Meeks v. Schofield et al

Filing 363

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 284 MOTION for Summary Judgment. In summary, for the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgm ent as a matter of law. Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED, and the complaint, as amended, DISMISSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 3/6/2014. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DANNY RAY MEEKS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff
v.
DERRICK D. SCHOFIELD, et al.,
Defendants
TO:

No. 3:12-0545
Judge Trauger/Bryant
Jury Demand

THE HONORABLE ALETA A. TRAUGER
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendants

Dennis

Davis,

Mike

Christensen,

Julia

Campbell, Jewel Steele and the Tennessee Department of Corrections
(“TDOC”) have filed their motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry
No. 284). Plaintiff Meeks has responded in opposition (Docket Entry
Nos.

314,

315

and

316).

For

the

reasons

stated

below,

the

undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment should be GRANTED and the complaint, as amended,
dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Danny Ray Meeks, a prisoner proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis, has filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et
seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq.,
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and
punitive

damages.

Named

as

Defendants

are

Derrick

Schofield,

Commissioner of TDOC, Mike Christensen, the ADA officer at the
Deberry Special Needs Facility (“DSNF”) in Nashville, Tennessee,
and Dennis Davis, identified as a Grievance Board Chairman at DSNF
(Docket Entry No. 1).
Upon initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A, the Court found that Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant
Christensen had bathroom doors in Plaintiff’s housing unit removed
in

retaliation

for

being

required

to

produce

information

in

response to discovery served by Plaintiff in an earlier lawsuit
stated a cognizable claim under Section 1983(Docket Entry No. 5 at
3). The Court also found that the complaint stated a potentially
viable claim against Defendant Davis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy, as a result of Davis’s
alleged disclosure of the Plaintiff’s private medical information
to other inmates. The Court also allowed Plaintiff’s claims under
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to survive against Defendant
TDOC, but dismissed claims under these two statutes against the
individual Defendants upon a finding that, as a matter of law,
neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act authorized suit against
public employees or supervisors in their individual capacities
(Docket Entry No. 5 at 4). All other claims in the complaint were
dismissed for failure to state a claim (Id. at 6).
Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint supplementing
his claims, including new claims against Defendants Davis, Julia
Campbell and Warden Jewel Steele (Docket Entry No. 28).

2

Defendants

have

filed

their

amended

answer

denying

liability and asserting affirmative defenses (Docket Entry No.
175).

Thereafter,

Defendants

filed

their

motion

for

summary

judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party may obtain summary judgment by showing “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Covington v. Knox County School Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 914
(6th Cir. 2000).

The moving party bears the initial burden of

satisfying the court that the standards of Rule 56 have been met.
See Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 239 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986).

The

ultimate question to be addressed is whether there exists any
genuine dispute of material fact.

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Covington, 205 F.3d at 914 (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). If so, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
To

defeat

a

properly

supported

motion

for

summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

If the

party does not so respond, summary judgment will be entered if
appropriate.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The nonmoving party’s burden

of providing specific facts demonstrating that there remains a
genuine issue of material fact for trial is triggered once the
moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

3

party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. A genuine issue of material
fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
248.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party,

drawing

all

justifiable

inferences

in

its

favor.

See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986).
ANALYSIS
For sake of organization, the undersigned will discuss
Plaintiff’s claims against the moving Defendants separately.
Defendant Mike Christensen.

Plaintiff Meeks claims that

Defendant Christensen, the ADA Coordinator at DSNF, was aware of
Plaintiff’s paruresis,1 and that Christensen retaliated against
Plaintiff by having bathroom doors removed from housing Unit 4A
where Plaintiff was housed. Plaintiff alleges that this act by
Christensen was in retaliation for his being required to produce
certain information in response to discovery requests by Plaintiff
in an earlier lawsuit (Docket Entry No. 1 at 5-6).
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant
Christensen has filed his own affidavit and the affidavit of Jennie
Jobe, who was warden at DSNF when the bathroom doors in Unit 4 were

1

Paruresis, sometimes called “shy bladder syndrome,” is a phobia
that involves fear and avoidance in using public restrooms, and may make
it impossible for one to urinate in the presence of others, such as in
a public restroom.

