Love v. Steele

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 10/8/13. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JACOB STEPHEN LOVE,
Petitioner,
v.
JEWEL STEELE, Warden,
Respondent.

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Case No. 3:13-cv-382
Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Jacob Stephen Love, a prisoner in state custody who is currently incarcerated at the
DeBerry Special Needs Facility, has filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas
corpus (ECF No. 1). The respondent has filed an answer in opposition to the petition, along with a
complete copy of the underlying state-court record. The petition is ripe for review. For the reasons set
forth herein, the petition will be denied and this matter dismissed.
I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2009, Jacob Love was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury on five counts of

aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child. (ECF No. 14-1, at 4–12.) On February 16,
2010, he filed a petition to enter a plea of guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery,
with an agreed sentence of four years’ confinement on each charge, to run consecutively, for a total
sentence of eight years. (ECF No. 14-1, at 13–15.) The plea petition also reflects that the petitioner would
be subject to lifetime supervision after his release from prison, and that he would have to register as a sex
offender. The plea was accepted by an order entered by Davidson County Criminal Court Judge Cheryl
Blackburn on February 25, 2010 (ECF No. 14-1, at 16), after a hearing conducted before her on the same
day. (ECF No. 14-3, at 7–20.) Judgment was entered against Love that day as well. (ECF No. 14-1, at
17–18.) The petitioner did not challenge his conviction or sentence on direct appeal.
Shortly after judgment was entered, however, Love filed a pro se petition in the state court for the
writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court denied on May 26, 2010. (ECF No. 1, at 31–35 (Ex. 1 to
habeas petition).) He then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 12, 2010 (ECF No.

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14-1, at 19–27.) Counsel was appointed for him, and an amended petition filed on his behalf in March
2011. (ECF No. 14-1, at 50–52.) After a hearing at which the petitioner and his trial counsel testified (see
Post-Conviction Tr., ECF No. 14-2), the trial court denied the petition (ECF No. 14-1, at 54–70), and the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that decision on December 7, 2012. Love v. State, No.
M2012-00135-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 6098318 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2012). The Tennessee
Supreme Court denied Love’s application for permission to appeal on March 5, 2013. (ECF No. 14-4, at
68.)
Love filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on April 23, 2013 (ECF No. 1, at 139
(stamp showing date the petition was received by prison mail system)). After being granted an extension
of time for doing so, the respondent filed an answer along with a complete copy of the underlying record.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the testimony presented during the plea

hearing as follows:
The record reflects that the Petitioner was charged with five counts of aggravated
sexual battery and three counts of child rape. Pursuant to agreement, he pleaded guilty
to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. According to the State's recitation
of the facts at the guilty plea hearing:
[The Petitioner] was residing with the victim.... Her date of birth is 3–29–97, a
child less than thirteen years of age. [The Petitioner] ... was residing with her, her
sibling, and her mother, and he was her mother's boyfriend at the time.... [O]n
two separate incidents ... [the Petitioner] did attempt to engage in unlawful sexual
contact with the child named in the indictment. These events happened at their
residence, which [was] located here in Davidson County.
The Petitioner received consecutive four-year sentences.
The judgments reflect that the Petitioner was sentenced to community supervision for
life following the expiration of his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 39–13–524 and that the Petitioner was required to register as a sexual offender.
The transcript of the plea submission hearing shows that the trial court advised the
Petitioner that the consequences of his guilty pleas included registering as a sex offender
and lifetime supervision after his release from confinement. When the trial court asked if
the Petitioner understood these consequences, his response was, “Yes, ma‘am.” The
court stated that it noted on the petition to enter a plea of guilty that it advised the
Petitioner of both consequences. When the trial court asked the Petitioner if he read the
guilty plea petition, he responded, “I read it myself. And I had questions, and it was
explained to me.” He agreed his questions were explained to his satisfaction.
Love v. State, 2012 WL 6098318, at *1.
The state appellate court summarized the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing as

