Minor v. Davidson County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 1/15/2013`. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER S. MINOR
Plaintiff,

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v.
DAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, et al.
Defendants.

No. 3:13-0024
Judge Campbell

M E M O R A N D U M
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is an inmate at the Davidson
County Criminal Justice Center in Nashville. He brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Davidson County Sheriff’s
Office, Daron Hall, Sheriff of Davidson County, and the Criminal
Justice Center, seeking damages.
According to the complaint, the plaintiff and another inmate
have been held in a segregated cell for twenty one days without
drinking water. The plaintiff alleges that this constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.
To establish a claim for § 1983 relief, the plaintiff must
plead and prove that a person or persons, while acting under color
of

state

law,

deprived

him

of

some

right

guaranteed

by

the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
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The plaintiff does not allege that Sheriff Hall was in any way
directly involved in his assignment to a cell without drinking
water. Therefore, it appears that the plaintiff is suing Sheriff
Hall because his Office operates the Davidson County Criminal
Justice Center. The plaintiff, however, can not sue Sheriff Hall
solely because of his role as a chief executive officer. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 will not support a claim posed on a respondeat superior
theory of liability. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325
(1981). Where there is no allegation of participation, either
directly or indirectly, by a supervisory official in an allegedly
wrongful act, the complaint fails to state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted. See Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121,
128 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983).
In this case, there has been no showing that Sheriff Hall was
involved

in,

or

was

even

aware

of,

the

plaintiff’s

housing

situation. Personal liability “must be based on the actions of that
defendant in the situation that the defendant faced, and not based
on

any

problems

caused

by

the

errors

of

others.”

Gibson

v.

Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir.1991). Consequently, the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Sheriff Hall for
which relief can be granted.
A county jail or workhouse is not a person that can be sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rhodes v.McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th
Cir. 1991). Nor is a county sheriff’s office a person subject to §

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1983 liability. Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 478 F.3d 341,
347 (6th Cir. 2007). Of course, giving this pro se pleading a
liberal construction, the Court could construe the complaint as an
attempt to state a claim against Davidson County, the entity
responsible for the operation of the Criminal Justice Center.
However, for Davidson County to be liable, the plaintiff would have
to allege and prove that his constitutional rights were violated
pursuant to a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision
officially adopted and promulgated” by the county. Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 689-690 (1978). No
such allegation appears in the complaint. Therefore, the plaintiff
has also failed to state a claim against the Davidson County
Sheriff’s Office and the Criminal Justice Center upon which relief
can be granted.
In the absence of a colorable claim, the Court is obliged to
dismiss the complaint sua sponte. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
An appropriate order will be entered.

______________________________
Todd Campbell
United States District Judge

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