Moore v. Nashville TN Metro Government Police

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION. An appropriate order is filed herewith. Signed by District Judge Aleta A. Trauger on 5/21/13. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(tmw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

TAMARA L. MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, and
METRO POLICE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:13-cv-0446
Judge Trauger

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Tamara L. Moore, proceeding pro se, instituted this action by filing in this court a complaint
and amended complaint, the latter of which clarifies that the plaintiff intends to bring suit against the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro Nashville”) and the Metro Police. By
separate order, the court has granted the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Having granted the plaintiff’s application to proceed as a pauper, the court must conduct an initial
review of the complaint and dismiss it sua sponte, prior to service on the defendant, if it is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th
Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)). In reviewing the complaint, the
court must construe the pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, Boag v. McDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982),
and accept the plaintiff's allegations as true unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
In this case, the plaintiff’s statement of her claim contains no factual allegations and instead is vague
and conclusory. The plaintiff alleges, in full, as follows:
Arrest Report Wrongfully Miss stated!
Facts of Accident injury (covered up).
Was not Mentioned (head injury)! Medical
Treatment and Police Arrest Report
affected, endangering my Life and mental
well being etc.
(ECF No. 3, at 2.) The only defendants named in the complaint are Metro Nashville and the Metro Police.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The presumption is that a federal court lacks
jurisdiction in a particular case until it has been demonstrated that jurisdiction over the subject matter exists.
Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895). The facts showing the existence of jurisdiction
must be affirmatively alleged in the complaint. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189
(1936); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
The basic statutory grants of subject-matter jurisdiction for federal courts are contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, which provides for “federal question” jurisdiction, and 28 U .S.C. § 1332, which provides for “diversity
of citizenship” jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction requires that “the matter in controversy exceed[] the sum or
value of $75,000,” and that the opposing parties be citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although
the plaintiff seeks $20 million in damages, diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case because the
defendants are not citizens of a different state than the plaintiff.
Consequently, the complaint must on its face provide at least an arguable basis for federal-question
jurisdiction in order to survive the court’s screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A plaintiff properly invokes
federal-question jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the federal Constitution or laws.
28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded
complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on
the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)
(citing Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112–13 (1936)).
The court infers from the plaintiff’s cryptic statement of her claim that the plaintiff was arrested by
some member of the Metro Nashville Police Department and that the arrest report contained misstatements
or omissions, such as a failure to mention that the plaintiff had a head injury. It appears that the arrest may
have been in connection with an accident of some type, and the plaintiff may or may not have incurred the
head injury in this accident. The complaint implies that the failure to mention the plaintiff’s head injury in the
arrest report has affected her subsequent ability to obtain treatment for that injury. The plaintiff does not
identify the individuals involved in her arrest or responsible for the alleged misstatements; she does not invoke
any particular federal law or constitutional provision on which her claims are based, nor does she otherwise
identify the basis for this court’s exercise of jurisdiction over her claims. Construing the complaint very liberally,
the court will presume, based on the fact that the plaintiff names only government entities (Metro Nashville
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and the Metro Police) as defendants, that the plaintiff intends to bring suit for alleged violations of her federal
constitutional rights in connection with her arrest.
The vehicle through which a plaintiff may vindicate violations of her constitutional rights is through an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, not only that she was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, but also that the deprivation was
caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights,
not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A failure to identify a right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution that was violated will result in dismissal of the cause of action
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addition, claims against entities or individuals
who are not state actors and “persons” subject to suit under § 1983 must be dismissed.
The claim against “Metro Police” is subject to dismissal under this standard because the Metro
Nashville Police Department is a division of Metro Nashville, but is not itself a separate legal entity susceptible
to liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Boykin v. Van Buren Twp., 479 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
claim against township police department, which was subsumed within township itself for purposes of
establishing municipal liability); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he Sheriff’s
Department is not a legal entity subject to suit[.]” (citation omitted)). See also Mathes v. Metro. Gov’t of

Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:10-cv-0496, 2010 WL 3341889, at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010)
(collecting cases holding that police and sheriff’s departments are not entities subject to suit under § 1983).
A municipality like Metro Nashville, however, does qualify as a “person” who may be subject to liability
under § 1983. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Nonetheless, a
municipality cannot be held responsible for an alleged constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal
link between a policy or custom of the municipality or entity and the alleged constitutional violation. Id. at 691;
Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, to state a claim against a
municipality, a plaintiff must first articulate a constitutional violation and then “identify the policy, connect the
policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury [or constitutional violation] was incurred because of
the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 363–64 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
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Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of
Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The plaintiff here has not identified a constitutional violation, much
less shown how such a violation resulted from the existence and execution of a municipal policy.
In sum, the Court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim against either of the defendants named
in the complaint for which relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law. Because
the complaint, as amended, does not provide any other basis for the exercise of this court’s jurisdiction over
the plaintiff’s claims, this action is subject to dismissal in its entirety for failure to state a claim for which relief
may be granted. An appropriate order is filed herewith.

Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge

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