Gibbs v. Corrections Corporation of America et al

Filing 125

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The undersigned RECOMMENDS that both motions for summary judgment (DE 111, 120) be GRANTED and that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Jordan, Pritchard, Casey, Jones, Lineberry, Payne, Bass, and Staggs, be DISMISSED w ith prejudice, but that the claims against the John Doe Defendants be DISMISSED without prejudice. The Magistrate Judge further RECOMMENDS that any appeal NOT BE CERTIFIED as taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Signed by Magistrate Judge Joe Brown on 8/5/2014. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MICHAEL T. GIBBS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION
OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 3:13-00350
Judge Campbell/Magistrate Judge Brown
Jury Demand

To: The Honorable Todd J. Campbell, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court are Defendant Jordan’s motion for summary judgment (DE
111) 1 and Defendants Pritchard, Casey, Jones, Lineberry, Payne, 2 Bass, and Staggs’ motion for
summary judgment. (DE 120). For the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge
RECOMMENDS that both motions for summary judgment (DE 111, 120) be GRANTED and
that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Jordan, Pritchard, Casey, Jones, Lineberry, Payne,
Bass, and Staggs, be DISMISSED with prejudice, but that the claims against the John Doe
Defendants be DISMISSED without prejudice. The Magistrate Judge further RECOMMENDS
that any appeal NOT BE CERTIFIED as taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3).
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. (DE 19). While confined at South
Central Correctional Center (“SCCC”) in Clifton, Tennessee, 3 Plaintiff filed a complaint against

1

“DE” refers to Docket Entry.
It appears that Defendant Payne was originally referred to as Defendant “Pain.” (DE 22).
3
Plaintiff was released from TDOC custody on April 11, 2014. (DE 115).
2

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Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) and Department of Corrections Association. (DE
1). He later moved to amend his complaint on March 27, 2013 (DE 9), adding the following
defendants: Daniel Pritchard (SCCC Warden), Cecile N. Casey (SCCC Officer), Amber Bass
(SCCC Officer), Mercedes R. Jones (SCCC Officer), Kayla Perry Lineberry (SCCC Officer),
Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”), Candace Whisman (TDOC Director of
Sentence Management), Debre Inglis (TDOC General Counsel), and unnamed SCCC doctors
and nurses. (DE 9, p. 3).
The District Judge granted the motion to amend and summarized Plaintiff’s claims as: (1)
CCA and the Department of Corrections Association violated the Federal Torts Claims Act
(“FTCA”) as a result of their employees’ negligence, (2) TDOC unlawfully confined Plaintiff
beyond the length of his sentence as a result of TDOC’s employees’ negligence, (3) SCCC
Defendants Pritchard, Casey, Jones, Bass, and Lineberry retaliated against Plaintiff for filing this
lawsuit, and (4) Defendant Pritchard and SCCC doctors and nurses denied Plaintiff treatment for
his known mental conditions. (DE 18). After doing so, the District Judge dismissed Plaintiff’s
claims arising under the FTCA, 4 Plaintiff’s claims of unlawful confinement, and Plaintiff’s
request that the court “annul and expunge” certain “felony time periods” from his record. (DE
18, 19). The District Judge further dismissed the § 1983 claims brought against TDOC, as they
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (DE 18, 19). Remaining in the lawsuit were § 1983
claims of (1) retaliation by Defendants Pritchard, Casey, Bass, Jones, and Lineberry, and (2)
denial of medical treatment by Defendant Pritchard and unnamed prison doctors and nurses. (DE
18, 19).

4

The docked does not reflect that CCA has been terminated as a Defendant. The Clerk should update the docket to
show that CCA was terminated on 4-17-2013. (DE 18)

2

Plaintiff next moved to add Stephen Payne (SCCC Counselor), Carolyn Jordan (TDOC
Commisioner’s Designee), and Leigh Staggs (SCCC Disciplinary Officer) as defendants. (DE
22). The Magistrate Judge only granted this request insofar as Plaintiff claimed Defendants
Payne, Jordan, and Staggs failed to protect him from assault by other detainees. (DE 25, p. 2).
Defendants Pritchard, Casey, Jones, Lineberry, Payne, and Staggs filed an answer on
August 23, 2013. (DE 68). Defendant Jordan answered on September 5, 2013 (DE 74), and
moved for summary judgment on August 8, 2014. (DE 111). Defendants Bass, Casey, Jones,
Lineberry, Payne, Pritchard, and Staggs filed a motion for summary judgment under seal on May
30, 2014. (DE 120). The Magistrate Judge directed Plaintiff to respond to the motions for
summary judgment by July 7, 2014, and warned Plaintiff that failing to respond may result in the
motions being granted. (DE 121). Plaintiff did not reply to either motion.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A fact is “material” for purposes of summary
judgment if the fact could affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury, presented with the evidence,
could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Id.; Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 131
(6th Cir. 2014). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court should draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant and avoid weighing the evidence or making
credibility decisions. Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905, 910 (6th Cir. 2013).
The movant has the burden of showing an absence of evidence supporting the opponent’s
position. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). If the movant makes this

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showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “designate specific facts showing that there [is] a
genuine issue for trial.” Id. The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings” to establish a
genuine dispute of material fact. Shreve, 743 F.3d at 132 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
III.