4

removed (Docket Entry Nos. 285-4 and -11). In his affidavit,
Defendant Christensen testifies that he did not have the bathroom
doors removed from Unit 4, that he was not personally involved in
the decision to remove the bathroom doors, that he lacked the
authority to have the bathroom doors removed, and that he had no
authority, direction, or control over the decision to remove the
bathroom doors. In her affidavit, Ms. Jobe testifies that Defendant
Christensen did not recommend removal of the bathroom doors in Unit
4, and that Christensen lacked the authority to have the bathroom
doors removed because only the warden of the institution had such
authority. Jobe further testified that she ordered the removal of
the

bathroom

doors

upon

the

recommendation

of

unit

manager

Abingambe because inmates were smoking in the bathrooms.
In his response in opposition, Plaintiff Meeks fails to
offer any evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact in support of his claim that Defendant Christensen
had the bathroom doors in Unit 4 removed (Docket Entry 314 at 2-7).
Instead, Plaintiff seems to argue that then-Warden Jennie Jobe “was
motivated to punish the Plaintiff for having exercised his First
Amendment rights of protected speech activities in seeking relief
from

the

unlawful

ADA

violations

by

contacting

Commissioner

Schofield” (Docket Entry 314 at 6).
The

undersigned

Magistrate

Judge

finds

from

the

admissible evidence in the record there is no genuine issue as to

5

any material fact, that there is no evidence supporting the claim
that Defendant Christensen had the bathroom doors removed, and that
Christensen is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant Dennis Davis. Plaintiff Meeks alleges that on
May 17, 2011, Defendant Dennis Davis, acting in the capacity of
Grievance Board Chairman, wrongfully disclosed confidential medical
information concerning Meeks – his paruresis diagnosis – to other
inmates in Meeks’s housing unit (Docket Entry No. 1 at 7). The
Court

has

previously

found

that

this

allegation

states

a

potentially viable claim against Davis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of Meeks’s right to privacy (Docket Entry No. 5 at 3).
The Sixth Circuit has found that, as a matter of law, inmates have
a

“Fourteenth

Amendment

privacy

interest

in

guarding

against

disclosure of sensitive medical information from other inmates
subject to legitimate penological interests.” Moore v. Prevo, 379
Fed. Appx. 425, 428, 2010 WL 1849208 (6th Cir. May 6, 2010)
(unpublished).
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant
Davis has filed the affidavits of two witnesses, Debra Moody and
Natasha Holt, both of whom testify that they were present at the
Grievance Board hearing on May 17, 2011 (Docket Entry Nos. 285-8
and -9). Both Moody and Holt testify that Defendant Davis did not
disclose any confidential medical information concerning Meeks at
this hearing, but that Meeks himself freely disclosed his paruresis
condition, presumably to bolster his argument before the Grievance
6

Board that removal of the bathroom doors in Unit 4 was especially
harmful

to

him.

In

addition,

Defendant

Davis

has

filed

the

affidavit of Ty Parker, the Grievance Chairman at DSNF. Parker
testifies by affidavit that Meeks has never filed a grievance at
DSNF grieving that Defendant Davis improperly disclosed Meeks’s
medical information to other inmates at DSNF (Docket Entry No. 28510). Parker’s testimony is undisputed in the record.
Assuming for the sake of argument that a genuine issue of
material fact exists concerning whether Defendant Davis wrongfully
disclosed Meeks’s confidential medical information, it appears
undisputed

that

Meeks

never

filed

an

institutional

grievance

concerning this claim or otherwise exhausted his administrative
remedies before filing this action. As such, Meeks’s unexhausted
privacy claim against Davis is barred by the provisions of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), and must be
dismissed. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220 (2007).
TDOC. Upon the initial review of the complaint, the Court
found

that

the

Plaintiff’s

claims

against

TDOC

under

the

Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA should be allowed to
proceed (Docket Entry No. 5 at 5). During its review, the Court
found that the “primary focus” of Meeks’s complaint is the removal
of the bathroom doors in his housing unit and the prison’s failure
to provide him a reasonable accommodation for his paruresis after
removal of the doors. (Id. at 4). Meeks also insists that his