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follows:
At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified that although the State's
discovery packet was about three inches thick, counsel failed to review it with him. He
said the discovery materials included a criminal history of Jacob J. Love, who was not the
Petitioner. He said counsel believed it was the Petitioner's criminal history until eight
months later when the Petitioner asked an investigator to compare the Petitioner's
fingerprints with Jacob J. Love's fingerprints.
The Petitioner testified that the witness statements contained different versions of
events. He said that he talked to counsel about the recording counsel received eight days
after the Petitioner's arrest and that the victim admitted on the recording that the victim
made up the allegations. He said that although counsel sent the prosecutor an email
about the recording, counsel told the Petitioner “none of that matters, because if it goes
to trial, they can change their mind, take the plea.”
The Petitioner testified that counsel confused the facts of his case with another
client's case and that counsel did not know the number of offenses for which the
Petitioner was indicted. He said that at his plea hearing, he reviewed the plea agreement
with counsel and that he told the trial court he understood the agreement. He said,
though, that counsel did not “fully discuss” his being on community supervision for life. He
said he feared going to prison and had never faced a prison sentence before the instant
charges. He said counsel told him “that all [the Petitioner] would be subject to was
lifetime supervision.” He said counsel defined lifetime supervision as requiring the
Petitioner to go to the police department every four months to register as a sexual
offender. He said that after he pleaded guilty, he learned he was required to wear an
ankle bracelet, to meet with a parole officer, and to undergo psychological or psychiatric
treatment for the remainder of his life. He said he understood he was required to register
with the sexual offender database. He said counsel never discussed a prerelease
psychological evaluation. He said that counsel told him he would be denied parole the
first time and that he would probably receive parole the second time.
The Petitioner testified that in August 2009, he wanted to go to trial but that counsel
did not want a trial. He stated that they argued about whether to go to trial and that
counsel refused “to present the case in chief.” He said counsel told the Petitioner
approximately twenty-five times that the Petitioner would be convicted at a trial. He said
that although he was charged with two Class C felonies, counsel told him the range of
punishment was two to four years. He said that counsel was a “plea attorney” rather than
a trial attorney and that counsel told him that counsel had not tried “these types of cases.”
He said counsel advised him that he should accept the plea offer because sexual
offenses were difficult to win at a trial.
The Petitioner testified that he pleaded guilty because he was not familiar with the
criminal justice system and his attorney told him to plead guilty. He said he did not know
the consequences of his pleading guilty when he pleaded guilty. He said that he and
counsel argued several times over counsel's representation and that he attempted to fire
counsel because counsel refused to review the discovery materials. He said counsel
introduced him to co-counsel and told him the trial court would not allow the Petitioner to
fire counsel. He said that to his knowledge, counsel did not file a motion requesting
permission to withdraw as his counsel.
On cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that he received the State's discovery
package and clarified that counsel refused to review the materials until two months
before the trial date. He said counsel agreed that after the investigator examined the
fingerprints, the criminal history included in the discovery materials was not the
Petitioner's criminal history. He said that eight months before his arrest, the victim's

