Meeks v. Schofield et al

Filing 226

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Before the court are the plaintiff's objections (ECF Nos. 216 , 217 , and 218 ) to several different orders entered by the magistrate judge (ECF Nos. 201 , 202 and 205 ). Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 5/9/2013. The plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DANNY RAY MEEKS

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Plaintiff,
v.
DERRICK D. SCHOFIELD et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:12-cv-545
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Before the court are the plaintiff’s objections (ECF Nos. 216, 217, and 218) to several different orders
entered by the magistrate judge (ECF Nos. 201, 202 and 205).
Each of the orders in question is non-dispositive. Under Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 626(b)(1)(A), a party may object to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive orders.
The district court must review the objections and must affirm the magistrate judge’s ruling unless the movant
demonstrates that the ruling is “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The “clearly
erroneous” standard does not empower a reviewing court to reverse a magistrate judge’s finding because it
would have decided the matter differently. Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).
Instead, the standard is met when, despite the existence of evidence to support the finding, the court, upon
reviewing the record in its entirety, “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 33 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff’s objections will be overruled.
(1)

Objections at ECF No. 216

On October 10, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion (ECF No. 49) to alter the scheduling order (ECF No.
30) entered by Magistrate Judge Bryant on August 16, 2012. Specifically, the plaintiff sought an extension
of 30 days after his release from segregation, or until Monday, November 26, 2012, to “get his files, research
materials and schedule reorganized to the point at which he can again begin work on the instant case.” (ECF
No. 49, at 1.) The plaintiff did not ask for an extension of any specific deadline; it appears he sought to
extend all the deadlines in the scheduling order by approximately six weeks. Besides asking to extend all

deadlines, the plaintiff also described in great detail the events leading up to his being placed back in
segregation, alleging that a corrections officer “planted” contraband, in the form of a two-inch square of
sandpaper, in the plaintiff’s pocket and that other corrections officers found contraband in the form of other
inmates’ legal papers in the plaintiff’s box at the prison law library. The plaintiff received disciplinary write-ups
on both charges but was found not guilty on the latter charge. The plaintiff was then charged with and found
guilty of attempting to intimidate a prison employee. The plaintiff alleges the planting of contraband and the
disciplinary actions were in retaliation for his continuing his legal activities, and specifically in response to his
having served on the defendants a motion for a restraining order, filed in this action on September 20, 2012
(ECF No. 43) (which has since been denied (ECF No. 205)).
On April 12, 2013, Magistrate Judge Bryant entered a margin order denying the plaintiff’s motion to
amend the scheduling order as moot. (ECF No. 201.) Magistrate Judge Bryant noted that the deadlines for
which extension was sought in the motion had all expired, even if construed as extended,1 and the court had
already extended the pretrial deadlines by order entered February 7, 2013 (ECF No. 104). The February 7
order extended all pretrial deadlines by several months, and thus provided greater relief than that sought by
the plaintiff’s original request to extend the deadlines.
The plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s order on the basis that it was not timely and therefore
failed to comply with Rule 72(a), requiring that the magistrate judge “promptly conduct” the proceedings
referred to him. The plaintiff asserts that the magistrate judge’s failure to rule promptly on the plaintiff’s
motion “prejudiced Plaintiff’s entire case,” and “‘sabotage[d]’ this action to the point that the Plaintiff is now
in an adversarial position with the magistrate judge, the defendant’s counsel, the Tennessee Department of
Correction (TDOC) . . . and the named Defendants as individuals.” (ECF No. 216, at 1.) The plaintiff does
not explain how he has been prejudiced by the denial of his order when the magistrate judge already granted
an extension of all pretrial deadlines well beyond the six weeks originally sought by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff similarly objects that the magistrate judge engaged in “preferential treatment” insofar as
he ignored the plaintiff’s motion to amend the scheduling order for four months, but when the defendants filed

