Lawson et al v. 15th Judicial Drug Task Force et al

Filing 117

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The Defendants have filed three motions for summary judgment that are currently pending in this case (Docket Entry Nos. 85 , 88 and 100 ). Plaintiff Capri Lawson, who is deemed to be proceeding pro se following the with drawal of her counsel, has not responded in opposition. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that these three motions for summary judgment be granted and that the complaint be dismissed Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 12/23/15. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CAPRI LAWSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs
v.
15TH JUDICIAL DRUG TASK FORCE,
et al.,
Defendants
TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 3:13-0418
Chief Judge Sharp/Bryant
Jury Demand

KEVIN H. SHARP, CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Defendants have filed three motions for summary

judgment that are currently pending in this case (Docket Entry Nos.
85, 88 and 100). Plaintiff Capri Lawson, who is deemed to be
proceeding pro se following the withdrawal of her counsel, has not
responded in opposition.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that these three motions for summary judgment be
granted and that the complaint be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Capri Lawson, Joshua Kleinhans, and Capri
Lawson as next friend for D.G. and C.S., both minors, have filed
their civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
a state law enforcement agency, two Tennessee counties, and five
individual law enforcement officers alleging that Defendants have

violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also
assert state law claims for malicious prosecution, conversion,
negligent

supervision,

intentional

interference

with

business

relationships, and bad faith seizure (Docket Entry No. 1).
Defendants

have

filed

their

respective

motions

for

summary judgment, supported by multiple affidavits. No response has
been filed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party may obtain summary judgment by showing “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Covington v. Knox County School Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 914
(6th Cir. 2000). The moving party bears the initial burden of
satisfying the court that the standards of Rule 56 have been met.
See Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 239 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986). The
ultimate question to be addressed is whether there exists any
genuine dispute of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Covington, 205 F.3d at 914 (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). If so, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
To

defeat

a

properly

supported

motion

for

summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing
2

that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

If the

party does not so respond, summary judgment will be entered if
appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The nonmoving party’s burden of
providing specific facts demonstrating that there remains a genuine
issue of material fact for trial is triggered once the moving party
shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. A genuine issue of material fact exists
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
drawing all justifiable inferences in its favor. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
SUMMARY OF PERTINENT FACTS
At all pertinent times, Plaintiff Capri Lawson was a
resident of Smith County, Tennessee, and the mother of Joshua
Kleinhans, an adult, and D.G. and C.S., both minors. Capri Lawson
was employed as a bail bondsman and licensed to write bail bonds in
Smith, Macon and Trousdale Counties in Tennessee.
Plaintiffs’ claims in this case arise out of Defendants’
execution of a search warrant at Plaintiffs’ Carthage, Tennessee,
residence on May 2, 2012, and the related criminal prosecution of
Plaintiff Capri Lawson.
3

By way of background, in early April 2012, it became
apparent

to

law

enforcement

that

information

about

sealed

indictments issued by the Smith County, Tennessee, Grand Jury on
April 2nd had been leaked to the indicted defendants. During an
attempted round-up of these 19 offenders, only one–Nancy Berry–was
located. This was an extremely low number for such a normal roundup. Shortly thereafter, Casey Lawson, husband of Plaintiff Capri
Lawson, approached Smith County Sheriff Steve Hopper and Defendant
Mike Thompson, Director of the Fifteenth Judicial District Drug
Task Force (“JDDTF”), and informed them that the Frenches had moved
“down off Highway 70" to a new address. The Frenches were among the
19 drug offenders indicted under seal by the Smith County Grand
Jury on April 2, and Casey Lawson should not have known about these
indictments (Docket Entry No. 85-1 at 7).
Nancy Berry, one of the drug offenders indicted under
seal, already knew about the sealed indictment against her when
Sheriff Hopper and Defendant Thompson arrested her on April 10,
2012. Ms. Berry’s cell phone was seized incident to her arrest and
was found to contain a text message that she had received on April
2 from Casey Lawson’s cell phone number stating, “You got 3
indictments today.” During an interview with Defendant Thompson at
the Smith County Jail, Ms. Berry admitted that she had indeed
received this text message from Casey Lawson. Ms. Berry also told
4

Defendant Thompson that Casey Lawson had also informed Andrew
Gibbs, another of the indicted offenders, about sealed indictments
issued

against

him

for

trafficking

cocaine.

