Marlow v. The Tennessee Supreme Court et al

Filing 61

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, and construing Marlow's complaint liberally, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that this is not an appropriate case for Rule 11 sanctions and DENIES NCBE's motion 36 . It is so ORDERED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 9/24/13. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(tmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ROBERT BENTLEY MARLOW,
Plaintiff
v.
THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT,
et al.,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 3:12-0646
Judge Sharp/Bryant
Jury Demand

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant National Conference of Bar Examiners (“NCBE”)
has filed its motion seeking sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Docket Entry No. 36). As grounds, NCBE
argues that Plaintiff Robert Bentley Marlow’s (“Marlow”) claims
against NCBE are “without legal or factual basis and constitute[]
abuse of the federal courts.” Marlow has filed a response in
opposition (Docket Entry No. 43).
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge DENIES NCBE’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Marlow, who is proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, has filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that the Defendants, acting under color of state law, have
violated his constitutional rights by wrongfully denying him a
license to practice law after he successfully passed the Tennessee
bar examination.
ANALYSIS
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party filing a pleading with the court thereby certifies

that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
the pleading is not being filed for any improper purpose, the claim
and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing the
existing law, and that the factual contentions have evidentiary
support. The rule further provides for the imposition of sanctions
if the Court determines that the rule has been violated. This rule
by its terms applies both to attorneys and to parties.
NCBE argues in support of its motion for sanctions that
it is not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983, that Marlow’s
complaint fails to identify any constitutional right that NCBE
allegedly

violated,

and

that

Marlow

at

the

time

of

his

bar

application signed an authorization and release form in favor of
NCBE.
NCBE acknowledges that although Rule 11 does apply to pro
se plaintiffs, the Court nevertheless must read pro se complaints
liberally

and

not

hold

them

to

the

same

standards

as

those

applicable to pleadings filed by attorneys. Harris v. Heinrich, 919
F.2d 1515, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990). Moreover, courts have held that
private parties performing functions traditionally performed by a
state may be held to be “state actors” for purposes of section
1983. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (holding that a physician
providing medical treatment to state prison inmates pursuant to
contract is performing a function typically performed by the state
and is acting under color of state law for purposes of section
1983); Flint ex rel. Flint v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections, 270
2

F.3d 340, 351-52 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a defendant serving
as an inmate rehabilitation supervisor under contract with the
state was performing a traditional state function and therefore was
a state actor under section 1983).
Here,

the

complaint

alleges

that

NCBE

collected

information regarding Marlow’s moving violations and arrest record
for and at the request of the Tennessee Board of Law Examiners and
the Tennessee Supreme Court to be used in determining Marlow’s
fitness to hold a law license in Tennessee. While it is unnecessary
to decide whether this activity is sufficient to deem NCBE a state
actor for purposes of section 1983, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge finds that it is clearly enough to render such claims by a
pro se litigant nonfrivolous.
Moreover, the undersigned observes that the Court has
earlier in this proceeding considered the frivolity of Marlow’s
claims,

as

it

is

required

to

do

for

all

in

forma

pauperis

litigants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Although the Court did
at that time dismiss certain of Marlow’s claims for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the Court
permitted Marlow’s claims against NCBE to survive (Docket Entry No.
8).
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

and

construing

Marlow’s

complaint liberally, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that
this is not an appropriate case for Rule 11 sanctions and DENIES
NCBE’s motion(Docket Entry No. 36).
It is so ORDERED.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge

3