Odom v. Chute et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the reasons stated herein, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, this case is hereby REMANDED to the General Sessions Court for Montgomery County Tennessee. The Chutes' Motion for Te mporary Restraining Order 3 , Motion to Dismiss Restraining Order 10 , Motion to Dismiss False Statements Made in Affidavit of Jereme Odom 11 , Motion to Give an Assertion of Status on the Requested Plea 13 , and Motion to Accept Exhibits/Evidence Manually 14 are hereby DENIED AS MOOT. It is so ORDERED. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 6/11/12. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail; certified copy to General Sessions Court for Montgomery County)(tmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JEREME ODOM,

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Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID EDWARD CHUTE and
KATHLEEN PATRICIA CHUTE,
Defendants,

Case No. 3:12-CV-0586
Judge Aleta A. Trauger

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On June 7, 2012, David Edward Chute and Kathleen Patricia Chute (“Chutes”) filed a
Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1), which purports to remove an action pending in the General
Sessions Court for Montgomery County, Tennessee. The Chutes have also filed a Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (Docket No. 3), a Motion to Dismiss Restraining Order (Docket
No. 10), a Motion to Dismiss False Statements Made in Affidavit of Jereme Odom (Docket No.
11), a Motion to Give an Assertion of Status on the Requested Plea (Docket No. 13), and a
Motion to Accept Exhibits/Evidence Manually (Docket No. 14).
BACKGROUND
On June 4, 2012, Jereme Odom, an officer with the Tennessee Wildlife Resources
Agency, filed an action in the General Sessions Court for Montgomery County, Tennessee,
against the Chutes, alleging claims for harassment, slander, libel, and interference with official
duties of an officer, along with an application for a restraining order. In support of his request
for a restraining order, Odom submitted an affidavit explaining that the Chutes had stalked him
and harassed him in the exercise of his professional duties. That day, the General Sessions Court
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issued the requested restraining orders (“Restraining Orders”) against the Chutes, essentially
ordering the Chutes to refrain from going near Odom.
After the General Sessions Court issued the Restraining Orders, the Chutes filed a Notice
of Removal, which asserted that this court has original jurisdiction over the case, including a
federal counterclaim. (See Docket No. 1.) On June 8, 2012, this court issued an Order that, in
relevant part, expressed serious doubt that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the Chutes’
claim. The court noted that the lower court action concerned only state law claims and that the
parties were all residents of Tennessee, thereby defeating diversity. (Docket No. 6.) The court
also noted that, to the extent the plaintiffs sought review of the Restraining Orders, the BookerFeldman doctrine appeared to bar the claims. (Id.)
The Chutes filed affidavits (Docket Nos. 4-5) that purport to articulate claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The court then issued a separate order that required the Chutes to file a
Complaint or to file a notice stating that they wished to remove the General Sessions case to this
court. (Docket No. 7.) In response, the Chutes filed a “Counterclaim Complaint” against Odom,
several other named individuals, “John Doe” Montgomery County Emergency Services
Personnel, the County of Montgomery, and the State of Tennessee as Counterdefendants (Docket
No. 9). The Chutes also filed a Motion to Dismiss Restraining Order, which asserts that the
General Sessions Judge violated the plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights by issuing the
Restraining Orders (Docket No. 10), and a Motion to Dismiss False Statements Made in
Affidavit of Jereme Odom, which argues that the Affidavit of Jereme Odom filed in the General
Sessions Court case contained false statements (Docket No. 11).
ANALYSIS

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When it appears that the court may not have jurisdiction over the claims presented, the
court may consider the issue sua sponte. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S.
124, 132 n.1, 116 S. Ct. 494, 133 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1995) (“[E]very federal court, whether trial or
appellate, is obliged to notice want of subject matter jurisdiction on its own Motion.”) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring); Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l., Ltd., 556 F.3d 459,
465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in
regard to every case and may raise the issue sua sponte.”)
The parties to this case are all Tennessee residents. Therefore, the parties are not diverse
and the court only has jurisdiction if it would have had “original jurisdiction” over a claim. See
Collins v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich, 103 F.3d 35, 36 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a)). “District courts have original federal question jurisdiction of cases ‘arising under the
Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). A case arises
under federal law when an issue of federal law appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.
Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L. Ed. 2d
318 (1987)). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a case does not arise under federal law if
the federal issue initially appears as a defense. Id. at 37-38 (citing Franchise Tax Bd v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2845, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1983) and
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840-41, 109 S. Ct. 1519, 1520-21, 103 L. Ed. 2d
924 (1989)).
The plaintiff in this case, Odom, asserted only state law claims in the General Sessions
Court proceeding. Therefore, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the case does not arise
under federal law. Because the case as removed does not present a federal question, the Chutes’

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assertion of a federal counterclaim under § 1983, made for the first time in this court after
removal of the state court action, does not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court proceedings or to adjudicate claims
‘inextricably intertwined’ with issues decided in state court proceedings.” Peterson Novelties,
Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals. v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies
to interlocutory, as well as final, state court decisions. Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336
F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, as stated in the Notice of Removal, the Chutes ask the court
to review the merits of the General Session Judge’s decision to grant Odom’s request for
Restraining Orders against them. In that respect, this case falls squarely within the types of state
court decisions over which this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
Accordingly, this case is hereby REMANDED to the General Sessions Court for Montgomery
County Tennessee. The Chutes’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Docket No. 3),
Motion to Dismiss Restraining Order (Docket No. 10), Motion to Dismiss False Statements
Made in Affidavit of Jereme Odom (Docket No. 11), Motion to Give an Assertion of Status on
the Requested Plea (Docket No. 13), and Motion to Accept Exhibits/Evidence Manually (Docket
No. 14) are hereby DENIED AS MOOT.
It is so ORDERED.

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Enter this 11th day of June, 2012.
_____________________________
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge

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