1

The last dates noted in the original scheduling order provided a January 14, 2013 deadline for filing
dispositive motions and a February 25, 2013 deadline for replies to responses to such motions. (ECF No.
30, at 4.)
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a motion to amend the scheduling order on February 6, 2013, the magistrate judge promptly granted the
defendants’ motion the next day, on February 7, 2013. (See ECF Nos. 101, 104.)
The plaintiff includes other objections that do not specifically pertain to the order denying his motion
to amend the scheduling order, which the court therefore will not address
The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was in any way prejudiced by the magistrate judge’s
failure to rule on his own motion to extend deadlines and instead granting the defendants’ motion to amend
the scheduling order. The plaintiff’s motion was vague and did not ask for the extension of any specific
deadline, and it included extraneous materials and requests for relief that were unrelated to the scheduling
order. The plaintiff was not barred from taking any action or filing any documents by reason of a failure to
meet the established deadlines. More fundamentally, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the magistrate
judge’s action was “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
The plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 216) to the magistrate judge’s order denying as moot his motion
to amend the scheduling order are therefore OVERRULED.
(2)

Objections at ECF No. 217

In his order at ECF No. 202, Magistrate Judge Bryant denied two motions filed by the plaintiff seeking
leave to amend his complaint (ECF Nos. 62 and 95 (filed on November 29, 2012 and January 25, 2013,
respectively)). In denying the motions, the magistrate judge first noted that the plaintiff had already been
given leave to amend his complaint once, and that both the new motions to amend were untimely, having
been filed after the deadline for amendments to the pleadings established by the scheduling order at ECF
No. 30.2
The actual reason for the magistrate judge’s ruling, however, was that the proposed amendments
were actually proposed supplemental complaints, insofar as they sought to assert claims based on events
that occurred after the original complaint was filed, and they sought to add new defendants, including some
who were identified with a different correctional facility than the one where the current defendants were
employed. The magistrate judge denied the motions to amend based on his finding that allowing the

2

The plaintiff’s motion to extend the filing deadline (ECF No. 49) was still pending at the time the
plaintiff filed both the motions to amend.
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proposed amendments “would unnecessarily and unreasonably complicate and delay the resolution of the
current action and would not further interests of judicial economy.” (ECF No. 202, at 2.) The denial was
without prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to assert the claims in a separately filed action.3
The plaintiff objects to this ruling, first, on the basis that it was not timely, asserting that he was
prejudiced by the magistrate judge’s failure to “promptly conduct” his review of the plaintiff’s motions, as
required by Rule 72(a). (ECF No. 217, at 1.) The plaintiff does not state how he has been prejudiced, but
he further objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that amendment would unnecessarily delay and
complicate proceedings, pointing out that the magistrate judge’s months-long delay in ruling on the plaintiff’s
motions has unnecessarily delayed proceedings.
The court understands that the magistrate judge is dealing with an extremely full docket, and that the
plaintiff’s multiplicity of filings does nothing to ease that burden. Certainly, more timely rulings would be
preferable for all involved, but the plaintiff has not shown that the magistrate judge’s ruling was clearly
erroneous or contrary to law. The plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 217) are therefore OVERRULED.
(3)

Objections at ECF No. 218

Finally, the plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s order (ECF No. 205) denying the plaintiff’s
motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 43, filed Sept. 20, 2012), and his motion for an expedited
hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 48, filed Oct. 10, 2012).
In his motion for a restraining order, the plaintiff alleged that various defendants at the DeBerry
Special Needs Facility where he was then housed were interfering with his “‘federally protected’ right of
mutual assistance with other inmates.” (ECF No. 43, at 1.) He sought an order prohibiting the defendants
from harassing or retaliating against him for his legal activities and his work as an Inmate Legal Helper, and
from interfering with the plaintiff’s access to the prison law library. (See ECF No. 43-1, at 1–2 (proposed
order).)
The magistrate judge denied the motion as moot, on the basis that Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permits the issuance of a temporary restraining order if the record “clearly show[s] that

3

The magistrate judge also denied the plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 165) asking the court to address
pending amendments, and a related motion requesting a ruling on the earlier motion (ECF No. 179).
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immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be
heard in opposition (ECF No. 205, at 1 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)), but that the plaintiff had been
transferred to the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee on or around October 24, 2012,
shortly after the filing of the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order.
In reaching his conclusion, the magistrate judge correctly noted that claims against prison officials
for declaratory and injunctive relief are rendered moot when the inmate plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at
the facility that employs the defendants against whom such relief is sought, because these defendants lack
the ability to provide the prospective injunctive relief the plaintiff seeks. Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794,
798–99 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Again, the plaintiff has not shown that the magistrate judge’s ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary
to law. The plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 218) are OVERRULED.
This matter remains referred to the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B).
It is so ORDERED.

Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge

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