Deiters v. Donahoe

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM signed by District Judge Todd J. Campbell on 11/14/2014. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

LUCY M. DEITERS

)
)
) NO. 3-13-0315
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
)

v.
PATRICK R. DONAHOE,

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 30).1 For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion is
GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED.
FACTS
Plaintiff filed this action against her former employer, the United States Postal Service,
through the Postmaster General Patrick R. Donahoe. She alleges that Defendant violated Title VII
by retaliating against her for filing complaints, both internally and with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).2
At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was employed as a full-time mail handler in
Nashville, Tennessee. Plaintiff and her co-worker Jacqueline Smith had an on-going contentious
working relationship, and each of them complained to Defendant about the other. Plaintiff alleges

1

Because Defendant has filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts and Plaintiff has
responded, both parties are arguing facts outside the pleadings, and the Court will treat this
Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
2

Plaintiff has conceded that her Tennessee Human Rights Act claim and her state
law retaliation claim cannot be brought against the United States, so those claims (Counts Two
and Three) are DISMISSED. In addition, Plaintiff concedes that she cannot recover punitive
damages against the United States, so her claim for punitive damages is also DISMISSED.

that the tension was a result of Smith’s ongoing racial harassment of Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that
from January 2009 through May 2011, she filed at least three Equal Employment Opportunity
(“EEO”) complaints based upon race and reprisal. Plaintiff admits that the conflict between Smith
and her caused constant turmoil on the workroom floor, disruption and loss of productivity. Because
of this disruption, and on the advice of the Postal Service Labor Relations Office, Defendant placed
both Plaintiff and Smith on emergency placement while Defendant conducted an investigation.3
The Mail Handler’s Union (“the Union”) grieved Plaintiff’s emergency placement and
ultimately settled the grievance by, among other things, returning Plaintiff to work. Thereafter,
Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint, arguing that her emergency placement was in retaliation for prior
EEO activity. Defendant dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, and that dismissal was affirmed by the
EEOC. Plaintiff was not fired; the adverse employment action upon which she bases her claim is
the emergency placement of September 29, 2011.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pennington v. State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009). The party bringing the summary
judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and
identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material
facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may satisfy this

3

Plaintiff contends that she was on vacation when this decision was made and had
no knowledge of it until she returned to work and was locked out.
2

burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element of the non-moving party’s claim
or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review all the evidence, facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk
Western Railroad, Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court does not, however, weigh the
evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been
presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position will be insufficient to survive summary
judgment; rather, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving
party. Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 595.
RETALIATION
To make a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in
protected activity; (2) the exercise of protected rights was known to the Defendant; (3) Defendant
took an adverse employment action against Plaintiff, and (4) there was a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action. Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2013).4
Once a prima facie showing is made, the Defendant must articulate a legitimate nonretaliatory reason
for its action, and then the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was

4

To establish a causal connection, Plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from
which one could draw an inference that Defendant would not have taken the adverse employment
action had she not engaged in activity protected under Title VII. Taylor, 703 F.3d at 339. In
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013), the Court
held that a plaintiff making a Title VII retaliation claim must establish that his or her protected
activity was a “but-for” cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer. Id. at 2533-34.

3

not its true reason but merely a pretext for retaliation. Harris v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville and
Davidson County, 594 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir. 2010).
Defendant argues that, even assuming Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, she cannot
show that Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for placing her on emergency placement
was a pretext for retaliation. Defendant asserts that its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
placing Plaintiff and Smith on emergency placement was to address allegations that both of them
were creating a hostile work environment which impacted co-workers and supervisory employees.
Defendant claims that it took action against both Plaintiff and Smith to address the turmoil,
disruption and loss of productivity caused by both Plaintiff and Smith on the workroom floor.

To show pretext, Plaintiff may show that (1) the proffered reason had no basis in fact, (2) the
proffered reason did not actually motivate the action, or (3) the proffered reason was insufficient to
warrant the adverse action. Sybrandt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 560 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 2009).
A plaintiff cannot establish pretext so long as the employer made a reasonably informed and
considered decision before taking the adverse employment action. Foster v. Spring Meadows
Healthcare Center, LLC, 2013 WL 829363 at * 10 (M.D. Tenn. March 6, 2013) (citing Smith v.
Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Where the employer can demonstrate an honest belief in its proffered reason, an inference
of pretext is not warranted. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th
Cir. 2012). An employer’s proffered reason is considered honestly held where the employer can
establish it reasonably relied upon the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision
was made. Id. A plaintiff is required to show more than a dispute over the facts upon which the
decision was based. Id.

4

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason was pretext for retaliation. Defendant has presented evidence that both
Plaintiff and Smith were put on emergency placement because of their continuing, disruptive,
contentious working relationship. Plaintiff was not singled out; both parties were treated the same.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s managers conferred with the Postal Service Labor Relations Board prior to
taking this action. In addition, Plaintiff admitted that the Union grieved and settled her emergency
placement in October of 2011.5
Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Defendant made a reasonably informed and
considered decision before taking the adverse employment action of placing Plaintiff on emergency
placement. Plaintiff cannot establish pretext simply by disagreeing with Defendant’s business
judgment and choice of actions. Pretext cannot be shown by attacking the business decision itself.
Hein v. All America Plywood Co., Inc., 232 F.2d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2000); Brocklehurst v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 123 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 1997).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 30) is
GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
TODD J. CAMPBELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5

Defendant also asserts that the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
Defendant and the Union allows for emergency placement under these circumstances.
5