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brother molested the victim and that counsel said this information did not matter. He said
that anytime he raised issues with the discovery materials, counsel said the information
did not matter.
The Petitioner testified that at the guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked him if he
was satisfied with counsel's work and that he responded counsel “were perfect.” He
agreed that he knew about the evidence the State and the defense would have presented
at a trial before he pleaded guilty and that he knew what the witnesses would have
testified to at a trial. He agreed that counsel had the same information he had before he
pleaded guilty and that counsel's advice was to accept the plea offer. He said he knew
the decision whether to plead guilty was his, not counsel's. He agreed counsel only
offered their opinions on whether he should plead guilty.
The Petitioner testified that he did not ask counsel about the sexual offender registry
and that he thought the registry and lifetime supervision were the same. He said that
counsel did not discuss community supervision for life or lifetime supervision at any time
before he pleaded guilty. He said he first heard about lifetime supervision from the trial
court when he pleaded guilty.
The Petitioner testified that he knew he pleaded guilty to two Class C felonies. He
denied counsel told him that he was pleading to Class D felonies. The Petitioner's only
issue was the length of sentence, although the range of punishment for a Class C felony
was three to six years. He agreed he received two four-year sentences. When asked how
counsel confused his case with another client's case, he said counsel told him “eleven
people found Raul guilty, one hung the jury. [The Petitioner was] coming behind Raul . . .
remember what happened to Raul.” He said counsel's statement showed “coercion” but
agreed the statement did not show counsel was confused. He said that counsel
compared the two cases and agreed that it was counsel's job to inform the Petitioner of
how similar cases were resolved.
Upon examination by the trial court, the Petitioner testified that he did not understand
the difference between community supervision for life and lifetime supervision. The
Petitioner said he did not understand that his registration on the sexual offender database
was separate from community supervision.
Counsel testified that he had been licensed to practice law since 1998 and that he
only practiced criminal defense work. He agreed he was appointed to represent the
Petitioner and said he reviewed the discovery materials numerous times with the
Petitioner. He said he did not understand the Petitioner's testimony that counsel refused
to review the discovery materials until two months before trial. He said he told the
Petitioner that they would meet more often for trial preparation two months before trial.
Counsel testified that with regard to the victim and her family, the Department of
Children's Services investigated previous allegations of sexual abuse that did not involve
the Petitioner and that he attempted to tell the Petitioner that these previous allegations
were irrelevant to the instant charges. He said he attempted to explain to the Petitioner
that whether a jury believed the victim mattered at a trial. He said that with regard to the
incorrect criminal history, the Petitioner believed the State wanted to prosecute him
because of the criminal history. He said he attempted to explain to the Petitioner that the
prosecutor charged him because of the victim's allegations, not because of any criminal
history. He said that to his knowledge, he did not confuse the Petitioner's case with
another client's case, although he said he could have misstated the number of counts in
the indictment.
Counsel testified that he had long conversations about the plea offer with the
Petitioner. He said that although there were weaknesses in the State's case, he told the

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Petitioner that it was “very risky” to go to trial. He said the Petitioner faced life
imprisonment if convicted by a jury and agreed the plea agreement was for two
consecutive four-year sentences to be served at thirty percent. He said that he told the
Petitioner the decision to go to trial was the Petitioner's and agreed that when the
Petitioner asked for his opinion, he told the Petitioner that he believed a jury would
convict him. He said that he never told the Petitioner to plead guilty and that at one point,
the Petitioner's case was scheduled for a trial.
Counsel testified that his frustration with the Petitioner resulted from the Petitioner's
changing his mind daily about whether to accept the plea offer or go to trial and that he
told the Petitioner that the Petitioner had to decide if he wanted to accept the offer or go
to trial. He said that he and the Petitioner had a heated exchange and that he asked cocounsel to work with the Petitioner. He said he “bowed out” of the Petitioner's case when
co-counsel became involved. He said that he had never tried a case like the Petitioner's
but that co-counsel had.
Counsel testified that he discussed community supervision for life with the Petitioner
and that he discussed the consequences of the Petitioner's pleading guilty to a sexual
offense, including sexual offender registration, sexual offender requirements, and
supervision. He said his file included a copy of the sexual offender probation guidelines,
and he thought he showed the guidelines to the Petitioner. He said he did not go into
detail about everything that would be required of the Petitioner.
On cross-examination, counsel testified that the Petitioner always denied his guilt and
that he believed the Petitioner became frustrated because the Petitioner wanted a trial
but knew a trial was risky. He denied dismissing as unimportant anything the Petitioner
raised and said he discussed each topic with the Petitioner. He said he interviewed the
people the Petitioner suggested and met with the people the Petitioner wanted him to
meet. He said he reviewed the video recording of the victim's statement and discussed it
with the Petitioner. He denied telling the Petitioner that the Petitioner could not go to trial
or that counsel would not try the Petitioner's case. He said he gave the Petitioner his
opinion with regard to the outcome of a trial and told the Petitioner it was the Petitioner's
decision. He agreed that with regard to the Petitioner's community supervision, there
were “probably some specifics” that the Petitioner did not know.
Co-counsel testified that she had been licensed to practice law since 1984 and that
she had only done criminal work. She said she told the Petitioner that if he decided to
plead guilty, the Petitioner would be required to register as sexual offender and would be
subject to lifetime supervision. She did not recall the amount of detail in which she
discussed lifetime supervision. She believed the Petitioner knew the consequences of his
guilty plea.
On cross-examination, co-counsel testified that she represented the Petitioner close
to the time of the guilty plea and that she reviewed the case and was briefed about the
status of the case. She said that she began working on the Petitioner's case because of
communication issues between counsel and the Petitioner and that she discussed the
Petitioner's accepting the plea offer and going to trial. She said she considered the offer
to be “extraordinarily good.” She said she told the Petitioner that sexual offense cases
were difficult to win at trial, that the State made a good offer, and that the Petitioner had
to make the decision.
Id. at *1–5.
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In his present petition, Love asserts the following claims for relief:

