Meeks v. Schofield et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 5/29/2012. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(hb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DANNY RAY MEEKS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
DERRICK D. SCHOFIELD et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:12-mc-00035
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Danny Ray Meeks, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Lois M. DeBerry Special Needs Facility
in Nashville, Tennessee, has filed a pro se complaint asserting violations of his rights under various federal
laws. Because the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis and because he seeks redress from a government
entity and government officers and employees, the complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).
Upon conducting this review, the court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, if it is
determined to be frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The court must
construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, Boag v. McDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982), and accept the
plaintiff's allegations as true unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
I.

Factual Allegations in the Complaint
The plaintiff in this case names as defendants Derrick Schofield, Commissioner of the Tennessee

Department of Corrections (“TDOC”); Mike Christensen, FS/ADA Officer; Chris Aibangbee,1 Unit Manger; and
Dennis Davis, Grievance Board Corporal. The complaint states explicitly that each of these defendants is sued
in his individual capacity only. TDOC is also named as a defendant, as the agency that may be liable under
the RA and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

1

The exhibits filed with the plaintiff’s complaint indicate that the correct spelling of this defendant’s
name is “Abingambe.” (See ECF 1-1, at 2.)

Broadly construed, the complaint contains allegations that the plaintiff engaged in activity protected
by the First Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by pursuing a lawsuit in federal court
to vindicate rights under the ADA, and successfully seeking discovery in that case. He claims that defendant
Mike Christensen was upset with the plaintiff for being required to produce discovery in the plaintiff’s federal
lawsuit, and retaliated against the plaintiff for his having engaged in that protected activity by taking the
bathroom doors off all the bathrooms in the plaintiff’s housing unit, knowing that the plaintiff suffers from
paruresis, a mental anxiety disorder which makes the sufferer unable to urinate in the presence of others, such
as in a public restroom. The plaintiff alleges that the other defendants were aware of this action and failed to
take any action to stop it, but he does not allege that they personally had any involvement in the retaliatory
action.
The plaintiff also alleges that the action of removing the bathroom doors in his unit violated his right
of access under the ADA, and that the defendants failed to make a reasonable accommodation for his disability
(paruresis) and failed to engage in the statutory interactive process for determining a reasonable
accommodation. Instead, the plaintiff was eventually transferred to a medical unit at the prison facility as an
“accommodation,” even though he did not have a medical problem. Being housed in the medical unit means,
however, that the plaintiff is ineligible to participate in activities open to the general prison population, including
such activities as the Inmate Field Day event and “incentive meals.” (ECF No. 1, at 13.) As a result of being
housed in the medical unit, the plaintiff is also disqualified for placement in the Honor Unit, and ineligible to be
classified to a lower security/custody level or to be considered for a job as a Trusty worker outside the
compound.
Finally, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Dennis Davis revealed confidential medical information
regarding his paruresis to all the inmates in his housing unit during a grievance meeting concerning the removal
of the bathroom doors, without the plaintiff’s permission or consent.
The plaintiff asserts that he has filed numerous grievances and appeals of his grievances related to
all these actions, to no avail. The plaintiff seeks to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He requests declaratory and injunctive relief
as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

-2-

B.

Analysis and Discussion
Having carefully reviewed the plaintiff’s complaint, the court finds that the complaint states a

cognizable claim under § 1983 against defendant Mike Christensen for retaliation based on the plaintiff’s having
engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. The plaintiff alleges (1) protected activity—pursuit of
a lawsuit and discovery in federal court; (2) an adverse action by the defendant—the decision to remove the
bathroom doors with the knowledge that this would cause a hardship for the plaintiff because of his paruresis;
and (3) that the action was taken at least in part because of the plaintiff’s having engaged in the protected
activity. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007) (“To state a claim alleging retaliation for
exercising a constitutional right, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) that
defendant took an adverse action against him . . . ; and (3) that the adverse action was taken (at least in part)
because of the protected conduct.” (citing Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
The allegations in the complaint, however, do not suggest that the other individual defendants actively engaged
in the unconstitutional behavior in such a way that would give rise to individual liability on their part for that
action. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300) (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that knowledge of allegedly
unconstitutional behavior but failure to act did not constitute the active unconstitutional behavior required to
support a claim under § 1983). TDOC cannot be liable to the plaintiff on this claim, because neither the state
nor a state agency is a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989).
The court finds that the complaint also states a potentially viable claim against defendant Dennis Davis
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the plaintiff’s right to privacy, as a result of Dennis’s alleged disclosure
of the plaintiff’s private medical information to other inmates . The Sixth Circuit has held that, while prisoners

do not have a constitutional privacy right protecting against the disclosure of private medical information to
corrections officials, Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994), prisoners do have a Fourteenth
Amendment privacy interest in having sensitive medical information kept confidential from other inmates.
Moore v. Prevo, 379 F. App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that prison officials who disclosed an inmate’s HIV status to officers, guards, and inmates had violated
the inmate’s constitutionally protected right to privacy)). In both Moore and Delie, the private medical

