Vargas v. Trauger et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OF THE COURT. Signed by District Judge Kevin H. Sharp on 6/25/2013. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

ALVA N. VARGAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

ALETA A. TRAUGER, JULIET GRIFFIN,
JUDGE KENNEDY, JUDGE COLE,
JUDGE GILMAN, AND JUDGE ALICE M.
BATCHELDER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:13-cv-0600
Judge Sharp

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Alva Vargas, proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint for injunctive relief based on
alleged violations of the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Because the plaintiff
names as defendants six federal judges, the Court construes the complaint as arising under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The plaintiff having been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, her complaint is before the Court for an initial review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I.

Standard of Review
Under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must review any complaint filed in forma pauperis and dismiss it

sua sponte, prior to service on the defendants, if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In reviewing the complaint, the court must construe the pro se plaintiff’s complaint
liberally, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 389, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), and accept the plaintiff's allegations as true
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under [§ 1915(e)(2)] because the relevant statutory language tracks
the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-

pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
II.

Factual Allegations and Procedural History
The plaintiff asserts that “[t]his action is to secure Plaintiff’s Civil and Fourteenth Amendment

Rights that the Defendants, acting independently and consecutively, denied the Plaintiff in order to give
Defendant Dillard’s Inc., favor.” (ECF No. 1, at 4.)
The Court takes judicial notice that the plaintiff filed suit in 2007 against Dillard’s, asserting that
she had been subjected to employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Vargas v. Dillard’s Dep’t Store, No. 3:07-cv-0737 (M.D. Tenn. July 12, 2007) (Complaint).
Magistrate Judge Juliet Griffin issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment be granted and that the action be dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiff
submitted objections to the Report and Recommendation, but District Judge Aleta Trauger overruled the
objections and accepted and adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety, and therefore
dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her case, and the Sixth Circuit, in a panel
consisting of Judges Kennedy, Cole, and Gilman, affirmed the decision. The United States Supreme
Court subsequently denied the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari and her petition for rehearing. In September
2009, the plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court to reopen the case, which was denied on
October 15, 2009.
At some point in 2010, the plaintiff filed a “complaint for Judicial Misconduct” in the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 351, against Judges Trauger, Griffin, Kennedy, Cole, and
Gilman. The Honorable Alice Batchelder, in her capacity as Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, dismissed the complaint in April 2013.
The plaintiff asserts in her present complaint that the granting of the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment in Vargas v. Dillard’s Department Store was improper because the defendant was
never required “to submit to the court any merits or material evidence whatsoever and the court denied
Plaintiff’s relevant material evidence, witness notarized testimony, and a timely written request for a trial.”
(ECF No. 1, at 5.) The plaintiff also alleges that the district court’s docket was falsified insofar as it falsely
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states that she never demanded a jury. She also complains that she never received notice of the denial of
her motion for recusal.1 The claims against Judges Griffin, Trauger, Kennedy, Cole, and Gilman are
based upon their respective rulings in favor of the defendant, allegedly in violation of the plaintiff’s due
process rights. The plaintiff’s claim against Chief Judge Batchelder is apparently based upon the denial of
the plaintiff’s administrative complaint for judicial misconduct, and the fact that the review of her complaint
was not “expeditious” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 352(a).
The plaintiff insists that the defendants’ “determined, pervasive, relentless, and unlawful rulings”
have violated the plaintiff’s protected due process rights and civil rights, and that “[d]enial of Injunctive
Relief will allow the Defendants to continue their abuse of judicial discretion, unconstitutional rulings, and
favor, denying unsuspecting Citizens, like the Plaintiff, justice and relief.” (ECF No. 1, at 7.)
III.

Discussion
A.

The Claims Against Judges Griffin, Trauger, Kennedy, Cole, and Gilman

Although the plaintiff does not identify the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over her claims, the
vehicle through which a plaintiff may vindicate violations of her constitutional rights against federal
officials acting under color of federal law is an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
It is well settled that state and federal judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for
any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–
12 (1991); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511–13 (1978); Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1440 (6th
Cir. 1997). “[J]udicial immunity is necessary because ‘principled and fearless decision-making” will be
compromised if a judge ‘fear[s] that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or
corruption.’” Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 465, 488–89 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
Absolute judicial immunity applies to all judges and other persons engaged in a judicial function,