Berry

also

told

Thompson that Capri Lawson was involved with, or at least knew
about, the sealed indictments being leaked to the drug offenders.
Following this interview with Nancy Berry, she agreed to
be a cooperating witness by carrying an audio transmitter, or
“wire,” in her purse during an arranged meeting with Casey Lawson.
This audio transmitter would permit law enforcement officers of the
JDDTF to overhear conversations during the meeting.
Later, on April 10, 2012, Casey Lawson and Capri Lawson
came to the Smith County Jail for the purpose of bonding out Nancy
Berry. Capri Lawson bonded Berry out of the jail and thereafter
agreed to give Berry a ride to a motel in Carthage, Tennessee.
While Berry and Capri Lawson were sitting in the Cadillac CTS-V in
the jail parking lot, Defendant Brandon Gooch, listening over the
audio transmitter, overheard Berry tell Lawson that the JDDTF’s
were “on to them.” Gooch then overheard Berry borrow Capri Lawson’s
telephone and call Andrew Gibbs, another subject of the sealed
indictment, to warn Gibbs that the JDDTF had discovered the plot to
leak sealed indictments (Docket Entry No. 85-2 at 5).
On April 12, 2012, Smith County Detective Christopher
“Kit” Jenkins applied for a search warrant for Casey Lawson and
5

Capri Lawson’s cell phone records including text message content.
This search warrant was issued by Smith County Criminal Court Judge
David Durham on April 12, 2012. Telephone records obtained from
execution of these search warrants demonstrated Casey Lawson’s
direct involvement in tipping off indicted drug offenders about
sealed

indictments

against

them,

as

well

as

Capri

Lawson’s

knowledge of, and likely involvement in, the scheme of informing
drug offenders of sealed indictments against them. Specifically, by
way of example, Casey Lawson’s phone record included the following
text message to the number of drug offender Mark King, who had been
indicted under seal: “Hide hide old buddy you’ve got 3 indictments
today but they aint serving them til Friday.” (Docket Entry No. 851 at 10). Casey Lawson’s text messages also implicated him in
arranging a marijuana transaction with Jermaine Phillips on April
13, 2012.
In order to further the investigation of the Lawsons for
suspicion of leaking sealed indictments and engaging in drug
transactions, Smith County Detective Jenkins applied for a search
warrant to search the Lawson residence, including out buildings and
any vehicles located at their residence. This warrant was issued by
Circuit Court Judge John Wootten on May 2, 2012, at 8:18 a.m.
(Docket Entry No. 85-1 at 11).

6

On May 2, 2012, at approximately 9:00 or 9:30 a.m.,
Defendants Clint Hestand, Steve Babcock and Brandon Gooch arrived
at the Lawson residence at 405 Third Avenue East in Carthage. When
Capri Lawson came to the front door following the officers’ knock,
they informed her that a search warrant for her home had been
issued. Ms. Lawson stepped back into the house and picked up her
cell phone to call her attorney, Brandon Bellar. After apparently
speaking briefly with Bellar, Ms. Lawson told the officers that she
had Bellar on the phone and that he said they needed to leave the
house. The officers responded that there was a search warrant
issued for the residence and that they were there to secure the
location. Thereafter, Capri Lawson allowed the officers to enter
the home.
After the officers entered, two minor children present
took seats on the living room couch to watch cartoons on a large
television. Clint Hestand and Steve Babcock performed a protective
sweep of the house and returned to the living room in about five
minutes with Joshua Kleinhans, whom they had located in one of the
rear rooms. As soon as Capri Lawson finished her phone conversation
with Brandon Bellar, she and the other occupants were asked to put
their cell phones on a table in the living room. Ms. Lawson and the
other occupants of the home were permitted to continue their normal
activities so long as they remained within sight of the officers.
7

At approximately 10 to 10:30 a.m., Defendants Thompson
and Jenkins arrived at the Lawson residence joined by the Chief of
the Carthage Police Department and a uniformed police officer of
that department. They brought with them the search warrant that had
been issued earlier in the day by Judge Wootten. Thereafter, the
search of the home began. Numerous items were seized as evidence
incident to this search, including multiple weapons, ammunition and
three cell phones belonging to occupants of the home (Docket Entry
No. 85-3 at 9-10). In addition, two vehicles belonging to the
Lawsons, a 2003 Ford F-250 truck, and a 2006 Cadillac CTS-V, along
with $255 in cash thought to be proceeds from a drug transaction
involving

Casey

Thompson,

were

seized

pursuant

to

Tennessee

forfeiture statutes.
In June 2012, Plaintiff Capri Lawson was indicted by the
Smith County Grand Jury for the following offense: one count of
accessory after the fact based upon her participation in warning
offender