ANALYSIS

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the claimant must allege that he was deprived
of a federal or constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state law. Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575
(6th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has raised First Amendment retaliation claims and Eighth Amendment
denial of medical treatment and failure to protect claims against Defendants.
B. Defendant Jordan’s Motion for Summary Judgment
According to Defendant Jordan, summary judgment is appropriately resolved in her favor
because (1) Plaintiff’s claims are conclusory and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (2) there is no evidence that Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated
inmates regarding his disciplinary charges, (3) the facts demonstrate that there has been no
retaliation against Plaintiff, and (4) Plaintiff’s claims regarding his disciplinary convictions are
barred by Heck v. Humphrey and Edwards v. Balisok. (DE 111). Plaintiff has not responded to
Defendant Jordan’s motion for summary judgment or statement of undisputed material facts. 5
Before addressing the merits of Defendant Jordan’s motion, the Magistrate Judge would
like to clarify which claims have been brought against Defendant Jordan. In Plaintiff’s motion to
add three new defendants (DE 22), Plaintiff sought to assert several claims against Defendants
5

Pursuant to Local Rule 56.01(g), Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendant Jordan’s statement of undisputed
material facts indicates that Plaintiff does not dispute the facts for purposes of summary judgment. Additionally,
Local Rule 7.01(b) provides that a party’s failure to file a timely response to a motion, such as a motion for
summary judgment, indicates that the party does not oppose the motion. Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge has
reviewed the entire file to ensure that the moving party has met their burden.

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Jordan, Payne, and Staggs, including claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
allegations regarding the grievance and disciplinary process, and claims that these Defendants
failed to protect him from assault by other detainees. (DE 22) (DE 25, p. 2). The Magistrate
Judge only granted Plaintiff’s motion insofar as it added “failure to protect” claims against these
Defendants. 6 (DE 25, p. 2).
While the Magistrate Judge originally allowed the matter to proceed with reservations
(DE 25), Defendant Jordan has raised the issue of insufficient pleadings. (DE 111, 114). Plaintiff
has not responded to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or come forward with
additional evidence outside the pleadings in support of his “failure to protect” claim. As such, the
Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant Jordan is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
C. Defendants Pritchard, Casey, Jones, Lineberry, Payne, Bass, and Staggs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment
The Defendants above seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of (1) retaliation, (2)
denial of medical care, and (3) failure to protect. (DE 120) (DE 120-1). Plaintiff has not
responded to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or statement of undisputed material
facts. 7
1. Retaliation

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“Finally, Plaintiff has alleged that these Defendants failed to protect him and that he was assaulted by other
detainees. . . . On this claim service of process will be allowed to proceed as to Pain, Jordan and Staggs.” (DE 25, p.
2) (emphasis added). Defendant Jordan’s discussion of Plaintiff’s equal protection claims, retaliation allegations,
and complaints regarding his disciplinary convictions (DE 114) is irrelevant as these claims are not currently
pending against Defendant Jordan. It is unclear why the State devoted this much effort to addressing nonexistent
claims, and it is even more disconcerting that the State spent so little discussion on Plaintiff’s “failure to protect”
allegation, the only claim pending against Defendant Jordan.
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Pursuant to Local Rule 56.01(g), Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendants’ statement of undisputed material
facts indicates that Plaintiff does not dispute the facts for purposes of summary judgment. Since Plaintiff did not
respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the motion may be considered unopposed. See Local Rule
7.01(b). Again, the Magistrate Judge has reviewed the entire record, including all arguments for and against, to
ensure that the moving party has met their burden.