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The docket reflects that the plaintiff’s motion for Judges Trauger and Griffin to recuse
themselves, filed after the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari and after Judge
Trauger denied the motion to reopen, was denied as moot since dismissal of the case had been affirmed
and the case was closed. Vargas v. Dillard’s Dep’t Store, No. 3:07-cv-0737 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 15, 2009)
(Order denying motion for recusal).
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which is defined as the “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of
authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (1991). The doctrine affords
absolute immunity from damage suits for judicial acts, unless such acts are done in the “clear absence of
all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority;
rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”
(citation omitted)).
Here, all of the plaintiff’s claims stem from judicial decisions made while the judge defendants
were lawfully presiding over a case properly before them. “There is no evidence proffered, nor plausible
claim suggesting, that [any judge] was without jurisdiction to decide the matters or that they acted outside
their judicial capacity.” Vasile, 20 F.Supp.2d at 489. Accordingly, they are all entitled to absolute immunity
from suit, and dismissal of the claims against them on that basis.
The fact that the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief only, rather than damages, does not affect the
defendants’ entitlement to immunity. In the Sixth Circuit, absolute immunity in a Bivens actions against
federal judges extends to requests for injunctive and other forms of equitable relief. Kipen v. Lawson, 57
F. App’x 691, 691 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Newsome v. Merz, 17 F. App’x 343, 345 (6th Cir. 2001)
(finding that a plaintiff who sued a magistrate judge whose rulings allegedly favored the opposing parties
in the plaintiff’s prior lawsuits “had no claim for injunctive relief . . . because he did not demonstrate an
inadequate remedy at law or a serious risk of irreparable harm,” and also holding that “federal judges are
immune from Bivens suits for equitable relief”). Cf. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he doctrine of absolute judicial immunity serves to protect federal judges from injunctive relief as well
as money damages.”); Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1392–93
(9th Cir. 1987) (noting that to allow injunctive relief against federal judges would be to permit a “horizontal
appeal” from one district court to another or even “reverse review” of a ruling of the court of appeals by a
district court)).
The claims against Judges Griffin, Trauger, Kennedy, Cole, and Gilman will be dismissed on the
basis that these federal judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit, whether for damages or
equitable relief.
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B.

The Claims Against Chief Judge Batchelder
Chief Judge Batchelder was not involved in the plaintiff’s earlier lawsuit in a judicial capacity, and

it is unclear whether absolute immunity applies to the plaintiff’s claim against her. Chief Judge Batchelder
is named in this suit because, in her capacity as Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, she
denied the plaintiff’s judicial-misconduct complaint against the other defendants, submitted under 28
U.S.C. § 351(a). The plaintiff complains that Judge Batchelder’s denial of her administrative complaint,
issued three years after the complaint itself was lodged, was not issued “expediently” in compliance with
28 U.S.C. § 352. She also asserts that Judge Batchelder “disregarded all evidence and judicial violations,
in collaboration with District Judge Aleta Trauger, Magistrate Judge Juliet Griffin, and Six[th] Circuit Court
of Appeals Judges Kennedy, Cole, and Gilman to give them favor and to give Defendant in Vargas v.
Dillard’s, Inc. favor.” (ECF No. 1, at 6.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) “[a]ny person alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts . . . may file with the clerk of
the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint containing a brief statement of the facts constituting
such conduct.” Upon receipt of such complaint, the clerk is to transmit it to the chief judge of the circuit.
Id. § 351(c). The chief judge is to “expeditiously review” any such complaint, id. § 352(a), and, after such
expeditious review, may dismiss the complaint if she finds, for instance, that it is “directly related to the
merits of a decision or procedural ruling.” Id. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii).
“A complainant . . . aggrieved by a final order of the chief judge . . . may petition the judicial
council of the circuit for review thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 352(c). From there, the complainant may then
petition the Judicial Conference of the United States for review of any action taken by the judicial council.
28 U.S.C. § 357(a). Otherwise, however, “all orders and determinations . . . shall be final and conclusive
and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” Id. § 357(c).
The plaintiff does not state whether she followed the appropriate process for seeking review of
Chief Judge Batchelder’s decision. Regardless, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order reversing Chief
Judge Batchelder’s decision or enjoining her to rule differently, this Court clearly lacks jurisdiction to grant
such relief. Id.
It is not clear what other relief the plaintiff might seek from Chief Judge Batchelder, and her claim
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is subject to dismissal on that basis alone. Moreover, regardless of what relief she might seek, the plaintiff
fails to state a colorable Bivens claim against the chief judge. The only actual fact offered in support of
her claim for constitutional violations is that the review of the plaintiff’s administrative complaint was not
“expeditious.” The chief judge’s alleged failure to conduct an “expeditious” review of the plaintiff’s
administrative complaint, standing alone, does not constitute a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. The plaintiff’s wholly conclusory and speculative statements that Chief Judge Batchelder abused
her discretion and refused to acknowledge the other judges’ “unconstitutional rulings” are not factual
allegations and do not support the plaintiff’s claims. The Court therefore finds that, even assuming
absolute judicial immunity does not apply, the plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted
against Chief Judge Batchelder.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the complaint will be dismissed in its entirety. An appropriate

order is filed herewith.

Kevin H. Sharp
United States District Judge

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