Shabazz v. Schofield et al

Filing 379

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The undersigned recommends that the claims against the NECX Defendants should be transferred to the Northeastern Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee, and the claims against the MCCX Defendants should be transfe rred to the Northern Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee. Nothing herein shall be construed as stating any opinion as to whether any particular Defendant has been properly served. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Clifton Knowles on 10/10/2014. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

OMOWALE ASHANTI SHABAZZ,
Plaintiff,

vs.

DERRICK SCHOFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:13-0091
JUDGE SHARP/KNOWLES
JURY DEMAND

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court held a Case Management Conference in this action on October 8, 2014.
Counsel for the State Defendants who have been served, counsel for Corizon, Inc., and Mr.
Shabazz were present. Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, filed his original Complaint against 36
Defendants. Docket No. 1. The Court undertook a frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A and determined that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted as to 7 Defendants, and they were dismissed. Docket No. 7.
Plaintiff was permitted to amend his Complaint on two occasions. Docket Nos. 15, 323.
His latest Complaint, filed with leave of Court, is headed “Amended and Supplemental Verified
Complaint.” Docket No. 323. In that 218 page Complaint, Plaintiff has sued 39 Defendants in
three different prisons, as well as administrators of the Tennessee Department of Correction and
two corporate contract healthcare providers.
As of the date of the submission of this Report and Recommendation, there are 378
docket entries in this action. In the opinion of the undersigned, the case as it exists at the present

time is essentially unmanageable.
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Misjoinder parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On
motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add
or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
party.
(Emphasis added.)
As one noted authority has stated,
The courts have properly concluded that they may issue orders
under Rule 21 . . . to structure a case for the efficient
administration of justice. . . . .
...
In appropriate instances, the court may sever a claim to facilitate
its transfer to another venue . . . .
Moore’s Federal Practice 3d § 21.02[1], p. 21-3 to 21-4 (footnote and citations omitted).
Moore’s further states, “The Rule vests great discretion in the court in determining
whether to . . . order severance.” Id., § 21.02[4], p. 21-11 (footnote omitted). Moore’s also
states that courts “should not hesitate to severe claims based on different factual situations from
that of the main action.” Id., § 21.02[4], p. 21-15. Finally, “Rule 21 gives the court tools to
jettison both parties and claims that are . . . not conveniently prosecuted together . . . .” Id., §
21.05, p. 21-24.
The Court has reviewed the operative Complaint in this action (Docket No. 323), as well
as the prior Complaints. It seems clear that Plaintiff’s claims are brought against essentially five
groups of Defendants. The first group of Defendants is administrative employees of the
Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Those Defendants are: Derrick Schofield,
Catherine Posey, Jim Thrasher, Reuben Hodge, Donna Kay White, and Lester Lewis.
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The second group of Defendants is employed at or related to Morgan County
Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), where Plaintiff was previously housed, and where some of
his claims arise. Those Defendants are: David R. Osborne, Ronald Higgs, Dale Hadden, Tony
Howerton, and Dan Walker.
A third group of Defendants is employed at or related to Turney Center Correctional
Complex (“TCIX”), where Plaintiff was previously housed, and where some of his claims arise.
Those Defendants are: Jerry Lester, Ricky Mathis, David Jenkins, Laura N. Pierceal, and Rita
Edwards.
The fourth group of Defendants is employed at or related to North East Correctional
Complex (“NECX”), where Plaintiff was previously housed, and where some of his claims arise.
Those Defendants are: David Sexton, Todd Wiggins, Sherry Freeman, Harold Angel, Clifford
Tressler, Chris A. Davis, James Lundy, Misty Gregg, Charles Short, Wanda Chaffin, Angela
Combs, Sue Clark, Georgia Crowle, Julie Holtkamp, Sharon Taylor, Jerry Gentry, Dr. Clement
Bernard, Connie Church, Ruby Anderson, Paige Reburn, Rebecca Gouge, and Correctional
Medical Services.
The fifth group of Defendants, Corizon, Inc., and Correctional Medical Services, are sued
as healthcare providers under contract with TDOC to provide services at MCCX, as well as at
other TDOC facilities (¶ 17, 18). Plaintiff’s claims against these two Defendants may relate to
his care at all three facilities involved in this action.
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that this action be severed
into four separate actions as described above, with Defendants Corizon, Inc. and Correctional
Medical Services being placed in the action with the administrative employees of TDOC.

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Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claims against the MCCX Defendants, the TCIX Defendants, and
the NECX Defendants generally arise out of incidents that took place at those institutions.
Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1391(b) authorizes the commencement of a civil action only in a
judicial district:
(1) Where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State,
(2) A judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . , or
(3) A judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if
there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
Plaintiff’s claims against the NECX and MCCX Defendants have little or no connection
with the Middle District of Tennessee. Those respective Defendants are employed by or related
to these two institutions, both of which are located in the Eastern District of Tennessee.1
Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1406(a) states:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue
in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or subdivision
in which it could have been brought.
Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought or to any
district or division to which all parties have consented.
It is readily apparent that Plaintiff’s claims against the NECX and MCCX Defendants
could have been brought in the Eastern District of Tennessee, as both facilities are in that

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TCIX is located in the Middle District of Tennessee, as are the TDOC Administrative

Offices.
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District. 28 U.S.C. § 123(a)(1). NECX is in Carter County, which is in the Northeastern
Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee. MCCX is located in Morgan County, which is in
the Northern Division of the Eastern Division of Tennessee.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the claims against the
NECX Defendants should be transferred to the Northeastern Division of the Eastern District of
Tennessee, and the claims against the MCCX Defendants should be transferred to the Northern
Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee.
Nothing herein shall be construed as stating any opinion as to whether any particular
Defendant has been properly served.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to
this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have
fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any
response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this
Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985),
reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

E. Clifton Knowles
United States Magistrate Judge

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