7

subsequent transfer from Unit 4 to Unit 15 amounted to retaliation
for his assertion of his rights under the ADA.
Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from
discriminating against disabled individuals and states that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12132. The term “public entity” is defined, in relevant
part, as “any State or local government” and as “any department,
agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a State or local
government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)&(B).
With respect to retaliation, the ADA provides that “[n]o
person shall discriminate against any individual because such
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Since both the
Rehabilitation Act and ADA prohibit discrimination based upon an
8

individual’s disability, claims under both statutes can be analyzed
together. Thompson v. Williamson Co., 219 F.3d 555, 557 (6th Cir.
2000).
In

support

of

their

motion

for

summary

judgment,

Defendants have filed the affidavit of Jennie Jobe, who was the
warden at DSNF when the bathroom doors of Unit 4 were removed
(Docket Entry No. 185-11). Ms. Jobe testifies that, as warden, she
ordered removal of the bathroom doors in Units 3 and 4 based upon
reports that inmates had begun smoking in those bathrooms. She
further testifies that after the bathroom doors were removed, Meeks
began filing grievances claiming that the removal of the doors
violated

his

rights,

and

he

began

writing

letters

to

the

Commissioner of Corrections, Derrick Schofield. Ms. Jobe testifies
that in response to “numerous complaints” from Meeks regarding the
bathroom doors and his paruresis, she decided to move Meeks from
Unit 4 to Unit 15A “where he would have a private bathroom in his
cell to accommodate his paruresis.” (Docket Entry No. 185-11 at 3).
Finally, Ms. Jobe testifies that while housed in the medical unit,
Unit 15A, Meeks was allowed to continue his prison job, to have
access to the library, and to “participate in the same activities
he was allowed to participate in while housed in general population
in Unit 4.” (Id.).
In response, Plaintiff Meeks has filed six affidavits
signed by fellow inmates (Docket Entry Nos. 294, 295, 296, 297,
298, and 299). These affidavits, which are substantially identical,
9

state in contradiction to Ms. Jobe’s affidavit that inmates housed
in the medical unit, Unit 15A, were not allowed to participate in
the inmate field day program on October 12, 2011. Although these
affidavits also state generally that inmates housed in Unit 15A
were regularly excluded from other programs available to inmates in
the general population at DSNF, the affidavits fail to identify any
other specific program from which inmates housed in Unit 15A were
excluded. Significantly, Meeks makes no claim in this action that
he would have participated in the inmate field day program if
permitted to do so.
From

the

undisputed

evidence

in

this

case,

the

undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Warden Jobe ordered the
bathroom

doors

in

Unit

4

at

DSNF

removed

for

a

legitimate

penological purpose – to address the problem of inmates smoking in
these bathrooms. The undersigned further finds that after Plaintiff
Meeks complained about the removal of the bathroom doors, Warden
Jobe transferred Meeks to Unit 15A, where he would have a private
bathroom in his cell, in a good-faith attempt to accommodate
Meeks’s paruresis. Although Meeks clearly found this move to Unit
15A objectionable, he has wholly failed to identify any condition
of his confinement in Unit 15A that was materially worse than the
conditions in Unit 4. Thus, applying the “bounds of reasonableness”
standard, Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2008),
the undersigned finds that the action of TDOC in removing the
bathroom doors in Unit 4 at DSNF and thereafter transferring Meeks
10

