Jones v. Raye et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 11/27/12. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)[Transferred from Tennessee Middle on 11/28/2012.]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

TOMMY EARL JONES
Plaintiff,

]
]
]
]
]
]
]

v.
GAYLE RAYE, et al.
Defendants.

No.
(No. 3:12-mc-0073)
Judge Sharp

M E M O R A N D U M
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is an inmate at the West
Tennessee State Prison in Henning, Tennessee. He brings this action
pursuant

to

42

U.S.C.

§

1983

against

Gayle

Raye,

former

Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction; Ricky Bell,
former Warden of the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution; and
six past and present members of the Riverbend staff; seeking
declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief.
On December 22, 2009, the plaintiff and a fellow inmate at the
Dickson County Jail attempted an escape. During the escape, the
pair threw bleach into the eyes of two corrections officers,
threatened an officer with a broken broom handle, and threw a fire
extinguisher through a window.
Upon

their

recapture,

the

pair

was

transferred

to

the

Riverbend Maximum Security Institution where they were placed in
administrative segregation. The plaintiff’s co-escapee was released

from

administrative

segregation

in

September,

2010

and

was

transferred to the West Tennessee State Prison. The plaintiff,
however, remained in administrative segregation until June 9, 2012.
The plaintiff believes that he was kept in segregation in
violation of his right to due process. He also asserts an equal
protection claim based upon the early release and transfer of his
co-escapee.
To state a claim for § 1983 relief, the plaintiff must plead
and prove that the defendants, while acting under color of state
law, deprived him of some right or privilege guaranteed by the
Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, (1981).
The plaintiff believes that he was kept in segregation in
violation of his right to due process. For several years, it was
well settled that an inmate facing the possibility of disciplinary
sanctions was entitled to a certain degree of procedural due
process. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). This process
included advance written notice of the charge, a hearing to resolve
the

charge

during

which

the

accused

may

present

documentary

evidence and call witnesses, and a written statement from the factfinder describing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
disciplinary action taken.
The Supreme Court, however, has changed the methodology used
to determine whether an inmate has a liberty interest worthy of due
process protection. See, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995).

Federal courts are no longer required to examine the language of
prison regulations to ascertain whether substantive restrictions
have been placed upon the discretion of prison officials. Rather,
our inquiry now focuses on whether the imposition of a particular
disciplinary sanction " presents the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty
interest." Sandin, supra at 115 S.Ct. 2301.
The Sandin opinion reaffirmed that when a prison disciplinary
sanction directly affects the length of a prisoner's incarceration,
the prisoner has an inherent liberty interest subject to the
procedural safeguards announced in Wolff, supra. However, when the
disciplinary sanction contemplated would not

"impose atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life," the procedural due process described in
Wolff does not apply. Sandin, supra at 115 S.Ct. 2300.
There

is

nothing

in

the

complaint

to

suggest

that

the

plaintiff was made to suffer an atypical and significant hardship
sufficient to create a liberty interest subject to constitutional
protection. See Sandin, supra (finding that thirty days in punitive
segregation was neither atypical nor a significant hardship). The
plaintiff does not allege that his length of incarceration was
increased

in

any

way

as

a

consequence

of

being

placed

in

segregation. Moreover, attachments to the complaint show that he
was accorded a monthly review to determine whether his continued
segregation was warranted. Thus, the plaintiff's confinement in

segregation did not offend his right to due process.
To the extent that the plaintiff asserts an equal protection
claim based upon his co-escapee being released from segregation
before he was, such a claim is untimely. Merriweather v. City of
Memphis,

107

F.3d

396,

398

(6th

Cir.1997)(§

1983

claims

in

Tennessee are subject to a one year statute of limitation).
In the absence of conduct in violation of federal law, the
plaintiff is unable to prove every element of his cause of action.
Thus, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Under such circumstances, a district court is obliged to
dismiss

the

complaint

sua

sponte.

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2).

Therefore, this action shall be dismissed.
An appropriate order will be entered.

____________________________
Kevin H. Sharp
United States District Judge