Pewitte v. Haycraft et al

Filing 41

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 14 First MOTION for Summary Judgment or to Dismiss. For the reasons stated above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendant's motion for dismissal and, in the alternative, summary judgment be DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 1/23/2014. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(hb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Saidrick Pewitte,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
Annette Haycraft, et al.
Defendant.

Cv. No.

3:13-cv-0484

JUDGE CAMPBELL/BRYANT

To: The Honorable Todd Campbell
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is on ref erral to th e undersigned for, inter alia, pretrial m anagement of the
case, including recommendation for ruling on any di spositive motions (Docket Entry (“DE”) 3).
Defendant Annette Haycraft (“Defendant”) has filed a motion for dismissal or, in the alternative,
for summary judgm ent. (DE 14) For the reas ons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that defendant’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment be DENIED.
Statement of the Case
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed the instant complaint
on May 20, 2013, alleging that def endant Annette Ha ycraft (“Haycraft”) violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and inhuman punishment.1 (DE 1) Pla intiff alleges that
his injuries are the re sult of Haycraft’s deliberate indifference in f orcing Plaintiff to wear
handcuffs that were too small for approximately 12 hours.2 (DE 1)
1

Plaintiff also asserts claims against a corrections officer Jones. However, the summons issued to Officer Jones
was returned unexecuted on July 2, 2013. (DE 18)

2

Ronnie J. Mc Coy, a prisone r from West Tennessee who accompanied Plaintiff to Bledsoe, claims that the
handcuffs were fastened around Plaintiff’s wrists at approximately 6:15 AM and that the prisoners arrived at
Morgan County, which sits in the Eastern Time Zone, at 6 PM local time.

Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an amount exceeding $50,000 as well
as injunctive relief in the treatment of prisoners during transport from facility to facility. (DE 1)
Haycraft moved the court for dismissal of Plain tiff’s complaint or, in the alte rnative, summary
judgment on July 2, 2013, asserting that Plain

tiff has failed to exhaust his adm

inistrative

remedies through the prison grievance system as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42
U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a), requires him to do.
Statement of the Facts
On May 1, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred

from the W est Tennessee State Prison in

Henning, Tennessee, to the Bledsoe County Corr

ectional Complex in Pikeville, Tennessee

(“Bledsoe”). (Com plaint, DE 1, p. 4.) Prior
handcuffs on Plaintiff, an individual tippi

to embarking at 7:00 AM, Haycraft placed

ng the scales at 400 pounds and suffering from

diabetes, for transport. (Com plaint, DE 1, p. 4. ) When Plaintiff complained, Haycraft replied
that Plaintiff would be okay an d neither loosened the handcuffs

nor investigated Plaintiff’s

complaints. (Complaint, DE 1, pp. 4, 6.)
Upon arriving at the Charles Ba ss Correctional Complex in Nashville, Tennessee, nearly
five hours later, Plaintiff com plained to defenda nt Jones, who, despite his attem pts, could not
loosen the handcuffs due to the swelling in Plaintiff’s wrists. (Complaint, DE 1, p. 5.) Plaintiff
was forced to wear thes e handcuffs until h e reached the Mo rgan County Correctional Com plex
(“Morgan County”) at approximately 6:00 PM. (Complaint, DE 1, p. 7.)
Plaintiff requested medical attention both at Morgan County and at Bledsoe upon arrival
there, and filed a grievance concerning the conduct of Ha

ycraft and Jones on May 3, 2013,

through the Bledsoe grievance pro cess. (Complaint, DE 1, pp. 3, 7.) Plaintiff has received no
response to his initial grievance.

Haycraft subm its that “[t]he prison grievance office has no

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record of [any] grievan ce” concerning Haycraft’s conduct; thus, she is en titled to dism issal of
Plaintiff’s claims or, in the

alternative, summary judgment.

(Affidavit of Sergeant April

Hubbard, DE 32, p. 2 ¶ 9; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, DE 14, p. 1.)
Legal Analysis

1. Dismissal
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6 ), dismissal is appropriate where, after accepting all of
Plaintiff’s allegations as true

and resolving all doubt s in Plaintiff’s fa vor, it appears that

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to “plausibly state a claim for relief.” Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC,
704 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 2013).
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Cons

titution protects prison inmates from

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Baker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 434 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). To

state a claim against prison

officials for conditions of confinement that violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison inmate must
allege “that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm.”

Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). A prison official’s

knowledge “of the risk may be demonstrated through circumstantial evidence and inference, and
‘a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that
the risk was obvious.’” Baker, 649 F.3d at 434 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.)
According to the com plaint, Plaintiff informed Haycraft that he was d iabetic, that the
handcuffs were too sm all, and th at the blood flow to Plainti ff’s hands was being im pacted.
However, despite these complaints, Haycraft ignored or refused his repeat ed requests to loosen
the handcuffs even though the

consequences of prolonged expos ure were readily apparent.

Further, Plaintiff alleges that he availed him self of the prison’s grievance process, but, just as
with his complaints to Haycraft, prison officials have ignored him.
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Accepting these facts as true, the Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a
claim to relief under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
2. Summary Judgment:
The PLRA provides that “a prisoner m ay not bring a federal action related to p rison
conditions ‘until such adm inistrative procedures as are availabl e are exhausted.’”

Surles v.

Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). However, a prisoner
is deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies where prison officials fail to respond to
a grievance or actively thwart and/or frustrate the grievance process. See Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 380 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004). Exhaustion

need not be pleaded, but, rather, is an

affirmative defense to suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007).
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no “genuine dispute as to any m aterial
fact and the movant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Miller v. City of Calhoun
County, 408 F.3d 803, 812-13 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A “genuine issue
of material fact” is one which, if proven, could adduce a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The burden
for establishing the absence of a factual dispute rests with the moving party. Id. at 249-50.
In deciding whether summary judgm ent is a ppropriate, the court m ust look beyond the
pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for a trial.” Sowards
v. Loudon County, 203 F.3d. 426 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000). In so doing,
the district court m ust “draw al l reasonable inferences in f avor of the nonm oving party” in its
analysis of the pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions. Sadie v. City of Cleveland, 718 F.3d
596, 599 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Matsushita Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986)).

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Normally, “[t]he moving party need not suppo rt its motion with evidence disproving the
non-moving party’s claim, but need only show that ‘there is an absence of evidence to support
the non-moving party’s case.’” Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir.
2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). Ho wever, as to exhaustion,
the moving party bears both the burd en of proof and of persuasion.

Surles, 678 F.3d at 455.

Thus, when exhaustion is raised as an affir mative defense as it is here, the m oving party bears a
heightened burden to submit evidence showing a lack of exhausti on that is “so pow erful that no
jury would be f ree to d isbelieve it.” Id. (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby Cty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d
1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). Haycraft has failed to meet this burden.
The basis of Haycraft’s motion for summ ary judgment is the statement of Sergeant April
Hubbard, the current sergeant over the Grievance Board, that “[t] he prison office has no record
of” Plaintiff’s grievance. (Affidavit of Apr il Hubbard, DE 32, pp. 1-2 ¶ 2, 9.) In a light m
favorable to Plaintiff, the weight of

ost

this s tatement pales in com parison to Plaintiff’s own

declaration and his “statem ent of disputed f acts,” which are supported by statem ents from the
former “grievance clerk” at Bledsoe and f our other inmates housed with Plaint iff. (DE 24, 25,
26, 30, 34-37)
George Haynie (“Haynie”), a prisoner and tr ained paralegal housed at Bledsoe, aided
Plaintiff in drafting two different

grievances. (Declar ation of Saidrick Pewitte (“Pla intiff’s

Dec.”), DE 25, p. 1 ¶ 6; Affidavit of George Haynie (“Hanie Aff.”), DE 30-1, p. 2 ¶ 9.) The first,
drafted on May 3, 2013, pertained to Plaintiff’s injuries sustained during his transfer to Bledsoe.
(Plaintiff’s Dec., DE 25, p. 1 ¶ 6; H aynie Aff., DE 30-1, p. 2 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff laboriously copied
the grievance onto a grievance form and depos

ited it in the grievance box, as required by

Bledsoe’s grievance process, during the evening of May 3, 2013. (Plaintiff’s Dec., DE 25, p. 1 ¶

