Martin-Dobson v. Hall et al

Filing 69

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: Based on the foregoing, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment 56 filed by Defendant Michael Graulau be GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin on 5/21/14. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(tmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

MARK BRYAN MARTIN-DOBSON
v.

DARON HALL, et al.

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NO. 3:12-1146

TO: Honorable Kevin H. Sharp, District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMENDATION
By Order entered November 26, 2012 (Docket Entry No. 4), this action was referred to the
Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), for management of the case, for
decisions on all pre-trial, non-dispositive motions, to issue a Report and Recommendation on all
dispositive motions, and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.
Presently pending is Defendant Michael Graulau’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
Entry No. 56), to which Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition. See Docket Entry No. 64. For
the reasons set out below, the Court recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted
and this action be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Davidson County, Tennessee, Sheriff’s Office
(“DCSO”), filed this action pro se and in forma pauperis on November 5, 2012, seeking damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that his constitutional right to personal safety was violated
during his confinement at the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center (“CJC”). Named as
defendants are Davidson County Sheriff Daron Hall and CJC employees Beth Gentry, Michael
Graulau, and Frank Sykes.
By Order entered September 25, 2013 (Docket Entry No. 37), the Court dismissed all claims
against Defendants Hall, Gentry, and Sykes upon their motions to dismiss (Docket Entry Nos. 14 and
24), leaving only Defendant Graulau as a defendant in the action. Pursuant to a scheduling order
(Docket Entry No. 44), a period of pretrial activity was provided.
Plaintiff alleges that, on September 18, 2012, he was handcuffed by Defendant Graulau after
an altercation among inmates occurred at the CJC. He alleges that Graulau then left him in Housing
Unit 5C while still handcuffed and that he was assaulted and injured by another inmate while
handcuffed. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Graulau should have escorted him to a safer area
instead of leaving him unprotected. See Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1) and Amended Complaint
(Docket Entry No. 20).
Defendant Graulau seeks summary judgment on the claim brought against him. He asserts
that Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust his available administrative remedies within the DCSO prior to
bringing this action and his claim is, therefore, barred pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“PLRA”). In addition, Defendant Graulau argues that the undisputed evidence
warrants summary judgment in his favor because Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant Graulau
knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm during the September 18, 2012, incident and yet
disregarded that risk. Finally, Defendant Graulau contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity
for the good faith actions he took during the inmate disturbance on September 18, 2012. In support
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of his motion, Defendant Graulau relies on his own Declaration (Docket Entry No. 60), the
Declaration of DCSO Records Manager Tom Davis (Docket Entry No. 59), and excerpts from
Plaintiff’s deposition (Docket Entry No. 56-1).
Plaintiff has responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment by filing a response to
Defendant Graulau’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. See Docket Entry No. 64. Plaintiff has not
submitted any evidence in support of his claim or filed any other type of response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment.1

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment is reviewed under the standard that summary judgment is
appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). A “genuine issue of material fact” is a fact which, if proven at trial, could lead a reasonable
jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering whether summary judgment is
appropriate, the Court must “look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether
there is a genuine need for trial.” Sowards v. Loudon Cnty., 203 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 875, 121 S.Ct. 179, 148 L.Ed.2d 123 (2000). In reviewing a motion for summary
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By Order entered March 25, 2014, the Court set a deadline of May 9, 2014, for Plaintiff to
file a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed his response
to the Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. By Order entered April 15, 2014, the Court
advised Plaintiff that any additional response to the Motion for Summary Judgment shall be filed by
the May 9, 2014, deadline.
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judgment, the Court must view the evidence and all inferences drawn from underlying facts “in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Gribcheck v. Runyon,
245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 896, 122 S.Ct. 217, 151 L.Ed.2d 155 (2001).
The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine factual disputes from
which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, at 249-50.
However, “[t]he moving party need not support its motion with evidence disproving the non-moving
party’s claim, but need only show that ‘there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case.’” Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325).
“Once the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party is not entitled to trial merely on the basis of allegations; significant
probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint.” Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559,
561 (6th Cir. 1991). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not rely solely on
the pleadings but must present evidence supporting the claims asserted by the party. Banks v. Wolfe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003). Moreover, conclusory allegations,
speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not evidence, and are not sufficient to defeat a
well-supported motion for summary judgment. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,
888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). In other words, to defeat summary judgment, the
party opposing the motion must present affirmative evidence to support his or her position; a mere
“scintilla of evidence” is insufficient. Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
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III. CONCLUSIONS
The Court finds that summary judgment should be granted to Defendant Graulau because
Plaintiff’s claim has not been properly exhausted. The PLRA states that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This statute requires a prisoner plaintiff to exhaust all available administrative
remedies before filing a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the district court. Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 528, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733, 121
S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1998).
Once the defense of failure to exhaust is raised, a prisoner plaintiff must set forth evidence
to show that he has complied with the requirements of exhaustion. See Napier v. Laurel Cnty., Ky.,
636 F.3d 218 (6th Cir. 2011). To establish that he has exhausted his administrative remedies,
Plaintiff must show that he presented his grievance(s) “through one complete round” of the
established grievance process. Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 733 (6th Cir. 2003), abrogated
on other grounds, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). It is
further well-settled that there is no futility exception to the exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S.
at 741 n.6; Napier, 636 F.3d at 222.
It is undisputed that a grievance system is available to inmates within the custody of the
DCSO and that an inmate who is not satisfied with the decision on his grievance may file an appeal.
See Declaration of Tom Davis (Docket Entry No. 59). It is further undisputed that Plaintiff filed an
administrative grievance on October 18, 2012, about the incident in question, that his grievance was

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found to be unsustained on October 30, 2012, and that Plaintiff did not file an appeal of the denial
of his grievance. Id.; Docket Entry No. 59-1.
Plaintiff has not set forth any basis excusing his failure to file an administrative appeal of his
unsustained grievance and thus complete the grievance process available to him at the DCSO. It is
Plaintiff’s burden to rebut the Defendant’s assertion that he failed to exhaust. See Napier, supra.
Although Plaintiff makes statements in his response to Defendant Graulau’s Statement of
Undisputed Facts that his grievances about the matter were “either lost or disregarded,” that the
grievance system is “terrible,” and that his “appeal [was] never answered,” see Docket Entry No. 64,
at 3, his response is not supported by any actual admissible evidence such as an affidavit and, thus,
his statements fail to support his opposition to the exhaustion argument made by Defendant Graulau.
Furthermore, in his deposition, Plaintiff stated only that he did not remember whether he filed an
appeal of his denied grievance. See Docket Entry No. 56-1, at 15. His statements simply fail to
satisfy this burden, especially in light of Defendant Graulau’s affirmative evidence.
Because the Court finds that the failure to exhaust argument raised by Defendant Graulau
requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim, it is not necessary to address the alternative arguments for
summary judgment raised by Defendant Graulau.

RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 56) filed by Defendant Michael Graulau be GRANTED and
this action be DISMISSED.

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ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
Court within fourteen (14) days of service of the Report and Recommendation upon the party and
must state with particularity the specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which
objection is made. Failure to file written objections within the specified time can be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal the District Court's Order regarding the Report and Recommendation.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); United States v. Walters,
638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,

JULIET GRIFFIN
United States Magistrate Judge

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