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1. That the guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the petitioner was not made aware
of the mandatory requirement of lifetime community supervision following release from prison (ECF No. 1,
at 5);
2. That the state’s discovery materials included documents pertaining to a different individual
named Jacob Love (ECF No. 1, at 14);
3. That the victim allegedly recanted her accusation nearly a year prior to entry of the petitioner’s
guilty plea (ECF No. 1 at 17).
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal district court will not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has first exhausted all available state-court remedies for each claim in his petition. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1). While exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement, it is a strictly enforced doctrine which
promotes comity between the states and the federal government by giving the state an initial opportunity
to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.
838, 845 (1999). Consequently, as a condition precedent to seeking federal habeas corpus relief, the
petitioner is required to fairly present his claims to every available level of the state court system. Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–20 (1982); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (“[A]
federal habeas petitioner . . . [must] provide the state courts with a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling
legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.”). Moreover, “the doctrine of exhaustion
requires that a claim be presented to the state courts under the same theory in which it is later presented
in federal court.” Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 1998). Once his federal claims have been
raised in the highest state court available,1 the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, even if that court
refused to consider the claims. Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878, 883 (6th Cir. 1990).
A habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he has properly and fully exhausted
his available state court remedies with respect to the claims he presents for federal habeas review.
Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1420 n.3 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). If a habeas petitioner retains

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In Tennessee, review by the state Supreme Court is not required for exhaustion. Instead, “once
the Court of Criminal Appeals has denied a claim of error, ‘the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted
all available state remedies available for that claim.’” Adams v. Holland, 330 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Tenn. S. Ct. R. 39).

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the right under state law to raise a claim by any available procedure, he has not exhausted that claim. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(c). Ordinarily, habeas petitions containing unexhausted claims are dismissed without
prejudice in order to permit the petitioner the opportunity to pursue them in state court. Alley v. Bell, 307
F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 518, 520–22); see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.
269 (2005) (reconfirming the continued relevance of Rose under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)).
If, however, an unexhausted claim would be procedurally barred under state law, for instance by
statutes of limitations or state rules barring successive petitions, then the claim is deemed exhausted
(because no further state review is available) but procedurally defaulted, and may not be considered by
the federal court on habeas review except under extraordinary circumstances. Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380,
385–86 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); In re Cook, 215 F.3d 606, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2000). Specifically,
in order to obtain consideration of a claim that is procedurally defaulted, a petitioner must demonstrate
both cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional errors,
or alternatively that failure to consider the claims will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); cf. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
Even when a petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus raises only federal constitutional
claims that have been properly exhausted in the state courts, this Court’s review of the state court’s
resolution of those issues remains quite limited. The standard for reviewing applications for the writ of
habeas corpus is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This section states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Id. In other words, a federal court is bound by a state court’s adjudication of a petitioner’s claims unless
the state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law. Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433

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(6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual
determinations, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) (“We
give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995).
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the “contrary to” clause
as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court’s] clearly
established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law
set forth in our cases. . . . A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s
clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from [this Court’s] precedent.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000) (citation omitted).
With respect to the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court has
held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the “unreasonable
application” clause when “a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of
a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. The Court defined “unreasonable application” as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask
whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively
unreasonable. . . .
. . . . [A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause,
then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes
in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be
unreasonable.
Id. at 409–11 (emphasis original).
With these principles in mind, this Court will turn to the examination of the claims raised in Love’s
petition for habeas relief.
V.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A.