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In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Pritchard, Casey, Jones,
Bass, and Lineberry retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit which originally only named
CCA and Department of Corrections Association as defendants. (DE 1, 9). According to
Plaintiff, the retaliatory acts took the form of false disciplinary reports and convictions. (DE 9).
First Amendment retaliation claims have three required elements: (1) the claimant
engaged in protected conduct, (2) an adverse action was taken against the claimant, and (3) the
claimant shows that the protected conduct motivated, at least in part, the adverse action.
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d
378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). Filing a lawsuit against CCA, which owns and operates the
prison, qualifies as protected conduct. See id. Disciplinary charges may meet the second prong if
they would “deter a person of ordinary firmness from” filing lawsuits. Id. (internal citation
omitted). The causal connection may be shown through “direct or circumstantial evidence
indicating that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor behind the adverse
action against plaintiff.” Eckerman v. Tennessee Dep’t of Safety, 636 F.3d 202, 208 (6th Cir.
2010). The evidence must be “such that a reasonable juror could conclude that the [disciplinary
conviction] would not have occurred but for his engagement in protected activity.” Id. at 209.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, as Plaintiff
has failed to establish a causal connection between Plaintiff filing the lawsuit and his subsequent
disciplinary convictions. (DE 120-1, p. 4). According to Defendants, and not rebutted by
Plaintiff, there are two relevant disciplinary incidents. The first occurred on March 16, 2013, and
the second occurred on March 18, 2013. (DE 120-1, p. 4) (DE 120-2, p. 3 ¶¶ 17, 18). 8 Plaintiff
pled guilty to these charges on March 26 and 27, 2013, and did not appeal the convictions. (DE
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The Magistrate Judge notes a typo in Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts. According to Defendant
Bass’ declaration, Plaintiff “was not called by anyone to be in the Apollo Care Center.” (DE 120-7, p. 1 ¶ 3). The
statement of undisputed material facts neglected to include “not” in this statement. (DE 120-2, p. 3 ¶ 18).

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120-1, pp. 4-5) (DE 120-2, p. 3 ¶¶ 20-22). Defendants were not named in the original complaint,
and their declarations universally state they were not aware of the pending case until they were
served with Plaintiff’s amended complaint in June and July 2013. (DE 120-1, p. 5) (DE 120-3, p.
2 ¶¶ 10-11) (DE 120-4, p. 1 ¶¶ 4-5) (DE 120-5, p. 1 ¶¶ 5-6) (DE 120-6, p. 1 ¶¶ 5-6) (DE 120-7,
p. 1 ¶¶ 4-5). Plaintiff has not responded to these claims and has not put forth facts suggesting that
Defendants were aware of his complaint at the time of the disciplinary proceedings. The causal
connection has not been shown, and summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.
2. Denial of Medical Care
Plaintiff received mental health treatment from TDOC before he was transferred to
SCCC. (DE 9, pp. 6-7). He contends that upon his arrival at SCCC “his medication was cut-off,
changed, reduced in amount with denial of the treatment he was receiving.” (DE 9, pp. 7, 10).
Dropping and changing Plaintiff’s medication was, according to Plaintiff, a way for SCCC
officers to punish him and was an insufficient response to Plaintiff’s medical needs. (DE 9, p.
12). He further claimed that “C.C.A. Officials fail to respond to complaints about the seriousness
of the severe headaches, panic attacks, blackouts, shocks, voices, etc.” (DE 9, p. 13). Defendant
Pritchard and unnamed doctors and nurses are alleged to be responsible for this conduct. (DE 9).
It is well understood that the Eighth Amendment “forbids prison officials from
unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting with deliberate indifference
toward [his] serious medical needs.” Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal
quotations omitted). “Deliberate indifference has two components to it: objective and
subjective.” Id.; Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013). To
satisfy the objective prong, the claimant must show he had a “sufficiently serious medical need.”

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Jones, 625 F.3d at 941 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To satisfy the
subjective prong, the claimant must show that the “prison officials have a sufficiently culpable
state of mind in denying medical care” which has been compared to a recklessness standard. Id.
(quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895) (internal quotations omitted). The claimant must prove that
the official “(1) subjectively knew of a risk to the inmate’s health, (2) drew the inference that a
substantial risk of harm to the inmate existed, and (3) consciously disregarded that risk.” Id.
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to meet the subjective prong because Plaintiff
received medical care for his mental health issues while incarcerated at SCCC. (DE 120-1, pp. 67). Plaintiff’s claim, according to Defendants, should be analyzed as a claim of inadequate
medical treatment, not denial of medical treatment. (DE 120-1, p. 7). The Magistrate Judge
agrees, as Plaintiff has alleged that changes to his medication violated the Eighth Amendment.
When presented with claims of inadequate medical treatment, “federal courts are generally
reluctant to second guess medical judgments,” unless the treatment was “so woefully inadequate
as to amount to no treatment at all.” Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)). Moreover, inmates are not
entitled to choose their medical care, and an inmate’s disagreement with the type or scope of the
medical care he received does not establish that the treatment was inadequate or that the prison
officials were acting with deliberate indifference. Dotson v. Phillips, 385 F. App’x 468, 471 (6th
Cir. 2010); Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 106 F.3d 401, at *3–4 (6th Cir. 1997); Westlake,
537 F.2d at 860 n.5; Kimbrough v. Waldon, No. 3:12-cv-00782, 2013 WL 5236656, at *3 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 17, 2013).