Andrew

Gibbs

on

April

10,

2012,

of

his

impending

apprehension or discovery (Docket Entry No. 85-1 at 18-19). The
District Attorney’s Office later elected to dismiss or nolle the
case against Plaintiff Capri Lawson (Id.).
ANALYSIS
As mentioned above, Plaintiff Capri Lawson has not filed
a

response

in

opposition

to

Defendants’
8

motion

for

summary

judgment. Nevertheless, a district court cannot grant summary
judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has
not responded. The court is required, at a minimum, to examine the
movant’s

motion

for

summary

judgment

to

insure

that

he

has

discharged that burden. Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir.
1991).
Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In her first cause of
action, Plaintiff Lawson alleges that Defendants Thompson, Jenkins,
Gooch, Babcock, Hopper, Smith and Trousdale Counties, and the 15th
Judicial Drug Task Force violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution relating to the
execution of the search warrant at Plaintiffs’ residence on May 2,
2012. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants (1)
illegally entered their home in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
(2) illegally detained Plaintiffs in the home awaiting arrival of
the search warrant; and (3) conducted an illegal search of the home
pursuant to a “bad warrant” (Docket Entry No. 1 at 17).
To begin with, it appears undisputed in this record that
Circuit Judge John Wootten issued the subject search warrant at
8:18 a.m. on May 2, 2012 (Docket Entry No. 85-1 at 28-34).
Therefore, it appears undisputed that the state court had issued
the

subject

search

warrant

almost

an

hour

before

Defendants

Babcock, Gooch and Hestand first arrived at the Lawson residence.
9

Moreover, the affidavit testimony of Defendants Gooch and Babcock,
which is undisputed in this record, establishes that following a
brief

conversation

at

the

front

door

Plaintiff

Capri

Lawson

consented to the officers’ entering the home (Docket Entry Nos. 852 at 7 and 85-3 at 3). Because the undisputed record shows that the
Court

had

issued

a

search

warrant

for

the

Lawson

residence

approximately an hour before the officers arrived at the house, and
that Plaintiff Capri Lawson consented to the officer’s entry, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that entry by the officers was
neither illegal nor a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the
Fourth Amendment.
As the factual summary above states, after entering the
Lawson residence, Officers Babcock, Gooch and Hestand permitted the
occupants, Ms. Lawson and her three children, to continue their
normal activities within the home so long as they remained within
sight

of

the

officers.

Ms.

Lawson

did

at

one

point

request

permission for her three children to leave the home in order to
walk to her lawyer’s office, and this request was denied. At
approximately 10:00 a.m., additional law enforcement officers
arrived and the physical search warrant and the actual search of
the residence was begun. Plaintiffs allege that their detention in
the home awaiting delivery of the search warrant violated their
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure.
10

The United States Supreme Court in the case of Michigan
v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), has held that officers executing
a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. The
Court further held in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), that an
officer’s authority to detain an occupant incident to the execution
of a search warrant is categorical and does not depend upon the
quantum

of

proof

justifying

detention

or

the

extent

of

the

intrusion to be imposed by the seizure. Id. at 98. Upon this
authority

and

the

undisputed

evidence

in

this

record,

the

undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that the temporary detention of
the Plaintiff occupants of the Lawson residence on May 2, 2012, as
a matter of law, did not constitute an unreasonable seizure in
violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that “once officers arrived
with the Search Warrant the Search was illegal because the Search
Warrant was bad and did not demonstrate probable cause as required
by the law.” (Docket Entry No. 1 at 18). The undisputed evidence in
the record before the Court establishes that on May 2, 2012,
Defendant Detective Christopher (“Kit”) Jenkins of the Smith County
Sheriff’s

Department

executed

an

affidavit

in

support

of

an

application for a search warrant of the Lawson residence at 405
Third Avenue East in Carthage and that Criminal Court Judge John
11

Wootten, Jr., issued the requested search warrant at 8:18 a.m.
(Docket Entry No. 104-1 at 7-13). From this evidence it appears
undisputed that a court of competent jurisdiction found probable
cause to believe that evidence of violation of state criminal
statutes was in the possession of Casey Lawson and located at his
residence. Upon this finding, the state court issued the subject
search

warrant.

In

the

absence

of

any

contrary

proof,

the

undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that the subsequent search of
the Lawson residence pursuant to this search warrant, as a matter
of law, did not violate Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment.
Claim of Malicious Prosecution. Plaintiff Capri Lawson in
her second cause of action asserts a claim of malicious prosecution
against Defendants (Docket Entry No. 1 at 20-21). In order to
succeed in a malicious prosecution claim brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Lawson must show that her prosecution was initiated
without probable cause. Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir.
2007).
It appears undisputed in this record that on June 13,
2012, the Smith County Grand Jury returned a one count indictment
against Plaintiff Capri Lawson charging her as an accessory after
the fact in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-11-41(a)(3).
Plaintiff Lawson was again indicted by the Smith County Grand Jury
12

on August 6, 2012, on a charge of theft over $1,000. It has long
been settled that the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face,
by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the
existence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused
to answer. Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006). As
a matter of law, Plaintiff Lawson’s indictment is dispositive of
her