Ground One: That the Guilty Plea Was Not Knowing and Voluntary

The respondent concedes that this claim was fully exhausted in the state-court proceedings and
is properly before the Court for habeas review. The respondent contends, however, that the Tennessee

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Court of Criminal Appeals’ resolution of this issue did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law.
As set forth above, at the post-conviction hearing, the petitioner testified, essentially, that he
never “fully discussed” the meaning of lifetime community supervision with his trial attorneys, and that his
counsel had defined it as requiring the petitioner to go to the police department every four months to
register as a sexual offender. He testified that, only after he pleaded guilty did he learn that he would be
required to wear an ankle bracelet, to meet with a parole officer, and to undergo psychological or
psychiatric treatment for the remainder of his life. His lead counsel testified, to the contrary, that he
discussed lifetime community supervision with the petitioner, and generally discussed the consequences
of a guilty plea, including sexual-offender registration, sexual-offender requirements, and supervision. He
also provided a copy of the sex-offender probation requirements to the petitioner so he could see the
restrictions that would apply to him after he was released from prison. Defense co-counsel similarly
testified that she had told the petitioner that a guilty plea would require the petitioner to register as a
sexual offender and that he would be subject to lifetime supervision, but she did not recall the degree of
detail in which she had discussed lifetime supervision.
The trial court credited the attorneys’ testimony, noting that counsel had testified that they did not
go into “specific details regarding everything lifetime supervision entails” but that they had “discussed the
lifetime supervision requirement” with the petitioner. (Order Denying Post-Conviction Relief, ECF No. 141, at 68.) The court further observed that, during the plea colloquy, she had asked the petitioner if his
counsel had explained to him the collateral consequences of the plea, including lifetime community
supervision and the sex-offender registry, and the petitioner affirmatively represented that these
consequences had been adequately explained to him. (Id. at 69.) Specifically, the plea hearing reflected
the following exchange:
THE COURT: . . . All right. Now, I have a petition that tells me you‘re going to be
pleading guilty on Counts 1 and 2 of this indictment to attempted aggravated sexual
battery. You’re going to receive a four-year sentence as a Range 1 standard offender on
each one of them. They’re going to be consecutive to each other. So it’s a total sentence
of eight years, therefore, it has to be served in the Department of Corrections. You’re
doing this in your best interest, but you understand the consequences. The
consequences are that you‘re going to have to register as a sex offender when you‘re
released, and you‘re going to be on lifetime supervision when you get out. And everything
else is going to be dismissed. Is that your understanding of the agreement?

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MR. LOVE: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: All right. Now, I‘m going to add to make sure—I put on here that you’re
advised in open court about the lifetime supervision and the sex offender registration.
(Guilty-Plea Hearing Tr., ECF No. 14-3, at 9–10 (emphasis added).)
The court further queried:
THE COURT: . . . But you still have to register as a sex offender when you‘re
released and have lifetime supervision. So the question is: Did your attorneys discuss
with you all of that and about this lifetime supervision and about the sex offender
registration? Do you understand that?
MR. LOVE: Yes, ma‘am.
(Id. ECF No. 14-3, at 11 (emphasis added).)
During the post-conviction hearing, the trial judge found that the written plea agreement reflected
both requirements, and that a handwritten note initialed by the judge herself on the plea agreement
showed that she too had discussed the matter with Love at the time she accepted the plea: “2/25/10
advised in open court lifetime supervision and sex offender registration.” (ECF No. 14-1, at 68 (quoting
Plea Petition, ECF No. 14-3, at 3).) Based on all these facts, the trial court determined that the petitioner
had been adequately informed of the consequences of his guilty plea, and denied post-conviction relief on
the basis of this claim.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals considered the applicable federal standard
pertaining to the voluntariness of a guilty plea, as follows:
The United States Supreme Court has held that a plea must represent a “voluntary
and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, (1970). The court reviewing the voluntariness of
a guilty plea must look to the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Turner, 919
S.W.2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). A plea resulting from ignorance,
misunderstanding, coercion, inducement, or threats is not “voluntary.” Blankenship v.
State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993). A petitioner’s solemn declaration in open court
that his or her plea is knowing and voluntary creates a formidable barrier in any
subsequent collateral proceeding because these declarations “carry a strong
presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
Love, 2012 WL 6098318, at *6. Based on that standard, in light of the evidence before the trial court and
the trial court’s crediting trial counsel’s testimony, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
that “the Petitioner was informed of the community supervision for life requirement and that his pleas
were knowingly and voluntarily entered. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s
factual findings. We conclude that counsel was not deficient and that the Petitioner is not entitled to