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6; Haynie Aff., DE 30-1, p. 2 ¶¶ 10-12.) These cl aims are supported by the statem ents of three
other inmates. (Affidavit of Ronnie McCoy,

DE 37-1, p. 3 ¶¶ 15-16; Affidavit of Douglas

Bamberg, DE 35-1, p. 2 ¶¶ 10-11; Affidavit of Darron Rogers, DE 36-1, p. 2 ¶¶ 10-11.)
On May 6, 2013, Haynie drafted the second

grievance over the a ssessment of $5.00

against Plaintiff’s acco unt for the m edical treatment necessitated by the wounds Plaintiff
sustained during transport. (Plaintiff’s Dec., DE 25, p. 2 ¶ 8; Haynie Aff., DE 30-1, p. 3 ¶ 14;
Inmate Grievance, DE 23-1, p. 2.) As with his

first grievance, Plaintiff laboriously copied the

grievance drafted by Haynie onto a pre-printed grievance form and deposited it in the grievance
box during the evening of May 6, 2013. (Plaintiff’ s Dec., DE 25, p. 2 ¶ 10; Haynie Aff., DE 301, p. 3 ¶ 14-16.) This grievan ce was rej ected on May 9, 2013, by the Grievance Comm ittee
Chairperson, then Sergeant Fisher (“Fisher”), because it was inappropriate. (Plaintiff’s Dec., DE
25, p. 2 ¶ 12; Haynie A ff., DE 30-1, p. 3-4 ¶¶ 18.) Plaintiff appealed the rejection. (Plaintiff’s
Dec., DE 25, p. 3 ¶ 13; Haynie Aff., DE 4, ¶¶ 19-20; Inmate Grievance, DE 23-1, p. 2.)
According to Robert Johnston, the for

mer grievance clerk at Bl edsoe, Plaintiff’s

grievances were received by prison official s and were re ferred to th e Grievance Committee
Chairperson, Fisher.3 (Statement of Robert Johnston, DE 34, p. 1.) Subsequently, Fisher asked
Johnston to procure an extension of tim e to respond to Plaintiff so that his grievance could be
forwarded to West Tennessee for a “supervisor’s response.” (Statement of Robert Johnston, DE
34, p. 1.) Despite being received through the grieva nce process and Plaintiff’s consent to a time
extension, Fisher never entered Pl aintiff’s grievances into the pr ison’s computerized grievance
system.4 (Statement of Robert Johnston, DE 34, p. 1.)
3

A copy of Plaintiff’s grievance over the $5.00 assessment to his account for medical services bears Johnston’s
signature, is dated May 6, 2013, and confirms that Plaintiff appealed the decision on May 9th. (DE 23-1)

4

A grievance rejection form dated May 9, 2013 bears the electronic si gnature of Sg t. Edward Fisher as the
grievance Committee Chairperson. (DE 24-1) Fisher is now Lieutenant Fisher and Sgt. April Hubbard is now
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Conclusion
The Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to state a claim to relief
under the Eighth Am endment to the U.S. Constitution. Further, th e Magistrate Judge finds that
Haycraft’s proof of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust is not such that a “jury would be free t
disbelieve it,” Surles, 678 F.3d at 455-56, and that a genuine
regarding Plaintiff’s exhaustion of adm

o

issue of m aterial fact exists

inistrative remedies, rendering summ ary judgment

inappropriate.
Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, the undersig

ned Magistrate Judge recommends that

Defendant’s motion for dismissal and, in the alternative, summary judgment be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of this R&R to serve and
file written objections to the findings and r

ecommendation proposed herein. A party shall

respond to the objecting party’s objections to this

R&R within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy thereof. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt
of this R&R m ay constitute a waiver of further appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, reh’g
denied, 474 U.S. 111 (1986); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).
ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2014.

/s/ John S. Bryant________
John S. Bryant
States Magistrate Judge

United

the “Sergeant in charge of the Grievance Board.” (Statement of Robert Johnston, DE 24-1, p. 1; Affidavit of
April Hubbard, DE 32, p. 1 ¶ 2.) Because inm ates are not allowed access to the formal computerized system
for entering grievances, TOMIS, t his responsibility fell to Fisher as t he grievance Committee Chairperson.
(Statement of Robert Johnston, DE 24-1, p. 1.)

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