the complaint,
even though the allegations in Jett’s proposed pleading, at least, show that he was aware of potential claims
as early as the fall of 2011.
Although Jett at least has established the existence of some overlapping questions of law and fact,
namely the law of retaliation and the fact that some of the retaliation Jett allegedly suffered was due to his
relationship with Meeks, the overlap is relatively small compared to the entire scope of Meeks’ lawsuit and
Jett’s proposed claims. The court therefore finds that the existence of a few common issues of law and fact
does not justify intervention in this case. And finally, Jett and the other proposed intervenors have not shown
that they will be prejudiced by being required to file separate lawsuits to pursue their legal claims.

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D.

Conclusion

For all these reasons, the court finds that the proposed intervenors are not entitled to intervene as
of right under Rule 24(a), and that permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) is not warranted. The magistrate
judge’s recommendation (ECF No. 182) that the motions to intervene be denied is hereby ADOPTED AND
ACCEPTED, and the motions to intervene (ECF Nos. 84, 85, 87, 89, and 91) are DENIED.
Further, because the motions to intervene have been denied, the motions for appointment of counsel
(ECF Nos. 86, 88, 90, and 92) have been rendered moot.
It is so ORDERED.

Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge

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