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relief.” Id. at *7.
This Court finds that the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reasonably applied clearly held
federal law to deny the petitioner relief. The court accurately cited and applied Alford, which contains the
applicable standard, and the court reasonably found that the testimony of the petitioner’s counsel and cocounsel, as well as the trial judge’s own comments at the state sentencing and post-conviction hearings,
showed that the petitioner had been adequately apprised of the mandatory requirement of lifetime
community supervision following release from prison, which was incorporated into the proposed plea
petition. The post-conviction court acted within its discretion to credit the testimony of the petitioner’s
counsel and co-counsel. As the respondent points out, Judge Blackburn was very careful not to conflate
the sexual-offender-registration requirement and the lifetime-supervision requirement, and instead
articulated them, repeatedly, as two separate consequences of the guilty plea. And on each occasion, the
petitioner indicated that he understood. The petitioner also signed the plea petition, which stated, “I
believe my lawyer has done everything any lawyer could have done to represent me and I am satisfied
with my legal representation and assistance in this case. I have no problem communicating with my
attorney.” (Plea Petition, ECF No 14-1, at 14.) The trial court was not unreasonable in discrediting the
petitioner’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing, and the state appellate court reasonably applied
clearly held federal law to find that the petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. The petitioner is
not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
B.

Ground Two: That the State’s Files Included the Criminal History of the Wrong
Jacob Love

The petitioner next complains that the state’s discovery materials included documents pertaining
to a different individual named Jacob Love (Jacob J. Love rather than Jacob Stephen Love).
A petitioner may be entitled to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only if he shows “that
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a). Ground Two as articulated by the petitioner does not allege a constitutional violation. On this
basis alone, the Court finds that the petitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.
Moreover, as the respondent points out, even if this issue raised a federal constitutional claim, the
petitioner concedes that he did not exhaust this claim in the state court, and he is now procedurally
barred from doing so by the one-petition rule in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(c). The claim is therefore

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considered exhausted but procedurally defaulted, and barred from review by this Court unless the
petitioner can establish cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law, or alternatively
that a failure to consider the claims will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The petitioner has not articulated cause or prejudice, nor could he
plausibly argue that a failure to consider this claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
For this reason too, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of Ground Two.
C.

Ground Three: That the Victim Recanted her Accusation

The Court liberally interprets this ground for relief as a claim that defense counsel was ineffective
for discounting the effect of the victim’s recantation of her accusation and insisting that it made no
difference to the petitioner’s chances at trial, and therefore continuing to persuade the petitioner to plead
guilty rather than to risk going to trial.
Construed as such, the claim states a colorable claim for relief based on the violation of a
constitutional right to reasonably effective counsel, but the petitioner concedes that he did not exhaust
this claim in the state courts. Moreover, as with Ground Two, the petitioner is barred by Tennessee’s onepetition rule from presenting the issue to the state courts at this date. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103(c).
This claim too is therefore technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, and may not be reviewed by
this Court unless the petitioner provides cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome the default, or
alternatively that a failure to consider the claims will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The petitioner does not attempt to establish cause for the procedural default;
he simply asserts that his trial attorneys did not believe the victim’s recantation would be useful at trial or
during plea negotiations, and that his post-conviction counsel did not question the trial attorneys on this
issue. The petitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749.
VI.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Jacob Love’s petition under § 2254 will be denied and this

matter dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order is filed herewith.

Kevin H. Sharp
United States District Judge