-3-

information at issue was the plaintiff’s HIV status, but the cases did not draw a distinction among different
degrees of the sensitivity of medical information.
The plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim under Title VII, because he has not
alleged discrimination arising in the context of employment.
The primary focus of the plaintiff’s complaint is the removal of the bathroom doors. In that regard, the
court finds that the complaint can be read generously to allege the violation of his rights under the ADA and
the RA resulting from the prison’s failure to provide him a reasonable accommodation for his paruresis after
removal of the doors of the bathrooms in his housing unit. The plaintiff, however, cannot pursue these claims
against the individual defendants.
Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against disabled individuals and states
that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The term “public entity” is defined, in relevant part, as
“any State or local government” and as “any department, agency . . . or other instrumentality of a State or
States or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A) & (B). Thus, “[u]nder Title II of the ADA, which forbids
discrimination by ‘any public entity’, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, the proper defendant is that ‘entity.’” Williams v.
McLemore, 247 F. App’x 1, 6 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000)).
The ADA does not authorize suit against public employees or supervisors in their individual capacities. See
Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 808 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999). Consequently, the ADA and RA
claims against the individual defendants, who are all expressly named only in their individual capacity, are
subject to dismissal.
However, the plaintiff also names TDOC as a defendant, which is a public entity subject to suit under
both the RA and the ADA. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) (“The [ADA] defines
‘public entity’ to include ‘any State or local government’ and ‘any department, agency, . . . or other
instrumentality of a State,’ § 12131(1). . . . [T]his term includes state prisons.” (citing Penn. Dep’t of Corrs.
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)); Thompson v. Williamson Co., 219 F.3d 555, 557, n.3 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“Because the ADA sets forth the same remedies, procedures, and rights as the Rehabilitation Act . . . claims

-4-

brought under both statutes may be analyzed together.”). States waive sovereign immunity against the RA
when they accept federal funds, Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 2002), and the court
will presume, at this stage in the proceedings, that the state receives federal funds for the operation of state
prisons, including the DeBerry Special Needs Facility where the plaintiff is housed. Further, it is clear that
claims under the Title II of the ADA for injunctive relief may proceed against the state agency. See United
States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 160 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that “the state defendants have
correctly chosen not to challenge the Eleventh Circuit's holding that Title II [of the ADA] is constitutional insofar
as it authorizes prospective injunctive relief against the State”).2 To the extent that the plaintiff alleges that
the conduct that violated the ADA also violated his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has held that the
ADA validly authorizes claims for monetary damages against a state. See id. at 159 (“[I]nsofar as Title II [of
the ADA] creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates
the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.”). While it is doubtful in the
present case that the actions that allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights under the ADA also violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the court nonetheless finds, for purposes of the initial review, that the plaintiff’s
claims against TDOC under the RA and Title II of the ADA, for both injunctive relief and monetary damages,
should be allowed to proceed. Neither the RA nor the Title II of the ADA, however, authorizes punitive
damages. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002). The claim against TDOC for punitive damages is
therefore subject to dismissal.
C.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the § 1983 claims against defendants Mike Christensen and Dennis

Davis in their individual capacities, for compensatory and punitive damage and injunctive relief, will be allowed
to proceed, as will the claims for injunctive relief and compensatory damages against TDOC under the RA and
the ADA. The plaintiff is cautioned that this is a preliminary finding only, and that the court makes no findings
with respect to the merits of any of the plaintiff’s claims.

2

The Supreme Court’s statement in this regard, which may be considered dicta and appears in a
concurring opinion but is nonetheless quite clear, is directly at odds with the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Carten
v. Kent State, 282 F.3d at 397–98, that the Eleventh Amendment bars Title II ADA claims for prospective
injunctive relief against a state.

-5-

All other claims in the complaint are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, including the First
Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Derrick Schofield, Chris Aibangbee/Abingambe, Dennis
Davis and TDOC; any claim under Title VII; the ADA/RA claims against the individual defendants; and the
punitive damages claims against TDOC.
An appropriate order will enter.

Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge

-6-