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According to Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts, Plaintiff was
incarcerated at SCCC from January 22, 2013 to July 2013. (DE 120-2, p. 1 ¶ 1). When Plaintiff
arrived at SCCC, he was suffering from mental health issues and was being treated with Elavil,
Risperdal, and Wellbutrin. (DE 120-2, p. 2 ¶ 10). For unspecified safety and security reasons,
Plaintiff’s prescriptions for Wellbutrin and Elavil were discontinued. (DE 120-2, p. 2 ¶ 11). Six
days after Plaintiff arrived at SCCC, the facility psychiatrist reviewed Plaintiff’s file, scheduled a
psychiatric appointment for Plaintiff, and provided Celexa for his mental health issues. (DE 1202, p. 2 ¶ 12). Plaintiff was later prescribed Risperdal to treat his mental health issues in February
2013. (DE 120-2, p. 2 ¶ 13). After complaining of sleep disturbances and racing thoughts,
Plaintiff was prescribed Risperdal and Celexa on March 11, 2013. (DE 120-2, p. 3 ¶ 16). On
March 25, 2013, Plaintiff had a mental health treatment review where he was instructed to take
his medications and attend individual psychotherapy. (DE 120-2, p. 3 ¶ 19). He was treated on
April 17, 2013 after he complained of hearing voices. (DE 120-2, pp. 3-4 ¶ 23). Plaintiff was
next seen for an individual psychiatry session on April 24, 2013, where his medications were
changed in response to Plaintiff’s complaints; he was prescribed Risperdal, and his Celexa
prescription was changed to Pamelor. (DE 120-2, p. 4 ¶ 24). Plaintiff had another therapy session
on April 27, 2013 (DE 120-2, p. 4 ¶ 25), and Plaintiff had no mental health complaints during a
mental health screening on May 15, 2013. (DE 120-2, p. 4 ¶ 26). During Plaintiff’s individual
psychiatry session on June 10, 2013, he complained about his medication, but the medications
were continued because there was no evidence of true psychosis. (DE 120-2, p. 4 ¶ 27). Plaintiff
has neither responded to nor disputed any of these statements.
Although Plaintiff disagrees with the type of medical care he received, Defendants have
presented unrebutted evidence of regular mental health treatment and timely responses to

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Plaintiff’s complaints of sleep disturbances, racing thoughts, and hearing voices. Summary
judgment is appropriate as Plaintiff was not denied treatment, and the treatment he received was
not “so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169.
3. Failure to Protect
Defendants Staggs and Payne seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s “failure to protect”
claim. (DE 120-1, p. 9). According to Defendants, they were not aware of a potential risk to
Plaintiff’s health or safety and therefore may not be held liable for his subsequent injury. (DE
120-1, p. 11).
Claims of deliberate indifference are cognizable under § 1983, for “prison officials have a
duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Bishop v. Hackel,
636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). To state such a claim, the
claimant must satisfy two prongs: “(1) the alleged mistreatment was objectively serious; and (2)
the defendant subjectively ignored the risk to the inmate’s safety.” Id. With regard to the second
prong, the claimant must show that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his health
or safety and may do so by showing the official “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Id. at 766–67; see also Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir.
2004).
According to Defendants, Plaintiff failed to establish the subjective prong. (DE 120-1, p.
10). Citing to declarations from Defendants Staggs and Payne, Defendants contend that they had
no knowledge of a potential threat to Plaintiff’s health or safety. (DE 120-1, p. 10) (DE 120-8,
pp. 1-2 ¶¶ 5-7) (DE 120-9, p. 2 ¶¶ 8-10). Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts
further provides that Plaintiff’s institutional file did not contain a record of any incompatibles or
any grievances or complaints made by Plaintiff regarding other inmates, his safety, or his health.

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(DE 120-1, p. 10) (DE 120-2, p. 4 ¶¶ 28-31). These statements are not contested by Plaintiff and
are accepted as true. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate, as Plaintiff failed
to meet the subjective prong.
D.

Remaining Defendants
The Plaintiff states that he made no effort to name or serve the John Doe Defendants.

Under Rule 4, Fed. R. Civ. P., these claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
IV.

RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that both motions for
summary judgment (DE 111, 120) be GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
Jordan, Pritchard, Casey, Jones, Lineberry, Payne, Bass, and Staggs, be DISMISSED with
prejudice, but that the claims against the John Doe Defendants be DISMISSED without
prejudice.

The Magistrate Judge further RECOMMENDS that any appeal NOT BE

CERTIFIED as taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
Within fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation, the parties
may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations made herein. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Parties opposing the objections must respond within fourteen (14) days from
service of these objections. Id. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
receipt of this Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of further appeal. Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
ENTERED the 5th day of August, 2014,

_________________________
Joe B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge

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