§

1983

malicious

prosecution

claim,

particularly

in

the

complete absence of any evidence that her indictments were obtained
through improper testimony in front of the grand jury.
For the foregoing reason, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim and that it
should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Complaints of Conversion and Bad Faith Seizure. In her
third and sixth causes of action, Plaintiff asserts causes of
action for conversion and bad faith seizure, apparently based upon
items of personal property, including vehicles, taken from the
Lawson home incident to the search on May 2, 2012, some of which
were

later

subjected

to

seizure

and

forfeiture

pursuant

to

Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-33-201, et seq.
As stated earlier in this report and recommendation, the
search of the Lawson residence at 405 Third Avenue East, Carthage,
Tennessee, on May 2, 2012, was conducted pursuant to a facially
13

valid search warrant issued by the state criminal court (Docket
Entry 104-1 at 8-13). A written inventory of items taken from the
Lawson residence during the search was prepared by the defendant
officers who conducted the search (Docket Entry No. 85-3 at 9-10).
Defendant Drug Task Force sought a forfeiture warrant for the
Lawson’s Ford F-250 truck, Cadillac CTS-V and $255 in U.S. currency
seized during the search of Lawson home and vehicles. Trousdale
County General Sessions Judge Kenny Linville found that probable
cause existed for the forfeiture of the two vehicles and the U.S.
currency (Docket Entry 85-1 at 16-17). Except for the firearms
found in the Lawson residence, which are being held as evidence in
a criminal proceeding, the remainder of the personal property
seized during the execution of a search warrant on the Lawson home
has been returned to the Lawsons except for a 22-inch TV, which has
been held available for pick-up by Casey or Capri Lawson for
considerable period (Docket Entry No. 85-1 at 18).
From

the

undisputed

evidence

in

this

record,

the

undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that personal property belonging
to the Lawsons was seized pursuant to the execution of a validly
issued search warrant on May 2, 2015, and that the two vehicles and
$255 in cash was held thereafter subject to validly issued seizure
warrants obtained upon a showing of probable cause to a state court
judge. In the absence of any contrary evidence, the undersigned
14

Magistrate Judge finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact regarding the conversion and bad faith seizure claims in the
third and sixth causes of action in the complaint, and that these
claims should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Claim of Negligent Supervision. Plaintiffs in their
fourth cause of action allege that Defendants Thompson, Hopper,
Smith

County

and

Trousdale

County

are

liable

for

negligent

supervision pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability
Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-10-101. Specifically, Plaintiffs
allege that these Defendants negligently failed “to provide proper
training and outlining proper procedures for seizing property and
instituting forfeiture proceedings.” (Docket Entry No. 1 at 22).
As

the

discussion

immediately

above

indicates,

the

undersigned finds from the undisputed evidence in the record that
both the seizure of personal property and the subsequent forfeiture
proceedings were conducted pursuant to validly issued warrants. In
the

absence

of

any

contrary

evidence

or

other

response

by

Plaintiffs, the undersigned finds that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on Plaintiffs’ claims of negligent supervision.
Claim

of

Intentional

Interference

With

Business

Relationship. In her fifth cause of action, Plaintiff Capri Lawson
claims that the Defendants “used improper means and had improper
15

motives to interfere with the prospective business relationship
through the use of their authority in the scope of employment, and
this intentional interference resulted in significant monetary
damages

and

non-economic

injuries

to

Plaintiff

Capri

Lawson”

(Docket Entry No. 1 at 22-23). Although the allegations in the
complaint regarding this cause of action are somewhat vague, it
seems that Plaintiff Capri Lawson claims that the Defendants
wrongfully searched her home and charged her with a criminal
offense in a deliberate attempt to jeopardize her bail bonding
business. As stated above, the search of Plaintiff’s home was
conducted pursuant to a facially valid search warrant issued by a
state court judge upon a showing of probable cause. Similarly,
Plaintiff Capri Lawson was indicted on two separate occasions by
the Grand Jury of Smith County, Tennessee (Docket Entry No. 85-5).
On their face, these two indictments appear to have been validly
issued by the grand jury. In the absence of any response by
Plaintiffs or other contrary evidence, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding

Plaintiff

Capri

Lawson’s

claim

of

intentional

interference with business relationships, and that Defendants are
entitled to judgment on this claims as a matter of law.
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge finds that the three motions for summary judgment filed by
16

Defendants in this case (Docket Entry Nos. 85, 88 and 100), should
be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment
be granted and the complaint dismissed.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any

party

has

14

days

from

receipt

of

this

Report

and

Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said
objections shall have 14 days from receipt of any objections filed
in this Report in which to file any responses to said objections.
Failure to file specific objections within 14 days of receipt of
this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further
appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 106 S.
Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), Reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
ENTER this 23rd day of December, 2015.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge

17