Brown v. CCA/Metro Davidson Co. Detention Facility et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/18/13. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(afs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

CHARLES R. BROWN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CCA/METRO DAVIDSON DETENTION
FACILITY, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:13-cv-00423
Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, an inmate at the CCA/Metro
Davidson Detention Facility in Nashville, Tennessee. He brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the CCA/Metro Davidson Detention Facility as well as Y. Berzmude, and Dr. f/n/u Pelmore,
alleging that the defendants failed to provide him with medical attention after a seizure. (Docket
No. 1).
I.

Prison Litigation Reform Act Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the courts are required to dismiss a

prisoner’s complaint if it is determined to be frivolous, malicious, or if it fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous and warrants
dismissal when the claims “lack[] an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989); see Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). Claims lack an arguable
basis in law or fact if they contain factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional, or if they are
based on legal theories that are indisputably meritless. Id. at 327-28; Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d
863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (6th Cir. 1990).
1

II.

Facts
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff suffered a seizure in his cell on June 24, 2012, while

incarcerated at the CCA/Metro Davidson Detention Facility, causing injuries to the plaintiff’s
tongue, head, and shoulder. According to the complaint, the plaintiff sought medical attention
almost immediately after the seizure. Corrections Officer Hagstorm called the medical department
(hereinafter “medical”) and told the plaintiff that he would have to wait on medical to return the call.
Officer Hagstorm checked on the plaintiff off and on while waiting for the return telephone call and
brought the plaintiff his lunch. While awaiting the call from medical, the plaintiff fell asleep.
When he awoke, Officer Hagstorm’s shift was over, and the officer who had replaced Hagstorm told
the plaintiff that he could not send the plaintiff to medical because the seizure did not occur during
his shift.
The next morning, Officer Hagstorm arrived and discovered that the plaintiff had not been
seen by the medical staff. At around 8:15 a.m., Officer Hagstorm called defendant Unit Manager
Y. Berzmude, who said he/she would be there shortly but Berzmude did not arrive until 3:05 p.m.
The plaintiff was upset and “in much pain.” Berzmude called medical, and the plaintiff was
permitted to go to medical but no one checked on him there. At around 9:45 p.m., a nurse brought
the plaintiff’s daily medications to him and asked him how he felt.
The following morning, Dr. Pelmore arrived at medical. She did not examine the plaintiff.
She asked what happened and, when she learned that the seizure had occurred more than twenty-four
(24) hours prior, she told the plaintiff that she was sending him back to his unit. The plaintiff never
received any medical attention for the seizure and the resulting injuries which, according to
complaint, still bother the plaintiff today. (Attachs. to Docket No. 1).

2

III.

Section 1983 Standard
The plaintiff alleges a claim under § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens
Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to
support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
IV.

Analysis
First, the plaintiff’s complaint names as a defendant the CCA/Metro Davidson Detention

Facility. However, the facility, like any other jail or workhouse, is not a “person” that can be sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991); Marbry v.
Correctional Med. Servs., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000). Thus, the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against CCA/Metro Davidson
Detention Facility.
Next, § 1983 complaints require that plaintiffs clearly specify whether they are suing
government-employed defendants in their official or individual capacity. Beil v. Lake Erie Corr.
Records Dep’t, 282 F. App’x 363, 367 (6th Cir. 2008). In his complaint, the plaintiff does not make
it clear whether he is suing defendants Berzmude and Pelmore in their individual or official
capacities. (Docket No. 1 at p. 4). Generally, if a plaintiff does not specify the capacity of his suit
against a defendant, official capacity is presumed unless the allegations of the complaint would
provide notice to a defendant of the plaintiff’s intent to sue him or her in an individual capacity.

3

Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193 (6th Cir. 1991)(citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593
(6th Cir. 1989)); Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 967-68 (6th Cir. 2002). When a defendant is
sued in his official capacity as an employee of the government, the lawsuit is directed against “the
entity for which the officer is an agent.” Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir.
1993).
Here, both defendant Berzmude and Pelmore are employees of the CCA/ Metro Davidson
Detention Facility, which is operated by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County. A claim of governmental liability requires a showing that the alleged misconduct is the
result of a policy, statement, regulation, decision or custom promulgated by the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County or its agent. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691. In
short, for the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County to be liable to the
plaintiff under § 1983, there must be a direct causal link between an official policy or custom and
the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
385 (1989).
Here, the plaintiff offers nothing to suggest that his rights were violated pursuant to a policy
or regulation of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. Consequently,
the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against defendants
Berzmude and Pelmore in their official capacities.
V.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the court finds that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state claims upon

which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to all named defendants. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. In the absence of an actionable claim, the court is obliged to dismiss the complaint sua

4

sponte. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

____________________________________
Kevin H. Sharp
United States District Judge

5