to Unit 15A, where he had access to a private bathroom in his cell,
did not constitute a violation of the ADA or RA2, and that upon the
evidence in this record no reasonable jury could find otherwise.
Retaliation Claims Against Defendants Davis, Campbell and
Steele. In his amended complaint (Docket Entry No. 28), Meeks makes
certain supplemental claims.
He alleges that on November 3, 2011, Defendant Julia
Campbell, a unit manager at DSNF, searched Plaintiff’s cell and
seized certain legal materials allegedly belonging to Plaintiff and
to other inmates.
Meeks alleges that on June 15, 2012, Defendant Davis
conducted a search of the computer at Meeks’s assigned work station
to determine whether Meeks had been doing any type of legal work on
the state computer.
On June 20, 2012, Defendant Campbell directed Meeks to
leave the law library because he was not authorized to be there,
apparently because she was unaware that his “Release for Success”
class had been canceled that day.
On June 27, 2012, and on July 10, 2012, Defendant Davis
and others conducted a search of Meeks’s assigned work space,
including his state computer.

2

Meeks in his motion papers insists that the prison was legally
obligated to engage with him in an “informal interactive process hearing”
to collectively decide upon a suitable accommodation for Meeks’s
disability, citing 29 C.F.R § 1630.9 (Docket Entry No. 314 at 4). This
argument is misplaced, because the subject regulation is promulgated
under chapter I of the ADA governing the employment relationship. Meeks’s
ADA claim arises under chapter II governing public services.

11

Meeks in his amended complaint claims that the foregoing
incidents are “strictly the result of interference, coercion, and
retaliation in an attempt to impede Plaintiff’s right of access to
the court under the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution” (Docket Entry No. 28 at 12).
Meeks asserts that the foregoing action by Defendants
amounts to retaliation for his exercise of his constitutional
rights, here, access to the court. It is well established that
prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175
F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999).
A retaliation claim essentially entails three elements:
(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse
action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and
(3) there is a causal connection between elements 1 and 2 – that
is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the
plaintiff’s protected conduct. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394.
It is undisputed that at all times pertinent to the
present complaint Meeks was engaged in an earlier lawsuit filed
against TDOC and others based upon the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Danny Ray Meeks v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.,
No. 1:07-0013). Thus, Meeks was engaged in protected activities in
satisfaction of the first element of a retaliation claim.

12

The second element of a plaintiff’s retaliation claim is
a showing that an adverse action was taken against him. Meeks
alleges various actions taken against him in his complaint. It is
not necessarily true, however, that every action, no matter how
small, is constitutionally cognizable. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 674 (1977) (“There is, of course, a de minimis level of
imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.”). To
determine whether actions of lesser severity merit being deemed
“adverse” for purposes of a retaliation claim, the Sixth Circuit
has adopted the standard defining an adverse action as one that
would deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of the
right at stake. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396.
Here,

Meeks

alleges

that

Defendant

Davis

on

three

occasions conducted a search of the computer at Meeks’s assigned
work station, presumably to determine whether Meeks at been doing
any type of legal work on the state computer. Meeks fails to allege
that Defendant Davis found any contraband during these searches or
that these searches resulted in any adverse consequences to Meeks.
Therefore,

the

undersigned

Magistrate

Judge

finds

that

these

searches of Meeks’s assigned work station, including the state
computer located there, were de minimis, and were not sufficient to
deter a person of ordinary firmness from accessing the courts.
Indeed, there is no evidence that Meeks has been deterred in any
respect in the prosecution of his lawsuits.

13

Similarly, Defendant Campbell’s direction to Meeks on
June 20, 2012, to leave the law library because he was not
authorized to be there is likewise is a de minimis imposition which
is insufficient to implicate constitutional concerns. This is
especially true in light of the undisputed evidence from Defendant
Campbell’s affidavit, in which she testified that on June 20, 2012,
she did not believe that Meeks had permission to be in the library,
but that she found out on the following day that, in fact, Meeks
did have such permission (Docket Entry No. 285-6 at 2-3).
Meeks further complains about a search of his cell by
Defendant Campbell on November 3, 2011, which revealed that Meeks
had legal materials belonging to other inmates. This discovery
resulted in a disciplinary charge against Meeks for violating
prison policy regarding inmate legal helpers. Meeks was convicted
of

this

disciplinary

disciplinary

offense

conviction

was

on

November

affirmed

by

9,

the

2011,

and

Commissioner

his
of

Corrections on December 13, 2011 (Docket Entry No. 285-6).
The Sixth Circuit has held that an inmate does not have
an independent right to help other prisoners with their legal
claims. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395 (citing Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10
F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993)). Moreover, a jailhouse lawyer’s right
to assist another prisoner is wholly derivative of that prisoner’s
right of access to the court. Prison officials may prohibit or
limit jailhouse lawyering unless doing so interferes with an
inmate’s ability to present his grievances to a court. Id. Among
14

unauthenticated documents filed by Meeks in this record is a
memorandum dated May 22, 2011, signed by Warden Jennie L. Jobe
granting Meeks permission to assist inmate David Cosgriff with
legal work (Docket Entry No. 315 at 15). Also in the record is an
unauthenicated memorandum from Warden Jobe dated June 7, 2011,
which states in part that such legal assistance is limited to one
inmate at a time, and that additional approval must be obtained
before working with additional inmates (Docket Entry No. 315 at
16). Thus, although unauthenicated documents in the record suggest
that Meeks had earlier been approved to serve as inmate legal
helper to a single inmate, the record indicates that on November 3,
2011, Meeks was not an approved legal helper and was not permitted
by prison policies to possess legal documents of multiple other
inmates (Docket Entry No. 285-6 at 2).
If a prisoner violates a legitimate prison regulation, he
is not engaged in “protected conduct” and cannot proceed beyond the
first element of a retaliation claim. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395.
For these reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds as a
matter of law that the search of Meeks’s cell on November 3, 3011,
and the resulting disciplinary charge of which he was convicted,
cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim.
Warden Jewel Steele. In his amended complaint, Meeks
alleges that Defendant Steele was the warden at DSNF and that she
“has listened to Defendant/FSO/ADA Officer Mr. Mike Christensen, as
evidenced by her actions toward the Plaintiff and her written
15

responses and refusal to respond to the Plaintiff’s request for a
reasonable accommodation interactive process hearing.” (Docket
Entry No. 28 at 22). Defendant Steele has filed her affidavit in
which she testifies that she was appointed to the position of
warden at DSNF on September 1, 2011 (Docket Entry No. 285-7). She
further testifies that after becoming warden she learned that the
previous warden, Jennie Jobe, had ordered bathroom doors removed
from Units 3 and 4 to prevent the use of contraband in those units.
Defendant Steele testified that she ordered the bathroom doors
replaced on the bathrooms in Units 3 and 4. She further testified
that she had no personal involvement in the allegations contained
in the Meeks complaint beyond responding to Meeks’s appeal of his
grievances

regarding

removal

of

the

bathroom

doors

and

his

disciplinary convictions, which came to her in her administrative
capacity as a warden (Docket Entry No. 285-7 at 2).
A plaintiff pursuing a section 1983 claim must establish
that

a

defendant

was

personally

involved

in

the

alleged

unconstitutional activities set out in the complaint. Bellamy v.
Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Liability under section
1983 must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior and cannot
be premised upon a mere failure to act. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199
F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). In order to impose liability under
section 1983, a plaintiff must show that each government official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, engaged

16

in active unconstitutional behavior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677 (2009).
Considering the foregoing undisputed evidence, and the
above legal standards, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material
fact

supporting

the

liability

of

Defendant

Steele,

and

that

Defendant Steele, therefore, is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
In summary, for the reasons stated above, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgement as a
matter of law. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
should be GRANTED, and the complaint, as amended, DISMISSED.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be
GRANTED and the complaint DISMISSED with prejudice.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any

party

has

14

days

from

receipt

of

this

Report

and

Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said
objections shall have 14 days from receipt of any objections filed
in this Report in which to file any responses to said objections.
Failure to file specific objections within 14 days of receipt of
this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further
17

appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 106 S.
Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), Reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
ENTER this 6th day of March, 2014.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge

18